Ukrajina

[sumirprimus]

miša čečen bub

[sumirprimus]

31va padobranska ovi su glumili male zelene na krimu 2014te. svese vraca sve se placa jarane..



anex posta na31vu

[bordo gandalf]

Zauzeti ruski polozaji, razbacani televizori po rovovima pokradeni iz okolnih sela



komentar Nevzorova

Rat u Ukrajini je još uvijek lakši za ruskog vojnika nego za ruske vojnike u Čečeniji. Tada su vojnici sami sebi morali ugurati u kamione teške televizore ukradene u bogatim selima Ichkerije, koji su bili mnogo teži od moderne "plazme".

Ruski arkanovci...

[madner]

Jack Detsch
@JackDetsch
5h
Zelensky, tonight: “Russia has been losing almost 300 lives a day for a completely pointless war against Ukraine. And still the day will come when the number of losses, even for , will exceed the permissible limit.”

Caveat: Western experts think casualty counts are lower.

zapadnjaci su obicno pazljiviji u procjenama, no ukri dosad nisu mnogo grijesili u vezi ruskih gubitaka u ljudstvu. dodaj na to ranjene. ogromni su gubici na dnevnoj bazi

Trenutno su zapadne procjene da UA gubi vise ljudi dnevno od VRF.
Ako uzmemo da su tacni, VRF gubici su usporili jer bili su davno na 18000.

Zato sam rekao ako je broj tacan, RF ima 100 000 gubitaka. Sto ce reci da ili su brojke prenapuhane ili mogu jako brzo da nadomjeste iste.

[sumirprimus]

tri mjeseca rata u minut i po

[sumirprimus]

Jack Detsch
@JackDetsch
5h
Zelensky, tonight: “Russia has been losing almost 300 lives a day for a completely pointless war against Ukraine. And still the day will come when the number of losses, even for , will exceed the permissible limit.”

Caveat: Western experts think casualty counts are lower.

zapadnjaci su obicno pazljiviji u procjenama, no ukri dosad nisu mnogo grijesili u vezi ruskih gubitaka u ljudstvu. dodaj na to ranjene. ogromni su gubici na dnevnoj bazi

Trenutno su zapadne procjene da UA gubi vise ljudi dnevno od VRF.
Ako uzmemo da su tacni, VRF gubici su usporili jer bili su davno na 18000.

Zato sam rekao ako je broj tacan, RF ima 100 000 gubitaka. Sto ce reci da ili su brojke prenapuhane ili mogu jako brzo da nadomjeste iste.

procjene ruskih gubitaka su preko 30k. ruje svakako zakonom stite iznos takvih info, sto ce reci gubici su im ogromni i abd jos ce rasti.
plus u pocetku ruje su trpile vece gubtike, tak da ih ukri tek trebaju sustici, vojno, jer civilno gubici su vec ogromni.

[sumirprimus]

na snimci kojom se rjue hvale smo vidjeli da su zasuli 4, od tog samo jedna je unistena. dakle ima ih jos kolko ti bog hoec u minuti da unistavaju ruske ciljeve. i nisu jedine, svakim danom sve vise puca roka po orcima

[sumirprimus]

posljedice raketiranja harkiva. al jok dje ce to orci radit ne raketiraju oni civilne ciljeve, ovde se jasno vidi vojna meta

[zigzag]

Jack Detsch
@JackDetsch
5h
Zelensky, tonight: “Russia has been losing almost 300 lives a day for a completely pointless war against Ukraine. And still the day will come when the number of losses, even for , will exceed the permissible limit.”

Caveat: Western experts think casualty counts are lower.

zapadnjaci su obicno pazljiviji u procjenama, no ukri dosad nisu mnogo grijesili u vezi ruskih gubitaka u ljudstvu. dodaj na to ranjene. ogromni su gubici na dnevnoj bazi

Trenutno su zapadne procjene da UA gubi vise ljudi dnevno od VRF.
Ako uzmemo da su tacni, VRF gubici su usporili jer bili su davno na 18000.

Zato sam rekao ako je broj tacan, RF ima 100 000 gubitaka. Sto ce reci da ili su brojke prenapuhane ili mogu jako brzo da nadomjeste iste.

Sve skupa nema vojničkog smisla.

