Ukrajina

[CrveniKuk]

Srećom nema blata.

[CrveniKuk]

Fuck you Musk!

[CrveniKuk]

Sto je salutirao,salutirao je!

[Bobi]

Rusi priznali da je ostecen jedan minolovac.

[lajkujMe]

Lapin out!!!

[sumirprimus]

[Čitalac]

Moskva kaže da su napadnuti brodovi angažovani na osiguranju izvoza žitarica iz Ukrajine ("instruktori Britanci") pa će i ovo sasvim sigurno biti iskorišćeno za natezanje oko produženja sporazuma.

[sumirprimus]

Nova razmjen a

[SanskiBiser]

28 slovenskih T55 S tenkova isporuceno Ukrajini, ovo mogu dati TO jedinicama na granici sa Bjelorusijom.

[Zumbul2]

I ove reparacije su značajna pomoć

[Zumbul2]

Me i je ovo vjerodostojno, oblik broda odgovara razaraču, fino mu je dron prišao po noći, ako je električni pogon i bešuman je samo je pitanje koliku rupu pravi. Helikopter na drugom videu loše gađa da zaustavi dron ali mislim da ga je uspio uništiti.... Neki su i prošli fakat...

[SanskiBiser]

I know, many of you 'can't wait' to read my 'next update' on the War in Ukraine. Here it is - combined with answers to different questions I've received over the last week ('or so'):

Good morning everybody!

A little bit later than originally planned, here is another ‘update’. That is: there’s not really that much to report about the fighting (by all respect for those that lost their homes or family members in the latest Russian attacks on Ukraine): not only that both sides — but: especially the Fool in Kremlin and his Keystone Cops — are reporting next to no details, are reporting lots of PR-nonsense, while the fighting has slowed down due to bad weather and mud.

Generally, a lot is going on, but not as much as back in August and September. At least there are no major movements by either side. Primary reason: bad weather, resulting in rain and mud.

Thus, let me address diverse of questions that came up the last week: I’ll provide a ‘brief update’ on tactical situation as I go, too.

1.) Quality of reporting by the GenStab-U?

This is slightly better than that by the Keystone Cops in Moscow, no doubt, but it also contains less details, and is ‘less direct’. For example:

- Konashenko continues trying to impress with figures, often with what appears to be ‘detailed descriptions’ of specific strikes or battles — but, the mass of his ‘facts’ are fantasy;

- Shtupun is rarely ‘announcing liberation’ of specific places — unless these are shelled by the Russians — and (at least as often) ‘ignoring bad news’ (for example: loss of specific positions). Furthermore, the GenStab-U is frequently ‘misreporting’ Russian strikes on facilities with ‘dual purpose’ as ‘strikes on civilians’.

Overall, while ‘OK’, the reporting by the GenStab-U is nothing one can ‘depend 100% upon’. It’s ‘useful for orientation’, for about 50–70% of what it usually lists — but, still ‘requiring lots of cross-examination’.

However, that’s ‘nothing new’: propaganda warfare is fundament of every war, and every government is always having its ‘official line’. In this regards, there’s no difference between Ukraine, Russia, USA, Israel, or any other government.

This is why I find discussing propaganda for entirely pointless. What really matters are ‘facts’ — and facts can only be determined with help of evidence. Since neither side is publishing a lot of these, we do remain overdependent on the social media for finding out what exactly is going on. That’s about all that matters to me.

2.) Following this or that podcast, Twitter-accounts and other social media presence?

I have no specific preferences: never feel ‘well-enough informed’ by just one (in digits: 1) source. Not even by 10–15 of different social media presences.

Can only add that most of the time I’m lacking the time to follow podcasts.

3.) Russian Strategy?

Obviously, Putin blundered into this war expecting a quick and easy win (indeed, he was co-influenced into launching this aggression because even the West expected him to win quickly and easily, i.e. Ukrainians to fold and run away or join him). Because he has no political program, just his media appearances, the situation is requiring repeated (not to say ‘constant’) adaptation of aims — and immense loads of propaganda warfare, the mass of which is meanwhile nothing but absurd.


