Ukrajina

[sumirprimus]

ameri jednostavno imaju najjacu vojnu silu u istoriji ljudskog roda i to se ogleda i u specijalnim jedinicama, stepen obuke, iskustvo koje imaju u ovim ovim konfliktima kao i pristup opremi i tehnologiji, i resursima koje oni imaju je liga za sebe u odnosu na sve druge. jednostavno su van konkurencije.

[TheProfessional]

Potrosili su rusi mornarickih i padobranskih brigada bruku, onaj Specnazp, ne postoji vise, to su specijalci ranga SEAL.SAS itd

Cisto radi fakata.. Spetznaz nije jedna specijalna jedinica, vec uopcen naziv za specijalnu jedinicu u vecini bivsih sovjetskih republika. Kopnena vojska ima 7 takvih brigada. Nisam siguran koliko ima mornarica. FSB takodje odrzava spetznaz jedinice i u njihovom sastavu je poznata Alfa grupa.

[sumirprimus]

Potrosili su rusi mornarickih i padobranskih brigada bruku, onaj Specnazp, ne postoji vise, to su specijalci ranga SEAL.SAS itd

Cisto radi fakata.. Spetznaz nije jedna specijalna jedinica, vec uopcen naziv za specijalnu jedinicu u vecini bivsih sovjetskih republika. Kopnena vojska ima 7 takvih brigada. Nisam siguran koliko ima mornarica. FSB takodje odrzava spetznaz jedinice i u njihovom sastavu je poznata Alfa grupa.

i u odnosu na amere navikani su.
s tim da ameri nose te brojeve do kraja, koliko imaju ljudi u tim jedinicama nema sumnje u njihovu obuku, dok sad na osnovu iskustva iz ukrajine mali je broj obcenih ruja koji wse mogu nositi.

[TheProfessional]

Cisto radi fakata.. Spetznaz nije jedna specijalna jedinica, vec uopcen naziv za specijalnu jedinicu u vecini bivsih sovjetskih republika. Kopnena vojska ima 7 takvih brigada. Nisam siguran koliko ima mornarica. FSB takodje odrzava spetznaz jedinice i u njihovom sastavu je poznata Alfa grupa.

i u odnosu na amere navikani su.
s tim da ameri nose te brojeve do kraja, koliko imaju ljudi u tim jedinicama nema sumnje u njihovu obuku, dok sad na osnovu iskustva iz ukrajine mali je broj obcenih ruja koji wse mogu nositi.

Ameri su broj 1 pa onda ide 10 praznih mjesta pa nek se ostali redaju kako hoce. I to ne samo kad su specijalne jedinice u pitanju. Svaki vid, rod, sluzba u Americkim oruzanim snagama su najbolji na svijetu u poslu koji rade. Sve to iz ratova koje su vodili naravno ali... to je posao vojske jbg. Neke vojske nikad ne nauce. Negdje sam citao da Rusi nisu u stanju u isto podrucje poslati vise od ne znam ovako 4 aviona da koordinisano dijeluju jedan npr za dogfight jedan za bombardovanje jedan za EW i jedan za... nadzor, radar kako hoces... Ameri su u stanju da 100 aviona drze konstantno u zraku da izvrsavaju zadatke i da se vracaju nazad na npr nosac po resurse (municija, gorivo) i u isto vijeme koordinisu djelovanje sa jedinicama na vodi ili na zemlji. PS Da... i njima se desavaju greske ali ... za razliku od drugih poslije svake misije u TRADOC se uzari da apsolviraju naucene lekcije.

[pici]

Potrosili su rusi mornarickih i padobranskih brigada bruku, onaj Specnazp, ne postoji vise, to su specijalci ranga SEAL.SAS itd

Cisto radi fakata.. Spetznaz nije jedna specijalna jedinica, vec uopcen naziv za specijalnu jedinicu u vecini bivsih sovjetskih republika. Kopnena vojska ima 7 takvih brigada. Nisam siguran koliko ima mornarica. FSB takodje odrzava spetznaz jedinice i u njihovom sastavu je poznata Alfa grupa.

