In God's Name

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pitt
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#1 In God's Name

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Najnovije izdanje The Economist magazina donosi odlical special report o usponu (i vaznosti) religije kao i sukobu sa politikom, naukom, ekonomijom, itd. Clanci su malo poduzi ali zanimljivo stivo za sve pravovjerne i cafire, kao i bracu ateiste i agnostike :D:D

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Faith and politics

The new wars of religion
Nov 1st 2007
From The Economist print edition

Faith will unsettle politics everywhere this century; it will do so least when it is separated from the state

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A RELIGIOUS fanatic feels persecuted, goes overseas to fight for his God and then returns home to attempt a bloody act of terrorism. Next week as Britons celebrate the capture of Guy Fawkes, a Catholic jihadist, under the Houses of Parliament in 1605, they might reflect how dismally modern the Gunpowder Plot and Europe's wars of religion now seem.

Back in the 20th century, most Western politicians and intellectuals (and even some clerics) assumed religion was becoming marginal to public life; faith was largely treated as an irrelevance in foreign policy. Symptomatically, State Department diaries ignored Muslim holidays until the 1990s. In the 21st century, by contrast, religion is playing a central role. From Nigeria to Sri Lanka, from Chechnya to Baghdad, people have been slain in God's name; and money and volunteers have poured into these regions. Once again, one of the world's great religions has a bloody divide (this time it is Sunnis and Shias, not Catholics and Protestants). And once again zealotry seems all too relevant to foreign policy: America would surely not have invaded Iraq and Afghanistan (and be thinking so actively of striking Iran) had 19 young Muslims not attacked New York and Washington.

It does not stop there. Outside Western Europe, religion has forced itself dramatically into the public square. In 1960 John Kennedy pleaded with Americans to treat his Catholicism as irrelevant; now a born-again Christian sits in the White House and his most likely Democrat replacement wants voters to know she prays. An Islamist party rules once-secular Turkey; Hindu nationalists may return to power in India's next election; ever more children in Israel and Palestine are attending religious schools that tell them that God granted them the whole Holy Land. On present trends, China will become the world's biggest Christian country—and perhaps its biggest Muslim one too. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, not usually a reliable authority on current affairs, got it right in an open letter to George Bush: “Whether we like it or not,” he wrote, “the world is gravitating towards faith in the Almighty.”

Gunpowder, treason and plot
How frightening (or inspiring) is this prospect? As our special report explains, the idea that religion has re-emerged in public life is to some extent an illusion. It never really went away—certainly not to the extent that French politicians and American college professors imagined. Its new power is mostly the consequence of two changes. The first is the failure of secular creeds: religion's political comeback started during the 1970s, when faith in government everywhere was crumbling. Second, although some theocracies survive in the Islamic world, religion has returned to the stage as a much more democratic, individualistic affair: a bottom-up marketing success, surprisingly in tune with globalisation. Secularism was not as modern as many intellectuals imagined, but pluralism is. Free up religion and ardent believers and ardent atheists both do well.

From a classical liberal point of view, this multiplicity of sects is a good thing. Freedom of conscience is an axiom of liberal thought. If man is a theotropic beast, inclined to believe in a hereafter, it is surely better that he chooses his faith, rather than follows the one his government orders. But that makes religion a complicated force to deal with. In domestic policy, adults who choose to become Pentecostals, Orthodox Jews or Muslim fundamentalists are far less likely to forget those beliefs when it comes to the ballot box. The culture wars that America has grown used to may become a global phenomenon; expect fierce battles about science, in particular.

Abroad, yes, there is a chance of full-blown war of religion between states. A conflagration between Iran and Israel would, alas, be seen as a faith-based conflict by millions; so would war between India and Pakistan. But compared with Guy Fawkes's time, when wars sprang from monarchs throwing their military might at others of different faiths, religious conflict today is the result as much of popular will as of state sponsorship: it is bottom-up, driven by volunteers not conscripts, their activities blessed by rogue preachers not popes, their fury mostly directed at apostates not competing civilisations. Ironically, America, the model for much choice-based religion, has often seemed stuck in the secular era, declaring war on state-sponsored terror, only to discover the main weapon of militant Islamism is often the ballot box.

Start praying now
For politicians doomed to deal with religion, two lessons stand out—one principled, the other pragmatic. The principle is that church and state are best kept separate. Subsidised religion has seldom made sense for either state or church: witness Europe's empty pews. In some cases, separating the two is easy. In private, people can choose to believe that the world was created exactly 6,003 years ago, but teachers should not be allowed to teach children creationism as science. The state should not tell people whether they can wear headscarves, let alone ban “unauthorised” reincarnation (as China did recently in Tibet). But the line is not always easy to draw: this paper disapproves of publicly financed faith schools, especially ones that discriminate against non-believers, but it also believes in giving poor parents more choice—and in American cities the main alternative to public schools is Catholic ones.

The religion that invades the public square most overtly is Islam: it affords secular power the least respect, teaching that the primary unit of society is the umma, the international brotherhood of believers. At its most theocratic, it forces people to follow sharia laws, sometimes with barbaric penalties. Yet Islam can clearly co-exist with a modern liberal state. For all its failures in the Arab world, democracy has taken root in Malaysia and Indonesia. America's Muslims worship freely and respect its secular constitution—a success the United States should make more of in its foreign policy. But the test case will be Turkey, a secular state currently ruled by Islamists whose progress is being watched with nervous attention.

The pragmatic lesson concerns those wars of religion. Partly because of their obsession with keeping church and state separate, Western powers (and religious leaders) have been too reluctant to look for faith-driven solutions to religious conflicts. Many of those struggles, notably the Middle East, began as secular tribal disputes. Now that they have a religious component they are much harder to solve: if God granted you the West Bank, you are less likely to trade it. “Inter-faith dialogue” may sound a wishy-washy concept; but it is a more realistic idea than presenting a secular peace to competing faiths without the backing of religious leaders. Priests and pastors condemned violence from both sides in Northern Ireland; that has not really happened in the Holy Land.

Atheists and agnostics hate the fact, but these days religion is an inescapable part of politics. Although it is not the state's business “to make windows into men's souls”, it is part of the government's job to prevent grievances from stirring into bloodshed, and fanatics from guiding policy. But it isn't easy. Catholics did not get back into Parliament for 224 years after the Gunpowder Plot. Unless politicians learn to take account of religious feelings and to draw a firm line between church and state, the new wars of religion may prove as intractable.
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RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE

In God's name
Nov 1st 2007
From The Economist print edition

Religion will play a big role in this century's politics. John Micklethwait (interviewed here) asks how we should deal with it

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THE four-hour journey through the bush from Kano to Jos in northern Nigeria features many of the staples of African life: checkpoints with greedy soldiers, huge potholes, scrawny children in football shirts drying rice on the road. But it is also a journey along a front-line.

Nigeria, evenly split between Christians and Muslims, is a country where people identify themselves by their religion first and as Nigerians second (see chart 1). Around 20,000 have been killed in God's name since 1990, estimates Shehu Sani, a local chronicler of religious violence. Kano, the centre of the Islamic north, introduced sharia law seven years ago. Many of the Christians who fled ended up in Jos, the capital of Plateau state, where the Christian south begins. The road between the two towns is dotted with competing churches and mosques.

