Razlika je bila u tajmingu i spremnosti NATO pakta da koristi i nuklearno oružje u odbrani Jugoslavije.tvsabina wrote:
Ma da.....sticaj okolnosti je zapravo posljedica Titove politike......sve i jedna komunisticka zemlja je mogla reci ne Staljinu i biti nezavisna.....u cemu je razlika izmedju Poljske, Cehoslovacke i Jugoslavije ? Zasto su sve cutale a samo Jugoslavija nije ?
E pa reci cu ti u cemu je razlika , Jugoslavija je imala Tita......
https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/ ... geddon.pdf
Despite the West's crash military aid program to Yugoslavia, fears ofinvasion and a wider conflict continued to mount in NATO capitals. In early February 1951, the British Chiefs of Staff announced. that a direct Soviet attack on Yugoslavia \ "would lead to world war." Washington agreed that Stalinist aggression on Yugoslavia "might well be the prelude to a global war." NATO concerns about what was termed a "second Korea"\ in Europe were increased by a broad acceptance that, unlike in Korea, a Communist offensive against Tito could not be localized; or, as the British Chiefs of Staff expressed it, "it is always likely that an attack on Yugoslavia would spread to a global war." Given NATO's overwhelming weakness in conventional forces, it was inevitable that the nuclear issue came to the fore. Within weeks of the invasion of South Korea, Washington had accepted in principle that due to the dearth of conventional forces, atomic weapons would probably have to be used to defend Yugoslavia against Soviet attack. America's "freedom of action to employ atomic weapons in such a localized conflict if the situation dictates" was a jealously guarded prerogative, as well as the strategic logic underpinning NATO policy towards Yugoslavia. Given that the conventional balance in the Balkans continued to deteriorate - by early 1951, not counting Soviet garrisons, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria possessed standing forces more than twice the size of Tito's army - any NATO defense of Yugoslavia would require nuclear backing to be viable.