That said, explaining anything like, ‘Russians are now doing what they should have done from the start’ — is rather prompting something like ‘not really’-answer from me. There are multiple reasons. One is that, with hindsight, one cannot avoid the conclusion that the best idea would’ve been not to launch this (re-)invasion, i.e. to abstain from sending the VSRF to fight any kind of a big war. Second is that Putin remains obsessed with bolstering failures. For example: sending the VSRF to assault heavily fortified urban areas (see Bakhmut as the best example); defending areas the VSRF simply can’t hold in long term (Kherson); or doing things its logistics cannot support (like mobilising ‘300,000–1,000,000 reservists, while it couldn’t really equip and train more than 70,000–90,000 reservists, and remains unable to maintain presence of more than about 150,000–200,000 troops inside Ukraine).

4.) Is the Russian strategy now the same like in Syria?

Gauging by mass murder — read: extermination — of Ukrainians in occupied territories, yes. That is: there was never any doubt about that (see my reporting from back in March as example).

‘But, then…’, they’re not ‘fighting’ this war that way because they ‘believe this land is unfriendly to them’ or ‘because they do not care if the land is habitable’ — or not — but because they, actually, always fight a ‘total war’. It’s not only so that they do not understand the ‘concept’ of Ukrainians wanting to be Ukrainians and live in Ukraine (i.e. for them Ukraine = part of Russia, and therefore all the Ukrainians have to be and feel as Russians). For them, ‘Russia = internationalist’, and thus anybody ‘non-Russian’ is ‘extremist’ and ‘enemy’. Correspondingly, ‘anybody resisting Russia = must die’.

Above all, that’s simply the way the Russians fight wars: they occupy the territory of their interest and then exterminate whatever population is not openly siding with them. Should there be any doubts, see not only Syria, but also what they did in Afghanistan of the 1980s, Chechnya of the 1990s, or what their advisors were advising in places like Ethiopia and/or Mozambique of the 1980s.

5.) The Russians are going to withdraw from Kherson at the point in time of their choice, and….


Nope, they’re not going to withdraw from anywhere in Ukraine.

There’s no doubt that Putin (more likely: Surovikin) has exploited the last few weeks to bolster VSRF in Ukraine, effecting a consolidation of Russian positions.

Right now, the situation is looking something like this:

Surovikin continues to pound the Ukrainian power grid with cruise missiles and — especially — Iranian-made LPGMs (Ukrainians claimed over 30 attacks by the latter, the last two days, and to have shot down 23–25 of the same; one of air defence commanders was decorated for downing six Kalibrs, the last week);

Ukrainians are pushing forward in the Kupyansk area, but slowly and methodically; as ‘announced’, back in August/September, the bad weather is making things incredibly hard for Russian UAVs (like Orlan-10, Orlan-30 etc), and thus the VSRF is nowadays losing lots of artillery in artillery duels (including MSTA-S’), and thus trying to hit back by Su-25s of the VKS ‘instead’;

which shouldn’t mean Ukrainians aren’t suffering losses, though…. they just, usually, do not let us see these;

the Russians are attacking/counterattacking in the Bakhmut area (like since three months), and continue suffering severe casualties there (rumour has it they’ve lost over 8,000 KIA there by now);

the Russians are attacking in the southern Donbass, too, and seem to have reached the south-eastern outskirts of Vodyane (so much about their claims about Ukraine preparing a ‘super offensive’ in that area);

contrary to lots of expectations, the Russians are anything else than ‘fleeing/withdrawing’ from Kherson.

They’ve reinforced their troops there to about 30 BTGs and even recovered some terrain: for example, they are back to Bruyskynske (Davydiv Brid area), and have recovered Mylove (shore of the Dnipro). Reinforcements have entirely included units staffed by recently mobilised reservists — which is why Ukrainians are capturing lots of intact T-62s there (apparently, because the mass of these is in very poor condition). Finally, Ukraine continued HIMARS-ing barges on the Dnipro (that said, M142s are even more so deployed to target VSRF troops along and/or behind the frontline, nowadays), while the VKS is meanwhile down to sending its Su-30s and Su-34s into close air support (CAS) strikes there, literally ‘Il-2 or P-47-in-1944-style’…

Putin is not going to order a withdrawal of his troops from even one inch of Ukrainian soil. The only way to force him into accepting anything of that kind is to destroy — or kick out — his troops.