I da ukrajinci trenutno imaju više gubitaka to ne znači da ih rusi nemaju. Sve ove ofanzivne akcije su besmislene jer u konačnici ništa ne donose. Vrše se samo da bi ukrajinska vojska bila angažovana na odbrani.
Čim rusi stanu, postaće meta. Svaki dan, svaka pozicija će biti na meti, nadgledana iz zraka i potencijalno bombardovana. I svaki dan će tu rusi iz rusije ginuti dok se ne povuku.
Čak i da ukrajinci ne napravi ni jednu kontraofanzivu nanosiće agresoru veliku štetu.

[sumirprimus]

upos kako ovo profula ,apdejt o ork oficirskim gubicima 700 jubilej bi juce a nismo obiljezili kako prilici damn

[sumirprimus]

𝔗𝔥𝔢 𝔇𝔢𝔞𝔡 𝔇𝔦𝔰𝔱𝔯𝔦𝔠𝔱
@TheDeadDistrict
- Russia removes hardware from long-term storage and sends it to the front line.
- Hardware from long-term storage






kae dovlace oruzje iz skladista ,stare zalihe

[Milenkov buraz]

Ma ovo sad je sve bezveze.

Dobro je neko primjetio, rat se i dalje vodi da bi putin bio manji idiot. A svrha nikakva, rusija je jebe oko par sela u ukrajinskoj ravnici.
A vrhovni zapovjednik ruske vojske se pohvali kad zauzmu selo. (Takva sila bi trebala zauzimati pola kontinenta odjednom)
Kome?
Koja ja svrha okupiranja sela u stranoj državi?

Upravo tako, guze se sa Ukrajinom evo već mjesecima. Pomoć Zapada ovdje ne može biti baš toliko presudan faktor, može usporiti ali ne i skroz zaustaviti planove takve jedne moćne sile kakva smo mislili da je Rusija. Da nemaju nuklearano oružije Rusija bi bila na nivou jednog Egipta u vojom smislu.

[lajkujMe]

Potvrda onog sto vidjamo ovih dana.
UA aktivno lovi i unistava Ruske artiljerijske pozicije

[lajkujMe]

Bilo ali neka ga

[lajkujMe]

I dalje slabo

[sumirprimus]

postavljo ja juce jt snimak

[lajkujMe]

Navodno opet Zmijsko ostrvo pod napadom

[sumirprimus]

zamiljiv tekst
After 100 Days, Russian Offensive Crawls Toward Eventual Defeat
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 19 Issue: 83
By: Pavel K. Baev
June 6, 2022 05:17 PM Age: 1 day

Spoiler

Show

Russian military strategists argue that modern wars are decided in the high-intensity initial period; and the multi-pronged large-scale offensive into Ukraine was indeed launched, on February 24, 2022, with the aim of achieving a decisive success in the first couple of weeks. Yet as the war crossed the symbolic 100 days milestone last weekend (June 4), nothing resembling a victory was discernible on Russia’s strategic horizon, even if the aims have been reduced to conquering the devastated Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Russian troops keep pushing into the ruins of Sievierodonetsk behind heavy artillery barrages, but they cannot deliver anything resembling the elegant enveloping operations that are so highly valued by Russia’s military theorists (Svoboda.org, June 3). The sequence of minor tactical successes over the last couple of weeks may, in fact, bring strategic defeat closer, as tired battalion tactical groups take more casualties and can only be merged together rather than reinforced due to the lack of reserves (Riddle, June 3).

Russian high command has given up on concepts describing the modern battlefield as an interplay of high-technology weapons systems, and it has fallen back on Soviet-era field manuals prescribing massive applications of firepower. This archaizing of operational planning is accompanied by the de-modernization of Russian force structures: legacy weapon systems are being reintroduced, while vintage armaments such as T-62 tanks are recovered from old depots (Ferra.ru, May 30). The Russian Air Force can neither establish control over the airspace nor provide effective ground support, so it is artillery that dominates the open but densely built-up front lines of the battle for Donbas (Meduza, June 3). Numerical advantage in large guns is still on the Russian side, but the accelerated delivery of various Western artillery systems, including M777 howitzers from the United States and its allies, will soon give the Ukrainian army a significant edge (Izvestia, May 19). What makes Russian command even more nervous is Washington’s decision to supply Ukraine with the M142 HIMARS guided missiles with a range of 70 kilometers, which could punish the Russian tactics of amassing artillery in fixed positions (Svoboda.org, June 1).

