Ukrajina

[sumirprimus]

prvo sto bi reko onaj krezavi polupismenjak nlaw prevara ,evo da vidimo..
a drugo, dajgle tenkiste u cvijetu mladosti.

[JoseMujica]

Prije nego počneš sa etiketiranjem, pročitaj moje postove na ovoj temi, pa vidi da ja nisam nikakav "njihov". Moj stav o ruskoj agresiji je nepromijenjen od samog početka, i moje želje su da kompletna Ukrajina bude oslobođena.
Ja govorim o situaciji na terenu i o mogućnosti da, čim se uspostavi neka ravnoteža sile, počnu pritisci na Zelenskog od strane Francuske, Njemačke i sl. da potpisuje primirje.

Onda nemoj nasjedati na jeftine ruske spinove i nikada nemoj zaboraviti da oni imaju veliku ekipu ljudi koji prave upravo ove spinove koje ti promovises. Ako nisi "njihov" onda promovises "njihovu politiku". Sve je beznadezno, ukrajinci nemaju snage, ne mogu nista uraditi. Predaj se. Bolje i ovo nego ginuti. EU ce pritisnuti Ukrajinu svakako. Bla bla bla. Ruski kreatori spinova su davno shvatili da je veoma tesko nekoga ubijediti u nesto i odustali su od ubjedjivanja U NESTO. Skontali su da je dovoljno zbuniti ljude i 80% biva paralisano sto njima ostavlja samo 20% koji im zaista pruzaju otpor.

Ruska artiljerija ima rok trajanja. Cijevi ne mogu vjecno ispaljivati jer se trose. Barut ih spali. Ispaljivali su 1000 granata svakih sat vremena. Roba je potrosena i treba je mijenjati. Fizika je neumoljiva. A Ukrajina dobija nove i nove svjeze komade artiljerije. Uzivajte:

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za uokviriti i na svakoj stranici ponavljati dok ne skontaju

[emigrazione]

ukrima zapad nije jedino atomsku poslao, yebote ni ameri nisu ovako brzo gazili po Iraku...đe glumac, šta kaže vratiće se rode

[rajvosa987]

Jes, jes a ovdje cekamo na potez ovih tvojih.
Sa il bez NATO -a, svejedno je

Niko nije moj. Samo treba misliti glavom.

Svrsavas na rusku agresorsku stoku i fol neutralan. Tu prekodrinsku svojim ukucanima mozes prosipati.

[EME91]

Meni sve nekako mirise da se ponavlja taktika iz Kijeva. Postepeno povlačenje ukrajinske vojske uz dalekometno targetiranje skladišta naoružanja/nafte.

Dva su efekta. Prvi Ruske linije idu sve dublje u teritorijumu Ukrajine, a postepeno sve vise pomjeraju skladišta oružja prema granici tj. izvan dometa od 80+ kilometara što može sad za sad gađati Himars. Ako je sada bila ruta za dostavu nafte i oružja recimo 10-20 km ici ce to na 40,50,60,100 itd.

Svi znamo sto se desilo kod Kijeva kada ne mozes da snadbjevas vojsku hranom i oruzijem .

Kad skladista budu dovoljno daleko, onda ce Himars krenuti na PVO . Vec smo vidjeli da je pancir + jedan buk stradao u zadnjih par dana. Ko zna sto nismo vidjeli. Himarsi ispale 30+ raketa , a svaka ima svoj cilj.
Kad se to zavrsi idu ukrajniski MIG 29, Bajraktar tb2, i vjerovatno neke desantne akcije helikopterima. Ici ce vjerovatno na Herson i za to se trebaju spaliti mostovi dole.

Rusi nece imati drugog izbora do masovne mobilizacije ili trazenja primirja. U prvom slučaju pada Putinova vlada , a mozda i manjine pocinju traziti nezavisnost. Uvjeren sam da bi par Hersona značajno proizveo negativan efekat na rusku spec. operaciju u tom psihološkom smislu.

[sumirprimus]

samo foe, on je iz raja izaso. kad im ne odgivoarate brzo otupe ostricu napada.

