Ukrajina

[mist]

Malo se vjezba sa bnt-ovim minobacacima.

[jednonogi_Jack]

Kako fercera dopunjavanje ovih patriot baterija? Koliko sam vidio na videima ona jedna baterija ima 4 projektila koji izlaze iz tako da kazem neke zatvorene kutije koja pukne nakon ispaljenja. Onda se valjda stavi nova "kutija" sa 4 projektila kad se ispale sva 4 stara?
Cujem da su i zalihe patriot projektila tanke. Kaze zoka da Amerika nije htjela/imala prodati saudiji dodatne rakete pa su morali traziti po drugim zemljama. Mada ne znam na sta su saudijci to trosili. Na dronove? Nesposobni kamilasi, ne cudi me od njih doduse.
Opet kazem....mislim da ovo nije nikakav game changer. Pa i danas ukrajina jelte obara 80% projektila i dronova. Ne vjerujem da ce ikad otici na 100% kako god.
Koliko balistickih iran dostavlja rusiji? Mozda je ovo sve igra da se iran poprilicno opeljesi pa da nemaju za sebe dovoljno kad/ako krene belaj.

Ovo je vise simbolicno, mozda stave bateriju dvije u kijevu i lavovu. Mozda oko nekih bitnih stvari, aerodroma ili nesto tako.

Može ti zoka sve to objasniti.
On je poznat po svom stručnom znanju.
Pogotovo o air defence.
Zna ga čitav dunjaluk po tome.

[Gandalf]

evo još jednog đavolu da istovara ćumur

[Gandalf]

rašisti i ne znaju drugačije nego po civilima

[Čitalac]

Britansko ministarstvo odbrane ne može da potvrdi glasine da je glavnokomandujući ruske vojske Gerasimov uklonjen sa položaja, ali naglašava da su tenzije u ruskom vojnom vrhu poprilično visoke.

[Gandalf]

budućnost ratovanja je u malim brzim vozilima, na koja možeš namontirati, bukvalno sve

[Gandalf]

kakvi debili jbt, ali daju dobar uvid u šizofrenost režima koji zastupaju
definitivno učesnike ovih emisija treba sve redom izvesti pred međunarodni tribunal za ratne zločine
oni su promotori agresije, ratni huškači i širitelji mržnje na globalnom nivou

[Čitalac]

U Teheranu ne odustaju od svoje verzije. Iranski ministar odbrane Mohammad Reza Ashtiani kaže da predstavnici Kijeva tokom sastanka nisu predočili „niti jedan dokaz da Rusija koristi iranske dronove“.

Ukrainian officials have not provided any proof for their accusation that Russia is deploying Iranian drones in its war with Ukraine, according to Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani. Ashtiani made the comments following a technical discussion between Iranian and Ukrainian experts.
"At the technical meeting, the Ukrainian side did not give any evidence of Russia's deployment of Iranian drones in the fight with this state," he remarked.
In the conflict in Ukraine, he continued, allegations that Russian forces utilized drones built in Iran are meaningless since they are based on "baseless statements and speculations." Russia and Iran have both vehemently refuted allegations that Tehran sent Moscow drones for use in the conflict in Ukraine.

[splinter]

[Point.]

U Teheranu ne odustaju od svoje verzije. Iranski ministar odbrane Mohammad Reza Ashtiani kaže da predstavnici Kijeva tokom sastanka nisu predočili „niti jedan dokaz da Rusija koristi iranske dronove“.

Ukrainian officials have not provided any proof for their accusation that Russia is deploying Iranian drones in its war with Ukraine, according to Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani. Ashtiani made the comments following a technical discussion between Iranian and Ukrainian experts.
"At the technical meeting, the Ukrainian side did not give any evidence of Russia's deployment of Iranian drones in the fight with this state," he remarked.
In the conflict in Ukraine, he continued, allegations that Russian forces utilized drones built in Iran are meaningless since they are based on "baseless statements and speculations." Russia and Iran have both vehemently refuted allegations that Tehran sent Moscow drones for use in the conflict in Ukraine.

Lažu bradati smradovi.

[sumirprimus]

zanimljiv tred...
ukratko skoro pa nemoguca misija, logicki gledano, ali treba uzeti u obzir da se radi o rujama i da je sve moguce. jedini objektivan cilj bi bio u zapadnoj ukrajini prekid snadbijevanja iz poljske, i da pridju livovu na 100km,ali onda opet dodju do brojeva i uvjeta. rusi nemaju brojeve za tako nesto, dalje u tom sektoru tri su puta koja bi mogli iskoristiti zimi i sva tri su uska za usmjeravanje napada preko njih sto bi na pripremljenu odbranu ukra bio masakr. dalje za ofanzivno dejstvo trebaju oklope, sve bolje oklope su potrosiliy sto se vidi po povlacenju orudja iz magacina , treba im i ljudstvo, bjelorusi mogu dati 2 spremne brigade i max do 16k ljudi. ali moraju cuvati i istocni dio da im ukri ne bi usli sazada. trebaju im i oficiri, za jednu motorizovanu cetu 4, za bataljon 20ak, a za brigadu ukljucujuci i stab 100njak. cega vec nemaju tj fali im ljudstva sa iskustvom. povlace ljude sa svih mogucih pozicija vec svakako..
i on se opet vraca na ruske trupe za ofanzivna djelovanja sperman za duzi period borbi a odakle da ih isporuce pod punom ratnom opremom? vise misija nemoguca, no opet ruje su u pitanju ..
kompletan tred unrolovan...

Spoiler

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ChrisO_wiki

Twitter logo
35m • 73 tweets • 18 min read

has posted an excellent thread analysing the current military situation in Ukraine. In the first of a series, he looks at the likelihood of a joint Russian-Belarusian attack on northern Ukraine. Translation follows.
The Russian army's winter stalemate. Part 1. Is an offensive from Belarus possible or not?