Kako god, rusi vise nemaju taj luksuz da salju specijalne utrenirane jedinice na tajne zadatke, mozda ta Alfa, ovo ostalo je desetkovano, poranjavano, pobijeno, zarobljeno.
Ove mornaricke i padobranske jedinice su u rangu evo dajem primjer ko njemacke SS jedinice ili 101 americka padobranska itd.Kad te jedinice pocnes gubiti, tu debelo nesta ne stima.Il mjenjaj taktiku il se uvuci u odbranu.Napadat sa robijasima, to je cirkuz.
Evo dovoljna je jedna 93th potpomugnuta specijalnim drugim jedinicama da amortizuje napad i desetkuje ih.To su uradili i kod Izjuma, samo sto ovdje imaju manji opseg djelovanja i u kotlusu i to urbanom.Oni da su bili oko Soledara ili Krasne Gore kao i jos neke brigade koje su njihovog ranga, to bi bio ruski pokolj, i ovako je al to bi bilo 20:1.

[sumirprimus]

da nastavimo sa onim clankom...
Explaining VKS Performance Compared to
Pre-war Expectations

Spoiler

Show

The most significant aspect of the VKS performance over Ukraine that had been overlooked or
at least not explicitly predicted by VKS experts before the invasion is the fact that Russian pilots
and planning staff lack the ability to plan, organize, and execute composite air operations
(COMAOs). COMAO is a NATO term used to describe missions where “dissimilar types of
aircraft interact in coordinated actions, to achieve defined military objectives within a given
time and geographical area…normally involving between 20–100 aircraft.”51
The Russian VKS began the invasion with an inventory of around 400 genuinely modern
multirole fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft like the Su-35S, Su-30SM, and Su-34, and another
300 or so heavily modernized legacy types like the Mig-31BM, Su-25SM(3), and Mig-29SMT.52
Therefore most external analysts simply assumed that these technically impressive fleets
would be employed in COMAOs to leverage the combined strengths and compensate for the
weaknesses of each type against Ukraine. This assumption was held despite that fact that the
VKS had never really demonstrated such a capability in practice. For example, over Syria, the
vast majority of Russian sorties were flown by single aircraft or pairs, involving largely fighter
patrols and unguided weapon drops from medium altitude.53 VKS training sorties have also
almost always been flown in small formations or by single aircraft, and largely involve simple
navigation sorties, unguided weapon deliveries on open ranges, ground-controlled
interception tasks, and SAM-target simulation serials.54 Furthermore, the typical Russian fast
jet pilot flew only around 80–100 hours per year before the invasion, and VKS regiments do
not have access to the sort of modern simulator facilities that Western air forces increasingly
rely on for complex synthetic training.55 Together, this lack of exposure to large formation
tactics in training and previous operations, limited live flying training hours for frontline pilots,
and a focus on relatively simple tasks during those training hours explains why the VKS was
not able to fly COMAOs in Ukraine.
COMAOs are absolutely critical to the way that the US and its NATO allies employ airpower in
contested airspace. By combining the capabilities of many different types of combat aircraft
and enablers such as aerial refuelling tankers and airborne warning and control system
(AWACS) and electronic support aircraft, NATO has routinely deployed combat air packages
that are far more capable in aggregate than the sum of their individual parts would suggest.
For example, a typical NATO COMAO during the first week of a campaign against an enemy air
force and air defense network might combine both offensive and defensive fighter sweeps, a
core strike package to force defenses to illuminate and engage, ARM “shooters” such as F-16CM
and electronic jamming and escort aircraft such as the EA-18G for SEAD, and DEAD elements
such as F-35A to locate and physically destroy suppressed SAM systems.56
To enable all the different force elements to safely assemble at an initial point, fly the required
mission, and recover safely with allowances for combat maneuvers, extensive aerial refuelling
would be provided at a safe distance from enemy defenses, and AWACS aircraft would provide
early warning and mission-command/deconfliction functions.57 Because this way of operating
is so central to the US Air Force and its main partner air forces, the extraordinary complexity
of the planning, enabler support provision, and command and control arrangements required
is often overlooked or forgotten by non-practitioners. Below the planning level, flying COMAOs
in a complex and contested environment requires highly experienced weapons instructor
pilots at the squadron level to plan, brief, lead, and then debrief each sortie. It also requires
that regular pilots are trained from basic flying training onwards to execute complex sorties
while adapting their route, fuel calculations, communications planning, and tactical decisions
on the fly so that when enemy action, weather, or mechanical failures change things, they still
hit their assigned rendezvous and weapon release points accurately to within several
seconds.58 This is simply not a skill set that can be quickly learned or backfilled if it is not a core
part of an air force’s training DNA.
Put simply, VKS has never trained its pilots to operate in the relatively independent, mission
command-focused way that RAF, US Air Force, Armée de l’Air or other Western air forces have
always done. Instead, Russian pilots are trained to perform narrower mission profiles under
tighter command and control arrangements in smaller formations. Therefore, when the
invasion of Ukraine began, neither the pilot capacity nor a sufficient understanding among VKS
commanders of the practical planning requirements were present to enable COMAOs at scale
to facilitate effective offensive counter-air, SEAD/DEAD, and strike tasks. Instead, as detailed
in the first section, Russian fighters flew CAPs and launched ARMs while individual or pairs of
strike aircraft were sent to hit individual air defense targets.
It should be pointed out at this stage that the inability to conduct COMAOs and, consequently,
the inability to sequence effective SEAD/DEAD operations with effective deep strike and