[Ima Bosne_Bice Bosne]

jooojj koja je ravaku

Kroz njen tunel je prosao i onaj voz sto nikada ne staje.

[ketronsd1]

Niko nije moj. Samo treba misliti glavom.

Pa počni.

Eeee stari moj. Nema bureka bez mesa.

[Hercegoviina]

Rusija polako ,ali sigurno pobjeđuje u ovom ratu. Ukrajincima bi bilo pametno da što prije zključe mir ,jer će izgubiti cijelu istočnu Ukrajinu ,ako se ovo oduži

[Spiritbreaker]

Povratak ruskih botova vol.3.

[Peacean]

Dok god Putler izbjegava proglašavanje ratnog stanja Ukrajina ima šanse da vojno dominira, ali ne možemo ignorisati demografiju Krima i Donbasa. Tu je rusko stanovništvo ispranih mozgova velika većina pogotovo sada kada je dosta ukrajinaca protjerano i to je ogroman problem. Čak i kada bi ukrajinci vojno vratili Krim bez pokretanja "zvaničnog rata" sa Rusijom, šta onda? Morali bi konstantno da se nose sa separatistima koji bi uz podršku Rusije postajali sve nasilniji i koji bi nanosili sve teže gubitke ukrajincima na duge staze i to bi ispalo nešto kao izraelsko-palestinska situacija. Jedini način da ukrajinci ovo spreče je da urade rusima ono što su srbi nama uradili, masovni progon i genocid. Podržavam Ukrajinu od početka i nadam se da će vratiti sve što im je oteto ali mislim da je ukrajinski dejton pod pritiskom evrope neizbježan mada se nadam da griješim. Vrijeme će pokazati kako će ovo završiti, za sada možemo samo da nagađamo i da se nadamo...

[sumirprimus]

neunistvi ukrajinski duh, ev peti mjesec odolijevaju ruskim hordama istom onim kojima sa citav sveijt sklanjao s puta evo 7 decenija!
SlavaUkrajini i respekt za svaku njihovu zrtvu

[drug_profi]

Nece Ukri praviti genocid, vec Oluju. Otice izdajnici zajedno sa Ruskom vojskom.

A pozivam komšije koje su naložene na ruske pobjede, svetove i carstva, da uzmu sto prije ucesca u ostvarenja istog, te da ne cekaju da neko uradi njihov posao.
Dakle odmah se pokupiti i avionom za Moskvu iz Beograda, pa onda lepo u regrutni centar LNR/DNR. Dajte svoj doprinos.

[A_A_AKCIJA]

Sve vise lici na NATO doktrinu let od 4 aviona a ne 2

Da, a što je još zanimljivije, je let ova dva aviona u formaciji.

Su24 je ruska verzija f111, tzv multirole all weather jurišnog aviona, koji ima zadatak udara u dubini teritorije neprijatelja. Potpuno druga uloga od su25.

Su27 su u pratnji kao zaštita.

Dosta se može zaključiti da same slike.

[pici]

Nikad rusija nece dobiti ovaj rat, NIKAD!
Nije to moja zelja, nego sto dugorocno rusi nece moci izdrzati ovaj tempo ratovanja.Treba novog mesa a njega nidze.Placaju se placenici, regrutuju maloljetnici, fataju dezertere a sirotinja sve bijednija.
Juli je tek poceo, Herson se gura do Dnjepra i Harkiv se cisti sjever a onda nastupa august i novi uvjezbani vojnici sa NATO igrackama.Nebi bio rujama u koži kad ih pocnu Ukri fatat i opkoljavat sve do Belgoroda i Volge.
Zivi bili pa vidjeli.Rusi ce gadjat svoje samo da zaustave Ukre.
Ovo oko pada SD je ocekivano, ja sam to govorio ima mjesec, jedino ako Slovanjsk padne onda je guravo.