Today we will begin to examine what the Russian army may undertake in the coming months and go over all fronts. Let's start from the top - with the alleged new attack from Belarus. /1

I should say right away that Putin's army may act unpredictably, because it depends on the Kremlin's decisions. Therefore I'll proceed from the Russian army's somewhat perverse and certainly criminal logic. Don't consider all this as a prediction, more as a reasoning. /2

Opening a new front or battle area is logical when a war or battle comes to a standstill. Right now Putin's army is at a stalemate - relying only on defence and unclear where and where to attack. On paper it seems that an attack in Western Ukraine would change that. But no. /3
What aims could such an attack serve? I will immediately discount the capture (or encirclement) of Kyiv and an offensive into the Chernihiv area. There are obviously not enough forces for the former, and the latter has no tangible result except the occupation of territory. /4
The only tangible objective could be the supply routes to Ukraine, which mainly go through Poland. In theory, by occupying western Ukraine, the Russian army could make it much more difficult to supply shells, equipment and even household items like generators. /5
Again, it is quite clear that capturing the entire west of the country is impossible. But if they advance at least partially, Russian MLRS and S-300 missiles for ground targets could regularly attack railways and highways. Which would lead to significant problems for Ukraine. /6
But to achieve such a goal, a significant foothold is needed. This would require the capture of several cities and large settlements. For example, to the Kovel-Sarny line with further attacks on Lutsk and Rivne. /7

The airfield in Lutsk could be occupied, along with the Rivne nuclear power plant near Varash. Two highways to Kiev would be blocked at once, and Lviv and Ternopil would be only 100-120 kilometres away. Any lesser advance simply does not make any sense. /8
Is it possible to attack on a smaller scale, along one road, say? But then the grouping will be more vulnerable – it's easier to attack one column, the logistics are even more difficult and the result is negligible. The Ukrainians will easily defeat a localised attack. /9
Battlefield. Having defined the goal, we must consider the known conditions of the battlefield. Winter precipitation is expected. Most likely, it will be possible to move only along known roads or specially laid paths. /10
Image
There are few roads in this area – only three, to be exact. All three roads leading from Belarus to Western Ukraine have one thing in common – they are narrow. The quality of the surface does matter – the trucks will cope. But the width does make a difference. /11

The Russian army got stuck at the beginning of the war on the narrow road to Kiev. Similar problems await them here. Here they face similar problems. And around the roads there are forests and swamps. Swamps that do not freeze in winter. /12
In other words, if there is an attack from Belarus, the bulk of the troops and all supplies of the Russian army will be trapped on three narrow roads under the fire of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which has already been prepared. /13

Putin's units will be advancing through unfamiliar territory. And the AFU will defend on prepared terrain. Mines, roadblocks, artillery positions, and well-developed movement patterns of the units all create a great advantage for the Ukrainians. /14

All significant targets are far from the border. In other words, for a long time the Russian army will have to pass essentially in a void, without any significant successes. The airfields will not be in the way. The Ukrainians can evacuate and retreat if necessary. /15
At the same time, the attackers' flanks will also be under threat, or the invasion zone would have to be expanded to the border with Poland, but that may cause nuances with NATO. In general, the battlefield on the border of Ukraine and Belarus is difficult to attack now. /16
The forces of the sides. An offensive can succeed even in difficult conditions if the forces are not equal. Monte Cassino was taken. And the Stalingrad victory, let's face it, wasn't achieved by stealth. Let's consider the strengths of both armies. First of all, Russia. /17
According to various sources, there are currently 9-12,000 mobilized people in Belarus who are being trained. Because there are not enough training ranges in Russia. But we can assume that this is the same grouping for an attack. However, this is absolutely not enough! /18
The Russian army needs at least 3 mobile brigades (tank or motorized) and another 3 motorized infantry brigades or divisions to follow, support the attack and secure territory for the offensive along the three routes. /19
Total – 6 brigades + reserve. That is in the region of 40,000 men at least. Taking into account supply troops, additional artillery, special forces troops, I estimate a minimum possible grouping of 50,000 people. This counts only those who will take part in an offensive. /20
Let's go back to the calculations. Yes, in theory Putin has this many people, counting the newly mobilised. Apart from those 12,000 in Belarus he says there are a total of 150,000 people on the home front. However, no combat-ready units have been formed. /21
The Russian Ministry of Defence uses these mobilized men not as independent units, but to make up for the losses on the active front. This is partly because there are not enough equipment, supplies and officers to create large brigade-level units. /22
Moreover, officers play a decisive role. In a typical motorized rifle company, you can’t do without 4 officers, in a battalion there are already about 20 of them. And in a brigade, taking into account the command staff, there are more than 100. /23
If there are auxiliary units, then there are even more officers with unique skills.

Yes, it is theoretically possible to replace platoon commanders with, say, sergeants from among the more experienced soldiers. /24
The second difficulty is equipment. The Russian army is experiencing a severe shortage of tanks and armoured vehicles, which has been replenished even by deliveries from Belarus. There is a shortage of armoured vehicles even for the active front. /26

Suddenly it turned out that the T-62s are in storage, but the T-72s seem to have run out.

An offensive is impossible without armoured vehicles. /27
According to rough estimates before the invasion, on paper the Russian army had about 11,000 armoured vehicles, including tracked BMPs, wheeled APCs and unarmed MTLBs (3,500). Since then 2,800 have been lost according to Oryx. /28

Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/a ... pment.html
Taking into account that APCs, BMPs, MTLBs and other vehicles are actively being used in the fighting, I think that no less than 5–6,000 of them are being employed. It turns out that some vehicles remain, but quite close to 3,000, if the paper figures are to be believed. /29
But keep in mind that when replenishing, all good equipment is used first. If these machines are still stored somewhere, then they are literally the worst. Many probably need repair. Supplying old vehicles to units for offensive use is not a good idea. /30

It's the same with tanks, and artillery, including MLRS. What's more, mobilized people in Russia don't even have enough bulletproof vests and helmets, not even enough socks. Even finding 50,000 pairs of socks for a new attacking force is a difficult task for Russia right now. /31
Many are turning their attention to the Belarusian army. Could it become the backbone of the offensive? They've announced a combat readiness review again today, there are rumors of mobilisation and there's a lot of talk about Lukashenko's soldiers possibly being used. /32
The Belarusian armed forces officially number slightly less than 50,000. But that is all the armed forces. The ground forces number only 16,000 (infantry + special forces). Two mechanized brigades could theoretically lead the offensive. But who would remain in reserve? /33
Look at the map. The border between Ukraine and Belarus is quite long. Who will guarantee that by throwing all his forces into an adventurous attack, Lukashenko will not get a march of Ukrainian units to Minsk via Gomel and Bobruisk? /34
A march to overthrow the regime, which will surely be supported by the locals.