…and, there’s no doubt that the longer the war goes on, the more ‘surprises’ one can expect from Putin. For example, I wouldn’t have expected him to ‘fall as low’ as to start using Iranian-made UAVs and LPGMs, ‘big style’: thought he would be too arrogant but to do so. Nowadays I wouldn’t be surprised if he really starts buying ballistic missiles from Iran, too: obviously, nothing — but remaining in power — is important for that character any more.

6.) The Russians are going to bring in 200,000, 300,000, 1,000,000 troops and….

No, they are not. The VSRF’s logistics system has proven unable of successfully supporting the presence of more than 150,000 Russian troops inside Ukraine. Yes, Putin ‘pumped’ about 200,000+ Russian troops into the country, at one point in time, but the result was a collapse of 3–4 of VSRF’s ‘armies’…

Actually, most of the time the VSRF did ‘best’ when maintaining the presence of less than 120,000 troops in the country. This is what it can keep well-supplied: it’s not enough for more than local offensives — or, better said: to keep the ZSU under severe pressure in the Donbass — but it is enough to withstand most of Ukrainian counteroffensives.


7.) Is the ‘time with Ukrainians’?

Gauging by official statements of specific Western governments — yes. That is: there are ‘solemn guarantees/promises’ of (almost) ‘everlasting’ support from Washington DC, London, Paris, even Berlin. But, the flow of deliveries of high-tech arms — the arms that really matter, because they would ascertain a major Ukrainian advantage on the battlefield — remains much too slow. I.e. the West continues ‘fighting to profit’, not ‘fighting to win’.

On the other hand, Russian strategic capabilities (short of nukes, of course) — and thus Putin’s options — for continuing to fight this war are meanwhile limited to ‘holding to whatever one can hold, any more’. The peacetime VSRF is demolished and has no serious offensive capability left; it remains a potent opponent in defence only. The VKS never had any serious capability to change the situation at operational- nor on strategic level (bar cruise missiles, which are meanwhile far too few), and the Navy can only continue launching sporadic cruise-missile strikes….

However, unless Ukrainians get much more ‘punch’ from the West (i.e. have, say, about 20 SAM-sites of such systems like IRIS-T and NASAMS, plus about 100 M142 and M270 in operational service), this is the level of war Putin can continue maintaining for at least a year, if not longer — and that without any particular problems.

….if for no other reason, then because alcoholism and mistreatment of female partners is so widespread in Russia that plenty of wives (and families) are happy to cash the ‘bonus’ (or collect their Lada) for their fallen husbands/relatives…


8.) How many reserves does the ZSU have?

Frankly, no idea any more. I do ‘estimate’ (read: guess) that the ZSU meanwhile has up to 700,000 troops under arms. However, over 50% of these are lacking both training and equipment to go fighting the VSRF the way this would be necessary if the aim of the war is a complete liberation of the country.

With other words: ZSU has no shortages on manpower, but still a massive shortage of very specific types of heavy equipment (see: air defences and artillery).

Mind: theoretically, if properly equipped (‘with most advanced stuff the West has to offer, and in sufficient numbers’), the ZSU could fight this war successfully (and with lot less losses) with about 200,000 troops — and that with ease.

Right now, it can’t — because it lacks that clearly superior equipment.


9.) State of Ukrainian Railways?

Remains (much) better than generally assessed/expected. Yes, the loss of much of the power grid is a bad blow, but — and for example — the UZ has managed to evacuate its fleet of diesel locomotives from the areas captured by the Russians, early on. Yes, these are slightly less powerful than electric locomotives. In grand total, the trains keep on moving even if the power grid is badly damaged, and although they are slightly smaller now. As long as trains keep on moving, the ZSU remains well-supplied. That’s about ‘what matters’ in this regards.


10.) Air Defence is ‘crucial now’….