[sumirprimus]

Nikad rusija nece dobiti ovaj rat, NIKAD!
Nije to moja zelja, nego sto dugorocno rusi nece moci izdrzati ovaj tempo ratovanja.Treba novog mesa a njega nidze.Placaju se placenici, regrutuju maloljetnici, fataju dezertere a sirotinja sve bijednija.
Juli je tek poceo, Herson se gura do Dnjepra i Harkiv se cisti sjever a onda nastupa august i novi uvjezbani vojnici sa NATO igrackama.Nebi bio rujama u koži kad ih pocnu Ukri fatat i opkoljavat sve do Belgoroda i Volge.
Zivi bili pa vidjeli.Rusi ce gadjat svoje samo da zaustave Ukre.
Ovo oko pada SD je ocekivano, ja sam to govorio ima mjesec, jedino ako Slovanjsk padne onda je guravo.

treba i novih cijevi, a proizvodnja im nije na zapadnom nivou, ni u mirnodobsko pogotov neu ratnom stanju kada ameri i zapad ubace u brzinu vise zna se...

[duh_sa_sjekirom]

Ako Ukrajina ovo prihvati, onda je jasno da je popušila i kapitulirala...

Jesu ispali budale. Kako su ih navukli ko bekane...
Kao kada grupica huligana u školi nagovori nekog levata da se potuče sa glavnim bajom u raji i ovaj levat se ko budala zaleti... I dobije po ušima. I onda ostali kažu: jbg šta ćeš...

Kakva ti je ovo logika?
Pa nije Ukrajina napala Rusiju, već obrnuto...
Ukri su imali dvije opcije:
1. naguziti se i pustiti ruske horde
2. boriti se za goli opstanak.

[A_A_AKCIJA]

to je u hardveru a ljudstvo..
One-way ticket
Pavel Luzin on why Russia’s military capabilities have suffered irreparable losses after four months of war


By Pavel Luzin
04 July 2022

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According to figures that can be confirmed, after four months of the war against Ukraine Russia has used up or lost armaments in amounts unheard of in its recent history. According only to open sources backed by photographs, Russia has lost over 2,000 tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) altogether, several dozen aircraft and helicopters and many other military vehicles. In addition, since the beginning of its aggressive campaign, Russia has expended over 2,500 different cruise and tactical ballistic missiles.

Against this backdrop, Moscow obviously has to scale up its military expenditure dramatically. Despite the fact that the Ministry of Finance has almost fully restricted access to data on current federal budget spending since May 2022, the item ‘National Defence’ is still accessible. Thus, in January-April about RUB 1.6 trillion out of a planned RUB 3.85 trillion was spent on national defence. Meanwhile, the entire 2022 federal budget amounts to about RUB 26 trillion. For comparison, in 2021 nearly RUB 3.6 trillion was spent on national defence (the entire budget was RUB 24.8 trillion), but the bar of RUB 1.5 trillion was crossed as late as June. If the pace of spending seen in March-April is maintained — RUB 500 billion a month instead of an average of RUB 300 billion a month — by the end of the year spending on national defence may well reach RUB 5.0−5.5 trillion, or 19%-21% of the federal budget.

Nevertheless, even if this were to happen, the Russian armed forces would no longer be able to restore their capabilities in the foreseeable future, as the military industry would not be able to catch up with the demand.

AFVs

Russia inherited a stockpile of thousands of different models of tanks (T-64, T-72, T-80, etc.) and tens of thousands of AFVs of various types from the Soviet Union. And despite the fact that in the post-Soviet decades Russia has conducted development in this area, and even began production of some new models, such as T-90 tanks, BMD-4 amphibious infantry fighting vehicles, etc., its AFV arsenal is being renewed mainly by repairing and upgrading Soviet models. For example, T-72 tanks are upgraded by replacing the engines and installing Thales thermal weapon sights, other solutions and communication systems.

