Jemen

[Co0l]

Nisu oni ni stoti dio svoje vojne sile upotrijebili u Jemenu a nit imaju potrebu.

[Fantassin]

Nisu oni ni stoti dio svoje vojne sile upotrijebili u Jemenu a nit imaju potrebu.

Vojna sila nije samo u tehnici ... ista je samo sredstvo vojnika od kojeg zavisi upotreba iste... koliko je on profesionalan,motiviran,disciplinovan,hrabar i obucen... ukoliko manjkaju neke od tih vrlina i znanja... tehnika ne znaci mnogo.

[Co0l]

Nisu oni ni stoti dio svoje vojne sile upotrijebili u Jemenu a nit imaju potrebu.

Vojna sila nije samo u tehnici ... ista je samo sredstvo vojnika od kojeg zavisi upotreba iste... koliko je on profesionalan,motiviran,disciplinovan,hrabar i obucen... ukoliko manjkaju neke od tih vrlina i znanja... tehnika ne znaci mnogo.

Ejs.

[Fantassin]

Nisu oni ni stoti dio svoje vojne sile upotrijebili u Jemenu a nit imaju potrebu.

Vojna sila nije samo u tehnici ... ista je samo sredstvo vojnika od kojeg zavisi upotreba iste... koliko je on profesionalan,motiviran,disciplinovan,hrabar i obucen... ukoliko manjkaju neke od tih vrlina i znanja... tehnika ne znaci mnogo.

Ejs.

Ejs ... ocito da se slazes sa time nebi pisao o Saudijskoj vojsci i njihovoj vojnoj sili kao o necemu mnogo uticajnom u regiji...

[Co0l]

Vojna sila nije samo u tehnici ... ista je samo sredstvo vojnika od kojeg zavisi upotreba iste... koliko je on profesionalan,motiviran,disciplinovan,hrabar i obucen... ukoliko manjkaju neke od tih vrlina i znanja... tehnika ne znaci mnogo.

Ejs.

Ejs ... ocito da se slazes sa time nebi pisao o Saudijskoj vojsci i njihovoj vojnoj sili kao o necemu mnogo uticajnom u regiji...

Naravno da se slazem sa tim jer pises o toploj vodi i mislis da si je ti izmislio.Ali isto tako stojim i iza onoga sto sam napisao da nisu ni stoti dio onoga sto imaju upotrijebili u Jemenu.A pod tim ne mislim samo na tehniku,kao sto si pogresno zakljucio.

[Sanjarko]

Prognoza data

http://forum.klix.ba/jemen-t129727s250.html

Da ce Dobit KSA po nosu

[Co0l]

[Sanjarko]

[Gojeni H]

Nego, da osvjetlmo neke personalne promjene unutar Dvora koje se itekako reflektuju na dešavanja... Naime, poslije smrti kralja Abdullaha, kralj postaje Selman. On vrši kadrovsku sječu i na čelne pozicije stavlja ljude bliske sebi. Mislim da je ovo najznačajnije ime: Muhamed bin Salman, Salmanov sin iz trećeg braka rođen - pazite ovo - 1985 godine. Po obrazovanju pravnik. On sada vrši više vrlo bitnih funkcija a najznačajnija je - ministar odbrane. Njegov (i Salmanov pristup) je sušta suprotnost opreznoj politici prethodnika: sa Turskom je "odradio" Idlib, a igra ofanzivno protiv Jemena sa željom da uguši nemire u saudijskom podrumu i stekne reputaciju kako unutar Kuće tako među Arapima.



Mlad, obrazovan, vrijedan, ambiciozan, tvrde - harizmatičan. Mislim da uz Selmana ima najviše vlasti u svojim rukama.

Vrijeme potvrđuje ovu tezu a nije mali broj autora koji ovaj rat nazvaju ratom Muhameda bin Selmana. Primjer:

Saudi Arabia's 29-year-old defense minister, Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has staked his and his country's future on achieving some kind of clear-cut victory in the kingdom's war in Yemen. UN talks that leave Sanaa under the control of what the Saudis claim is an illegal Iranian-backed rebel regime are clearly not a decisive victory for the royals.

