Interesantni detalji (uzeti sa rezervom, jer je rat i informacije se filtriraju):
Q: Thank you for letting us participate. My question focusses on the morale of the fighters on these extended front lines. As many heroes die there under the eyes of their comrades, how are they coping with orders to hold out. General Syrsky’s frequent visits do they take place to boost the soldiers spirits ? Is there any mentions of the spring offensive ? Best wishes.
A: Morale is overall good, I would say. As I gather, for most holding out is a given, the thing is, for a few who happen to be in the not-so-many holes or buildings the Russians have picked for the days attacks, you may run out of ammo, get Russian infantry inside your position, find out company or battalion can’t give you fire support like you need it, or die. But most of the guys in a given day just hold their positions, or do their specialty job whatever it is. Morale goes up when people hear Ukrainian guns outshooting the Russian ones.
Q: Hi Stefan, many thanks for your continued excellent coverage of the war. Whenever I see graphics of the Bakhmut fighting it looks like the Russians are getting close to flanking the UAF from North and South. What is your sense of the danger of UAF in Bakhmut being cut off and overrun?
A: My view is the Russians will have a whole lot of very bloody fighting ahead of them before they even manage to threaten Bakhmut’s communications seriously, and if the weight of artillery I heard and observed over the weekend was any indicator of the general situation, the Ukrainians have artillery dominance around Bakhmut. Given sufficient shells and mortar rounds, there will be no danger, is how I see it.
Q: Dear Stefan, here in Germany the newspapers have reported that the military from the Ukraine have criticized Selensky’s Bachmut plan, saying that it is supposed to burn reservists there who were trained in the West. Bachmuth is not strategically important, retreat would make more sense in order not to endanger the spring offensive because of the threat of encirclement. As a result, Selensky’s reputation would suffer. On the other hand, Domagoj Franic writes that it is perhaps part of a “trick” that Wagner only has 7,000 good soldiers who are to be tied up at Bachmut.
A: I am not sure about “criticism” or “direct conflict” viz a viz the Zelensky administration and the UAF high command, but, it seems to me the German press is describing the strategic question fairly accurately: What is the best way for Ukraine to exploit Russian fixation on Bakhmut? My personal instinct is that holding Bakhmut is a good call, but compared to Zaluzhny and Zelensky I’m very poorly-informed. I can tell you for sure the UAF has strong fall-back positions and defense terrain just to the west of Bakhmut.
Q: The obvious thing for the RF to do is bomb the f*** out of the few roads into or out of Bakhmut (and similar places). If they can stop or reduce enormously the replacement ammo and personnel, and wounded getting out by destroying the roads, then those little fortresses will fall as soldiers run out. Are the Russians doing that? Or are they just trying to shift the UAF by weight of numbers. So fighting only at a tactical not strategic level?
A: It’s clear from their blogs and media that the Russians understand encirclement of Bakhmut is in their interest. The problem is doing it. They say the Ukrainians are fighting hard and that bringing in the Russian air force is a no-go, the Ukrainians have lots of anti-aircraft weapons and they know how to use them. The strategy the Russians have settled on, it seems, is to send light, expendable infantry in high casualty attacks, and hope that Ukrainian forces will be forced to stay put and then they can be hit with Russian artillery, and forced to retreat or surrender by attrition. However, the Russians are openly complaining about a serious shell shortage, and without a lot of Russian artillery, a plan to beat the UAF by attrition becomes a lot less viable.
...ima potrebe