offensive counter-air sweeps should not have come as a major surprise to Western analysts
given the traditional doctrinal role of the VKS within the Russian military as a whole. Russia
has long relied primarily on its extensive ground-based integrated air defense system (IADS)
to control the air in any conflict with NATO forces. The US and NATO collectively have a fairly
unassailable technology and experience lead in the air-to-air domain. The devastating lethality
of NATO airpower against ground forces once air superiority had been attained has also been
repeatedly demonstrated over Iraq, the Balkans, and Libya. Therefore, Russia has long
doctrinally and financially prioritised denying NATO airpower the ability to operate effectively
rather than the ability to project VKS sorties into defended airspace. By the same token, NATO
has collectively under-invested in GBAD capabilities since the end the of Cold War. Where
Russia has made investments, they have generally been in systems such as Patriot PAC-3 and
THAAD that are optimised for anti-ballistic missile work rather than intercepting combat
aircraft.59 Consequently, the primary high-end threat that the VKS itself had to plan to face was
from NATO fighter aircraft rather than NATO SAM systems. This was a further incentive to
deprioritise investment in the specialist weapons and training required to conduct
SEAD/DEAD effectively at scale.
The observed VKS limitations around close air support (CAS) and battlefield interdiction in
Ukraine should also not have been surprising given the known deficiencies in Russian laserand GPS/GLONASS-guided PGMs and targeting pods compared to Western multirole fighters.60
Modern targeting pods such as the Litening III and Sniper are vital to Western CAS tactics as
performed by fighter aircraft and bombers. They provide a sensor with well-stabilised multispectral optics that allow target acquisition, identification, tracking, and designation from a
holding orbit at a sufficient distance and altitude to remain outside the reach of short-range air
defense systems and MANPADS.61 However, despite producing several prototype targeting
pods for potential export customers, the VKS has not bought them for its own fast jet fleets and
so lacks this crucial capability.62
As a dedicated ground-attack aircraft, the Su-34 has a retractable electro-optical sensor with
laser-designation capabilities called “Platan,” but this only provides a limited field of view
forward and downwards and does not include thermal sighting capability for night or bad
weather operations.63 The fixed SOLT-25 sensor on the Su-25SM3 or the Kaira 24 retractable
system on the older Su-24M come with even worse field-of-view limitations, although the
SOLT-25 at least includes an infrared capability.64 In addition to the fixed forward field of view,
Russian optical targeting systems provide significantly worse stabilisation and zoom
performance compared to Western targeting pods, further limiting VKS pilots’ ability to rapidly
find and accurately identify battlefield targets from a safe distance. What this means in practice
is that even dedicated Russian ground-attack aircraft have to fly toward a target area while
trying to locate, identify, and then designate and drop/fire weapons at Ukrainian positions or
vehicles, using sensors with limited bad weather performance, poor stabilisation, and limited
resolution and zoom capabilities. This results in greatly increased time pressure and cockpit
workload and a flight path that increases vulnerability while within effective sensor range of
battlefield targets. For fighters such as the Su-35S and Su-30SM, the situation is even worse,
since the only really viable way to conduct CAS with PGMs against targets that do not show up
on radar or have a known fixed GPS/GLONASS position is to fly toward them while trying to
use an electro-optical or IR sensor on the missile itself to locate, identify, and lock onto targets.
The sensors on missiles are by nature more constrained by cost, space, weight, and power
limitations than those fitted to aircraft or targeting pods, so they provide worse image
resolution, zoom, resolution, and stabilisation. They also have much more limited fields of view
than targeting pods or even systems like Platan or SOLT-25.
In Syria, many of these limitations were mitigated by the fact that the VKS was able to operate
fixed-wing bombing sorties at medium altitude outside the range of MANPADS so that it could
take its time to find, designate, and hit targets. Even then, most of the munitions dropped were
unguided bombs, and the targets were primarily fixed fighting positions or besieged urban
areas. The success of the Russian air campaign in Syria largely hinged on the fact that
opposition groups had no way to contest control of the air and were struggling to hold ground
under sustained bombardment with little capacity to maneuver unpredictably. In Ukraine, the
VKS’s inability to destroy Ukrainian mobile SAM systems has prevented them from operating
at altitude beyond the frontlines, and the vulnerability of its jets and helicopters to MANPADS
when flying very low has prevented repeat passes over targets within visual range. In this
context, the VKS’s technical limitations go a long way towards explaining why its relatively
inexperienced crews have struggled to effectively conduct battlefield interdiction or CAS.
Without targeting pods, they can only reliably hit fixed targets pre-identified by friendly troops,
HUMINT sources, or UAVs using standoff weapons or conduct standoff barrages against area
targets with rockets.
Many of these limitations stem not from inherent Russian technological limitations, but from
the fact that the Russian military as a whole has long relied on massed artillery, armored
vehicles, and land-based precision fires for the core of its tactical and operational level
battlefield lethality rather than CAS. Therefore, Russia has not invested heavily in the sort of
sensors, weapons, and pilot training that Western air forces have taken for granted after
decades of counter-insurgency campaigns where airpower provided the majority of deployed
joint force firepower. Consequently, it should not have been a surprise for Western observers
that the VKS proved poor at conducting dynamic CAS and interdiction on the battlefield in
Ukraine.65