The bulk of the modernised and new AFVs were received by the Russian Armed Forces during the implementation of the 2011−2020 State Armament Programme (SAP), which continued with the 2018−2027 SAP (the overlapping of the SAP 2020 and the SAP 2027 is due to Russian bureaucratic logic). Each year, Russian industry supplied an average of about 650 tanks and other AFVs. Of these, tanks alone were supplied in numbers of no more than 160−170 T-72B3/B3M units per year under the 2011−2020 SAP from the UralVagonZavod (UVZ) facilities in Nizhny Tagil and Omsk (in 2021, only 34 of these tanks were supplied), and no more than 45−50 T-80BVM tanks were supplied from the Omsk plant in 2017−2021. Altogether about 1,900−2,000 upgraded tanks out of about 3,300 units were combat-ready before the attack on Ukraine. This is not counting the tanks that remained in storage. The rest were other types of AFVs. And if one considers that the armed forces had at least 16,000 AFVs of various types just before the war, the proportion of those produced or upgraded since the early 2010s was little more than a quarter of the total fleet.

In addition, in war conditions the natural life cycle of AFVs is reduced even if they are not damaged in combat. For example, the service life of the V-84 and V-92 engines and their variations installed on the T-72B3 and T-72B3M does not exceed 1,000 hours before overhaul. Taking this and the inevitable breakdown of other equipment into account, it is safe to assume that most Russian tanks involved in the current war will require an overhaul by the end of 2022 in a manufacturing facility rather than in the field. This assumption is also supported by data from the much less intensive Chechen campaign of 1994−1996. At that time, 65 Russian tanks were lost in combat, while the total losses amounted to about 200 tanks, the lion’s share of all tanks involved in that campaign. Thus, technical malfunctions may have a bigger impact on military capability than losses on the battlefield. And they also require effort and resources to repair and/or upgrade inoperative tanks and get them back on track.

However, these resources are limited not only by the embargo on components and industrial equipment. Since the early 2010s even tank engine components have been imported. Human resources are also limited. For example, the fact that UVZ is now working three shifts (around the clock) to refurbish AFVs only means that the staff are sent there from idle manufacturing facilities that produce railcars. Similarly, a year before the war, the railroad tank car division worked three shifts.

The problem with this kind of emergency production in a state-owned enterprise is that it increases costs, makes the plant less efficient and reduces the quality of output. All these conclusions are also true for the production, upgrading and repair of AFVs.

It is also noteworthy that UVZ was on the verge of bankruptcy in 2016 and that Kurganmashzavod, the only manufacturer of tracked AFVs, was about to go bankrupt at the end of 2017. The debts of these two companies were paid off by the government, and they both became part of the state-owned Rostec corporation, but there was no significant improvement in their economic efficiency. In such circumstances, a sharp increase in government spending on repairing damaged or disabled AFVs as well as on upgrading and restoring the combat readiness of vehicles removed from long-term storage will give rise to cost-push inflation in these companies. Each successive tank or other AFV will become more and more expensive to repair or upgrade, and the speed and quality of these efforts will diminish.

Therefore, after four months of war, it would take a minimum of 4 years to restore Russia’s armoured vehicle capacity to early 2022 levels, even with conservative estimates of combat losses. If the war continues, by the end of the year it will take 7−10 years of plant operations (and that’s leaving aside the effect of the embargo on industrial equipment and components, which can be estimated later). That is, Russia will face a shortage of AFVs in the army, whose structure and number of servicemen is determined with thousands of tanks and other AFVs of available models in mind. In other words, the Russian army should be organised and trained differently, and the technical and technological quality of available AFVs should be much higher to make do with fewer of them. That said, Russia cannot yet count on sufficient production of the new generation of Armata tanks and Armata-based heavy armament combat vehicles.

Aviation

By the start of its aggressive campaign against Ukraine, Russia had 900−1,000 fighters, fighter-bombers, bombers and attack aircraft. Of these, more than 130 Sukhoi Su-30M2 / Su-30SM fighters, 97 Su-35 fighters and 124 Su-34 fighter-bombers were delivered during the 2010s, more than 350 aircraft in total. Thus, at the peak of its financial and industrial capabilities, Russia was producing an average of 30−35 military aircraft a year.