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This is one of many religious battlefields in this part of Africa. Evangelical Christians, backed by American collection-plate money, are surging northwards, clashing with Islamic fundamentalists, backed by Saudi petrodollars, surging southwards. And the Christian-Muslim split is only one form of religious competition in northern Nigeria. Events in Iraq have set Sunnis, who make up most of Nigeria's Muslims, against the better-organised Shias; about 50 people have died in intra-Muslim violence, reckons Mr Sani. On the Christian side, Catholics are in a more peaceful battle with Protestant evangelists, whose signs promising immediate redemption dominate the roadside. By the time you reach Jos and see a poster proclaiming “the ABC of nourishment”, you are surprised to discover it is for chocolate.

Recently Christians have been returning to Kano, partly because sharia law (which in any case applies only to Muslims) has been introduced sympathetically. None of the bloodier sentences has been carried out. Indeed, the election in April was settled in a reassuringly secular way—with the local political barons swapping cash and ballot papers in the bungalow of the Prince Hotel.

Yet it would not take much for things to boil over again. The Muslim north resents the Christian south's hogging of Nigeria's oil money. When earlier this year the shadowy “Black Taliban” struck a police station in Kano, around 20 militants were killed. In September Muslim youths set shops on fire after rumours that a Christian teacher in the area had drawn a cartoon of the Prophet Muhammad. And the missionaries are still pushing provocatively north. Salihu Garba, a prominent Muslim convert to Christianity (who has survived various assassination attempts), claims that the Evangelical Church of West Africa now has 157 churches in Kano state—double the number five years ago.

The journey from Kano to Jos may seem a trip back in time. In fact, religious front-lines criss-cross the globe.

Most obviously, Americans and Britons would not be dying in Iraq and Afghanistan had 19 young Muslims not attacked the United States in the name of Allah. The West's previous great military interventions were to protect Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo from Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croatians. America's next war could be against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Other conflicts have acquired a new religious edge. In the poisonous war over Palestine, ever more people are claiming God on their side (with some of the most zealous sorts living miles away from the conflict). In Myanmar (Burma) Buddhist monks nearly brought down an evil regime, but in Sri Lanka they have prolonged a bloody conflict with Muslims. If India has an election, a bridge to Sri Lanka supposedly built by the god Ram (and a team of monkeys) may matter as much as a nuclear deal with America.

Formerly communist countries are also getting hooked again on the opium of the people. Russia's secret police, the KGB, hounded religion: its successor, the FSB, has its own Orthodox church opposite its headquarters. In the Polish parliament the speaker crosses himself before taking his seat. Some of China's technocrats think that Confucianism, which Mao condemned as “feudal”, is useful social glue in their fast-changing country. But they brutally repressed a Buddhist sect, the Falun Gong, and they are worried that Christian churchgoers may already outnumber Communist Party members.

In Western politics, too, religion has forced itself back into the public square. The American president begins each day on his knees and each cabinet meeting with a prayer. The easiest way to tell a Republican from a Democrat is to ask how often he or she goes to church. And although European liberals sneer about American theocracy, American conservatives claim that secular, childless Europe is turning into Eurabia.

Many secular intellectuals think that the real “clash of civilisations” is not between different religions but between superstition and modernity. A succession of bestselling books have torn into religion—Sam Harris's “The End of Faith”, Richard Dawkins's “The God Delusion” and Christopher Hitchens's “God is not Great—How Religion Poisons Everything”. This counterattack already shows a religious intensity. Mr Dawkins has set up an organisation to help atheists around the world.

Part of that secular fury, especially in Europe, comes from exasperation. After all, it has been a canon of progressive thought since the Enlightenment that modernity—that heady combination of science, learning and democracy—would kill religion. Plainly, this has not happened. Numbers about religious observance are notoriously untrustworthy, but most of them seem to indicate that any drift towards secularism has been halted, and some show religion to be on the increase. The proportion of people attached to the world's four biggest religions—Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism—rose from 67% in 1900 to 73% in 2005 and may reach 80% by 2050 (see chart 2).

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Moreover, from a secularist point of view, the wrong sorts of religion are flourishing, and in the wrong places. In general, it is the tougher versions of religion that are doing best—the sort that claim Adam and Eve met 6,003 years ago. Some of the new converts are from the ranks of the underprivileged (Pentecostalism has spread rapidly in the favelas of Brazil), but many are not. American evangelicals tend to be well-educated and well-off. In India and Turkey religious parties have been driven by the up-and-coming bourgeoisie.

With modernity now religion's friend, an eternal subject has become fashionable. Father Richard John Neuhaus points out that when he founded his Centre for Religion and Society in 1984, there were only four centres of religion and public life in America; now, he thinks, there are more than 200. Religious people are getting more vocal in all sorts of fields, including business. Religion is also cropping up in economics. Niall Ferguson, a Scottish historian, re-examined Max Weber's theory of the Protestant work ethic to explain why Europeans work less than Americans.

The garden of Eden
Philip Jenkins, one of America's best scholars of religion, claims that when historians look back at this century, they will probably see religion as “the prime animating and destructive force in human affairs, guiding attitudes to political liberty and obligation, concepts of nationhood and, of course, conflicts and wars.” If the first seven years are anything to go by, Mr Jenkins may well turn out to be right.

What has changed? The main protagonists are oddly unhelpful in providing explanations. Believers usually produce some version of “you can't repress the truth for ever.” Sociologists point out that outside western Europe most people have always been religious. Peter Berger, the dean of the subject, chides journalists for investigating the religious rule, not the secular exception: “Rather than studying American evangelicals and Islamic mullahs, you should look at Swedes and New England college professors.”

Yet even if underlying piety has not changed that much, religion's role in public life plainly has. Only ten years ago, most academics and politicians would have dismissed Mr Jenkins's claim about religion being central to politics as weird.

After all, for much of the 20th century religion was banished from politics. For most elites, God had been undone by Darwin, dismissed by Marx, deconstructed by Freud. Stalin forcibly ejected Him, but in much of western Europe there was no need for force: religion had been on the slide for centuries. In Britain the “long withdrawing roar” of Anglicanism that Matthew Arnold lamented faded to a distant echo in the 20th century.

In America the number of churchgoers stayed high, but evangelical Christians retreated from politics, embarrassed by the failure of prohibition and the Scopes Monkey trial (in which creationists were mocked). In 1960 Jack Kennedy assured the country that his Catholicism would not pollute his politics. In 1966 Time magazine famously ran a cover asking “Is God dead?”; three years later man reached the moon, metaphorically conquering the heavens.

For modernising post-colonial leaders in the developing world, secularism and progress were indivisible. “The fez”, said Kemal Ataturk, “sat upon our heads as a sign of ignorance and fanaticism.” In India Jawaharlal Nehru wished to make “a clean sweep” of organised religion: “almost always it seems to stand for blind belief and reaction, dogma and bigotry, superstition and exploitation and the preservation of vested interests.” In Egypt Gamal Abdel Nasser, the champion of Arab nationalism, clamped down on the Muslim Brotherhood. Africa's new rulers nationalised the Christian mission schools that had taught them. Even “the Jewish state” deemed religion a distraction: after Israel's founding in 1948 the secular David Ben-Gurion agreed that rabbinical law would prevail in matters such as marriage and divorce partly because he assumed the Orthodox would melt away.