VKS Medium- and Long-term Threat Outlook

Spoiler

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In assessing the threat posed by the VKS to Ukrainian military fortunes in the ongoing war to
retake territory still illegally occupied by Russian forces, it is crucial to understand why it has
not had a major effect on the ground war so far. First and foremost, it is because of Russia’s
failure to establish control of the air over most of Ukraine, and even over most frontline areas.
This is almost entirely due to the inability of the VKS to fly COMAOs and bring the required mix
of SEAD/DEAD capabilities to bear to reliably suppress, fix, and destroy Ukrainian mobile
SAMs. This is important because it follows that the threat that the VKS can pose to Ukraine in
the ongoing war is almost entirely dependent on whether Ukraine can sustain its GBAD
coverage near the frontlines. Ukraine has lost a significant number of SA-11 and SA-8 SAM
systems over the course of the war, primarily to artillery, missile, and loitering munition strikes
after being located and designed by Orlan-10 UAVs operated by Russian ground forces.66
Furthermore, Ukraine is increasingly reliant on external missile supplies to keep its Sovietmade SAM systems combat-effective because of the high rate of ammunition consumption
required to continuously intercept Russian aircraft, UAVs, and cruise missiles throughout the
country.67
Russia’s fighter force has shown that it is more than capable of overmatching Ukrainian fighter
aircraft due to the great disparities in radar and missile performance, as well as superior
Russian numbers and electronic warfare equipment. Furthermore, the VKS attack aircraft
fleets have proven in Syria that they can be brutally effective against fixed defensive positions,
cities, and infrastructure targets if they are able to operate freely at medium altitude.68
Therefore, if Ukraine’s SAM systems cannot be kept resupplied, augmented, and ultimately
replaced by Western partner nations, then the VKS could credibly threaten to overpower the
UkrAF’s remaining fighters and gain control of the airspace over the frontlines in key areas.
This would pose a serious risk to the Ukrainian Army’s ability to sustainably hold fixed
defensive positions, assemble reinforcements and reserve units in rear areas, and safely
marshal ammunition and logistics supplies. However, if Ukraine can maintain its current levels
of tactical and strategic SAM coverage, then it is unlikely that the VKS will be able to
significantly change its fortunes so far into the war.
In terms of a threat to NATO nations in a medium-term context, the Russian airpower picture
remains largely unchanged. The two major Russian military capability areas that threaten the
ability of NATO to establish and exploit air superiority, and thereby credibly defend its
territory in the event of Russian aggression, have always been the IADS and long-range
precision strike capabilities. Both of these capabilities have performed very effectively in
Ukraine.
Russian SAM systems have proven extremely lethal against both Ukrainian aircraft and also, in
many cases, munitions when emplaced and operating within the IADS as doctrinally intended.
From very long-range S-400 launches against low-flying Ukrainian fighters and ground-attack
aircraft guided by exotic radars like the 48Ya6-K1 to medium- and short-range engagements
by SA-17s and SA-15s, Russian SAMs remain the primary killer of Ukrainian fast jets
helicopters, and UAVs.69 Furthermore, despite some success with the AGM-88 HARM missile
since summer 2022, Russian SAM losses in Ukraine remain a small fraction of Russia’s total
inventory.70 As such, the Russian IADS remains a serious threat to NATO’s ability to rapidly
establish control of the air over the battlespace in any medium-term clash. The extent that this
remains the case will depend on whether or not European NATO air forces prioritise the
regeneration the capability to conduct SEAD/DEAD against Russia’s modern, mobile SAM
systems at scale in the coming years.71
In terms of cruise and ballistic missiles, salvos from VKS LRA, ground-based Iskander systems,
and naval platforms have consistently proven accurate enough hit their targets in quantity at
great distances.72 The threat to NATO from the VKS was always primarily cruise missiles and
air-launched quasi-ballistic missiles fired from the LRA Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers and Mig31K modified interceptors, respectively. These assets allow the VKS to credibly threaten NATO
