Challenger__ wrote:Challenger__ wrote:Nego, da osvjetlmo neke personalne promjene unutar Dvora koje se itekako reflektuju na dešavanja... Naime, poslije smrti kralja Abdullaha, kralj postaje Selman. On vrši kadrovsku sječu i na čelne pozicije stavlja ljude bliske sebi. Mislim da je ovo najznačajnije ime:
Muhamed bin Salman, Salmanov sin iz trećeg braka rođen - pazite ovo - 1985 godine. Po obrazovanju pravnik. On sada vrši više vrlo bitnih funkcija a najznačajnija je - ministar odbrane. Njegov (i Salmanov pristup) je sušta suprotnost opreznoj politici prethodnika: sa Turskom je "odradio" Idlib, a igra ofanzivno protiv Jemena sa željom da uguši nemire u saudijskom podrumu i stekne reputaciju kako unutar Kuće tako među Arapima.
Mlad, obrazovan, vrijedan, ambiciozan, tvrde - harizmatičan. Mislim da uz Selmana ima najviše vlasti u svojim rukama.
Vrijeme potvrđuje ovu tezu a nije mali broj autora koji ovaj rat nazvaju ratom Muhameda bin Selmana. Primjer:
Saudi Arabia's 29-year-old defense minister, Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has staked his and his country's future on achieving some kind of clear-cut victory in the kingdom's war in Yemen. UN talks that leave Sanaa under the control of what the Saudis claim is an illegal Iranian-backed rebel regime are clearly not a decisive victory for the royals.
Read more:
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/origina ... z3b5lC0KFd
Međutim, ovaj rat je pokazao sve limite saudjske vojne sile u koju se na godišnjoj ravni ulaže 10 puta više nego što ulaže jedan Iran. KSA izdvaja procentualno (više od 10% BDP-a) najviše sredstava za vojni budžet na svijetu.
The political rise of Mohammed Bin Salman Bin Abdelaziz Al-Saud (MBS) has been exceptionally swift, propelled by his close relationship with his father, King Salman. He had already been gaining in power and influence before his father’s accession, particularly at the defence ministry, where he had no formal role but considerable influence; once his father became king, he not only took over the ministry, but was named chief of the Royal Court, president of the Council of Economic and Development Affairs, special adviser to the king, and member of the Council of Political and Security Affairs.
To those he now adds deputy crown prince, second deputy premier, and president of the Supreme Council for Aramco; to counterbalance his gains, he is no longer chief of the Royal Court, though he will hardly want for access to his father. MBS is still very young.
He is generally thought to be in his early to mid-30s, though some say late 20s (the unusual absence of a birth date on his official biographies suggest he may not want the extent of his youth to be known). He is the eldest son of Salman’s second wife, Fahda Bint Falah Al-Hithlain; the Hithlain were supporters of the Al-Saud in the 20th century and married extensively into the family.
Married to Reema, a daughter of his uncle Mashour Bin Abdelaziz, since 2008, he has several full brothers and sisters, though none are prominent; the best known is Turki Bin Salman, formerly chairman of the Saudi Research and Marketing Group, which publishes Asharq Al-Awsat. King Salman’s other high-profile sons – Abdelaziz (deputy minister of oil), Sultan (chairman of the Saudi Commission for Tourism and Antiquities) and Faisal (governor of Medina) – were all born to a different mother, Sultana Al-Sudairi, who died in 2011.
MBS is seen as energetic, effective and willing to stand up to his father, though several sources have questioned his lack of education and integrity. His ambition is becoming increasingly clear, and his willingness to be seen as responsible for launching airstrikes on Yemen suggest a man of action rather than diplomacy.
Unlike Mohammed Bin Nayef, he has not yet built himself international networks, and it will be interesting to see if he attempts to do so now that he is second in line to the throne.
MBS, who like many of the younger princes has a lot of business interests, was secretary-general of the Riyadh Competitiveness Centre from around 2010, when his father was still governor of the province, and even then was actively seeking a more public profile. He was a special adviser to his father while the latter was governor and, in March 2013, by which time Salman was crown prince, he was named head of the Crown Prince’s Court and
special adviser (filling the position vacated when Prince Saud Bin Nayef became governor of Eastern Province). In April 2014, he was named a state minister and member of the cabinet. Despite not having a formal role at the defence ministry, there were rumours about his involvement in the removal of at least two deputy defence ministers.
kopnena intervencija je neminovna a tu cemo da vidimo odnos snaga morala.....