In retrospect, the turning point came long before Osama bin Laden declared his jihad on Jews and Crusaders. For Timothy Shah, a scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York who is writing a book on secularism, the symbolic turning point was the six-day war of 1967. It marked a crushing defeat for secular pan-Arabism; meanwhile Israel's “miraculous” triumph gave God a stronger voice in its politics, emboldening the settler movement. In the same year a Hindu nationalist party won 9.4% of the vote in India.

By the end of the 1970s this counter-revolution was in full swing. America had elected its first proudly born-again Christian, Jimmy Carter; Jerry Falwell had founded the Moral Majority; Iran had replaced the worldly shah with Ayatollah Khomeini; Zia ul Haq was busy Islamising Pakistan; Buddhism had been formally granted the foremost place in Sri Lanka's constitution; and an anti-communist Pole had become head of the Catholic church.

What caused this shift? Believers inevitably see a populist revolt against the overreach of elitist secularism—be it America's Supreme Court legalising pornography or Indira Gandhi harrying Hindus. From a more secular viewpoint, John Lewis Gaddis, a Yale historian, points out that much religious politics dates back to the 1970s, a time when more worldly “isms” seemed to fail. By then, the Soviet Union's evils had made a mockery of Marxism, and capitalism had also hit some buffers (the oil shocks, hyperinflation). More generally, politicians' ability to solve problems such as crime or unemployment was questioned: faith in government tumbled just about everywhere in the 1970s—and has stayed low since.

But why has religion's power seemed to keep on increasing? The first reason is a series of reactions and counter-reactions. Fundamentalist Islam, for instance, has helped spur radical Judaism and Hinduism, which in turn have reinforced the mullahs' fervour. Hamas owes much to Israel's settlers. Without Falwell, Messrs Hitchens and Dawkins would have smaller royalties.

Second, the latest form of modernity—globalisation—has propelled religion forward. For traditionalists, faith has acted as a barrier against change. For prosperous suburbanites, faith has become something of a lifestyle coach. It is no accident that America's bestselling religious book is called “The Purpose Driven Life”.

A hitch for the Hitch
Whatever the exact cause, two groups of people in particular have struggled to come to terms with this new world. The first is politicians, especially practitioners of foreign policy. Realpolitik does not easily cope with the irrational. For instance, religion does not appear in the index of “Diplomacy”, Henry Kissinger's 900-page masterpiece on statesmanship (a mistake, admits the former secretary of state, who now sees some “depressing similarities” with 17th-century Europe).

Mr Kissinger is not alone. Before September 11th 2001, most “big books” (with the exception of Samuel Huntington's “Clash of Civilisations”) predicted a secular end to history. The Economist was so confident of the Almighty's demise that we published His obituary in our millennium issue. Madeleine Albright recalls a meeting at the State Department about Northern Ireland in the late 1990s when a diplomat asked despairingly: “Who would believe that we would be dealing with a religious conflict near the end of the 20th century?”

September 11th has changed that. A decade ago, a proposal by the CIA to study religion was vetoed as “mere sociology”; that would not happen now. But mistakes are still made. When America went into Iraq, people worried about George Bush's God-directed foreign policy; in fact it would have helped if Donald Rumsfeld et al had understood more about religion—especially the difference between Shias and Sunnis. “Everywhere we look, we have religious problems,” admits one (born-again) member of the Bush team. “And it is not just Islam. There are the Orthodox in Russia, Hindu nationalism in India, Christians in China...the list is long.”

The other group struggling to deal with religion's role in public life are liberals. When religious belief is plainly unreasonable—for instance, when schools teach creationism—it is easy to fight. But in many disputes there are liberal answers on both sides. Those who are embracing religion nowadays are doing so out of choice. Is it liberal to stop a British Airways worker from wearing a crucifix? Whose rights are being infringed when a majority of people on a Turkish bus ask the driver to stop so they can pray?

A schism in Western liberalism that dates back to its two founding revolutions seems to have reopened. In France, where the Catholic church was the sole faith, the revolutionnaires detested God as a crucial part of the ancien régime: politics, they declared, henceforth would be protected from this evil. By contrast, America's Founding Fathers, used to many competing faiths, took a more benign view. They divided church from state not least to protect the former from the latter.

This special report is an attempt to tease out these conflicts. It comes with three health warnings. First, many numbers in religion are dodgy: most churches inflate their support and many governments do not record religion in their censuses (in Nigeria the best source is health records). Second, in a field where many believers claim to know all the answers, it poses mainly questions. And lastly, given the emotion the subject arouses, the chances are that some of what follows will offend you.
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Mega-crkve na korejski nacin :D


RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE

O come all ye faithful
Nov 1st 2007
From The Economist print edition

God is definitely not dead, but He now comes in many more varieties


MENTION a “megachurch” and most people think of a gleaming building in the American suburbs. In fact, many of the biggest churches are outside the United States. In Guatemala, Pentecostals have built what may be the largest building in Central America: Mega Frater (Big Brother) packs a 12,000-seater church, a vast baptism pool and a heliport. One church in Lagos can supposedly bring 2m people out onto the streets. But five of the world's ten biggest megachurches are in just one country: South Korea.



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The largest of them all, Yoido Full Gospel Church, sits opposite the national assembly in Seoul, an astute piece of political positioning. It looks somewhat unprepossessing—a brownish blob surrounded by office buildings—but Yoido boasts 830,000 members, a number it says is rising by 3,000 a month. One in 20 people in greater Seoul is a member.

Each of the seven Sunday services at Yoido is a logistical challenge: apart from the 12,000 people in the main sanctuary, another 20,000 follow the service on television in overflow chapels scattered around neighbouring buildings. Some 38,000 children go to Sunday school during the day. As one service begins and the next ends, around 60,000 comers and goers are ushered by white-jacketed traffic directors. If you want to attend one of the two services starring the church's founder, David Cho, you need to be an hour early or you won't get in.

Not that you will lack entertainment whilst you wait. The massed choir (one of 12) is already belting out hymns, backed by a large orchestra (one of three). The audience sings along, with huge television screens supplying the words, karaoke style. Pictures of the service are beamed to hundreds of satellite churches around the world and to Prayer Mountain, a gruelling religious camp close to the border with the North. Translation is offered in English, Japanese, Chinese, Spanish, French, Indonesian, Malay and Arabic.

By the standards of American preachers, Mr Cho is a relatively unflashy figure. With his glasses, tie and tidy red cassock, he looks like one of the more bureaucratic kinds of Asian politician. His tone is logical and unrelenting. His theme today is “Deliver us from the Evil One”.

Sin and Satan are omnipresent, he argues, but if you ignore their enticements, “your grave is already empty.” As he cites scripture, the passages appear on the big television screens. Mr Cho urges the liberation of North Korea and quotes Edward Gibbon. He then invites people to touch the part of their body that most needs healing. There are shouts of success. After he sits down, a young opera singer performs while the money is collected—by the sackful in gold and scarlet bags—and piled up in front of the pulpit.

Divide and multiply
To Mr Cho's critics, Yoido, like many megachurches, is too much of a business nowadays; and there was a fuss to do with his son running the church's newspaper, Korea's fourth-largest. Yet its beginnings were humble. Mr Cho, who was converted to Pentecostalism from Buddhism by his nurse after he nearly died of tuberculosis, founded Yoido in 1956 in a battered $50 tent bought from the Marine Corps. Like Pentecostals the world over, Yoido's system is rooted in “home-cells”. Most of the praying and converting is done at home, in small groups of around a dozen people. The idea is that these cells, like their biological equivalents, will multiply. Women are crucial. Mr Cho's right-hand woman was his mother-in-law, Jashil Choi, a figure known as “Hallelujah Mama”. Today Yoido boasts 68,000 female deacons—twice the number of male ones. A typical evangelist will make 35 visits a week and drink an unhealthy amount of coffee in the process.