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/origina ... z3b5lC0KFd

Međutim, ovaj rat je pokazao sve limite saudjske vojne sile u koju se na godišnjoj ravni ulaže 10 puta više nego što ulaže jedan Iran. KSA izdvaja procentualno (više od 10% BDP-a) najviše sredstava za vojni budžet na svijetu.

The political rise of Mohammed Bin Salman Bin Abdelaziz Al-Saud (MBS) has been exceptionally swift, propelled by his close relationship with his father, King Salman. He had already been gaining in power and influence before his father’s accession, particularly at the defence ministry, where he had no formal role but considerable influence; once his father became king, he not only took over the ministry, but was named chief of the Royal Court, president of the Council of Economic and Development Affairs, special adviser to the king, and member of the Council of Political and Security Affairs.
To those he now adds deputy crown prince, second deputy premier, and president of the Supreme Council for Aramco; to counterbalance his gains, he is no longer chief of the Royal Court, though he will hardly want for access to his father. MBS is still very young.

He is generally thought to be in his early to mid-30s, though some say late 20s (the unusual absence of a birth date on his official biographies suggest he may not want the extent of his youth to be known). He is the eldest son of Salman’s second wife, Fahda Bint Falah Al-Hithlain; the Hithlain were supporters of the Al-Saud in the 20th century and married extensively into the family.
Married to Reema, a daughter of his uncle Mashour Bin Abdelaziz, since 2008, he has several full brothers and sisters, though none are prominent; the best known is Turki Bin Salman, formerly chairman of the Saudi Research and Marketing Group, which publishes Asharq Al-Awsat. King Salman’s other high-profile sons – Abdelaziz (deputy minister of oil), Sultan (chairman of the Saudi Commission for Tourism and Antiquities) and Faisal (governor of Medina) – were all born to a different mother, Sultana Al-Sudairi, who died in 2011.

MBS is seen as energetic, effective and willing to stand up to his father, though several sources have questioned his lack of education and integrity. His ambition is becoming increasingly clear, and his willingness to be seen as responsible for launching airstrikes on Yemen suggest a man of action rather than diplomacy.
Unlike Mohammed Bin Nayef, he has not yet built himself international networks, and it will be interesting to see if he attempts to do so now that he is second in line to the throne.

MBS, who like many of the younger princes has a lot of business interests, was secretary-general of the Riyadh Competitiveness Centre from around 2010, when his father was still governor of the province, and even then was actively seeking a more public profile. He was a special adviser to his father while the latter was governor and, in March 2013, by which time Salman was crown prince, he was named head of the Crown Prince’s Court and
special adviser (filling the position vacated when Prince Saud Bin Nayef became governor of Eastern Province). In April 2014, he was named a state minister and member of the cabinet. Despite not having a formal role at the defence ministry, there were rumours about his involvement in the removal of at least two deputy defence ministers.

[dječak sa šibicama]

Ali pazi kako je ovim "borcima za demokratska prava u Siriji" krivo sto totalitarna i nedemokratska Saudi Arabija dobija po nosu od Hutista

[sumirprimus]

Ali pazi kako je ovim "borcima za demokratska prava u Siriji" krivo sto totalitarna i nedemokratska Saudi Arabija dobija po nosu od Hutista

zestoko su dobili,da nece sebi doci 2 minuta.
u medjuvremenu ce ih jos vise bacat natrag u kameno doba...
al nije poenta u vracanju jemena u kameno doba,nije poenta u stradanju civila...

[Gojeni H]

Da bi se ozbiljno naskodilo Saudima, mora da se urusi sistem koji hrani sve one koji od ove vladavine imaju koristi.
Dakle, nekoliko stotina princeva, plemena koja su okosnica nacionalne garde, ljudi van Saudije koji imaju interese u Aramku, te namjenska industrija nekoliko zemalja kojima su Saudi najbolje musterije.

Namjerno sam izostavio jos par "interesdzija". Predugo bi trajalo, a ne pise mi se.