air forces with large salvos of accurate precision-guided missiles against the main operating
bases lacking air defenses that are largely the norm in Europe following decades of
uncontested Western air operations. Against Ukraine, the LRA fleets have consistently
maintained solid readiness and a reliable launch tempo from the first waves of the invasion to
the winter bombardment of Ukrainian power and water infrastructure. These bombardments
have depleted stockpiles, but Russia maintains the ability to produce at least 6 9M723 Iskander
ballistic missiles and around 40 cruise missiles per month, so even a pause of a few years would
allow the VKS to rebuild a sufficient arsenal to cause major damage to NATO bases not
protected by layered GBAD.73 If effective Western sanctions succeed in cutting the flow of key
sub-components to Russian factories, then a key determinant of sustainable re-armament
efforts in this area (and elsewhere) will be the degree to which China steps in to assist with key
components or even whole systems once a ceasefire is reached in Ukraine.7
The medium-term threat to European NATO from the VKS fighter, fighter-bomber/groundattack, and helicopter gunship fleets should be understood in this context. Ukrainian
experience has confirmed that the VKS is not capable of effective SEAD/DEAD, is not good at
organic CAS or battlefield interdiction, and almost certainly cannot meet the best Western air
superiority types head-on. However, civilian analysts and military intelligence agencies were
likely aware of these facts before the invasion.75 It is unlikely that Russia will be able to fix
many of these deficiencies for the foreseeable future, especially since the skills required to
routinely employ combinations of air assets in COMAOs would require total reform of basic
pilot training and sufficient time for the resulting skills to be promoted up to operational
commander level. The primary threats to European NATO airpower were always Russia’s longrange precision strike and IADS, and those capabilities have been largely verified as effective
in Ukraine.
Despite poor tactical employment and an unworkable strategic plan, the Russian ground forces
have also proven resilient in the face of terrible losses and able to concentrate vicious massed
artillery and electronic warfare effects when on the attack. In a future frontal, single-axis clash
over disputed territory with NATO forces, the Russian military would not fundamentally need
air superiority to threaten NATO. Instead, it requires the ability to deny NATO air superiority
until ground can be taken with massed artillery firepower, and then nuclear threats can be
made to try to secure those gains. Therefore, the dangerous but not first-class combat air patrol
and strike capabilities against fixed targets that the VKS might bring to any future NATO
confrontation should be seen for what they are: a situationally potent second echelon behind
the primary IADS, long-range precision strike, and massed artillery threats.
In terms of the VKS’s long-term equipment plans, the primary question is whether or not China
ultimately chooses to supply its more modern sensors, targeting pods, PGMs, and air-to-air
missiles to help Russia re-arm after the war. This would require a significant policy change on
both sides, but it is unarguable that Russia will depend on Chinese economic and component
supply support anyway, and that China has a strong geopolitical interest in Russia remaining a
military threat to European security to tie down US and European NATO capabilities away from
the Indo-Pacific. Either way, with a faltering economy likely to remain fragile and under
extensive sanctions, Russia’s own military-industrial complex is likely to fall back on producing
and attempting to modernize existing types. Therefore, the VKS threat is likely to remain
concentrated around its existing bomber, Foxhound, Flanker, and Fullback fleets and the
missiles they carry, rather than vanity programs like the Su-57 Felon, Su-70 Okhotnik-B, or
PAK DA bomber, which are unlikely to see production in large quantities.
76

CAS-close air support
Iznenadjenje /otkrice konflikta...

the fact that Russian pilots
and planning staff lack the ability to plan, organize, and execute composite air operations
(COMAOs). COMAO is a NATO term used to describe missions where “dissimilar types of
aircraft interact in coordinated actions, to achieve defined military objectives within a given
time and geographical area…normally involving between 20–100 aircraft