This sort of “viral marketing” might seem untraditional to those used to bishops, cardinals and popes. In fact, Christianity advanced from an obscure sect to the official religion of the Roman empire by focusing on women. Christians stressed fidelity and marriage, which attracted women to the faith, who then bore Christian babies.

The Protestant surge in South Korea has slowed down a bit recently, a development which is variously blamed on changes in school laws and the abuses of some clerical families. Even so, the growth has been phenomenal. In 1950 only 2.4% of South Koreans were Protestant. Now the figure is close to 20%. Counting Catholics (which many Korean Protestants don't), Christians make up close to 30% of the population. “Koreans don't play church,” says an American elder at Yoido.

The people who have flocked to South Korea's megachurches are the upwardly mobile. Asked (in 2004) which faith had been most instrumental in their country's modernisation, 42.7% of South Koreans named Protestantism and 11.3% Catholicism. Hahn Meerha, a professor at Hoseo University, points out that 42% of the chief executives of listed companies and a third of its senators are Protestants. There are monthly prayer breakfasts at the national parliament, and the current favourite to win the presidency in the election due in December, Lee Myung-bak, is the elder of a megachurch.

That is not an undisguised blessing for Mr Lee. If one part of the middle classes has flocked to the megachurches, another is increasingly unhappy about religion's role in society: the same 2004 poll also found that 59% of Koreans thought the churches were going in the wrong direction. When a group of clueless young Korean missionaries were captured by the Taliban in Afghanistan earlier this year, there were widespread complaints in Seoul that the youngsters had been brainwashed into going there as a marketing ploy for South Korea's churches.

Korean Protestantism is certainly export-minded: Yoido sends out 600 missionaries a year. One target is North Korea, which used to be the more Christian end of the country. Yoido already has plans to build a second sanctuary in Pyongyang. Yanbian, a district in China that has a large ethnic Korean population, is choc-a-bloc with missionaries.

But the biggest prize for Christians across Asia is China itself. Some call it “the Africa of the 21st century”, recalling that the number of Christians in that continent rose from below 10m in 1900 to 400m in 2000. Officially, the Chinese government admits to 23m Christians within its borders, but it counts only churches that register with the authorities, and the real figure is probably around three times as high. Most Christians prefer private “house churches”. China even has two Catholic churches, one official and one underground. One Korean ruse is to set up small businesses and get work permits for traders who are really missionaries.

On this rock
South Korea illustrates three features of modern religion: competition, heat and choice. To understand the competitive mechanism, you need only two sacred texts. The first is “The Wealth of Nations”, in which Adam Smith argues that the free market works in religion as in everything else. Non-established clergy, who rely on the collection plate, show greater “zeal” in proselytising “the inferior ranks of people” than the established, salaried sort, who are more interested in sucking up to clerical bigwigs. Europe has been a textbook illustration of this (see article).

The second text is the American constitution. As a refuge for dissenters, America was always closer to Smith's vision, though it was not quite the religious city on a hill its boosters claim. The early Puritans were soon swamped by more venal colonists: in Salem, the zealous town in Arthur Miller's “The Crucible”, 83% of taxpayers in 1683 had no religious allegiance. Most of the Founding Fathers thought religion was useful in a squirearchial sort of way, but they were not particularly godly: George Washington never mentions Jesus Christ in his personal papers.

Thus, the First Amendment—“that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”—was a compromise between dissenters (who wanted to keep the state away from religion) and more anti-clerical sorts like Thomas Jefferson (who wanted the church out of politics). Yet it became the great engine of American religiosity, creating a new sort of country where membership of a church was a purely voluntary activity.

Look back at the first great success in this free market, Methodism, and it is not difficult to spot where Yoido's growth formula came from. When Francis Asbury arrived in America in 1771, there were barely 1,000 Methodists in the country. By the time he died in 1816, 1m people, one-eighth of the entire population, were attending Methodist camp meetings (the 19th-century equivalent of megachurches). The Methodists paid their preachers only a nominal stipend, gave them no job security and told them to avoid arid theology (“Always suit your subjects to your audience,” went the instruction, and “choose the plainest texts you can.”)

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Purposeful Warren

The constitution explains not just why America still excels at the religion business (the late Peter Drucker, a famous management guru, used to point out that American business could learn a lot from its “pastorpreneurs”) but also how it has become a huge export industry. Rick Warren, America's favourite preacher, likens his “purpose-driven formula” to an Intel operating chip that can be inserted into the motherboard of any church; there are now more than 100,000 “purpose-driven” churches in 160 countries. Korea was converted by Americans.

As the Methodists became more hierarchical in the mid-19th century, they began to lose ground to the Baptists. In all likelihood creative destruction will eventually hit Yoido and Mr Warren too. Religion in America tends to come in waves—and the current “awakening” may just be dying down. But an advantage of competition is that it spurs responses. For instance, the recent setback for Korean Protestantism has given a push to Catholicism (whose priests don't have sons to inherit churches). The Catholics are also fighting back against Pentecostals in Latin America, “becoming less Roman and more local”, says Harvey Cox, a Harvard divinity professor. In Nigeria Catholic priests have so embraced the habits of their evangelical competitors that the Cardinal of Lagos recently warned them about the “incalculable damage” being done to services by “unorthodox spontaneous prayers by all the faithful at the same time”.

Has the same competitive spirit gripped other religions? Buddhism, the religion whose market share has dipped most over the past century, remains pretty passive: its adherents believe that people should discover faith for themselves rather than be energetically introduced to it. But there are some signs of awakening. In South Korea Buddhist monks, often hidden away in inaccessible rural shrines, have set up meditation areas in cities to fight off the Protestants.

Hinduism tends to be more turf-conscious. Some states in India have passed “anti-conversion” laws banning evangelists from using force or “allurement”—code for Christians and Muslims converting Hindu untouchables, who tend to get a raw deal under the caste system. And when it comes to marketing pizzazz, the trendier Hindu ashrams are more than a match for America's pastorpreneurs. The Art of Living, a Bangalore ashram that “is committed to making life a celebration on this planet”, has offshoots in 141 countries.

This spirit of competition also helps to explain some of Islam's success. That may sound odd. Saudi Arabia enforces religious orthodoxy with police and prisons. Under many sharia systems, apostasy is still punishable by death. And in many Islamic countries mosques get far more financial help and direction from the state than Adam Smith would have approved of. But in fact there is more competition within Islam than at first appears.

Like Pentecostalism, Islam is a religion without much hierarchy: most mosques claim to be following the teachings of one preacher or another, but their real authority comes from the Koran. This helps new imams to set up shop and allows them to do pretty much what they like. But marketing has not been neglected. There are megamosques (one in east London, planned by missionaries, will hold 12,000 people, five times as many as St Paul's Cathedral) and televangelists, such as Amr Khaled, an engaging former accountant from Egypt, whose sermons are watched by millions in Europe and the Middle East. If you want a fatwa (religious ruling), you do not have to go to a mosque: you can get it online (and in English) from efatwa.com, muftisays.com or askimam.com.