He needs a force that will cover both Gomel and Mozyr and also control the internal situation – more about that a little later. /35
Mobilisation in Belarus, firstly, is not quick, just like in Russia. Secondly, it will face similar problems and may result in mass protests. /36
Despite mobilisation, Putin's army is still in a situation of severe shortages. The attack we are discussing needs combat-ready, well-equipped units with reserves for 1-2 months of fighting. Where will they come from? /37
On the other side they will be met by the Ukrainian army, which is fighting on its own territory. Including the units covering Kyiv. Yes, most of the supplies and equipment are in the east. But the fact is that the defending forces need less of it. /38
Attacking with a Javelin is quite difficult. Sitting with a Javelin in an ambush waiting for enemy vehicles is workable. Yes, Ukraine would need two motorised brigades to provide a mobile defence. But if that fails, they can focus on static defence. /39

If we use an attack formula with a 3-to-1 strength ratio, it comes out that Ukraine needs only about 20,000 men for defence, taking other factors into account. This figure does not look unrealistic, I think Kyiv's defence is not less than that now. /40
Tactics of the sides. Assuming Putin's troops do decide to attack, what tactics should they expect? Can they outplay the Ukrainians with some special techniques? /41
So far, Russian units have used two methods of attack. The first is to get into trucks and drive forward until they start shelling. The second is to shoot a lot first, then storm the enemy positions, of which little is left. That's it. /42
To start breaking through Ukrainian territory, the Russian army will first have to win the border battle. And here they can use the second method of attack. Possibly using Belarusian artillery, missile strikes and bombing by Su-24 and Su-34 aircraft. /43
Is there any chance of winning? I think there is a minimum chance. The Russian army still has a lot of artillery and they can obviously bring more. /44
The shelling will be concentrated on 3-4 localised areas and it is not yet clear whether there are sufficiently reliable fortified areas in the first echelon of the AFU defence. /45
I think that with the competent use of all available firepower, Putin's forces may well penetrate 1-2 gaps in the Ukrainian defence – this is something to be feared. The AFU will probably retreat to the 2nd or even 3rd line to save forces. /46
And this is where the momentum of the offensive comes in.

As soon as the Russian army tries to launch a rapid attack along the roads in columns, the main danger awaits it. /47
They will not be able to reliably probe the entire territory and will definitely encounter ambushes, air strikes and attacks in the rear.

They will have to move artillery as well, which means bringing in a lot of ammunition and supplies. /48
In essence, the Russian army will face a situation similar to the beginning of the war. There is simply no other way out for an offensive from Belarus. There is no magic way to teleport troops.

On the other side will be the Ukrainians. /49
They will be experienced, well-armed and knowing how to fight Russian equipment. Ukrainians with HIMARS, M777s, CAESARs and Javelins. Ukrainians who are not afraid of the enemy. They will be free to choose defensive tactics. /50
The AFU can stand tight on the border, or it can flexibly retreat – only civilians will have to be evacuated, but there are not too many of them there. /51

The Ukrainians are more likely to apply a mixture of static and mobile defence, clinging to key defensive areas, wearing down Putin's army. /52
I do not see any way in which the Russian army could win. On the contrary, by attacking it will only engage in a knowingly lost battle. It will lose even more soldiers and equipment. In addition, it will waste a lot of resources that will not go to other fronts. /53
I think the Russian General Staff understands this. Most of them are clearly stupid of course, but Putin's generals have clearly been cautious of late. They have screwed up too much, so they will not risk starting something radically new. /54
Especially since the offensive from Belarus reeks of danger, and the flashbacks are not the most pleasant. Furthermore, there are clear political reasons why this adventure cannot take place. /55
Political and other external factors. These may well be the ones that carry the most weight for Putin (and it will of course only be he who decides on a new offensive). And here we need to delve a little into the world of Lukashenko's politics. /56
This dictator has just recently crushed protest with violent repression, with literally one foot in the air between Minsk and Rostov. Lukashenko is well
After all, Lukashenko was largely saved by Putin, who has no attention left for Belarus now. Moscow has much less power, and attention is focused on Ukraine. Therefore, the moustached cockroach can only rely on his loyal enforcers. /58
That is why I exclude the entry of the Belarusian army directly into the war. Firstly, no one knows how quickly it will revolt. Secondly, the absence of the army and security forces (and they will be sent too) at hand deprives Lukashenko of protection. /59
Mobilisation may become a trigger for protests.

Yes, he might still survive, but who knows for sure? And he has only one power - he does not want to lose it. /60
Lukashenko knows perfectly well that the Belarusians hate him and are ready to drive him away at a convenient opportunity. Therefore, he will try not to provide this opportunity. /61
Besides, both the authorities and the generals in Belarus understand how this war is going. That it is lost by Putin. No one will enter a lost war with weaker forces. All the more so as now there is also the risk of transferring hostilities onto the territory of Belarus. /62
One must also take into account international politics. I am sure Lukashenko still wants to sit on the "hello, I am a European" chair and believes that the EU will at least accept him, if not forgive him, as a kind of bridge between civilisation and Putin. /63
And a real war with Belarusians killed at the front would also break the thesis of stability, on which Lukashenko has also been riding for years. If men go to die, who will "toil peacefully in the factories and farms"? /64
All these factors will prevent Lukashenko using the army to support a Russian offensive into western Ukraine. And without this the Russian army will be even more hindered. There is another interesting factor, by the way, which should not be forgotten. /65
It's quite easy for Western and Ukrainian intelligence to keep track of military preparations in Belarus. There is a NATO country, Poland, nearby – reconnaissance aircraft easily fly from it. And after all that's happened in February, I think they're looking east pretty hard. /66
Which means there will be no surprise effect for the Russian grouping. Even their artillery positions will be caught on camera, troop concentrations and frontline depots. All of these will be targets for HIMARS if an attack begins. /67
The Russian grouping runs the risk of being left without supplies from the very start.