It also had about 400 attack helicopters, of which over 130 Kamov Ka-52 helicopters, over 100 Mil Mi-28 helicopters and over 60 Mi-35 helicopters (a modification of the Mi-24) were produced during the 2010s, a total of around 300 units. That is, production capacity during the 2010s was on average 25−30 new attack helicopters a year. It should be kept in mind that the Russian armed forces received a total of up to 200 new and upgraded aircraft of all types per year. In other words, in quantitative terms, the upgrading and repairing of aircraft and helicopters play a decisive role in Russia.

Meanwhile, plans for 2021−2027 envisaged the delivery of some 150 new aircraft of all types, including 76 Su-57 fifth-generation fighters and at least 20 Su-34 fighter-bombers. There are serious problems with these plans too, as Riddle wrote earlier, but the sanctions imposed against Russia since the beginning of the war make them even more difficult to implement.

It turns out that Moscow has a choice to make. Either it should revise its plans and try to make up for the losses of aircraft and helicopters delivered in the 2010s through additional production in the coming years, or it should rather stick to the policy adopted earlier and opt for quality instead of quantity even under the technology embargo. However, with each subsequent month of war the first option seems more and more likely. True, the ability to produce aircraft and helicopters at the same rate as before to replace those that have been shot down or forced out of action or that are out of service for technical reasons is also questionable. But in any case, and even under the most favourable circumstances for Moscow, the potential of Russian military aviation will remain below February 2022 levels until at least 2025. With the protracted war and ongoing losses, it is unlikely to recover in principle.

Precision-guided munitions (PGM)

The number of cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles of all types available in Russia just prior to its attack on Ukraine is difficult to estimate. Today, however, there is a consensus that Moscow faces an acute shortage after having used over 2,500 of these missiles. Moreover, just before the war it had several hundred of both Kh-555 and Kh-22 cruise missiles, which were produced back in the USSR and are not manufactured today, just like the Tochka-U tactical ballistic missiles, which are no longer produced. Still, despite having managed to rearm with the more advanced extended-range Iskander-M tactical ballistic missile systems by the early 2020s, the Russian army has used Tochka-U missiles in the ongoing war. In addition to Iskander-M missiles, Russia produces ship- and submarine-launched Kalibr cruise missiles of various types and the ground-launched Kalibr 9M729 variant, whose development and deployment put an end to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019. Russia also produces P-800 Oniks supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, used against targets on Ukrainian soil, and Kh-101 (which replaced the Kh-555), Kh-32 (which replaced the Kh-22) and Kh-59 air-launched cruise missiles. There are also the Kh-35 anti-ship missiles, which can be launched from sea, land and air and have a range of up to 260 km in their latest variant.

And while in previous years Russian industry produced up to 55 P-800 Oniks missiles and up to 50 Iskander-M ballistic missiles annually, the production of the remaining missiles mentioned above depends on the availability of engines. The fact is that in Soviet times there was a family of R95−300 turbojet engines for cruise missiles. These engines were produced by Ukrainian enterprises. Therefore, after the collapse of the USSR, Russia started working on a replacement for them. However, even the early (pre-2014) variants of Kalibr missiles were probably equipped with these types of engines, which were removed from retired Soviet missiles.

Consequently, from the 1990s to the mid-2010s Russia managed to develop three turbojet engines for its cruise missiles: the R125−300 engine, a simplified version of the R95−300 with reduced thrust, and two variants of the TRDD-50 turbojet. And while the R125−300 is suitable for the Kh-35 missiles, the two variants of the TRDD-50 give the missiles a range of up to 1,000 km and 2,500 km (or even more), respectively. The former variant is installed on most Kalibr missiles, as well as the 9M729 and Kh-59 missiles. The latter is installed on sea-launched Kalibr-NK and air-launched Kh-101 missiles, with serial production of this variant launched as late as in 2014−2015. Here, it can be added that workforce productivity at the United Engine Corporation’s facilities is 6 to 11 times lower than at the US companies Williams International and General Electric, which are also involved in the production of engines for cruise missiles. As a result, the annual production of TRDD-50 turbojets can be estimated at 45−50 units in each of its two variants. That is, the total annual production of the Kalibr, Kh-101, 9M729 and Kh-59 cruise missiles is unlikely to exceed 100 missiles.