Islam is not as evangelical as Christianity. Its followers are less intent on spreading the good news; much of their attention is focused on stiffening the resolve of communities that are already Muslim. But Islam is expansionist in some areas, including sub-Saharan Africa and the fringes of China. In Xinjiang province, the state government has got so worried about Muslim separatism that it has cracked down on Islam. China may yet end up being both the world's largest Christian country and its largest Muslim one.

The second lesson from Korea is that hotter religion does better. In the 1960s it was thought that if any sort of religion would survive, it would be the reasonable and ecumenical sort—intellectual Anglicanism, say, or Graham Greene's doubting Catholicism. In fact, certainty has proved much easier to market.

In America the famously tolerant Episcopal Church (which recently elected a gay bishop) has been in decline; the Southern Baptists (who in 1988 denounced homosexuality as “a manifestation of a depraved nature”) have jumped forward. Altogether conservative Christians now make up around 25% of America's population, compared with 20% in 1960.

Hot as hell
In global terms the most remarkable religious success story of the past century has been the least intellectual (and most emotive) religion of all. Pentecostalism was founded only 100 years ago in a scruffy part of Los Angeles by a one-eyed black preacher, convinced that God would send a new Pentecost if only people would pray hard enough. There are now at least 400m revivalists around the world. Their beliefs are not for the faint-hearted. According to a study of ten countries by the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, most adherents have witnessed divine healing, received a “direct revelation from God” or seen exorcisms (see chart 3).

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The only other Christian faith to grow at such rates is the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints, again hardly an easy-going religion. Mormonism remains a favourite butt of comedians, because of its historic belief (now abandoned) in polygamy and its ban on such worldly pleasures as beer, coffee, tea and “passionate kissing” outside wedlock; there will be more fun poked if Mitt Romney wins the Republican nomination. But clean-living certainty sells: over the past half-century the church has grown sevenfold, with half the world's 13m Mormons living outside the United States.

The hotter bits of Islam have also gained ground. As American neoconservatives never tire of pointing out, this is partly a matter of Saudi money: petrodollars have flowed into fundamentalist madrassas around the world and paid for millions of copies of the Koran with Wahhabi interpretations (for instance, stressing jihad as an extra pillar of Islam). But the main driver has been globalisation.

In the Arab heartlands fundamentalism has become a refuge for anyone worried by the spread of Western culture and power. In overseas communities where Muslims are in a minority, notably Europe, it has had far more to do with a search for identity. Scholars such as Olivier Roy have shown that extremism has become a form of generational warfare, with Western-born Muslim klix choosing to wear the headscarf that their mothers jettisoned on their arrival from Pakistan and Morocco.

One final advantage for hotter religion of all sorts is demography. From Salt Lake City to Gaza, religious people tend to marry younger and breed faster than non-religious ones. An ultra-Orthodox Jewish woman in Israel will produce nearly three times as many children than her secular peer. By some counts, three-quarters of the growth in the hotter varieties of American Protestantism is down to demography.

But heat in religion does not necessarily generate light. Relatively few Muslims have actually read all of the Koran, and although 83% of Americans regard the Bible as the word of God, half of them do not know who preached the Sermon on the Mount. American evangelicals are so worried by fundamentalists being ignorant of the fundamentals that they have set up refresher courses in Bible knowledge.

Nor does the heat always last. “You don't see many graveyards in megachurches,” say the sceptics. Emotional, unhierarchical religion may be gloriously customer-centred, but it lacks a control mechanism. Pentecostal pulpits have been a home to some almighty rogues, and many Muslims would like to bring radical imams under control.

Besides, should religion really be so focused on rounding up customers? Rowan Williams, the thoughtful Archbishop of Canterbury, points to the many things his church does in the fields of social welfare and urban regeneration that pew-focused rivals do not. Pick-and-choose religion, he argues, has less depth. From the front-line in Nigeria, the Catholic Archbishop of Jos makes the same argument. He might be able to push up numbers if he spent his money on television rather than hospitals, and if he did not spend six years training priests. But that is not his job.

The value of choice
The final lesson from South Korea, however, is one that both archbishops admit is crucial. Modern religion is pluralistic and increasingly based on choice.

Often the spur is immigration. Richard Chartres, the Anglican Bishop of London, calls his city “a test case”, pointing to the sprawling number of mosques, Sikh temples, synagogues, African and West Indian churches, even the Church of Scientology. In Latin America, evangelical churches now offer a ready alternative to Catholicism. And in the United States mainstream Protestants will soon account for less than half the population. Although the country remains predominantly Christian, America is home to around 10m other believers (Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus) as well as 30m agnostics and atheists.

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And atheism is definitely part of this pluralism. The proportion of Americans citing no religious preference has increased from 7% to 14% (20% for young people). As Ross Douthat argued recently in the Atlantic Monthly, anti-religiosity has moved from America's east-coast elite to the masses. By some counts there are at least 500m declared non-believers in the world—enough to make atheism the fourth-biggest religion.

Choice is the most “modern” thing about contemporary religion. “We made a category mistake,” admits Peter Berger, the Boston sociologist, who was once one of the foremost champions of secularisation but changed his mind in the 1980s. “We thought that the relationship was between modernisation and secularisation. In fact it was between modernisation and pluralism.” Religion is no longer taken for granted or inherited; it is based around adults making a choice, going to a synagogue, temple, church or mosque.

This has a profound affect on public life. The more that people choose their religion, rather than just inherit it, the more likely they are to make a noise about it. Miroslav Volf, director of Yale's Centre for Faith and Culture, says this is showing up in the workplace too: “It used to be that workers hung their religion on a coat rack alongside their coats. At home, their religion mattered. At work, it was idle. That is no longer the case. For many people religion has something to say about all aspects of life, work included.”

The same applies to politics. For instance, South Korea's megachurches have recently created their own version of America's religious right. The New Right movement already has around 200,000 members, around two-thirds of whom are Christian. Its views are somewhat vague. The founder, Jin-Hong Kim, complains about the country's leftward drift, America-bashing, North Korea and corruption. His enemies say the New Right is really just a way to help his friend, Mr Lee, win the presidency. In the primary, Protestants voted overwhelmingly for Mr Lee. The churches are banned from endorsing candidates, but one prayer at Yoido asks God “to help us choose the right president”.

The rest of this special report will look at the various ways in which religion intrudes into public life—from religion-based parties to attempts to challenge capitalism and science. It begins with the subject that people fear most: the wars of religion.
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Evropaa - Godless Continent :D:D:D

RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE

The power of private prayer
Nov 1st 2007
From The Economist print edition

A heretical thought about religion in Europe


EVEN in these dark days for the Bush presidency, there is one topic that can make American conservatives smile—religion in Europe. The White House might be going to hell (or at least to Hillary Clinton), but Europe faces a worse nightmare: a continued descent into Godlessness, and then a takeover by Islam.