From this combination of factors, I believe that a Russian offensive from Belarus is an impossible gamble. /68
Again, Putin's insanity is impossible to predict and even such a suicidal attack could be launched on his personal order. /69
But within the Russian army's general logic, all the talk of an offensive from Belarus is just a way to scare the Ukrainians and distract the AFU. And undoubtedly, in this way this tactic works. The AFU has to keep some forces in the north to keep an eye on the neighbours. /70
There is no point in waiting for something new here – talk and news about another Belarusian army exercise and possible attack will continue, while Lukashenko and Putin will try to fuel all these fears. /71
This is only the first part of a series of threads about the situation in the war in winter. Next we will analyze the other fronts and areas of possible attacks by Ukraine. /72
But the main theme will remain the same - the impasse of the Russian army, which will most likely last until spring. /end

[sumirprimus]

Koliko gori na bahmut prqvcu govori i podatak da su objavili da su 2 strana volontera kao paramedici poginuli amerikanka i svedjanin. Prije toga dan bila je objava o pogibiji 2 poljaka i jos jednog amera.I bucko iz 93ce je objavio prije objave o povlacenju 93ce sa bahmuta o pogibiji druga iz jedinice i tezem ranjavanju jos jednog..
Slava Ukrajini i da izdrze

Amerikanka je navodno nakon te vijesti opovrgla vlastitu pogibiju svojom objavom na TW...

da vidio sam jutros, i drago mi je da su opovrgli..

[mishic]

Spoiler

Show

Snimci iz Mariupola sa pocetka rata. Na sta podsjeca?

Na bombardovanje Beograda u, nicim izazvanoj, agresiji NATO zlikovaca?

"Ničim izazvanoj agresiji" prethodilo je: " Porazili su ih svi, od Janšinih teritorijalaca, preko Hrvatske vojske, do Armije BiH i Oslobodilačke vojske kosova" onda se i Putinova i Vučićeva soldateska mogu porediti kao dva tigra od papira čiji komandanti misle da su velesile."

A onda je došao NATO da stavi tačku na ove poraze ali nažalost ni on nije u dovoljnoj mjeri poravnao sve što je trebalo poravnati. No nadamo se da je konačno shvatio to pa da će ako se desi slijedeći izazov posao uraditi do kraja.

[sumirprimus]

jel bilo?

[sumirprimus]

kazu ruski tenk nagazi na minu?..

[sumirprimus]

jesu bili snimvci? sta ono pise za razan?

[sumirprimus]

jel bilo bubova?

[Honda Rajvosa]

zanimljiv tred...
ukratko skoro pa nemoguca misija, logicki gledano, ali treba uzeti u obzir da se radi o rujama i da je sve moguce. jedini objektivan cilj bi bio u zapadnoj ukrajini prekid snadbijevanja iz poljske, i da pridju livovu na 100km,ali onda opet dodju do brojeva i uvjeta. rusi nemaju brojeve za tako nesto, dalje u tom sektoru tri su puta koja bi mogli iskoristiti zimi i sva tri su uska za usmjeravanje napada preko njih sto bi na pripremljenu odbranu ukra bio masakr. dalje za ofanzivno dejstvo trebaju oklope, sve bolje oklope su potrosiliy sto se vidi po povlacenju orudja iz magacina , treba im i ljudstvo, bjelorusi mogu dati 2 spremne brigade i max do 16k ljudi. ali moraju cuvati i istocni dio da im ukri ne bi usli sazada. trebaju im i oficiri, za jednu motorizovanu cetu 4, za bataljon 20ak, a za brigadu ukljucujuci i stab 100njak. cega vec nemaju tj fali im ljudstva sa iskustvom. povlace ljude sa svih mogucih pozicija vec svakako..
i on se opet vraca na ruske trupe za ofanzivna djelovanja sperman za duzi period borbi a odakle da ih isporuce pod punom ratnom opremom? vise misija nemoguca, no opet ruje su u pitanju ..
kompletan tred unrolovan...

Spoiler

Show

ChrisO_wiki

Twitter logo
35m • 73 tweets • 18 min read

has posted an excellent thread analysing the current military situation in Ukraine. In the first of a series, he looks at the likelihood of a joint Russian-Belarusian attack on northern Ukraine. Translation follows.
The Russian army's winter stalemate. Part 1. Is an offensive from Belarus possible or not?

Today we will begin to examine what the Russian army may undertake in the coming months and go over all fronts. Let's start from the top - with the alleged new attack from Belarus. /1

I should say right away that Putin's army may act unpredictably, because it depends on the Kremlin's decisions. Therefore I'll proceed from the Russian army's somewhat perverse and certainly criminal logic. Don't consider all this as a prediction, more as a reasoning. /2

Opening a new front or battle area is logical when a war or battle comes to a standstill. Right now Putin's army is at a stalemate - relying only on defence and unclear where and where to attack. On paper it seems that an attack in Western Ukraine would change that. But no. /3
What aims could such an attack serve? I will immediately discount the capture (or encirclement) of Kyiv and an offensive into the Chernihiv area. There are obviously not enough forces for the former, and the latter has no tangible result except the occupation of territory. /4
The only tangible objective could be the supply routes to Ukraine, which mainly go through Poland. In theory, by occupying western Ukraine, the Russian army could make it much more difficult to supply shells, equipment and even household items like generators. /5
Again, it is quite clear that capturing the entire west of the country is impossible. But if they advance at least partially, Russian MLRS and S-300 missiles for ground targets could regularly attack railways and highways. Which would lead to significant problems for Ukraine. /6
But to achieve such a goal, a significant foothold is needed. This would require the capture of several cities and large settlements. For example, to the Kovel-Sarny line with further attacks on Lutsk and Rivne. /7

