a za one koji bi o terorizmu da saznaju malo vishe od onoga shto im prezentiraju darko trifunovic, kurir i nezavisne novine, evo jednog chlanka od olivier roya - radi se upravo o mogucnosti pravljenja "profila" teroriste, te na koji nachin se ustvari boriti protiv toga.
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“The challenge is not to go at the roots of terrorism, as European government
spokespeople never tire of saying. . . . The challenge is to prevent the radical
fringe from finding a broad political base among the local Muslim population.”
Europe’s Response to Radical Islam
OLIVIER ROY
The April 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid and
those carried out in London this July have
turned Western Europe into a major battle-
field for Islamist terrorists. Western Europe had pre-
viously played a significant role as a base for
planning and organization by Al Qaeda cells: the
September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States
were planned by a Hamburg, Germany, cell of Al
Qaeda; Ahmed Ressam, who was arrested on his
way to bomb Los Angeles International Airport on
New Year’s Eve 1999, was linked with a French rad-
ical network; “shoe bomber” Richard Reid was
recruited in a British jail; and Zacharias Moussaoui,
believed to be a member of the 9-11 hijackers,
found his calling in a London mosque.
Al Qaeda, moreover, is not the only radical
Islamic group active in Western Europe. Other
networks have acted independently, mostly shar-
ing ideas and recruiting along patterns similar to
those of Al Qaeda. (Examples include the Algerian
terrorist Khaled Kelkal and Algerian Islamists
known as the Roubaix group.) New independent
groups could similarly arise in the future. The
issue of radicalization and violence thus goes
beyond the present challenge posed by Al Qaeda
and could continue or increase even if Al Qaeda
itself is destroyed.
Even more important, it should be noted that the
terrorists acting in Europe did not come from the
Middle East to perpetrate their attacks: they were
born in Europe or came as students or political
refugees. And it is in Europe that they became
“born-again” Muslims and political radicals. In
Western Europe radical Islamism is homegrown,
not an import. This homegrown radicalism forms
the challenge of Euro-Islam.
PROFILE OF A TERRORIST
Islamic radicals in Western Europe fall roughly
into three categories: foreign residents, second-
generation immigrants (most often native-born),
and converts.
The first category is that of young Middle East-
erners who come to Europe as political refugees or
students, who speak Arabic, and who are from mid-
dle-class backgrounds. The 9-11 hijackers are an
excellent example of this category; they became
born-again Muslims only after coming to Europe
and before joining a radical group.
The second category is made up of second-
generation European Muslims, some educated but
many more school dropouts, who usually come
from destitute neighborhoods. They speak a Euro-
pean language as their first language and often are
European citizens. Three of the July 2005 London
bombers fall into this category.
Another of the London bombers, Germaine
Lindsay, was a convert. Converts to Islam, many of
whom became Muslim while spending time in jail,
form the third category. It is the smallest in num-
ber, but not necessarily in significance.
Members of all three categories follow the same
general trajectory of radicalization. Almost invari-
ably, they become born-again Muslims (or converts)
by joining a mosque known to host radical imams,
and soon after that (in the span of less than a year),
they turn politically radical and go (or try to go) to
fight a jihad abroad. Before 9-11, that meant going
to Afghanistan. Since May 2003, it may mean trav-
eling to Iraq, as illustrated by a group of young sec-
ond-generation French Muslims who left for Falluja
in early 2005.
Notably, almost none of these radicals have gone
to their country of origin or of their families’ origin
to wage jihad. And they have usually gone to the
“peripheral” jihad—to Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghan-
istan, Kashmir, or New York—rather than to Israel
and Palestine. (Two Pak-Britons did perpetrate a
terrorist attack in Tel Aviv in spring 2003, but this
is, so far, the only exception to the rule.)
In addition, almost all of these terrorists broke
completely with their families only after entering
their process of radicalization. Having done so, they
usually became urban nomads of sorts, often chang-
ing places and even countries. Thus, these terror-
ists are largely supranational and socially atomized.