The second part—the imminent arrival of Eurabia—can be dismissed as poor mathematics. Muslim minorities in Europe are indeed growing fast and causing political friction, but they account for less than 5% of the total population, a klix proportion by American standards of immigration. Even if that proportion trebles in the next 20 years, Eurabia will still be a long way off.
The more interesting question is whether Christianity will recover. A new book by Philip Jenkins on European religion comes up with some gloomy statistics. Only 20% of Europeans say that God plays an important role in their lives, compared with 60% of Americans. A survey in 2004 found that only 44% of Britons believed in God, whereas 35% (45% among 18-34-year-olds) denied His existence. Only 15% of them go to church each week, against 40% of Americans. Even in the Catholic heartlands of Spain, Italy and Ireland attendance rates have dropped below 20%. And priests are dying out: in Dublin, home to 1m Catholics, precisely one was ordained in 2004.

But there are a few signs of revival. Some of this is of a demographic kind: even in Europe, the religious breed more. Writing in Prospect magazine, Eric Kaufmann calculated that in the most secular bits—France and Protestant Europe—the “non-religious” majority (currently 53%) would peak at around 55% in 2040. If present trends continue, by the end of the century there will be more religious Europeans than there are today.

This has to do with recovering Christian belief as well as fertility and immigration. Islam plays a role: where there are lots of Muslims in Britain, the locals are more likely to profess Christianity. But the real change is coming on the supply side: religion is being privatised.

Grace Davie of the University of Exeter argues that there are really two religious economies in Europe. In the old one, religion is “a public utility”: there is one state-backed supplier, and most Christians follow their religion vicariously (in the sense that somebody else does your churchgoing for you). For instance, around 75% of Swedes are baptised as Lutherans, but only 5% regularly go to church. The church pockets a staggering $1.6 billion in membership fees, collected by the state through the tax system. It has been rare for Swedes to opt out, though that seems to be changing.

Alongside this old religious economy, a smaller one, based on personal choice, is growing. Together evangelicals, charismatics and Pentecostals accounted for 8.2% of Europe's population in 2000, nearly double the rate in 1970, according to the World Christian Encyclopedia. Pentecostalism is France's fastest-growing religion. London's immigrant-packed East End is thought to have twice as many Pentecostal congregations as Church of England ones.

However, most evangelicals and charismatics are contained within the older religions. Over 2m Britons have now taken the Alpha course, “an opportunity to explore the meaning of life”, which began at Holy Trinity Brompton, a posh church in Kensington. Richard Chartres, the Bishop of London, uses Alpha veterans to “rechurch” areas of his diocese.

Ms Davie cites two examples of opt-in behaviour within the older churches. First, the number of adult confirmations in the Church of England has risen sharply even as the overall number has fallen. Second, pilgrimages are booming. Some 100,000 hikers a year make the trek across Europe to Santiago de Compostela in Spain; 6m people visit Lourdes and 4m go to Jasna Góra in Poland.

The optimists point out that Europe's churches are roughly as full as America's were before the First Amendment separated church from state. Hence the importance of the current pope. One rumour is that Benedict XVI would prefer a smaller but more vibrant Catholic church in Europe. In Germany he is said to have argued privately against the churches' lavish state funding. If he took the same line publicly in Rome, that would certainly test the free-market hypothesis.
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RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE

The new wars of religion
Nov 1st 2007
From The Economist print edition

An old menace has returned, but in very different forms


EARLIER this year Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, speaking to his country's parliament, posed two questions: “Who are our enemies?” and “Why do they hate us?” He described an axis of evil, with Iran's enemies being “all the wicked men of the world, whether abroad or at home”. The root cause of their hatred was religious—a loathing of “whomsoever should serve the glory of God”. Having described George Bush's atrocities, he told the cheering MPs, “Truly, your great enemy is the American—through that enmity that is in him against all that is of God in you.” Fortunately, Iran would not fight alone: it had the support of Muslims around the world. Be bold, he advised, and “you will find that you act for a very great many people that are God's own.”

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Oliver's Army

For Mr Ahmadinejad, read Oliver Cromwell; for Iran, England; and for America, Catholic Spain. The quotes above come from a speech made by Cromwell to the English Parliament in 1656. Parliament then passed an oath of loyalty in which English Catholics were asked to disown the pope and most of the canons of Catholic belief, or face losing two-thirds of their worldly goods. Shortly afterwards Cromwell invaded Ireland.

“Faith is a source of conflict,” reads a sign at St Ethelburga's Centre for Reconciliation and Peace in the City of London—adding that it can also be “a resource to transform conflict”. Appropriately, the centre was built in a church blown up in 1993 by Irish terrorists, brought up, no doubt, with tales of Cromwell's atrocities.

Conflict, of course, does not necessarily equate to war. But there are some depressing echoes of Cromwell's time.

•Faith is once again prolonging conflict. Religion is seldom the casus belli: indeed, in many struggles, notably the Middle East in modern times, it is amazing how long it took for religion to become a big part of the argument. But once there, it makes conflicts harder to resolve. A squabble over land (which can be divided) or power (which can be shared) or rules (that can be fudged) becomes a dispute over non-negotiable absolutes. If you believe that God granted you the West Bank, or that any form of abortion is murder, compromise is not really possible.

•Once again, politicians are stirring up religious passion. Mr Ahmadinejad may not have told Muslims that the Israeli “has an interest in your bowels” (as Cromwell did of Spaniards), but he has called for Israel's removal and denied the Holocaust. Osama bin Laden rages that Islam is under sustained attack: any Muslim who “collaborates” with the West is an apostate.

American leaders have been more careful, but many use religious imagery. In his new book, “God and Gold” (see article), Walter Russell Mead compares Ronald Reagan's denunciation of the Godless Soviet Union (the “Evil Empire”) to Cromwell's speech. Franklin Graham spoke for many on the religious right when he denounced Islam as a “very evil and wicked religion”. American conservatives seem undecided on whether the battle against “Islamofascism” is the third world war (Newt Gingrich) or the fourth (Norman Podhoretz).

•Once again, outsiders are rushing to defend their religions: religious scraps attract money and soldiers. Just as Guy Fawkes, Britain's most famous religious terrorist, hardened his radical beliefs when fighting for Catholicism in the Netherlands, European Muslims have gone to defend their faith in Kashmir, Chechnya and Iraq. Some of the most fervent supporters of India's Hindutva movement come from the diaspora. Many migrants define themselves by their faith, not their new home.

•One of the world's great religions, Christianity, split into Catholic and Protestant in the 16th century. Now Islam is having to contend with a sharpening split between Sunni and Shia. Once again nation states are weak: most Middle Eastern countries are recent creations. And there is a ring of instability on Islam's southern frontier, which runs roughly along the 10th parallel from West Africa to the Philippines.

•Terrorist outrages are once again presumed to have religious connections, as they would have done in Cromwell's time. In the 1970s terrorism seemed to be the preserve of Maoist guerrillas, middle-class Germans and Italians or the then very secular (and partly Christian-led) Palestine Liberation Organisation. Now three out of the four most likely flashpoints for nuclear conflict—Pakistan-India, Iran and Israel—have a strong religious element. The only exception is North Korea.

Wars can be Godless too
It is possible that these similarities could escalate into something horrifying. A confrontation between nuclear Iran on one side and Israel and America on the other would reverberate around the globe. But the idea that the world is reverting to a former age is too simplistic.

Most obviously, humanity can find plenty of reasons for genocide and suffering without troubling God. “The 20th century was the most secular and the most bloody in human history,” argues George Weigel, a leading American conservative. What he calls “the Godless religions of Nazism and communism” killed tens of millions of people. Each had its theory of salvation, its rites, its prophets, its sacred places and its distinctive idea of morality; but communists and Nazis did not use God to stir up passions. The Cambodian genocide was similarly secular.