Air defence (of Ukraine, but of Russia, too) was crucial right from the start. As long as Ukraine can barely defend its major urban centres — but, not all of them to the same degree — and can’t really protect its infrastructure, Surovikin can keep on striking. That’s serving a dual purpose:

it’s slowing down the overall Ukrainian war-fighting-effort, and
it’s scoring PR-points for Putin: i.e. Konashenko can keep on claiming ‘destruction of 100, 200, 500, nationalists, militants, foreign mercenaries, LGBT-extremists, mosquitoes and vampires on dope’…
That’s about all that matters to Putin.

Ukraine needs advanced — and mobile — air defences since 24 February 2022. It needs air defences that can simultaneously counter attacks by ballistic- and cruise missiles, and by LPGMs, and it needs not only air defences to protect its cities, industry, and infrastructure, but also air defences that can protect its troops, so it could concentrate a lots of these in one spot — as necessary for any kind of a successful offensive operation. Absolutely nothing has changed in this regards over the last eight months. Or if, then only in so far that nowadays it’s crystal clear that Ukraine (and not only Ukraine, but everybody else, too), needs a high-capacity air defence system capable of combating both ‘lots of UAVs and incoming artillery rockets and heavy shells’.

Ideally, Ukraine would also get ‘air defences’ that would enable it to drive the VKS entirely out of Ukrainian skies — in sense of getting fighter-interceptors capable of countering Russian MiG-31s and Su-35s on ‘at least equal terms’. Say: it would need stuff like (at least) the French Rafale F3/F4 or F-35, armed with Meteor and/or AIM-120D, respectively, and supported by stuff like E-3 Sentry. This is something that simply cannot be done ‘in a matter of days, weeks, months’ — and would be hard to achieve even ‘in a matter of years’, though.

Even if, that would be ‘just the start’, then even if having such interceptors, Ukraine would still need lots of advanced, ground-based air defence systems, and — especially — a cheap, yet highly capable and very mobile air defence system against ‘swarms of small UAVs’, too.

11.) Is it wise (from the Russians) to deploy their MiG-31s close to the frontline?

As long as Ukraine lacks the capability to regularly — and precisely — strike their bases, yes, it is. It’s lessening the stress upon aircraft and their crews; it’s shortening their reaction time, while increasing their ‘on station’ time.

Especially aircraft like MiG-31 are custom-tailored to create ‘defensive belts’ along a specific sector of frontline (or border), and to shot down anything approaching the same.

12.) Is there a way to stop Iran from supplying UAVs and LPGMs to Russia?

I know none.

Of course, there is a theoretical option of the West supporting the unrest in Iran, and thus effecting the end of the IRGC-regime. But, right now — and regardless what the regime in Tehran is claiming — there’s neither political-will, nor economic-capability to do so.

13.) Would long-range (artillery) rocket systems Ukraine is demanding from the West help stop Russian strikes by Iranian-made UAVs and LPGMs?
Long-range artillery rocket systems alone — nope.

There is simply no ‘single solution’ to any of problems Ukraine is facing. There are no ‘Wunderwaffen’, either.

This is resulting in the fact that the long-range artillery is useless without long-range means of detection.

Countering Iranian-made LPGMs and UAVs requires an ‘air defence system’, and such is including not only surface-to-air missiles, but also

early warning systems (see: radars and other kind of sensors);

electronic warfare systems (systems that can disrupt navigation systems of UAVs and LPGMs, disrupt their communication with ground stations etc.);
much better ‘hard kill’ capability (for example in form of ‘heavy’ anti-aircraft guns: these would offer better range and thus more time, and thus a higher chance of — at least — the ‘last minute intercept’) — and that in large numbers (see: ’30 Gepard Flakpanzers’ is ‘about 270 Gepard Flakpanzers too little’);
alternatively, Israel would stop blocking the export of such (actually: US-financed and developed) air defence systems like Iron Dome, in turn enabling Ukrainian air defences to ‘sweep the sky clean’ of a large number of Russian UAVs and LPGMs. Even then, that would require truly ‘mass production’ of such systems, because Ukraine is huge, and thus there is a lot to defend (Israelis have something like a dozen of Iron Dome SAM-systems in operation, and can’t protect 100% ‘even’ an area as ‘small’ as their major cities).
That’s about all coming to my mind in this regards, right now. Hope, I didn’t miss any other ‘important’ questions.