[walter kurtz]

zestoko su dobili,da nece sebi doci 2 minuta.
u medjuvremenu ce ih jos vise bacat natrag u kameno doba...
al nije poenta u vracanju jemena u kameno doba,nije poenta u stradanju civila...

Houthi su i prije udara zivjeli u kamenom dobu a cisto sumnjam da ih sve mogu pobiti iz zraka ko god da se iskrca u jemen dobiti ce po p...i kopnena intervencija je neminovna a tu cemo da vidimo odnos snaga morala.....

[Challenger__]

Odličan tekst, hvala Gojeni.

[Truba]

kad ameri bombarduju afganistan i talibane = neće moći pobijediti jer talibani žive u kamenom dobu
kad saudi bombardiraju hutije koji isto tako žive u kamenom dobu = pobjeda je blizO

[japin_mutapi]

kad ameri bombarduju afganistan i talibane = neće moći pobijediti jer talibani žive u kamenom dobu
kad saudi bombardiraju hutije koji isto tako žive u kamenom dobu = pobjeda je blizO

huti nisu talibani
razlika je drastična

[sumirprimus]

kad ameri bombarduju afganistan i talibane = neće moći pobijediti jer talibani žive u kamenom dobu
kad saudi bombardiraju hutije koji isto tako žive u kamenom dobu = pobjeda je blizO

Pa pregazili su ih nisu ni usli u afg....
pregazili,su i sadama....pregazili su i alkaidu....
Lokalci gube ha ostanu nasamo....plemena....

[Gojeni H]

Odličan tekst, hvala Gojeni.

It was received wisdom that King Salman Bin Abdelaziz Al-Saud and the increasingly tight Sudairi circle of power which surrounds him would one day seek to replace his half-brother Prince Miqrin as heir to the throne. While generally seen as benign, Miqrin has been isolated within the Al-Saud since King Abdullah’s death, and in recent months had already found himself sidelined.Yet the speed at which the manoeuvre was executed was a surprise.

On 29 April, in a sweeping string of decrees which has become something of a modus operandi for the new king, Salman announced that Miqrin was out as crown prince, and his nephew Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef (MBN) in. Miqrin’s demise not only confirmed MBN as the first king-in-waiting of the next generation, it also made it possible for the king to accelerate the dizzying rise of his favourite son, Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS), who just four months ago had never had a formal role in government, and now finds himself deputy crown prince, second deputy prime minister, minister of defence, president of the Council of Economic and Development Affairs (CEDA), and head of a new Supreme Council for Saudi Aramco.

To a large extent, the changes to the order of succession confirm something that had already taken place, officially establishing the triumvirate which has brought back power firmly into Sudairi hands. Taken as a whole, the series of decrees not only formalises the dominance of the branch of the family descended from the marriage of Ibn Saud and Hessa Bint Ahmed Al-Sudairi, it also seals the rise of the younger generation, which, directed by MBN and MBS, will seek to inject efficiency and decisiveness into a kingdom which in the late reign of Abdullah was plagued by a sense of drift.

[Maystor]

Nisu oni ni stoti dio svoje vojne sile upotrijebili u Jemenu a nit imaju potrebu.

cool posvađan sa činjenicama, kao i obično.
Upotrijebili su gotovo kompletnu avijaciju, a na kopnenu operaciju se nisu odlučili (i neće, po mom mišljenju) jer su svjesni da taj rat ne mogu dobiti.
Čak i površan pogled na elementarne činjenice to pokazuje. Ma može i wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_Arab ... n_in_Yemen

"Result
Ongoing
Saudi-led coalition claimed to have achieved its military goals,
Saudi failure to destroy the Houthi rebels and halt their advance,
Saudi failure to restore the government of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi,
Saudi-led coalition announced an end to the airstrike campaign and the beginning of an operation aimed at a political solution,
however, air-strikes and naval blockade continue.
Saudi Arabia proposes a 5-day ceasefire, days after its southern regions were raided and attacked by the Houthi rebels."