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Where it does exist, religious conflict is now far less of a top-down affair. No government officially approves of killing people solely because of their religion, and no significant religious leader sanctifies that killing by blessing armadas or preaching crusades. Last year the pope took issue with Islam in a speech at Regensburg, but he also opposed the Iraq war. Most Islamic authorities preach non-violence. Ayatollah Sistani, the most revered Shia on the planet, has often urged restraint in Iraq.

Of course, this does not prevent individual clerics from committing appalling acts of brutality: Catholic priests helped torture people in Argentina, Buddhist monks have led murderous attacks in Sri Lanka and imams have encouraged suicide-bombing in Israel. But every zealot interviewed for this special report, including those with blood near their hands, insisted that his religion was peaceful.

Meanwhile, the power of governments to control religious politics has declined. The wars of religion took place in an age of “cuius regio, eius religio”, where the monarch dictated the religion. England once turned to Protestantism because Henry VIII found the Catholic church's rules on matrimony irksome. Nowadays, nobody is trying to improve America's relations with the Middle East by marrying off the Bush twins to Arab princes.

The new battles
With national armies no longer marching under religious banners, grievances have reappeared in several guises. None of them is easy for the West to deal with.

The one that gets most attention is terrorism—especially Islamic terrorism. States are certainly actors in this: Iran may not openly wage religious war, but it has been happy to back Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine. But then neither Hamas nor Hizbullah is a purely sectarian organisation. Like the IRA in Ireland, they both have political-territorial objectives.

Most of the main jihadist terrorist organisations are bottom-up affairs. Mr bin Laden would no doubt like to control another state (as he once did from Afghanistan). But his organisation has been able to mount attacks and recruit volunteers without help from a government.

The second way in which religion thrusts itself into politics is inter-communal violence. Once again, other forces are often at work, such as tribalism in Nigeria or nationalism in India. But religion supplies the underlying viciousness. Sectarian violence has been responsible for most of the killing in Iraq in the aftermath of the war. Some 68,000 Sri Lankans have died since 1983. Other, lower-level conflicts, such as Catholics and Protestants attacking each other in Mexico's Chiapas, occasionally flare up. Outside parties can play a role in stoking up such struggles (and supplying arms), as Iran has done in Iraq and Syria has done in Lebanon. But most of these fights have a local, tit-for-tat feel. The violence is often set off by events such as marches, feast days or elections.

Third, there is state-based repression, where religion is either the target or the motivation. In the Muslim world the repression is sometimes by theocracies (like Iran or Saudi Arabia), against irreligious sorts, such as adulterers, heretics and homosexuals. But it also goes the other way, with secular states (Syria, Egypt, much of North Africa) discriminating against religious dissidents. In the most bizarre example, China recently banned Buddhist monks in Tibet from reincarnating without government permission. The religious-affairs agency explained that this was “an important move to institutionalise management of reincarnation”. The real purpose is to prevent the Dalai Lama, Tibet's exiled spiritual leader, from being succeeded by someone from outside China.

Yet the foremost way in which religion has expressed itself around the world has been more peaceful: the ballot box. Religious people have either formed religious parties (such as India's BJP) or converted secular ones into more faith-driven outfits (such as America's Republican Party). In places where religion was frowned upon by the state, such as Mexico or Turkey, greater freedom has allowed the pious to form parties, such as the Catholic-oriented PAN party or the Islamic AK Party.

And it has not just been a case of democracy helping religion. Timothy Shah of the Council on Foreign Relations argues that it can go the other way too. By his calculation, more than 30 of the 80 or so countries that became freer in 1972-2000 owed some of the improvement to religion. Sometimes established churches helped to push for democracy (eg, the Catholic church in Poland), but more often it was pressure from the grassroots: religious people usually look for a degree of freedom (if only to pursue their faith).

All this means that the modern wars of religion are mercifully less violent and all-consuming than their predecessors; but also that tackling the politics of religion is more awkward than it used to be. Culture wars are now global (a subject to which this special report will return).

This complicates foreign policy enormously. Should America focus on the klix number of angry Muslims with guns, or the millions who have voted for Islamic parties in Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, Algeria and Palestine? If most religious fanatics were bent on conquest and terror rather than democracy, their causes would be easier to discredit. And if religion were the sole cause of the conflicts, it would be easier to work out “why they hate us”.
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Religija i politika - paklena kombinacija :D

RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE

Holy depressing
Nov 1st 2007
From The Economist print edition

Religious politics at its worst


SHEIKH Yazid Khader and Rabbi Yaacov Medan both live in the occupied West Bank. Both are devoutly religious men who feel they have been betrayed by secularists. The sheikh, a local Hamas leader, has just emerged from another bout of Fatah custody (depressing when the rival Palestinians, he says, should both be fighting “the Zionist enemy”). The rabbi, a leader of the settler movement, is still seething about the Israeli government's forcible ejection of its own settlers from Gaza. Both men are obstacles to any chance of peace in the Middle East.

Not that they see it that way. Both insist that their religions are peaceful ones and each has solutions to the current impasse. Of course Israel should keep its settlements in the West Bank (illegal under international law), argues the rabbi: it is part of the land God gave it. But a system of tunnels could be constructed for the Palestinians to find their way round them. For his part, the sheikh refuses to accept Israel's right to exist: Palestine is a waqf, land placed by God in Muslim hands for eternity. But if Israel retreats to its 1967 borders, Hamas would generously grant the infidels a hudna or truce, initially for ten years.

If you are concerned about religion's effect on politics, there is no more discouraging place to visit than the klix sliver of land that is Israel-Palestine. Forty years ago the trouble there amounted to a territorial dispute between two fairly secular tribes. Religious Zionism—as opposed to the traditional, secular kind—was a fringe movement. Many of the Palestinian leaders were Christians or Marxists. But the six-day war of 1967 set off a chain of sectarian reactions on both sides. Polls show that most people on both sides still want a two-state solution, but many of the growing number determined to stop such an outcome now enlist God on their side of the argument.

Many of the most ardent fanatics live far away from the Holy Land. For Muslims the indignities heaped on the Palestinians are part of a systematic attack on Islam that must be fought to the bitter end. On the other side, many American Jewish groups will not tolerate the sort of criticism of Israel that is routine in the Jewish state itself. And now there are America's Christian Zionists to deal with: some have rallied instinctively to a klix democracy battling terrorism, but many think the creation of Biblical Israel is crucial for Armageddon and redemption.

Ignorance rules on all sides. Most Muslims seem totally unaware that Arabs can vote in Israel. Many Jews, even in Israel, are separated from the routine miseries of Palestinian life. American evangelicals are shocked to discover that some Palestinians are Christians.

The picture is not all bleak. Most of the Palestinians who voted for Hamas did so out of despair over Fatah's corruption rather than out of religious fervour. Israel is such an engagingly disputatious place that religious people pop up on different sides, depending on the argument. The ultra-Orthodox, who make up 5% of the population, traditionally attach less importance to land than some more secular Israelis. Many see the same dilemma that convinced their prime minister, Ehud Olmert, of the need for a two-state solution. Thanks to the fast-growing Palestinian population, the dream of a greater Israel increasingly conflicts with the still more precious idea of a Jewish state.

