THE TENDENCY IN much of the international discourse surrounding the
Russian military
has been to write it off as tactically inept, technically deficient and morally broken. These
criticisms have more than a grain of truth to them. Nevertheless, they tend to extrapolate
from the performance of certain Russian units to the whole force. Alongside their deficiencies,
Russian forces have demonstrated that much of their equipment is effective, highly lethal and
adaptable to a range of threats. While there are serious deficiencies in Russian capabilities,
these are most pronounced in conducting offensive operations. Conversely, many of Russia’s
combat support arms have not only demonstrated reasonable proficiency but have also shown
that they are able to adapt to emerging threats.
Although Russian forces have started to resolve a range of tactical challenges besetting their
forces, it is noteworthy that many of these adaptations are reactive. The role specialisation of
infantry has been driven by an inability to train enough troops, not by proactive force design.
The acceleration and simplification of fire control has been driven by failing to deliver effective
responsive fires early in the war. It thus remains unclear the extent to which these adaptations
will become permanent aspects of the Russian military.
It is also evident that as an institution
the Russian military continues to fail to anticipate new threats. Air defence units, for example,
show a growing proficiency against threats over time,
but the introduction of any new strike
system or tactics on the Ukrainian side usually causes a period of disruption and friendly fire.
Most of all it is evident that the Russian military is systematically struggling to coordinate
different functions; this can be exploited
. The callousness of Russian approaches towards its
own personnel continues to ensure that they underperform versus their potential, usually
because of poor unit cohesion.
The critical capability underpinning the Russian military remains its fires. Here, it is less clear that
its approach is sustainable, or that the pace of adaptation is sufficiently fast. Ultimately Russia
has used its massive stockpile of ammunition in a highly inefficient manner and is exceeding
its manufacturing rate as regards both shells and barrels. Firepower has been employed by
the Russian military as a crutch to compensate for its tactical shortcomings in other areas. If
the weight of salvo the Russian military can generate diminishes then it is not at all clear that
Russia’s infantry can effectively hold ground. Perhaps the greatest danger for Ukraine, therefore,
as regards the longer term trajectory of Russian forces, is if another country provides tooling
and workers to establish additional production capacity in Russia for munitions and barrels.
Dakle zakljucak, odma na kraj