They also tend to have a Westernized trajectory in
studies (urban planning, computer science), in lan-
guages (all are fluent in Western languages), and in
matrimonial affairs (often marrying or klix Euro-
pean women).
Such a Western profile is not only a function of
their sociological situation, it is also a condition of
success: they live totally immersed in Western soci-
ety. The strength and the weakness of Islamic
extremism in Western Europe are precisely that the radicals are
not rooted among the European Muslim pop-
ulation. The strength is that they cannot
be traced or spotted before going into action by police penetration of the
local Muslim population. It is also difficult to enter
their networks because they are cut off from the out-
side world and are highly mobile. The weakness is
that they have problems of recruitment and logistics
because they do not relate well to ordinary “civilian”
fellow Muslims.
WHY THE TURN TO RADICALISM ?
There is no clear-cut sociological profile of the
Islamic radicals beyond that which I have sketched
out. There is no characteristic that links them
definitively to a given socioeconomic situation.
More precisely, the reasons that may push them
toward violence are not specific enough and include
traits shared by a larger population that deals with
similar situations in very different ways. Explana-
tions based on poverty, exclusion, racism, accultur-
ation, and so forth may contain kernels of truth, but
they are not specific enough to be of much practi-
cal help in stopping terrorists from acting.
For example, there is clearly a generational
dimension at work here. Islamic radicalism is a
youth movement. Frustration is obviously a key
element in their radicalization, but it seems to have
more to do with a particular psychological dimen-
sion than with a social or economic one. A common
factor among known radicals is a concern for self-
image and a desire to reconstruct the self through
action. In this sense, young radicals are more in
search of an opportunity for spectacular action
where they will be personally and directly involved
than with the long-term patient building of a polit-
ical organization that could extend the social and
political base of their networks. They are more
present-oriented activists than future-oriented con-
structivists. They are thus far different from the
Comintern agents of the 1920s and 1930s.
This narcissist dimension explains both the com-
mitment to suicide attacks and the difficulty such
people have in working underground without the
perspective and prospect of action. Without terror-
ism, the young radicals do not exist. This commit-
ment to immediate or mid-term action, as opposed
to long-term political action, is probably the great-
est weakness of radical Islamists in Europe,
but it also makes them very hard to catch
and stop. Clearly, though, only a small fraction
of alienated Muslim youth evinces these characteristics.
Very few become terrorists. There is no obvious or practical
way to tell one trajectory from others because, as was
noted, it is less sociological than psychological.
Another significant pattern in Euro-Islamist
radicalization is the blending of Islamic wording
and phraseology with a typically Western anti-
imperialism and third-worldist radicalism. For the
most part, Euro-Islamist targets are the same ones
that the Western ultra-leftist movements of the
1970s identified. The Islamists target “US imperial- ism”
and “Zionism” in support of the “ummah”—
the world community of Muslims that, like the
world proletariat, is an abstract universal.
Islamists seek mass terrorism, and they do not
target political or business personalities, as the
European ultra-left did. Nevertheless, the paradigm
of ultra-leftist terrorism from the 1970s might pro-
vide a bridge in the future to non-Islamic radicals,
perhaps even to some in the so-called antiglobal-
ization movement.
Again, though, many Islamic residents in West-
ern Europe believe such ideologies, yet few of these
ideologues become terrorists. We can array several
perhaps necessary conditions for identifying an
Islamist terrorist in Europe, but we cannot specify
what the sufficient conditions are.
The real danger lies in Islamic radicalism
enlarging its social base or connecting with other
potentially radical movements or governments.
N EW PATTERNS
Since 9-11 and the US removal of the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan, Islamist terrorists have
faced two new problems that have immediate con-
sequences for their ability to act in or from West-
ern Europe. These problems are organizational
and political.
No longer is there easy sanctuary for Islamist
radicals in European Union countries to meet, train,
and forge esprit de corps and link with other
groups—in a word, to coalesce a ragtag collection
of activists into a cohesive and disciplined organi-
zation. It is becoming far more difficult to become
organized and maintain communications with lead-
ers within and outside a country.