[Čitalac]

Mali Ukrajinci na meti čeških vršnjaka, ogledalo roditelja. Ako ništa drugo, nadležni najavljuju hitru reakciju na nasilje.

Mockery, spitting in a notebook and the Russian anthem during breaks. Ukrainian children are bullied at some Czech schools by their classmates. The problem was pointed out on social networks by the mayor of Tetín Matěj Hlavatý. According to him, there are many such stories, some even go into physical bullying. According to experts, however, it is not the hatred of children, but of their parents, who pass it on to them.
Little Oleg from Kramatorsk together with his brother and mother fled from the war to the Czech Republic. When he entered elementary school in Central Bohemia in September this year, his classmates began bullying him.
"What the children of the local residents are doing to him is terrible. Children routinely mock him, saying that Ukraine will never win. They praise Russia and the last time they stole his book, which they destroyed," says Alena Vlková.
In recent days, the case of an elementary school in Lázně Bělohrad has begun to spread on social networks, where local second-grade pupils played the Russian anthem to their Ukrainian classmate when she arrived in class. "This was a clear attempt to give the Ukrainian minority even more, given how difficult the situation is. There are many more such stories, some of them are much more disgusting because they go into physical ways of bullying, which is completely over the edge," says the mayor of neighboring Tetín Matěj Hlavatý.

https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/domaci/nenav ... f6b220ee8/

[sumirprimus]

Lose vrijeme al je dnevno svjetlo i vidi se da je gadjaju

[Zumbul2]

[CrveniKuk]

Evo još snimaka sa podvodnih dronova.

[CrveniKuk]

Ode Gvozdika u helać.

[CrveniKuk]

Ovo mi liči na neku terensku radionicu u kojoj se popravlja lakše oštećena napuštena ruska tehnika. Uglavnom,Ukrajinci nastoje da sto vise toga osposobe i iskoriste prilikom izvođenja b/d.

[CrveniKuk]

Pored Krakena,imamo i Gonor. Samo nisam siguran,u čijem sastavu su ove jedinice!? Pretpostavljam, da jedinice specijalne namjene,imaja i Armija, sa svojim vidovima vojske,kao i nacionalna garda Ukrajine. Po ovim snimcima,u pitanju su,bar po opremi koju koriste,istinske jedinice za specijalno djelovanje.

[Gandalf]

Pored Krakena,imamo i Gonor. Samo nisam siguran,u čijem sastavu su ove jedinice!? Pretpostavljam, da jedinice specijalne namjene,imaja i Armija, sa svojim vidovima vojske,kao i nacionalna garda Ukrajine. Po ovim snimcima,u pitanju su,bar po opremi koju koriste,istinske jedinice za specijalno djelovanje.

Dobra zika u pozadini

[Zumbul2]

Suspendovan izvoz žitarica iz Ukrajine, razlog današnji napad na Sevastopolj. Ipak ih je zaboljelo jako.

[CrveniKuk]

Džaba guverner molio,snimci se objavljuju. Još jedan snimak iz Sevastopolja. Samo, ne mogu da shvatim, na snimku kojeg je postavio sumi, da podvodni dron,koji se vidi golim okom i koji je na površini,Rusi se pate da ga unište iz helikoptera. Koliko god pomislim da Rusi ne mogu vise biti toliko loši,srećom uvijek se pozitivno iznenadim kada, na osnovu snimaka,shvatim da mogu biti još gori. Jednostavno, ta armija i država,po svemu sudeći,nemaju dovoljno duboko dno na koje mogu potonuti.

[Distortion]

Trola ih Mihailo

[toska]

Nevjerovatni snimci danas

na ovom snimku je eksplozija/ uništenje drona?
to bi značilo da je eksplozija udaljena 5 do 5,5km od mjesta snimanja, a udarni val pali alarme i prepade snimatelja, djeluje da je sve u real-time.

to bi bilo tone TNT na dronu, šta nije u redu sa ovim računom?

[emirolini]

Treba par dronova i u Moskvi... (gradu naravno jer je brod potonuo )