Serial production of the Kh-32 air-launched anti-ship ballistic missile, which was developed to replace the Kh-22, did not start until 2019, when the production of liquid-propellant rockets for it was launched. Taking into account a contract worth RUB 5.26 billion (about $ 84 million), the characteristics of the Kh-32 missile, and the cost of missile engines with parameters similar to those of the liquid rocket for the Kh-32, it can be concluded that we are talking about no more than 20 engines produced a year.

Thus, in total, Russia can manufacture no more than 225 cruise and tactical ballistic missiles a year (not including the Kh-35 missiles). And at the current rate of production, it needs at least 10 years to make up for the losses.

izdvojeno

Each year, Russian industry supplied an average of about 650 tanks and other AFVs. Of these, tanks alone were supplied in numbers of no more than 160−170 T-72B3/B3M units per year under the 2011−2020 SAP from the UralVagonZavod (UVZ) facilities in Nizhny Tagil and Omsk (in 2021, only 34 of these tanks were supplied), and no more than 45−50 T-80BVM tanks were supplied from the Omsk plant in 2017−2021.

Thus, at the peak of its financial and industrial capabilities, Russia was producing an average of 30−35 military aircraft a year.

That is, production capacity during the 2010s was on average 25−30 new attack helicopters a year.

As a result, the annual production of TRDD-50 turbojets can be estimated at 45−50 units in each of its two variants. That is, the total annual production of the Kalibr, Kh-101, 9M729 and Kh-59 cruise missiles is unlikely to exceed 100 missiles.

Jedan od razloga zašto rat izgleda ovako.

Ukrajinci i NATO savjetnici su shvatili da se moraju pobrinuti da ih Rusi nemaju čime napasti sutra.

Jer nema sumnje da će, ako ostane ova ideologija, Rusi htjeti opet, ma kako se završi rat. U proteklih 20 godina je to konstanta.

Rusi će biti toliko iscrpljeni da će im komšije biti mirne par decenija.

[duh_sa_sjekirom]

Ako Ukrajina ovo prihvati, onda je jasno da je popušila i kapitulirala...

Koje su garancije da za 5-10-15 godina Rusi opet ne krenu po drugi dio Ukrajine?

Nema nikakvih garancija kad su ruski razbojnici u pitanju...
Oni ne razumiju niti poštuju drugi jezik osim jezika sile...kao i četnici 92. u Bosni

[studeni76]

Povratak ruskih botova vol.3.

Daj nemoj zajebavat, nije svako ko kaze da ne ide dobro za ukrajince odmah ruski bot.
A ocito je da ne ide, malo po malo orci guraju. Na cijenu ne gledaju svakako.
Mene vise nervira ova prica kako nema dovoljno UA vojnika. Pa majku mu, ko je nas 92e pitao imamo li obuku. U patikama i farmerkama, bez sljema i pancira se islo u rat. A ovdje sad su oni sebi dopustili da pored 40 miliona ljudi budu nadjacani u ljudstvu. Ma daj ba, neozbiljno se tako boriti za drzavu.
Btw cujem da turisticki dolaze na Jadran, mashala.

[sime_cipol]

Jedan od razloga zašto rat izgleda ovako.

Ukrajinci i NATO savjetnici su shvatili da se moraju pobrinuti da ih Rusi nemaju čime napasti sutra.

Jer nema sumnje da će, ako ostane ova ideologija, Rusi htjeti opet, ma kako se završi rat. U proteklih 20 godina je to konstanta.

Rusi će biti toliko iscrpljeni da će im komšije biti mirne par decenija.

Zapad ceka i da Putin umre, a onda krece "mala bara, puna krokodila".