Prevod:činjenica da ruski piloti
i osoblje za planiranje nemaju sposobnost planiranja, organiziranja i izvođenja složenih vazdušnih operacija
(COMAOs). COMAO je NATO termin koji se koristi za opisivanje misija u kojima su „različiti tipovi
vazduhoplovi međusobno deluju u koordinisanim akcijama, kako bi postigli definisane vojne ciljeve u okviru datog
vrijeme i geografsko područje... obično uključuje između 20-100 aviona

Zakljucak zadnjeg dijela

Ukrajinsko iskustvo je potvrdilo da VKS nije sposoban za učinkovit SEAD/DEAD, nije dobar u tome
organski CAS ili zabrana bojnog polja, i gotovo sigurno ne može zadovoljiti najbolji zapadni zrak
tipovi superiornosti direktno. Međutim, bili su civilni analitičari i vojne obavještajne agencije
vjerovatno svjestan ovih činjenica prije invazije.75 Malo je vjerovatno da će Rusija to moći popraviti
mnogi od ovih nedostataka u doglednoj budućnosti, posebno jer su potrebne vještine
rutinsko korištenje kombinacija vazdušnih sredstava u COMAO-ima bi zahtijevalo potpunu reformu osnovnih
obuku pilota i dovoljno vremena da se rezultirajuće vještine unaprijede u operativne
nivo komandanta. Primarne prijetnje evropskim NATO zračnim snagama uvijek su bili ruski precizni udari dugog dometa i IADS, a te sposobnosti su u velikoj mjeri potvrđene kao efikasne
u Ukrajini.

Pojmovi
GBAD-ground-based air defence
SEAD-Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
DEAD-Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses
COMAO-Composite Air Operations Course

[sumirprimus]

i u odnosu na amere navikani su.
s tim da ameri nose te brojeve do kraja, koliko imaju ljudi u tim jedinicama nema sumnje u njihovu obuku, dok sad na osnovu iskustva iz ukrajine mali je broj obcenih ruja koji wse mogu nositi.

Ameri su broj 1 pa onda ide 10 praznih mjesta pa nek se ostali redaju kako hoce. I to ne samo kad su specijalne jedinice u pitanju. Svaki vid, rod, sluzba u Americkim oruzanim snagama su najbolji na svijetu u poslu koji rade. Sve to iz ratova koje su vodili naravno ali... to je posao vojske jbg. Neke vojske nikad ne nauce. Negdje sam citao da Rusi nisu u stanju u isto podrucje poslati vise od ne znam ovako 4 aviona da koordinisano dijeluju jedan npr za dogfight jedan za bombardovanje jedan za EW i jedan za... nadzor, radar kako hoces... Ameri su u stanju da 100 aviona drze konstantno u zraku da izvrsavaju zadatke i da se vracaju nazad na npr nosac po resurse (municija, gorivo) i u isto vijeme koordinisu djelovanje sa jedinicama na vodi ili na zemlji. PS Da... i njima se desavaju greske ali ... za razliku od drugih poslije svake misije u TRADOC se uzari da apsolviraju naucene lekcije.

Znam da me ne vole zbog toga, ali iduci po stepenu organizacije i djelovanja su IDF sa svojim rodovima vojske ,specijalnim jedinicama i integriranim sistemima djelovanja, po uzoru na amere. Mali ameri.

[agent_zero]

Spoiler

Show

Jos malo o ovom malom debelom fasisti u pojusaju. Tacno se vidi linija spajnja svih ovih supaka od dodoika do tukera karlsona od orbana do trumpa.
Ne mos pogrijesit

To je ta putinofilska i rusofilska bagra koja se nakotila po USA i EU.

Što prije razbiti tu bagru!

[TheProfessional]

Cisto radi fakata.. Spetznaz nije jedna specijalna jedinica, vec uopcen naziv za specijalnu jedinicu u vecini bivsih sovjetskih republika. Kopnena vojska ima 7 takvih brigada. Nisam siguran koliko ima mornarica. FSB takodje odrzava spetznaz jedinice i u njihovom sastavu je poznata Alfa grupa.

