cija123 wrote: ↑24/10/2024 15:49
Styling wrote: ↑24/10/2024 15:17
U
svakoj drzavi u kojoj to ustav i zakon dozvoljavaju vladajuca stranka postavlja svoje ljude kao direktore javnih preduzeca i na sve pozicije na koje se ljudi imenuju a ne zaposljavaju.
De molim te, daj mi samo jedan primjer ovakvih postavljenja u EU, naravno nemoj mi sad reći Srbija, CG....
Je li ti stvarno misliš da vladajuća koalicija u At, Sloveniji, postavlja svoje odane kadrove u javna preduzeća, a da za to nemaju potrebno znanje, kvalifikacije, iskustvo, menadžerske sposobnosti...
Ja stvarno ne mogu da vjerujem da neko ovako piše. Imaš li nekog svog da živi u EU, pitaj, guglaj, čitaj wikipediju, pitaj chat GPT...ima načina, samo treba te ružičaste, trobojne naočale skinuti i suočiti se s realnošću.
Za sve drske i neobrazovane koji se prave pametni
Hajde se sada poklopi ušima
I svi ostali pametnjakovići sa teme
SOE je skraćenica za State Owned Enterprise
Sažetak praksi imenovanja u državama OECD, Evropske organizacije za saradnju i razvoj:
Political influence
The main characteristics of the nomination process according to the
different models of organisation of the ownership function are the following:
● In the centralised model of state ownership, the ownership entity is often fully
in charge of the nomination of SOE boards, both of state representatives if any
and of other “independent” members. In this case, state representatives are
not numerous, usually one or two if any, and are usually drawn from the
ownership entity itself.
● In other models, dual or decentralised, state representatives are often
nominated by the sector ministers concerned. But they usually have to be
cleared by the Cabinet before a final decision and are in cases nominated by
decree, at the Prime Minister or Ministerial level. It is often a collective decision
involving both the sector minister and the government and sometimes
accompanied by a complex round of negotiations amongst the different state
organs concerned. This is the case in Australia (cf. Box 6.2) where the GBPFAU
has an informal role in providing advice to the Minister on possible board
candidates.
● In the dual model, the centralising entity is often in charge of nominating
non state representatives.
Political influence in the nomination process is strong in a number of
OECD countries, but the process can and often degenerates into a situation
characterised as “political interference”. The political interference goes either
through the nomination process itself, involving a complex political negotiation
among different government organs, or through direct nomination of political
appointees. This is often identified as a main weakness of SOE governance, as “too
often, SOE boards are populated with people chosen for their political allegiance rather
than business acumen”:7
● In a number of cases there is a direct political dimension to the nomination
with the direct involvement of the Council of Ministries or even the President,
such as in France for Chairmen and CEOs of some large SOEs.
● Sometimes SOE boards will even be overstaffed with political appointees.
In Finland, for example, the “relative support of Parliamentary parties has
become the core criteria for the composition of Supervisory Boards” of SOEs, as
“the state (…) adopted in the early 1990’s the principle that the Parliamentary
factions of parties represented in Parliament appoint their representatives to the
Supervisory Boards of state-owned companies”.8
● In the most extreme cases, even the nomination of non-state
representatives will result from bargaining among ministries concerned,
possibly involving specific committees or organs.
● On the contrary, some countries, such as Norway, have explicitly excluded
the participation of members of the Parliament, Ministers or State
Secretaries on the boards of SOEs. This is also the case in Germany, except
regarding State Secretaries who can be appointed in SOE boards if they are
not members of the Parliament.
UK Code of Practice for Ministerial appointments
The Code of Practice’s Principles
1. Ministerial Responsibility: The ultimate responsibility for appointments
rests with Ministers.
2. Merit: All public appointments should be governed by the overriding principle
of selection based on merit, by the well informed choice of individuals who,
through their abilities, experience and qualities, match the needs of the public
body in question.
3. Independent klix: No appointment shall take place without first
being scrutinised by a panel which must include an Independent Assessor.
4. Equal Opportunities: Departments should sustain programs to promote
and deliver equal opportunities principles.
5. Probity: Board members must be committed to the principles and values of
public service and perform their duties with integrity.
6. Openness and Transparency: The principles of “open government” must
be applied to the appointments process, its workings must be transparent
and information must be provided about appointments made.
7. Proportionality: The appointments procedures need to be subject to the
principle of “proportionality”. That is they should be appropriate for the
nature of the post and the size and weight of its responsibilities.
izvor:
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver ... 038839FC18
- nooooooooot 
nekada smo, ovdje na forumu, krv pili SDA-ovcima kada su ovo radili, a danas ovakve stvari više od pola forumaša brani ko svoj život...i onda se kao ibrete što sve propada