[A_A_AKCIJA]

Rusija polako ,ali sigurno pobjeđuje u ovom ratu. Ukrajincima bi bilo pametno da što prije zključe mir ,jer će izgubiti cijelu istočnu Ukrajinu ,ako se ovo oduži

Dakle, nema boljeg pokazatelja kako ide Rusima, od ovog masovnog prizivanja pregovora. Orban, Vučić, ovi Rusi na svim nivoima, sitna buranija, satraše se prizivanjem nekog mirovnog sporazuma. Zadnjih par dana, svakodnevno, bez greške iz više izvora.

I sve je ta priča, ako Ukrajina želi, neka ispune naše uvjete i staće rat.

Pa ne želi, jarane

Stižu desetine milijardi u oružju, a Rusi pod sankcijama. Takva prilika se ne propušta.

Sa Ukrajinske strane, niko i ne spominje pregovore. Pregrmili najgore i sada oštre ćunu da Rusima prirede sex za uspomenu i dugo sjećanje.

Kakvi crni pregovori. Nije niko lud da spašava Ruse iz ove avanture i daje im sekunde predaha.

[japin_mutapi]

koliko ima ovo naoruzavanje ukrajine od strane nato slicnosti sa ratom u vijetnamu i naoruzavanjem vijetnamaca od strane sssr i kine

[pici]

Nikad rusija nece dobiti ovaj rat, NIKAD!
Nije to moja zelja, nego sto dugorocno rusi nece moci izdrzati ovaj tempo ratovanja.Treba novog mesa a njega nidze.Placaju se placenici, regrutuju maloljetnici, fataju dezertere a sirotinja sve bijednija.
Juli je tek poceo, Herson se gura do Dnjepra i Harkiv se cisti sjever a onda nastupa august i novi uvjezbani vojnici sa NATO igrackama.Nebi bio rujama u koži kad ih pocnu Ukri fatat i opkoljavat sve do Belgoroda i Volge.
Zivi bili pa vidjeli.Rusi ce gadjat svoje samo da zaustave Ukre.
Ovo oko pada SD je ocekivano, ja sam to govorio ima mjesec, jedino ako Slovanjsk padne onda je guravo.

treba i novih cijevi, a proizvodnja im nije na zapadnom nivou, ni u mirnodobsko pogotov neu ratnom stanju kada ameri i zapad ubace u brzinu vise zna se...

Ovi malorusi se oslanjaju na kinu, indiju, itd. Na njihove proizvodnje i kapacitete a nece da prihvate jednu notornu cinjenicu da je preko 50 najrazvijenijih zemalja uslo u rat sa sistemima kakve oni vode.USA evo po stohiljaditi put ponavljam je 1944 pravila jedan bojni brod dnevno.To je takva sila i masinerija koju svijet nije vidio u istoriji.
USA sama kad pokrene svoje kapacitete je dovoljno.Oni ulažu u jedno specificno oruzije milijarde i zato je kad prodaju jako skupo.Nije to sistem od kartona nego od visoko sofisticirane opreme i tehnologije.

Sto se tice kine ima jedna anegdota sa kineskim cipelama.Prije jedno dvajs i kusur godina nadjem ti na pijaci cipele za 25 kerma, kazu to iz kine dolazi dobra i jeftina roba, i hajde de sto bi uzimao po radnjema adidase i pume 200-300 kerma vidi cipela boli glava 25 kerma.Prva kiša, boja sa njih procurila, tj neka glazura i pojavi se karton koji se poceo mokriti od kiše.Jedva kuci dodjoh.
Jesu sad kinezi nesto kvalitetniji al nije to isto.Fantom je fantom a kopirani kineski mig je... smetlje.

[Peacean]

koliko ima ovo naoruzavanje ukrajine od strane nato slicnosti sa ratom u vijetnamu i naoruzavanjem vijetnamaca od strane sssr i kine

Ne baš puno, Ameri nisu pokušavali da uzmu teritoriju za sebe već da spriječe dominaciju komunista. Putin s druge strane pokušava da grabi teritoriju i šakom i kapom i pokušava da je pripoji Rusiji preko namještenih referenduma. Najveća sličnost je to da Rusija neće biti ništa uspješnija od Amerike u Vijetnamu