Novi izvjestaj RUSI instituta, ovaj put o ruskoj obavjestajnoj aktivnosti u Ukrajini. Vecinu informacija smo mi na temi vec znali, ali je jako dobro sumirano na jednom mjestu. Neki interesatni detalji, kao npr. da su dobar dio "nacista" u Ukrajini bili placeni ruski provokatori.
Prior to the invasion, Ukrainian law enforcement accuses him of receiving money to organise protests in Kyiv and three other oblasts at which extreme right-wing symbols would be prevalent and in which the protesters would accuse the government of failing to confront the threat from Russia. The intent was to infiltrate these protests with paid criminals and agent provocateurs to spark violent confrontations with the police. The original idea was to present the protests as an attempted ‘far-right coup’ and to use them as a justification for the invasion. It was also intended to sow internal instability among the Ukrainian resistance.
Before joining the pro-Russia camp in 2019, Kiva pretended to be a radical Ukrainian nationalist known for his aggressive Russophobia. Immediately after the Revolution of Dignity, Kiva joined the leadership of the paramilitary organisation Right Sector, and soon after joined the National Police of Ukraine, where he headed the Department of Anti-Drug Trafficking, as well as the trade union of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
The population was divided into five core categories:
1. Those deemed leaders of Ukrainian nationalism who were specified for physical liquidation on a high-priority target list, or for capture to enable show trials.
2. Those suspected of intending to support acts of resistance who needed to be recruited or suppressed including anyone associated with Ukrainian law enforcement, local government, the military or related to officials that were not actively collaborating.
3. Those who were deemed apathetic.
4. Those actively collaborating with Russian forces.
5. Individuals who were necessary for running critical national infrastructure and had to be controlled.
Within each town the TOG would appoint a garrison commander from the Russian military who would have an assigned detachment of garrison troops. These troops would occupy a building – usually the police or fire station – and set up facilities for detention, processing, interrogation and torture. The fact that the layout of these facilities is consistent throughout the country, and the equipment used in torture chambers, including specialised electrocution machines, were the same across multiple oblasts demonstrates that this was a systematic plan and not improvised sadism.
Based on its experiences in Chechnya, the planning assumption was that 8% of the population needed to collaborate, whether proactively or under coercion, to enable the counterintelligence regime to be effective. The Ukrainian intelligence community, based on assessments of those areas where the Russians did establish control, concluded that the FSB was broadly correct in its requirements for local support.
For those in senior positions or responsible for critical national infrastructure who were not active collaborators, the Russians worked to build leverage over them. In most cases this was first achieved through direct intimidation. Mayors, for example, were often taken in for questioning and received beatings, only to be released. Additionally, many persons in this category had members of their family detained and tortured. It was usually made clear to the person who was a target for leverage that other members of their family could also be detained, or the detained family members tortured further, if they did not comply with Russian instructions. This was also done by targeting Ukrainian officials within Ukrainian-controlled territory who had family members on the occupied territories. Generally speaking, the purpose of torture was to build leverage, evident from both the communications sent by the TOG to the target and as the victim was not subjected to questioning during or after their torture, but was simply tortured and then released.
Prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the number of Spetsnaz units in Russian formations had been expanding rapidly. Most military analysts anticipated that this would lead to Russian formations having a much stronger reconnaissance and direct action capability organic to their brigades. In the Second Chechen War, and in Syria, the Russian military had extensively employed Spetsnaz as reconnaissance troops to screen its advances and in other special forces roles. This was done for some formations during the invasion. For example, Spetsnaz punched into Kharkiv significantly ahead of the conventional forces. Although these formations could have been employed more widely in this way, the expansion of Spetsnaz units had contributed to a shortage of competent contract infantry for the wider Russian military – as most competent infantry had been pushed toward Spetsnaz and airborne units. For the invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin limited the number of conscripts in its battalion tactical groups, while the size of the invasion force prevented the concentration of personnel from across the force to bring those units committed to their full complement.
As a result, many Battlegroups were significantly under strength. Russian armoured personnel carriers often contained as few as three infantry. This may not have been a problem if the purpose of the Ground Force was to shock and awe the Ukrainians into folding, enabling the mechanisms of repression to get into Ukraine’s cities and establish control. Once the Russian military found itself in heavy fighting, however, the shortage of infantry became a serious problem. The lack of effective line infantry units caused Spetsnaz units to be deployed mostly as light infantry, which also led to a high level of casualties among these units. Far fewer Spetsnaz were therefore available for special forces missions.
https://static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Uncon ... al.pdf.pdf