Kako god, rusi vise nemaju taj luksuz da salju specijalne utrenirane jedinice na tajne zadatke, mozda ta Alfa, ovo ostalo je desetkovano, poranjavano, pobijeno, zarobljeno.
Ove mornaricke i padobranske jedinice su u rangu evo dajem primjer ko njemacke SS jedinice ili 101 americka padobranska itd.Kad te jedinice pocnes gubiti, tu debelo nesta ne stima.Il mjenjaj taktiku il se uvuci u odbranu.Napadat sa robijasima, to je cirkuz.
Evo dovoljna je jedna 93th potpomugnuta specijalnim drugim jedinicama da amortizuje napad i desetkuje ih.To su uradili i kod Izjuma, samo sto ovdje imaju manji opseg djelovanja i u kotlusu i to urbanom.Oni da su bili oko Soledara ili Krasne Gore kao i jos neke brigade koje su njihovog ranga, to bi bio ruski pokolj, i ovako je al to bi bilo 20:1.

Sa 101 air assault bi se mogla mjeriti npr 76 divizija iz Pskova koja je izgubila cijeli puk, dakle trecinu svoje ajmo reci ofanzivne snage.

I slazem se ja da su Ruske specijalne snage desetkovane (i vise od toga), ali ne bih ih otpisao potpuno. Ko zna mozda su Rusi (nazalost) nesto i naucili pa nece poslati specijalne snage sa heklerima na mehanizovane jedinice. Nadam se da nisu al... radije bih racunao da ih imaju pa bio u krivu nego da me iznenade.

[agent_zero]

Nije za curice.
Kome se gadi telegram ima twiter link.

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[sumirprimus]

najveci problem za oporavak tih jedinica je sto rujama rat jos traje a ljudi im ocajno tebaju , tako se mobilise i salje na liniju sve.
vidimo da nisu bas izbirljivi prilikom rotacija jedinica i da vesovi i ne igraju neku ulogu...

[sumirprimus]

tokmak je jedan od ovih perdvidjenih ciljeva u ukr prodoru ka jugu...

[agent_zero]

Ovo je vrlo ozbiljna izjava jebt.

„U južnom pravcu u toku su radovi na čišćenju okupirane lijeve obale Dnjepra. Poslednjih dana rezultati rada su „veoma moćni“ — Natalija Humenjuk, portparolka OK „Pivden“.

Dnevno je uništavano od 13 do 20 jedinica opreme Podorsky.

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@mysiagin_chat

To su pripremne operacije.

Ne može ofanziva započeti dok se nema utvrđen teritorij na lijevoj obali Dnjepra.

[TheProfessional]

Znam da me ne vole zbog toga, ali iduci po stepenu organizacije i djelovanja su IDF sa svojim rodovima vojske ,specijalnim jedinicama i integriranim sistemima djelovanja, po uzoru na amere. Mali ameri.

Slazem se sa ovim u jednoj mjeri. Razlog: Ameri su ipak svi profesionalci a IDF je ipak regrutna vojska. Takodje IDF djeluje na teritoriji duplo manjoj od BiH a Ameri su jedini koji mogu vrsiti projekciju sile bilo gdje i bilo kad (ne uvijek i ne po svaki cijenu). Ali definitivno nivo integracije je jako slican.

Mislim da je uvodenje BTC u kopnenu vojsku i slican pristup u svim drugim vidovima, najveci "izum" americkih oruzanih snaga u novom milenijumu do sada. Od uvodjenja, nivo zrtava, nivo zamora ljudstva, nivo potrosnosti logistike je znacajno smanjem a znacajno povecan sa druge strane operativni ocinak, obuka, komandovanje i kontrola, iskoristivost logistike i sl

[sumirprimus]

Znam da me ne vole zbog toga, ali iduci po stepenu organizacije i djelovanja su IDF sa svojim rodovima vojske ,specijalnim jedinicama i integriranim sistemima djelovanja, po uzoru na amere. Mali ameri.

Slazem se sa ovim u jednoj mjeri. Razlog: Ameri su ipak svi profesionalci a IDF je ipak regrutna vojska. Takodje IDF djeluje na teritoriji duplo manjoj od BiH a Ameri su jedini koji mogu vrsiti projekciju sile bilo gdje i bilo kad (ne uvijek i ne po svaki cijenu). Ali definitivno nivo integracije je jako slican.

Mislim da je uvodenje BTC u kopnenu vojsku i slican pristup u svim drugim vidovima, najveci "izum" americkih oruzanih snaga u novom milenijumu do sada. Od uvodjenja, nivo zrtava, nivo zamora ljudstva, nivo potrosnosti logistike je znacajno smanjem a znacajno povecan sa druge strane operativni ocinak, obuka, komandovanje i kontrola, iskoristivost logistike i sl

naravno, no sistem djelovanja, po americkoj strategiji prilagodjen velicini i brojkama za BI, a tice se odgovora i reagovanja nema im ravnih.
jasno da su ameri svijet za sebe samim brojevima i ersursima. te sam analize davno citao, i nevjerovatna slicnost da ne kazem kopi pjest prilagodba idfu i njihovim potrebama. mislim da sam i ovde nekad davno postavljao.
jedna stvar koja ih odvaja od rusa i arapskih rezima, sposobni a ne podobni.