A specific dimension of Al Qaeda was its veter-
ans’ solidarity: many young radicals, who met first
as groups of “buddies” in Western countries, turned
into efficient cells only after having lived in Afghan-
istan or after being led by someone who had been in
Afghanistan and returned. Moreover, Al Qaeda
exhibited a distinctive pattern of turning personal
links among veterans of the Afghan jihad
into an efficient but flexible chain of com-
mand. This is obviously no longer the case.
As for political problems, the West’s demonization of
Islam has put the Muslim population in the West on
the defensive. Although this demonizing may have
turned some individuals more radical, it has con-
vinced most Muslims living in the West to adopt a
clearer attitude and to advocate greater integration
into Western societies. European authorities have
contributed to isolating the radicals by responding
positively, at least in terms of rhetoric, to the quest
for recognition and integration. Isolation among and
alienation from the European Muslim population are
now among the radicals’ main challenges.
As a consequence of these developments, two
new patterns of Islamic radicalism are emerging or
will emerge. The first we may call “franchising.”
Local groups based on local solidarities—most
likely those of neighborhood, extended family, and
university—with few or no ties to Al Qaeda, will
assume the label and act according to what they see
as Al Qaeda’s ideology and strategy. The Internet is
playing a role here at three levels: motivation (by
providing propaganda), technology (how to make
bombs), and communication (connections between
people who do not need to meet physically).
The second pattern is a quest for allies and support
beyond the pale of Islamic fundamentalism. Radicals
may try to find allies and fellow travelers at the
expense of the purity of their ideological message.
They could find it among the European ultra-left or,
less probably, the ultra-right. They could find allies
among other “liberation” movements (for instance,
former Baathists in Iraq). Some might even serve as
proxies or gunmen for rogue states. They may also
develop links with local delinquents (as illustrated by
the Roubaix gang in France and the Madrid terrorist
ring, which was associated with drug dealers).
COUNTERING THE ISLAMISTS
Whatever the differences among the European
countries, including their appraisal of
US policy, European Union members share many interests
and policies. All European governments are reluctant to drasti-
cally alter their legal systems and basic political
approaches to terrorism. The issue of homeland
security was raised and essentially settled a long time
ago when these governments faced a more “indigenous”
terrorism (Spain’s ETA, Ireland’s IRA, Germany’s Baader-
Meinhof gang, and Italy’s Red Brigades).
In this sense, the Europeans have a more sea-
soned and experienced counterterrorism
homeland apparatus than the Americans
do. In countries where the “Islamic” threat had been
identified at least a decade ago (as in France), the
security apparatus is efficient.
The recent terrorist attacks have engendered
greater cooperation among the different countries,
as well as with the United States, in most cases. But
this cooperation has not led to the importation of
political differences among governments into their
thinking about security, partly because domestic
procedures are institutionalized and partly because
this is not a new concern.
In addition, as far as European countries are con-
cerned, the fight against terrorism is a matter of
police and intelligence, not military action. The
growing isolation of Islamic radicals in Europe
should allow the Europeans to continue with this
“soft” approach: police and intelligence services are
efficient to the extent that transnational coopera-
tion works and will probably provide sufficient
tools to carry out counterterrorism.
However, this approach will never totally eradi-
cate terrorism. The European tradition of terrorism
In Western Europe radical Islamism
is homegrown, not an import.
and political violence that has forged the experience
of the counterterrorist institutions makes it easier
for young activists to become violent. Put some-
what differently, the stigma attached to carrying out
violence is relatively weak in Europe. Young men
who want to become radical and engage in a spec-
tacular action to validate their confused and injured
manhood will not be stopped by this soft approach.
Even concentrating on root causes—on the soci-
ology and motivations of the radicals—while
important for understanding the radicals’ mode of
recruitment, will be of little use in drying up the
ground on which these extremists prosper. The aim
of European policy is not eradication; it is to make
terrorism a residual factor that can be lived with.
