Plavo-bijeli wrote: ↑05/10/2025 01:05Realno, JNA 1991. i Izrael 2025. nisu ni blizu po snazi.
JNA je imala masu ljudi i opreme na papiru – oko 2.000 tenkova, stotine hiljada rezervista, solidnu avijaciju za to doba – ali većina tehnike je bila zastarjela (T-54/55, MiG-21), logistika loša, i vojska se raspadala iznutra zbog politike i nacionalnih podjela. U praksi ta "veličina" nije značila mnogo.
Izrael danas ima jednu od najmodernijih vojski na svijetu: F-35 flotu, Merkava tenkove s aktivnom zaštitom, Iron Dome i David’s Sling protivzračne sisteme, dronove, satelite, elektronsko ratovanje i obavještajnu mrežu koja radi u realnom vremenu. Plus stalno su u ratnim i borbenim uvjetima, dok je JNA već 1991. bila troma i bez prave strategije.
Ako izuzmemo nuklearke, odnos snage je otprilike Izrael 75–80% : JNA 20–25%.
Sa nuklearnim oružjem, to je 95:5 u korist Izraela.
Ukratko — JNA je bila ogromna, ali tehnološki i taktički zastarjela. Izrael bi je danas pregazio prije nego što bi JNA stigla uopće organizovati front.
Dok gledam stare snimke vezane za sukobe Arapa i Izraela, vidim nešto poznato. Oficiri arapskih vojski, Irak, Egipat, Sirija itd, neoposivo podsjećaju na oficire JNA, onako velikih glava, seljačke fizionomije, bahati, izgledaju slabo pismeni, ali zato djeluju pokvareni, tipa Vahid Karavelić ili Kukanjac. Ista je to škola, arapski oficiri školUvali su se u SFRJ i slabo šta naučili.
JNA je bila užasno neefikasna u ratu u Hrvatskoj, Vukovar su zauzeli kada branitelji više nisu imali ni metaka. Dubrovnik nisu mogli zauzeti iako ga je branila šaka ljudi. VRS kao JNA isprdak nije bila sposobna zauzeti recimo jedan Teočak ili Olovo ili Tešanj i pored nadmoći u naoružanju. VRS je mogla zauzeti sam ono gdje im nije pružan nikakav otpor. Negdje sam pročitao da je VRS u svakoj svojoj brigadi imala na raspolaganju 15 - 16 tenkova. Oko Sarajeva VRS je imala pet ili šest brigada, pa su ih zvali Ilidžanska, Koševska, Vogošćanska itd. VRS je oko Sarajeva imala stotinjak tenkova i bezbroj drugih artiljerijskih cijevi. I slabo su šta postigli, ako izuzmemo njihovu ofanzivu Lukavac 93.
Jasno je da su arapske vojske izuzezno neefikasne, a to, između ostalog ima i korijen u sovjetskoj vojnoj filozofiji koju su slijedili, baš kao što su JNA i VRS bile neefikasne i kao što je ruska vojska neefikasna u Ukrajini.
A i da nije Turska u NATO-u i da nema NATO radara u Turskoj klinac bi oni radili sta rade na bliskom istoku. Ovo Turci rade da se osvete Arapima zbog unistavanja Osmanskog carstva. Pa im oni rovare od Sirije, Iraka, Libije.
The writer and analyst in regional affairs, Dr. Reda Al-Shab
As usual in setting political traps, US President Donald Trump suddenly came out, without introduction, to announce what he called the "Gaza Peace Plan", setting a theoretical limit to the bloodshed that has been flowing for over two years in the besieged Gaza Strip.
Trump starts his plan with an "immediate ceasefire", presenting it as a humanitarian entrance to stop the bleeding in Gaza, but soon links it to a series of conditions, turning the truce into a test of obedience rather than a binding agreement. Here, "peace" seems more like monitoring the victim's behavior than seeking justice for them.
The central point of the plan is the complete disarmament of Hamas under international supervision, which turns resistance from a legitimate right into an "obstacle" that must be removed. In return, the occupation remains armed and fortified, making the "peace" equation unbalanced: one side is unarmed facing a force imposing its conditions.
As for prisoner exchange, it is presented as a humanitarian gesture, but it hides a false equivalence between thousands of Palestinian prisoners - many of whom are arbitrarily detained - and Israeli hostages in an ongoing war. Thus, the "exchange" becomes a symbolic scene that deceives with justice while deepening inequality.
Israeli withdrawal is presented as a reward rather than a right. It is linked to implementing conditions, making any "Palestinian failure" a justification for the occupation to stay. Here, withdrawal is not a step towards liberation but a tool for blackmail, as happened in similar experiences, most notably in southern Lebanon today.
The most dangerous aspect of the plan is the transitional administration clause, where Gaza is placed under international tutelage led by America through a "Peace Council" headed by names like Tony Blair. Thus, "transitional" becomes permanent and "peace" becomes tutelage as Palestine's national project is emptied.
Reconstruction comes as a conditional "prize". Money and projects are managed from outside and used as pressure tools: accepting political conditions in exchange for reconstruction or being deprived of it. This is stick-and-carrot policy with a humanitarian face.
In conclusion, Trump launches his most explicit threat: the plan is not an offer for fair peace but an ultimatum. Whoever accepts opens doors for aid; whoever rejects gives Israel an open mandate to complete the war under an unmistakable American cover.
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