General War wrote: ↑17/12/2019 13:57
ALi zato toliko godina Americke unutrasnje granice mirne...niko nije ni drugacije rekao koliko ja pratim, vec ako vec nece talibani i ostala bagra da se smire...ok, bolje rat ratovati na neprijateljskoj teritoriji nego kod kuce.
Americke unutrasnje granice nikad nisu ni bile u opasnosti od Talibana, a clanak je vrlo dobro objasnio da je uradjeno vise stete nego koristi.
U.S. officials tried to create — from scratch — a democratic government in Kabul modeled after their own in Washington. It was a foreign concept to the Afghans, who were accustomed to tribalism, monarchism, communism and Islamic law.
“Our policy was to create a strong central government which was idiotic because Afghanistan does not have a history of a strong central government,” an unidentified former State Department official told government interviewers in 2015.
“The timeframe for creating a strong central government is 100 years, which we didn’t have.”
Meanwhile, the United States flooded the fragile country with far more aid than it could possibly absorb.
One unnamed executive with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) guessed that 90 percent of what they spent was overkill: “We lost objectivity. We were given money, told to spend it and we did, without reason.”
Many aid workers blamed Congress for what they saw as a mindless rush to spend.
One unidentified contractor told government interviewers he was expected to dole out $3 million daily for projects in a single Afghan district roughly the size of a U.S. county. He once asked a visiting congressman whether the lawmaker could responsibly spend that kind of money back home: “He said hell no. ‘Well, sir, that’s what you just obligated us to spend and I’m doing it for communities that live in mud huts with no windows.’ ”
The gusher of aid that Washington spent on Afghanistan also gave rise to historic levels of corruption.
In public, U.S. officials insisted they had no tolerance for graft. But in the Lessons Learned interviews, they admitted the U.S. government looked the other way while Afghan power brokers — allies of Washington — plundered with impunity.
Christopher Kolenda, an Army colonel who deployed to Afghanistan several times and advised three U.S. generals in charge of the war, said that the Afghan government led by President Hamid Karzai had “self-organized into a kleptocracy” by 2006 — and that U.S. officials failed to recognize the lethal threat it posed to their strategy.
Ili ce Amerikanci vecno ostati u Avganistanu ili ce sve otici u p.m. cim se povuku.