The airfield in Lutsk could be occupied, along with the Rivne nuclear power plant near Varash. Two highways to Kiev would be blocked at once, and Lviv and Ternopil would be only 100-120 kilometres away. Any lesser advance simply does not make any sense. /8
Is it possible to attack on a smaller scale, along one road, say? But then the grouping will be more vulnerable – it's easier to attack one column, the logistics are even more difficult and the result is negligible. The Ukrainians will easily defeat a localised attack. /9
Battlefield. Having defined the goal, we must consider the known conditions of the battlefield. Winter precipitation is expected. Most likely, it will be possible to move only along known roads or specially laid paths. /10
Image
There are few roads in this area – only three, to be exact. All three roads leading from Belarus to Western Ukraine have one thing in common – they are narrow. The quality of the surface does matter – the trucks will cope. But the width does make a difference. /11

The Russian army got stuck at the beginning of the war on the narrow road to Kiev. Similar problems await them here. Here they face similar problems. And around the roads there are forests and swamps. Swamps that do not freeze in winter. /12
In other words, if there is an attack from Belarus, the bulk of the troops and all supplies of the Russian army will be trapped on three narrow roads under the fire of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which has already been prepared. /13

Putin's units will be advancing through unfamiliar territory. And the AFU will defend on prepared terrain. Mines, roadblocks, artillery positions, and well-developed movement patterns of the units all create a great advantage for the Ukrainians. /14

All significant targets are far from the border. In other words, for a long time the Russian army will have to pass essentially in a void, without any significant successes. The airfields will not be in the way. The Ukrainians can evacuate and retreat if necessary. /15
At the same time, the attackers' flanks will also be under threat, or the invasion zone would have to be expanded to the border with Poland, but that may cause nuances with NATO. In general, the battlefield on the border of Ukraine and Belarus is difficult to attack now. /16
The forces of the sides. An offensive can succeed even in difficult conditions if the forces are not equal. Monte Cassino was taken. And the Stalingrad victory, let's face it, wasn't achieved by stealth. Let's consider the strengths of both armies. First of all, Russia. /17
According to various sources, there are currently 9-12,000 mobilized people in Belarus who are being trained. Because there are not enough training ranges in Russia. But we can assume that this is the same grouping for an attack. However, this is absolutely not enough! /18
The Russian army needs at least 3 mobile brigades (tank or motorized) and another 3 motorized infantry brigades or divisions to follow, support the attack and secure territory for the offensive along the three routes. /19
Total – 6 brigades + reserve. That is in the region of 40,000 men at least. Taking into account supply troops, additional artillery, special forces troops, I estimate a minimum possible grouping of 50,000 people. This counts only those who will take part in an offensive. /20
Let's go back to the calculations. Yes, in theory Putin has this many people, counting the newly mobilised. Apart from those 12,000 in Belarus he says there are a total of 150,000 people on the home front. However, no combat-ready units have been formed. /21
The Russian Ministry of Defence uses these mobilized men not as independent units, but to make up for the losses on the active front. This is partly because there are not enough equipment, supplies and officers to create large brigade-level units. /22
Moreover, officers play a decisive role. In a typical motorized rifle company, you can’t do without 4 officers, in a battalion there are already about 20 of them. And in a brigade, taking into account the command staff, there are more than 100. /23
If there are auxiliary units, then there are even more officers with unique skills.

Yes, it is theoretically possible to replace platoon commanders with, say, sergeants from among the more experienced soldiers. /24
The second difficulty is equipment. The Russian army is experiencing a severe shortage of tanks and armoured vehicles, which has been replenished even by deliveries from Belarus. There is a shortage of armoured vehicles even for the active front. /26

Suddenly it turned out that the T-62s are in storage, but the T-72s seem to have run out.

An offensive is impossible without armoured vehicles. /27
According to rough estimates before the invasion, on paper the Russian army had about 11,000 armoured vehicles, including tracked BMPs, wheeled APCs and unarmed MTLBs (3,500). Since then 2,800 have been lost according to Oryx. /28

Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/a ... pment.html
Taking into account that APCs, BMPs, MTLBs and other vehicles are actively being used in the fighting, I think that no less than 5–6,000 of them are being employed. It turns out that some vehicles remain, but quite close to 3,000, if the paper figures are to be believed. /29
But keep in mind that when replenishing, all good equipment is used first. If these machines are still stored somewhere, then they are literally the worst. Many probably need repair. Supplying old vehicles to units for offensive use is not a good idea. /30

It's the same with tanks, and artillery, including MLRS. What's more, mobilized people in Russia don't even have enough bulletproof vests and helmets, not even enough socks. Even finding 50,000 pairs of socks for a new attacking force is a difficult task for Russia right now. /31
Many are turning their attention to the Belarusian army. Could it become the backbone of the offensive? They've announced a combat readiness review again today, there are rumors of mobilisation and there's a lot of talk about Lukashenko's soldiers possibly being used. /32
The Belarusian armed forces officially number slightly less than 50,000. But that is all the armed forces. The ground forces number only 16,000 (infantry + special forces). Two mechanized brigades could theoretically lead the offensive. But who would remain in reserve? /33
Look at the map. The border between Ukraine and Belarus is quite long. Who will guarantee that by throwing all his forces into an adventurous attack, Lukashenko will not get a march of Ukrainian units to Minsk via Gomel and Bobruisk? /34
A march to overthrow the regime, which will surely be supported by the locals.