The Kremlin has issued a stream of warnings that the delivery of US missiles heightens the risks of escalation (RBC, May 1). But President Joseph Biden pointedly excluded the possibility of supplying Ukraine with medium-range missiles that could strike deep into Russian territory, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has denied any intentions of executing such attacks (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 1). The real aim of those Russian warnings is to exacerbate concerns among the presumably risk-averse Europeans and to convert natural fatigue with the protracted war into a reluctance to sustain and increase support for the hard-pressed Ukrainians. Moscow-based pundits have eagerly pounced on former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s opinion that Ukraine should buy peace with territorial concessions, pointing to his remarks as evidence of Western pressure on Zelenskyy to accept Russian-dictated compromises (Valdaiclub.com, May 30). Such wishful thinking, however, diverges widely from the reality of transatlantic populations’ and governments’ largely unwavering embrace of Ukraine. Even French President Emmanuel Macron, frustrated with the futility of his telephone diplomacy, rebuked President Vladimir Putin for the latter’s “historic mistake” in launching the 2022 re-invasion (RBC, June 3).

Disagreements among the Europeans are serious, but in fact less tumultuous than usual, and the European Union managed to approve last week its sixth package of sanctions, disappointing many expert opinions in Moscow (Kommersant, May 30). The main content of this latest package (besides a long list of personal penalties) consists of various restrictions on the export of Russian oil and natural gas, including a documented commitment by most EU member states to reduce or eliminate their dependency upon these supplies in the shortest possible timeframe. The pledge goes further than most observers had expected amidst a situation of market volatility and rising inflation (The Bell, May 31). But the Europeans’ resolve is underpinned by the assumption that, with the Russian energy sector so badly hit by the departure of Western partners and service companies, its oil and gas production is set to contract sharply, so Russia cannot possibly be a reliable supplier (Rosbalt, May 31).

The inevitable decline in petro-revenues will be painful for the Russian budget, but it is not necessarily the most impactful economic setback. The Russian transport system is progressively disorganized by the breakdown of supply chains and the closure of many plants built by Western companies, which have opted to discontinue business in Russia. Millions of Russian car owners are beginning to experience the consequences of this first-hand (The Insider, May 30). Putin held another virtual government meeting last week, focused on the traditionally underfunded agenda of road construction. But the allocation of proverbial truckloads of rubles cannot advance the problem too far in the absence of necessary equipment and technology (Kommersant, June 2).

Putin appears to have no grasp of the depth of his country’s economic problems beyond the direct costs associated with the Russian military offensive against Ukraine. But he has fewer concerns about the exasperation of his ministers than about the rising anger among the top brass. He cannot blame his generals for their failure in conquering Donbas and unleash Stalin-style purges, because the pool of experienced Russian commanders has been depleted as war casualties; replacing them with loyal siloviki from the special services is not an option (Meduza, June 1). Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu continues to command respect in the officer corps. He is aware not only of the fighting generals’ frustration with the lack of reserves and resources but also of the discontent in the vast state bureaucracy caused by ineffectual leadership and official denials of the unfolding disaster (Svoboda.org, June 2).

Putin’s war looks to have become unwinnable, whatever spin the agitated propaganda puts on every square kilometer of “liberated” Donbas. Ukraine, meanwhile, shows courage and tenacity in defensive battles, demonstrates strategic patience in letting the tired Russian army exhaust its last reserves in senseless attacks, and trains fresh battalions equipped with Western weapons. The threat of a penetrating Ukrainian counteroffensive is apparent for Russian commanders, but they cannot prepare defensive positions because the orders demand pushing forward. Neither Russia’s gradually degrading economy, nor the badly damaged military machine can sustain the protracted war of attrition, and this is the course Putin is committed to. His only hope is that Ukraine will break under the pain of bombing, but he seems unable to understand the unbreakable will of the Ukrainians to uphold their state.

[sumirprimus]

bub

[lajkujMe]

Mislim da je ovo glupa prica.

Patriot jeste zvjer ne sumnjam ali u ovoj situaciji dovesti sistem u upotrebu je problematicno u najmanju ruku.

Prvo od upotrebe i odrzavanja ali najveci problem je nedostatak slojevite odbrane za ovaj sistem.

Da bi Patriot radio efektivno prvo bilo bi potrebno dovesti nekoliko baterijs odjednom koje su podrzane od Medium range PVO i Shorad sistema.
Da bi se prvenstveno zastitio sistem ali i zasitio vazdusni prostor.

UA prica i o Iron Dome, ima logike nabaviti nekoliko sistema ali oni bi sluzili iskljucivo kao odbrana gradova ili strateskih lokacija.