[TheProfessional]

Slazem se sa ovim u jednoj mjeri. Razlog: Ameri su ipak svi profesionalci a IDF je ipak regrutna vojska. Takodje IDF djeluje na teritoriji duplo manjoj od BiH a Ameri su jedini koji mogu vrsiti projekciju sile bilo gdje i bilo kad (ne uvijek i ne po svaki cijenu). Ali definitivno nivo integracije je jako slican.

Mislim da je uvodenje BTC u kopnenu vojsku i slican pristup u svim drugim vidovima, najveci "izum" americkih oruzanih snaga u novom milenijumu do sada. Od uvodjenja, nivo zrtava, nivo zamora ljudstva, nivo potrosnosti logistike je znacajno smanjem a znacajno povecan sa druge strane operativni ocinak, obuka, komandovanje i kontrola, iskoristivost logistike i sl

naravno, no sistem djelovanja, po americkoj strategiji prilagodjen velicini i brojkama za BI, a tice se odgovora i reagovanja nema im ravnih.
jasno da su ameri svijet za sebe samim brojevima i ersursima. te sam analize davno citao, i nevjerovatna slicnost da ne kazem kopi pjest prilagodba idfu i njihovim potrebama. mislim da sam i ovde nekad davno postavljao.

Ovaj koncept djelovanja im je drugaciji al pristup kad je u pitanju integracija je isti to se slazem. Opet... naucene lekcije iz npr Mogadishua ili ... Bjeruta kad je u pitanju IDF. Ameri vise ne salju kopnene snage dok prvo ne "omeksaju" teren artiljerijom ili avijacijom a onda i samim izvidanjem iz druge kuce bilo da se radi o CIA, SFOD-D ili bilo kojim drugim operativcima.

IDF je otisao korak dalje sa time (u pogresnom pravcu) sa tzv Dahiya doktrinom.

Sorry za ovaj offtopic

[sumirprimus]

AH I ta , ucenje iz gresaka. kak svojih tak i tudjih.
ercimo ovo sto ruje sad rade, sjetite se sa pocetka invazije onog rusa glumac politicar ko je vec postavljan je i na ovoj temi, kako je ocrnio i popljuvo ruski vojni i politicki vrh, sad taj klip da stavimo od prije godinu sve je on ovo predvidio jer su isti bili i u ceceniji, i nista se promijenilko nije. dakle nista nisu naucili iz spopstvenih gresaka.
kako se zove..

[madner]

Bahmut je glupost i svako pravdanje istog je odbijanje prihvatanja cinjenica. Kao ne moze biti tako glupo kako izgleda, mora imati veci smisao.

Ova ideja da ljudi sa vezama pomognu brigade moze biti genijalna ili glupa, ocekujem da ce biti neka normalna distribucija tih ishoda.

Ne znam koji je smisao povlačiti se bez borbe ako znaš da dušman neće stati bar do Slavjanska i Kramatorska

U gradu se lakše braniti nego na livadi. Najvažnije je da ZSU nisu potpuno opkoljeni.

Ginu i Ukrajinci, u ratu se gine jbg, ali Bahmut je sigurno najveća ruska grobnica nskon ww2

Pa bila je borba, kada je pala Krasna Gora tu je nastao problem.

Imalo je smisla drzati grad dok se ne uspostavi nova linija, ali a) ne znam zasto ta linija nije vec tu, b) tlo se moze lakse vratiti neko iskusne jedinice.

Da li je Rusima lakse kada ih napadnu nove brigade ili 92 i 93?

[agent_zero]

Bahmut:

[sumirprimus]

[sumirprimus]

mix bubova

[agent_zero]

Rusofašisti gađali muzej u Kupjansku sa S-300:



A ovo je vrlo bitno, valjda ne ostane na obećanjima:

[sumirprimus]

31 vozilo i cisterne, 24 bpl, 12 oklopjnaka, i 690 orka, ne predobro ne prelose, taman mjera.

[agent_zero]

Dejstvovanje BMP-a po rusofašistima u Bahmutu:

[sumirprimus]

prica o putinovim bunkerima..