He needs a force that will cover both Gomel and Mozyr and also control the internal situation – more about that a little later. /35
Mobilisation in Belarus, firstly, is not quick, just like in Russia. Secondly, it will face similar problems and may result in mass protests. /36
Despite mobilisation, Putin's army is still in a situation of severe shortages. The attack we are discussing needs combat-ready, well-equipped units with reserves for 1-2 months of fighting. Where will they come from? /37
On the other side they will be met by the Ukrainian army, which is fighting on its own territory. Including the units covering Kyiv. Yes, most of the supplies and equipment are in the east. But the fact is that the defending forces need less of it. /38
Attacking with a Javelin is quite difficult. Sitting with a Javelin in an ambush waiting for enemy vehicles is workable. Yes, Ukraine would need two motorised brigades to provide a mobile defence. But if that fails, they can focus on static defence. /39

If we use an attack formula with a 3-to-1 strength ratio, it comes out that Ukraine needs only about 20,000 men for defence, taking other factors into account. This figure does not look unrealistic, I think Kyiv's defence is not less than that now. /40
Tactics of the sides. Assuming Putin's troops do decide to attack, what tactics should they expect? Can they outplay the Ukrainians with some special techniques? /41
So far, Russian units have used two methods of attack. The first is to get into trucks and drive forward until they start shelling. The second is to shoot a lot first, then storm the enemy positions, of which little is left. That's it. /42
To start breaking through Ukrainian territory, the Russian army will first have to win the border battle. And here they can use the second method of attack. Possibly using Belarusian artillery, missile strikes and bombing by Su-24 and Su-34 aircraft. /43
Is there any chance of winning? I think there is a minimum chance. The Russian army still has a lot of artillery and they can obviously bring more. /44
The shelling will be concentrated on 3-4 localised areas and it is not yet clear whether there are sufficiently reliable fortified areas in the first echelon of the AFU defence. /45
I think that with the competent use of all available firepower, Putin's forces may well penetrate 1-2 gaps in the Ukrainian defence – this is something to be feared. The AFU will probably retreat to the 2nd or even 3rd line to save forces. /46
And this is where the momentum of the offensive comes in.

As soon as the Russian army tries to launch a rapid attack along the roads in columns, the main danger awaits it. /47
They will not be able to reliably probe the entire territory and will definitely encounter ambushes, air strikes and attacks in the rear.

They will have to move artillery as well, which means bringing in a lot of ammunition and supplies. /48
In essence, the Russian army will face a situation similar to the beginning of the war. There is simply no other way out for an offensive from Belarus. There is no magic way to teleport troops.

On the other side will be the Ukrainians. /49
They will be experienced, well-armed and knowing how to fight Russian equipment. Ukrainians with HIMARS, M777s, CAESARs and Javelins. Ukrainians who are not afraid of the enemy. They will be free to choose defensive tactics. /50
The AFU can stand tight on the border, or it can flexibly retreat – only civilians will have to be evacuated, but there are not too many of them there. /51

The Ukrainians are more likely to apply a mixture of static and mobile defence, clinging to key defensive areas, wearing down Putin's army. /52
I do not see any way in which the Russian army could win. On the contrary, by attacking it will only engage in a knowingly lost battle. It will lose even more soldiers and equipment. In addition, it will waste a lot of resources that will not go to other fronts. /53
I think the Russian General Staff understands this. Most of them are clearly stupid of course, but Putin's generals have clearly been cautious of late. They have screwed up too much, so they will not risk starting something radically new. /54
Especially since the offensive from Belarus reeks of danger, and the flashbacks are not the most pleasant. Furthermore, there are clear political reasons why this adventure cannot take place. /55
Political and other external factors. These may well be the ones that carry the most weight for Putin (and it will of course only be he who decides on a new offensive). And here we need to delve a little into the world of Lukashenko's politics. /56
This dictator has just recently crushed protest with violent repression, with literally one foot in the air between Minsk and Rostov. Lukashenko is well
After all, Lukashenko was largely saved by Putin, who has no attention left for Belarus now. Moscow has much less power, and attention is focused on Ukraine. Therefore, the moustached cockroach can only rely on his loyal enforcers. /58
That is why I exclude the entry of the Belarusian army directly into the war. Firstly, no one knows how quickly it will revolt. Secondly, the absence of the army and security forces (and they will be sent too) at hand deprives Lukashenko of protection. /59
Mobilisation may become a trigger for protests.

Yes, he might still survive, but who knows for sure? And he has only one power - he does not want to lose it. /60
Lukashenko knows perfectly well that the Belarusians hate him and are ready to drive him away at a convenient opportunity. Therefore, he will try not to provide this opportunity. /61
Besides, both the authorities and the generals in Belarus understand how this war is going. That it is lost by Putin. No one will enter a lost war with weaker forces. All the more so as now there is also the risk of transferring hostilities onto the territory of Belarus. /62
One must also take into account international politics. I am sure Lukashenko still wants to sit on the "hello, I am a European" chair and believes that the EU will at least accept him, if not forgive him, as a kind of bridge between civilisation and Putin. /63
And a real war with Belarusians killed at the front would also break the thesis of stability, on which Lukashenko has also been riding for years. If men go to die, who will "toil peacefully in the factories and farms"? /64
All these factors will prevent Lukashenko using the army to support a Russian offensive into western Ukraine. And without this the Russian army will be even more hindered. There is another interesting factor, by the way, which should not be forgotten. /65
It's quite easy for Western and Ukrainian intelligence to keep track of military preparations in Belarus. There is a NATO country, Poland, nearby – reconnaissance aircraft easily fly from it. And after all that's happened in February, I think they're looking east pretty hard. /66
Which means there will be no surprise effect for the Russian grouping. Even their artillery positions will be caught on camera, troop concentrations and frontline depots. All of these will be targets for HIMARS if an attack begins. /67
The Russian grouping runs the risk of being left without supplies from the very start.