Nisu dobri za mobilne frontovske borbe i slicno.

UA treba puno vise PVO srednjeg dometa npr Slamraam ili Nasams sistem, ili taj njemacki Iris-T.
Ali jedno 20 baterija za pocetak.
1-2 ce biti odmah unistene

[sumirprimus]

evo ih kanadjani

[Milenkov buraz]

Mislim da je ovo glupa prica.

Patriot jeste zvjer ne sumnjam ali u ovoj situaciji dovesti sistem u upotrebu je problematicno u najmanju ruku.

Prvo od upotrebe i odrzavanja ali najveci problem je nedostatak slojevite odbrane za ovaj sistem.

Da bi Patriot radio efektivno prvo bilo bi potrebno dovesti nekoliko baterijs odjednom koje su podrzane od Medium range PVO i Shorad sistema.
Da bi se prvenstveno zastitio sistem ali i zasitio vazdusni prostor.

UA prica i o Iron Dome, ima logike nabaviti nekoliko sistema ali oni bi sluzili iskljucivo kao odbrana gradova ili strateskih lokacija.

Nisu dobri za mobilne frontovske borbe i slicno.

UA treba puno vise PVO srednjeg dometa npr Slamraam ili Nasams sistem, ili taj njemacki Iris-T.
Ali jedno 20 baterija za pocetak.
1-2 ce biti odmah unistene

Slažem se u potpunosti, IronDome je za strateške ciljeve da štiti a nikako za fronta gdje ti je neprijatelj 10-20 km od tebe.

[sumirprimus]

pravdsa je spora ali dostizna

[Ima Bosne_Bice Bosne]

posljedice raketiranja harkiva. al jok dje ce to orci radit ne raketiraju oni civilne ciljeve, ovde se jasno vidi vojna meta

Za orke su i ukrajinska djeca vojna meta, kao sto su im i za bracu na Balkanu bila sva nesrpska.

[lajkujMe]

Slabo vijesti s fronta jutros.

Jucer se desilo par kriticnih Ruskih napredovanja.

Metolkine kod Severodonetska je opet pod Ruskom sapom.
UA drzi citavu industrijsku zonu i dijelove grada pola pola je podjeljen.

Jucer su Rusi okupirali Sviatohirsk i okolinu.
Sad Orci kontrolisu citavu obalu Severodonetsk rijeke.

Slovljansk je u opasnosti, ma da nije kriticno jos uvijek jer moraju prvo preci rijeku Rusi a Slovljansk je pod zastitom artiljerije.

Po Firmsu borbe oko Kersona su pomjerenje na sjevero-zapad prema Mykolayevu.
Sad zasad sem par taktickih napredaka ne vidim Ukrajinski prodor i slom Rusa.
Nazalost mislim da je originalni plan da presjeku ruse kod Kahovke nije vise opcija.
Ofanziva prerasla u borbu metar po metar.
Vidim Snihurivku i dalje pokusavaju da uzmu ali bez napredtka.

Ruska artiljerija i avijacija remeti Ukrajinske planove na tom podrucju.

Ono sto treba Ukrajincima sad je dalekometna artiljerija na tom podrucju.
Primarni cilj bi meni bio Melitpolj aerodrom kojeg Rusi koriste za ratnu avijaciju.
Unistenjem njega uz pomoc Himars sistema lakse bi se disalo u Hersonu i Zaporozju.

Karkiv je meni i dalje najzanimljiviji pogledajte ovo



Grad Ukrainske Pilne zestoka artiljerija blizu Mostobrana kod Stare Saltive.
Izgleda da UA napada taj reon ali ne moze se s sigurnoscu reci.
Sto znaci da su mozda napravili dobar napredak...
Ono sto sigurno znam je da UA drzi liniju od Buhaivke do Khotomlie.


Zaporozje, Polohy grad pod jos jacom artiljerijom nego jucer mislim da se tu desava neka UA ofanziva ali isto nemam info.

Donbas situacija se opet promjenila po meni UA opet u defanzivnoj ulogi.
Ako ne povrate citav SD u sta sumnjam mislim da ce grad pasti tokom sedmice

Rusi poslije pocetnog soka opet napreduju poslali su sve sto imaju na taj grad.

Uglavnom selo po selo Rusi napreduju.
Svi cekamo trenutak kad vise nece moci.

Ali sve je vec receno od UA komande, jun i Jul ce biti teski mjeseci i tek u Augustu ocekujemo prevrat na UA stranu