[Gojeni H]

Saudi Council of Ministers

Crown Prince, Deputy Premier, Minister of Interior and
President of the Council of Political and Security Affairs: Prince
Mohammed Bin Nayef Bin Abdelaziz Al-Saud ◆

Deputy Crown Prince, Second Deputy Premier, Minister of
Defence and President of the Council of Economic and
Development Affairs: Prince Mohammed Bin Salman Bin Abdelaziz
Al-Saud ◆

National Guard: Prince Miteb Bin Abdullah Bin Abdelaziz Al-Saud

Foreign Affairs: Adel Bin Ahmed Al-Jubeir *

Petroleum and Mineral Resources: Ali Al-Naimi

Finance: Ibrahim Al-Assaf

Agriculture: Abdulrahman Bin Abdulmohsen Al-Fadhli

Civil Service: Khalid Bin Abdullah Al-Araj

Commerce and Industry: Tawfiq Bin Fawzan Al-Rabiah

Communications and Information Technology: Mohammed Bin
Ibrahim Al-Suwaiyel

Culture and Information: Adel Bin Zaid Al-Turaifi

Economy and Planning: Adel Bin Mohammed Bin Abdulqadir
Faqih ◆

Education: Azzam Bin Mohammed Al-Dakhil

Hajj: Bandar Bin Mohammed Hajjar

Health: Khalid Bin Abdelaziz Al-Falih

Housing: Essam Bin Saad Bin Said

Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Call and Guidance: Sheikh Saleh Bin
Abdelaziz Bin Mohammed Bin Ibrahim Al Al-Sheikh

Justice: Walid Bin Mohammed Bin Saleh Al-Samaani

Labour: Mufrej Bin Saad Al-Haqbani *

Municipal and Rural Affairs: Abdullatif Bin Abdulmalik Bin Omar
Al Al-Sheikh

Social Affairs: Majid Bin Abdullah Al-Qusaibi

Transport: Abdullah Bin Abdulrahman Al-Muqbil

Water and Electricity: Abdullah Bin Abdulrahman Al-Husayy

[sumirprimus]

Sta je kod njih agencjja, zamjenika i sekretara i sofera....valja sve one familije zadovoljit...bog te...

[Gojeni H]

Vanjski poslovi

The new minister of foreign affairs is Adel Bin Ahmed Al-Jubeir, who has been ambassador to the United States since January 2007. It is rare to see the foreign ministry in the hands of someone from outside the Al-Saud: Prince Saud’s father, Faisal Bin Abdelaziz, ran it from its establishment in 1930 until 1960, and again from 1962 to 1975 (retaining the portfolio when he was king), and Prince Saud took it over on his death; the only other non-royal to serve as minister was Ibrahim Bin Abdullah Al-Suwaiyel, who was in charge between Faisal’s two terms.

He was charged with announcing the start of Operation Decisive Storm, and has held a number of press conferences since, as part of what appear to be wider efforts by the Salman administration to be more proactive in controlling the way it is presented, at home and abroad.

His appointment – in conjunction with Salman’s dynastic rearrangements – has also been seen as a sign that Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Iran could become even more antagonistic. Mohammed Bin Salman’s aggressive approach to the Houthis in Yemen is an obvious factor, but Jubeir’s personal experiences may be another. In 2011, it emerged he had been the target of an assassination plot which the US attorney-general said had been directed by elements of the Iranian government, specifically senior members of the Quds force. US officials described a bizarre scheme – apparently thwarted by an undercover agent – in which an Iranian-American used car salesman from Texas, Mansour Arbabsiar, was accused of trying to recruit a Mexican drug cartel to bomb a restaurant in Washington where Jubeir dined. Arbabsiar was given a 25-year jail sentence in 2013.

[Gojeni H]

Sta je kod njih agencjja, zamjenika i sekretara i sofera....valja sve one familije zadovoljit...bog te...

Svaka grabljivica ima svoj dio plijena. Inace, nastaje medjusobno klanje. Tako se kupuje socijalni mir u zemljama Zaliva.