From this combination of factors, I believe that a Russian offensive from Belarus is an impossible gamble. /68
Again, Putin's insanity is impossible to predict and even such a suicidal attack could be launched on his personal order. /69
But within the Russian army's general logic, all the talk of an offensive from Belarus is just a way to scare the Ukrainians and distract the AFU. And undoubtedly, in this way this tactic works. The AFU has to keep some forces in the north to keep an eye on the neighbours. /70
There is no point in waiting for something new here – talk and news about another Belarusian army exercise and possible attack will continue, while Lukashenko and Putin will try to fuel all these fears. /71
This is only the first part of a series of threads about the situation in the war in winter. Next we will analyze the other fronts and areas of possible attacks by Ukraine. /72
But the main theme will remain the same - the impasse of the Russian army, which will most likely last until spring. /end

Poznavajuci bolesnike iz rusije oni ce opet pokusati iz bjelorusije...mada mislim da ce lagano ispušiti foru. Ovaj neki period niko nista ne pokusava (osim Bahmuta). Ne bi me iznenadilo da ih ukrajinci iznenade svojim napadom na zaporozje. Sto se rusa tice mislim da oni jedino mogu na tom dijelu da napadnu jer ih na jugu dnjepar sprjecava, na zaporozju je moguce (pisky i taj dio), Donbas (papadt ce onako beze), gore kremina i taj dio su vise u fazi odbrane (predostavljam da ce ukrajinci nastaviti svoju akciju).

[janje_]

jesu bili snimvci? sta ono pise za razan?

ja.. kao revans za onaj aerodrom sto su ukrajinci neki dan napali..

[Čitalac]

Kličko je danas javno podržao suspendovanog gradonačelnika Černihiva i tako dodatno zaoštrio svoje ionako loše odnose sa Zelenskim. U obraćanju javnosti Kličko kaže da se u slučaju Vladislava Atrošenka radi o „selektivnoj pravdi i političkom obračunu“.

„Uklanjanje s dužnosti gradonačelnika putem suda, zbog upravnog prekršaja, je presedan i događa se po prvi put u povijesti neovisne Ukrajine. U sadašnjoj situaciji, kada je rješavanje tolikih problema palo na pleća lokalnih vlasti, svi bi trebali raditi zajedno i bez ikakvih političkih obračuna. Ukrajina je već dokazala da je europska država, pa nije dobro da umanjujemo demokratska postignuća na kojima smo tako dugo i teško radili”, rekao je Kličko.

Prošle sedmice sud je Atrošenka uklonio sa funkcije na godinu dana jer je u avgustu poslao svog vozača da u inostranstvo prebaci automobil Atrošenkove supruge. Gradonačelnik Černihiva tvrdi da je žrtva pritisaka iz kabineta Zelenskog i odbija da se povuče.

[DonieBrasco]

Znaci rusi ce Bjelorusiju da uvuku u rat a onda ce zapad da napravi primjer na njima sta im sljedi, nadam da ce i Srbiju da uvuku da region odahne.

[mishic]

Ove dron bombice su ko bombonice. Ovdje dva-tri, ondje pet-šest samo što češće nek se rašisti lagano tope i neka strah uzima maha...
A Ljukašenko je svojom prevrtljivošću vezao ogromne ukrajinske snage za svoju granicu pa bi bilo korisno da se sa njim jednom raščisti.
Ruje ovo doživljavaju kao predah koji im je bio neophodan ali je izvjesno da će ako mognu poduzeti neku novu žešću ofanzivu.
A šta onaj naježeni portparol najavljuje ostaje da se vidi jer njihova "dobra volja" traje dok ne skontaju novo zlo i novi talas...

[tramvajtrojka]

Kako stoji Bahmut ima li ikakvih informacija u vezi grada jer ona najava povlacenja iz ukrajinskih medija i snimci iz grada kako su jos tu sve mirisu na mariupolj i sjeverodonjeck

[SanskiBiser]

Tom Cooper uglavnom o stanju u Bakhmutu.

Good morning everybody!

I would like to do more, but today — and with some minor exceptions related to air/missile warfare — I’ll entirely focus on the situation in the Bakhmut area. Reason is that I find there is a need to sort out some of related nonsense ‘flying’ around in the social media.

AIR/MISSILE WARFARE

A video surfaced shown a launch of a Ukrainian Tu-141 drone: seems to confirm reports/assessments according to which it was such weapons that were used to strike Russian bomber bases of Engels-2 and Dyagilevo. Ukraine should have overhauled some 68 such drones, back in 2014.

The first video about deployment of Swtichblade-300 mini-LPGM was released. There was a lots of talk about their deliveries, back in March-April, but so far none were seen in action.

The Biden administration seems to have taken the decision to deliver PAC Patriot air defence systems to Ukraine. The Pentagon has already agreed, but the plan still needs to be approved by Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin and then signed by Biden. As of now, exact quantity and version of the PAC-systems to be delivered are unknown.

Apparently in reaction to the US announcement, and reportedly, France and Italy are about to deliver SAMP/T and Mamba air defence systems to Ukraine. Paris should have already confirmed this, but negotiations with Rome are still going on.

To say all of this is taking place much too late — then up to 15 million of Ukrainians are without power and heating, often without water too, and that since days, and to remain without electricity for days longer — would be an understatement. But at least few of talking-heads in the West have finally figured out that equipping Ukraine with defensive weapons can’t be considered a ‘provocation’ even by Xi’s gauge — not to talk about Putin’s.

At least the systems delivered so far, and those already operated by Ukrainian Air Defences since earlier times, are working ever better. This morning (around 05.30–09.00hrs local time) 10 (this was later increased to 13) Shahed-136 LPGMs were released by the Russians in two waves in direction of Kyiv: reportedly, all 10/13 were shot down. Some damage was caused to administrative buildings in the Shevchenkivskyi District by debris, though.



BATTLE OF BAKHMUT

Up front, have chatted with several people serving there, the last few days, and they all stress: there is no trace of anything like ‘withdrawal’ of the ZSU from Bakhmut. Quite on the contrary: even if some of Russian attacks (like one on eastern side of Bakhmut, the last two days) are causing problems, and although several of ZSU units have suffered heavy casualties, essentially, the garrison was reinforced and holds firmly.



North of Bakhmut, Yakovlivka, Soledar, Bakhmutske and Pidhorodne remain under Ukrainian control (yes, ‘even’ Pidhorodne). They’re held by a miscellany of smaller units drawn from different brigades, but commanded by the HQ of the 57th Mech.

Foremost, all of Bakhmut remains in Ukrainian hands: sole exceptions are the eastern suburbs (east of the Patrice Lumumba Street), and southern suburbs (south-eastern side of Opytne and Ivanhrad). Further south, the frontline stabilised east of Klischiivka, but the Russians are controlling Andrivka.