KEEPING THEM ISOLATED
Such a “soft” approach is sustainable in Europe
only under one condition: that Islamic radicalism
remains a fringe movement. The real danger lies in
Islamic radicalism enlarging its social base or con-
necting with other potentially radical movements
or governments. The challenge is not to go at the
roots of terrorism, as European government spokes-
people never tire of saying, for that is well-nigh
impossible and will not eradicate terrorism in any
case. The challenge is to prevent the radical fringe
from finding a broad political base among the local
Muslim population.
To regain their momentum and create that base,
Euro-Islamic radicals will have to achieve two
strategic goals: mobilize other Muslims and link up
with non-Muslim radicals.
Eventually, Euro-Islamic leaders will try to mobi-
lize elements of the Muslim community to provide
shelter, logistics, recruits, and reliable communica-
tions. To do that, the activists will have to change
their patterns of recruitment, which are currently
based on spotting some individuals and taking
them out of their social milieu. They will have to
engage in a more collective dawa (“proselytizing”).
This would put them on the same path as many
nonpolitical conservative and even fundamentalist
organizations, such as the Tabligh (a movement
that urges Muslims to shun any form of assimila-
tion or Westernization) and the Salafis (a Wahhabi-
inspired group that urges Muslims to return to the
basic tenets of their faith, bypassing Islamic cultures
and history). Interestingly, many radical groups—
like the London-based Hizbul-Tahrir (HT) —share
the views of Al Qaeda but think the latter has been
premature to launch jihad. They believe that one
should first mobilize the Muslim community
through intensive proselytizing and political activ-
ity. (The British government banned HT
after the London bombings, not because it had been
involved but because of its radical views.)
Eventually, too, Islamist leaders will probably try
to establish some sort of joint venture with remnants
of the European extreme left who share the same
hatred for “imperialism.” Converts may play a par-
ticularly significant role here. Let us not forget that
Carlos the Jackal, who carried out well-publicized
terrorist attacks in the 1970s and 1980s, converted
to Islam in jail and now praises Osama bin Laden.
But given the social and psychological background
of the radicals, it remains unlikely that they will
develop a more sophisticated strategy.
The key issue is the attitude of the Muslim pop-
ulation in Europe toward radicalism and terrorism.
And for three main reasons, the Muslim population
in Europe has a far larger political stake, and plays a
far greater political role, in their nations than does
the Muslim population in the United States.
First, unlike in America, Muslim migrants are the
main source of immigration in Europe. Second, this
migration originates from Europe’s neighboring
southern countries. Legal immigration to the United
States is far more diverse in its origins. Third, migra-
tion to Europe has created the bulk of the underclass
and jobless youth. (In the United States, migrants
want to find—and generally do find—jobs that
quickly make them upwardly mobile.)
A EUROPEAN ISLAM
The social, geographic, political, and strategic
implications of Muslim immigration to Europe are
intertwined. In this light, European countries
should pursue a double objective: isolate the
Islamic radicals with the support of their own Mus-
lim population, and seek out at least the neutrality
of the nonviolent conservative fundamentalists
among them.
Two different approaches have been in competi-
tion in Europe in this regard. The multiculturalist
approach, tried mainly in Great Britain, treats Mus-
lims as members of a minority group who should
be addressed collectively and should benefit from a
specific status. The integrationist strategy, which is
the approach France has taken, seeks to grant full
citizenship to Muslims as individuals but not to
consider them as a separate community under any
ethnic, cultural, or religious paradigm.
Neither approach seems to be working well. The
multicultural tack tends to create ghettos. In Great
Britain, even before the London attacks in 2005,
some members of Parliament were questioning this
approach and called on the government to adapt a
more integrative policy. The integrationist approach,
however, ignores the quest for a new identity among
uprooted Muslims. In France, amid an ongoing
debate, the government has decided to establish an
official representation of Muslims as a faith group,
but not as a cultural or ethnic minority.