[Challenger__]

Saudi Council of Ministers

Crown Prince, Deputy Premier, Minister of Interior and
President of the Council of Political and Security Affairs: Prince
Mohammed Bin Nayef Bin Abdelaziz Al-Saud ◆

Deputy Crown Prince, Second Deputy Premier, Minister of
Defence and President of the Council of Economic and
Development Affairs: Prince Mohammed Bin Salman Bin Abdelaziz
Al-Saud ◆

National Guard: Prince Miteb Bin Abdullah Bin Abdelaziz Al-Saud

Foreign Affairs: Adel Bin Ahmed Al-Jubeir *

Petroleum and Mineral Resources: Ali Al-Naimi

Finance: Ibrahim Al-Assaf

Agriculture: Abdulrahman Bin Abdulmohsen Al-Fadhli

Civil Service: Khalid Bin Abdullah Al-Araj

Commerce and Industry: Tawfiq Bin Fawzan Al-Rabiah

Communications and Information Technology: Mohammed Bin
Ibrahim Al-Suwaiyel

Culture and Information: Adel Bin Zaid Al-Turaifi

Economy and Planning: Adel Bin Mohammed Bin Abdulqadir
Faqih ◆

Education: Azzam Bin Mohammed Al-Dakhil

Hajj: Bandar Bin Mohammed Hajjar

Health: Khalid Bin Abdelaziz Al-Falih

Housing: Essam Bin Saad Bin Said

Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Call and Guidance: Sheikh Saleh Bin
Abdelaziz Bin Mohammed Bin Ibrahim Al Al-Sheikh

Justice: Walid Bin Mohammed Bin Saleh Al-Samaani

Labour: Mufrej Bin Saad Al-Haqbani *

Municipal and Rural Affairs: Abdullatif Bin Abdulmalik Bin Omar
Al Al-Sheikh

Social Affairs: Majid Bin Abdullah Al-Qusaibi

Transport: Abdullah Bin Abdulrahman Al-Muqbil

Water and Electricity: Abdullah Bin Abdulrahman Al-Husayy

Od Selmanove kadrovske sječe se stiču barem dva utiska. Nesporan: Muhamed mu je glavni oslonac u unutrašnjoj strukturi moći. Špekulativni: Uprkos činjenici da je drugi u novouspostavljenom nasljednom lancu Selman ide da progura Muhameda (prvi je bolestan, a može postati "još bolesniji", ha,ha). Međutim, jedno su planovi a drugo stvarnost. U stvarnosti su mnogi iz Kuće Sauda nezadovoljni, a nekolicina su u kućnom pritvoru. Ukoliko intervencija u Jemenu ne da očekivane rezultate (a ne daje za sada), mogle bi po Rijadu letiti glave. Ako uspije (u šta sumnjam), eto Muhameda kao novog suverena sa velikim ambicijama .

[Gojeni H]

Od Selmanove kadrovske sječe se stiču barem dva utiska. Nesporan: Muhamed mu je glavni oslonac u unutrašnjoj strukturi moći. Špekulativni: Uprkos činjenici da je drugi u novouspostavljenom nasljednom lancu Selman ide da progura Muhameda (prvi je bolestan, a može postati "još bolesniji", ha,ha). Međutim, jedno su planovi a drugo stvarnost. U stvarnosti su mnogi iz Kuće Sauda nezadovoljni, a nekolicina su u kućnom pritvoru. Ukoliko intervencija u Jemenu ne da očekivane rezultate (a ne daje za sada), mogle bi po Rijadu letiti glave. Ako uspije (u šta sumnjam), eto Muhameda kao novog suverena sa velikim ambicijama .

Uvijek je najbitnije ko drzi Nacionalnu gardu i Aramco. Uvijek se tu postavljaju najodaniji ljudi.

Slazem se, definitivno mnogo nezadovoljnih jakih ljudi u kuci Saud i lojalistickim klanovima.
Lojalisticki klanovi i mutave su ih doveli na vlast ... oni ce ih i skinuti jednog dana. Ne uskoro ... ali nikad se ne zna.