Now, both in Ukraine and outside of it there is lots of guessing about what’s the purpose of Putin/Surovikin pushing this hard on Bakhmut? What’s the aim of this battle?

As can be seen/heard in this video — containing an interview with ‘Arty Green’, one of top Ukrainian artillery commanders (and a very sober person) — the overall Russian aim is to reach the administrative borders of the Donetsk Oblast. This ‘happens’ to include Bakhmut. For this purpose, the Russians are trying to by-pass the town through attacking north-east- (Soledar area) and south of it (Opytne and Klischiivka). Purpose of these attacks is to cut off Ukrainian supply links to Bakhmut.


[youtube]https://youtu.be/-5hmhU5LvC8[/youtube]

Is the situation in Bakhmut ‘good’ for Ukraine?

Nope. It is tense, sometimes even critical. For example, the last two days, the Russians have managed to enter the eastern suburbs of the town: have managed to push Ukrainians some 50–100 metres back.

However, this doesn’t mean that the garrison is short of running away, surrendering, destroyed, or suffering ‘heavy’ losses (one just needs to ask a few of ZSU officers, and they’re all going to immediately reply: their losses are nowhere near being comparable with those their units were suffering back in May, June or even July).

Over the last two weeks, the ZSU has rushed plentiful of reinforcements to the town: some say Ukraine meanwhile has more troops inside Bakhmut, than the Russians can deploy to attack the town.


Ukrainian artillery remains short on ammo, but resupply from the West keeps on flowing and keeping it in business. What the ZSU artillery did receive during October and November, was enough to destroy the mass of the Russian heavy equipment (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armoured personnel carriers, artillery etc.) in the Bakhmut area — primarily by using Excalibur guided shells calibre 155mm. This has forced the Russians to withdraw their remaining heavy equipment and operate with infantry alone — and to change their tactics, too.


The mass of operations the VSRF is running in this area the last two weeks were ‘human wave’, frontal attacks by (reportedly) about 26,000 convicts recruited by Wagner. Initially, this took Ukrainians by surprise: nobody could believe the Russians would operate that way, or be ready to take such casualties, or have troops ready to go charging that way. Moreover, Ukrainians had to learn how to deal with such attacks. This is what caused the loss of several positions — and heavy losses of several Ukrainian units (which I’m not going to discuss for reasons listed below) — the last two weeks. Meanwhile, the ZSU adapted to this ‘innovation’ — and replaced several incompetent commanders at ‘operational level’, while making its best to exploit the general incompetence of Russian officers.

Crucial point — or something like ‘most important lesson’ — about all this is: the losses of the first ten months of war have destroyed the professional core of the VSRF and degenerated its capabilities to the level where it is unable to deploy as much firepower as during spring offensives: it lost too much of its modern artillery, it never managed to solve its problems with command and communication, and is meanwhile short on ammunition, too. Moreover, because of the System Putin, it is run by incompetents. Aware of this, Putin and Surovikin are now actually searching for a ‘honourable’ end of war: some sort of a solution that would force Ukrainians into negotiations at their conditions. This is also why they have recruited 300,000 reservists, and are announcing the mobilisation of yet more: to threaten and to scare Kyiv — and the West — into some sort of negotiations in their favour. Nothing of this means that Ukraine is going to lose Bakhmut, though: ‘just’ that the Russians are going to do their utmost to get the town, and Ukrainians to defend it.

DISCUSSIONS ABOUT LOSSES

As mentioned several times before, I do not like discussions about losses because they’re actually pointless: precise figures are a well-kept secret, no matter what party in this (or any other) war. Therefore, one can only guess and gauge, but never be sure. And, if one is not sure about something, what’s the point of discussing it…?

Foremost, there are always people who prefer to misinterpret and fantasise about whatever figures I do mention — as ‘instantly confirmed’ by multiple readers of my latest reports.

For example: I’ve mentioned a platoon of the 30th Mech and wrote, there were 22 troops, three of these went missing and Ukrainians presumed them as prisoners of war, while 17 were wounded. In ‘response’ to this, some began fantasising things like this was a platoon of 22+17+3 troops and whatever else…

I’ve got used to such insanities like being called a ‘Nazi’, and ‘Jihadist-supporter’, and ‘paid by Qatar’, and ‘by Turkish MIT’, and by the CIA, and Mossad, and Mukhbarat, and whatever else….at most, I’m laughing about them. But, really, in this case I do not understand specific ‘reactions’ because it’s so simple.

22 troops in total (in letters: twenty-two).

22. No 21 and no 23. Especially no 22+17+3 (i.e. ‘42’). 22 — and there’s absolutely no reason to misinterpret this into anything like ‘ZSU units are organised along NATO-standards, thus this platoon must have XY number of troops’. It’s just 22.

People, please be so kind and activate your brains when reading: 22 is 22, no 11, no 37, and no 42…


A 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzer of the 30th Mech in action in the Bakhmut area, back in November.

It’s similar in regards of the 93rd Mech, where a ‘destruction’ of its II Battalion claimed by one of top Putin’s propaganda outlets, is meanwhile discussed as ‘destruction of the entire brigade’…. ‘because Tom Cooper said so’….

I have no clue what kind of person it must be to come to such ideas, but one thing is sure: I never ‘said’ anything of that kind. At most, and in the process of re-reporting what is the Russian social media reporting, the last few days, I’ve quoted WarGonzo’s claim about the ‘destruction’ of the II Battalion 93rd — and promptly expressed my doubts about that. Even the few Russians who are still sober enough to do so, are denying the destruction of the 93rd (or parts of it). For example, here what one of their volunteers has to say in this regards. ‘But Tom Cooper said so….’?!?

One thing is sure: after these experiences I’m certainly not going to discuss any further details of this kind. Sorry, but it’s entirely pointless.

[sumirprimus]

bub, ovo je onaj sto se srusio u aviobazi na krimu gledali smo ovaj klip.. pukovnik..