In Germany, although the laws on citizenship
were slightly relaxed three years ago, the Muslim
population, which is mainly Turkish, is perceived
as foreign. Yet the fact that no Turks have been
involved in terrorism has defused any reaction from
the government and public opinion since the
Madrid and London bombings. In Holland, by con-
trast, the government has toughened regulations on
immigration—including an obligation to speak
Dutch—since the killing of a controversial film-
maker, Theo Van Gogh, by a Muslim activist in
November 2004. (In Holland, unlike France, Islam
is still seen as a problem of immigration, not of
second-generation residents.)
IN PURSUIT OF PLURALISM
However awkwardly, a common approach is
slowly emerging in Europe: dealing with the Mus-
lim population in purely religious terms. Encour-
aging the emergence of a European Islam will help
integrate the Muslims, weaken links with foreign
countries, and provide a Western-compatible reli-
gious identity. The problem thus far is that some
governments (like that of France), as well as the
bulk of public opinion, equate European Islam with
“liberal” Islam. Calling on Muslims to adapt the
basic tenets of Islam to the Western concept of a
religion is a mistake.
For example, to officially sponsor “good and lib-
eral” Muslims would be the kiss of death. It would
deprive such liberal organizations and leaders of
any legitimacy. Besides, the main motivation for
youth radicalization is not theological—young peo-
ple are not interested in theological debates.
Instead, political radicalization is the main driving
force. Moreover, modern secular states should not
regulate theology as a matter of policy.
Is there a better approach? Yes. Genuine plural-
ism is the best way to avoid confrontation with a
tight-knit Muslim community. Conservative and
even fundamentalist views of religion are manage-
able in a pluralist environment, as shown by a host
of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish cases. A plural-
istic approach allows civil society to reach the
cadres of youth who could be ideal targets for rad-
icals and neo-fundamentalist groups. State policy
should be based on integration and the promotion
of Muslim community leaders on a pluralistic
basis. The emphasis should be on weakening the
links with foreign elements by pushing for the
“nativization” of Islam and for preventing the
deepening of the ghetto syndrome. Transparency
should be the aim.
If that general proposition is accepted, certain
proposals seem to follow logically. There should be
much tighter control on fundraising and subsidiz-
ing from abroad, which also means better access to
open domestic fundraising and subsidies (for build-
ing mosques, for example). Governments should
establish more links between Islamic religious
teaching institutions and the university and
academia. Religious representation should be
encouraged without monopoly. Mainstream politi-
cal parties should court and enlist Muslims as mem-
bers and party leaders. Social policy must avoid
confronting Muslims with black-and-white choices.
It should instead work to let Muslim youth experi-
ence a diversity of opinions in line with the spec-
trum of political diversity in the West.
In this respect, the European debate on whether
to support or not support the US military campaign
in Iraq has had a positive impact. In Great Britain,
as well as in France and elsewhere in Europe, Mus-
lims did not feel isolated or targeted; instead, they
felt as though they belonged to mainstream public
opinion. In this sense at least, in the European con-
text, the debate between so-called old and new
Europe has superseded the debate on the “clash of
civilizations.”
A policy of encouraging pluralism will meet the
aspirations of mainstream Muslims in Europe—
Islam recognized as a Western religion, Muslims as
full citizens—while avoiding the creation of a
closed community, ghettos, and minority status.
This policy will contribute to the isolation of the
terrorists and prevent them from building a dan-
gerous political constituency. Approaches that by
design or error drive Muslim communities inward
and into themselves will backfire, to the regret of all concerned.
OLIVIER ROY, a professor at the School of Advanced Studies in
Social Sciences in Paris, is the author most recently of Global-
ized Islam (Columbia University Press, 2004).
Source: Current History, November 2005 (
http://www.currenthistory.com/org_pdf_f ... 85_360.pdf)
sreca pa nije istinito... Oruzje je ocito zaostalo iza rata, mada ne iskljucujem mogucnost da ga je neko 'maksuz' nabavio za kojekakve namjere. Vec sam rekao da budala ima na svim stranama i da ih je mnogo mnogo vise medju 'nevehabijama' - odes na ilidzu u kafic i sve ti bude jasno 