One sad irony of this dispute in the Holy Land is how few holy people are trying to make peace. Rabbi David Rosen argues that the Oslo process collapsed in part because no religious people were involved. It was not until 2002 that a small group of leading rabbis, Muslim clerics and bishops signed the Alexandria Declaration, which condemned violence and insisted that the holy places should be kept open. There have been subsequent meetings (including some recently with Tony Blair and Condoleezza Rice) but progress is beset by practical problems, such as the inability of Palestinian clerics to get through Israel's West Bank barrier.

Whatever the reason, when suicide-bombers strike Israeli towns, too few imams condemn the violence; and when Israeli rockets or shells fall on Palestinian civilians, not enough rabbis speak out. Until that changes, the various children of Abraham will find peace elusive.
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Indija :)

RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE

Bridging the divide
Nov 1st 2007
From The Economist print edition

The world's most religious country is still battling with its demons


ON THE face of it, Praveen Togadia is just the sort of Indian the modernising Jawaharlal Nehru might have been proud of. Urbane and sophisticated, he is a cancer surgeon, with more than 10,000 operations to his credit. He hails from Gujarat, one of India's more go-ahead states, currently run by his friend, Narendra Modi, perhaps the most free-market-oriented of the state leaders.

Yet Mr Togadia is also the international general secretary of something Nehru would have abhorred—the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), one of the three main bodies of the Hindutva (Hinduness) movement. Mr Togadia drifted away from medicine towards politics because he became convinced that Hinduism, like Judaism, was a persecuted faith, especially by Muslims. He has played a leading role in the campaign to rebuild a temple at Ayodhya, the birthplace of Ram, one of Hinduism's great trinity of gods. In 1992 Hindu activists tore down a mosque built there by a Muslim ruler.

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Bridge-building Ram

For Mr Togadia, the crucial difference is that “we [Hindus] believe in peaceful co-existence; Islam does not.” But his definition of peaceful co-existence would be queried by India's 150m Muslims, especially those in Gujarat. The state is still haunted by the riots of 2002, which began after a train carrying Hindu activists on their way back from Ayodhya caught fire in a Muslim neighbourhood, and Muslims were blamed for the dozens of deaths. In the ensuing pogrom, 2,000 people died.

In Gujarat's state capital, Ahmedabad, many Muslims are now stuck in an eastern ghetto known as Little Pakistan. “Ayesha”, a widow housed in a gloomy resettlement complex, recalls how her family ill-advisedly took sanctuary in a local leader's house, only for her Hindu neighbours to force their way in, “stabbing, hacking and burning”. There was so little left of Ayesha's husband and one of her daughters that she had trouble getting death certificates for them. Many of the mob were wearing Hindutva gear—saffron headbands, or the khaki shorts favoured by those who take part in the movement's early-morning physical jerks.

The place is more peaceful now. “Farah”, a middle-class lawyer who was also forced to retreat to Little Pakistan, calls Mr Togadia “a fanatic”, but she thinks most Muslims have given in: “They are too scared and poor to get anything.” Although Mr Modi's reputation has suffered (he was refused a visa to visit America in 2005), he should get re-elected comfortably later this year.

Ayesha and her friends already worry that the election will be a pretext for more violence. But ghettoisation has radicalised the women in the resettlement complex. They go to the mosque more often and talk approvingly of Osama bin Laden. The otherwise mild Ayesha also praises Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader “who died for Islam”, and wishes a horrible death on Mr Modi and his friends.

City of religious dins
Mr Togadia has survived several assassination attempts. He is now concentrating on trying to stop the (mainly secular) Congress party blowing a hole in a holy bridge, supposedly built by Ram, that links India to Sri Lanka. Congress says that the bridge, which is mainly underwater but visible from the air, is really just a ridge blocking shipping. So far, two people have been killed in demonstrations. Sonia Gandhi, Congress's leader, has already ordered a retreat by her party—though not before Mr Modi had weighed in, asking pointedly what Italians knew about Ram (Mrs Gandhi is an Italian Catholic).

Today's India is a test-tube for religious politics. The birthplace of four big religions (Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism and Hinduism), it has remained religious even as it has modernised. It was founded in the throes of a religious conflict—partition between Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan. And religion informs three different political conflicts: the external one with Pakistan; an internal one between the Hindu majority and the sizeable Muslim minority; and a rip-roaring debate about religion in the public square.

India has had three big wars with Pakistan (in 1947, 1965 and 1971) and one minor one in 1999. The wars were not explicitly about religion but about the disputed territory of Kashmir and, in 1971, the independence of what was then East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. But religion is crucial to Kashmir, because Pakistan claims that the mainly Muslim state was ceded to India unlawfully by its Hindu maharajah. And some in the Hindutva movement think the real territorial crime is the existence of Pakistan itself. Hinduism, they claim, is the religion of “Hindustan”, the whole subcontinent. Maps in Hindutva offices have a habit of missing out the Pakistani border.

At the moment India's relationship with Pakistan is relatively peaceful, partly because Pakistan is not in a state to be unpeaceful with anybody. But both sides now have nuclear weapons. And Hindus persistently worry that Indian Muslims are a fifth column. One Hindu nationalist, Prafull Goradia, suggests that Indian Muslims should be forced to take an oath of loyalty (though he would rather Muslims of all sorts moved to Arabia).

Pluralist, in principle
An uneasy relationship with Pakistan was perhaps inevitable; but what would have distressed Nehru particularly is the prominent role played by religion in domestic politics. India's constitution writers tried to get round this in two ways. The first was to embrace pluralism. The new country would be “a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic...Pluralism is the keystone of Indian culture and religious tolerance is the bedrock of Indian secularism.” The second was to go out of their way to provide protection for the (generally poor) Muslim minority.

Many Hindus would add that India was also born with a third force for tolerance: Hinduism. As a religion with countless gods and many sacred texts, it does not lend itself to extremism: there are no rules for governments to enforce.

How did things go wrong? The short answer is that many Hindus, like Mr Togadia, came to see India's “secularism” as a code for favouritism towards Muslims—especially by Nehru's Congress party (which until recently most Muslims voted for). Muslims are allowed to live by their own family law and enjoy plenty of positive discrimination, including subsidies to fly to Mecca. There was also a change in Hinduism: the more mystical strain, Vedanta, which preaches the unity of all religions, was challenged by the stauncher Hindutva message. Vedanta Hindus stayed with Congress; Hindutva ones moved to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

Much of Hindutva is officially dedicated to social welfare—especially the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the world's biggest voluntary movement. Every day several million RSS members meet at some 50,000 shakhas (or meetings) to discuss the meaning of life and go through their stretching exercises. But Hindutva also has a clear political message centred on three issues: a federal ban on the slaughter of cattle; the introduction of a “uniform personal code” (which is itself code for getting rid of a separate family law for Muslims); and rebuilding Hindu temples, especially Ayodhya.

Politics has proved both exhilarating and depressing for the Hindutva movement. The BJP, which swept to power six years after the mosque at Ayodhya was destroyed, has firmly established itself as the party of the aspiring middle classes. The RSS wields enormous power on the right of Indian politics. It has also broadened its arguments, couching them in non-religious terms. Cows, for instance, need to be kept alive for their milk (a “white revolution”, they argue), not just because they are sacred. Ram's bridge to Sri Lanka is essential as a bulwark against tsunamis.

Yet none of Hindutva's main goals has been met. Although most of India's states ban the slaughter of cows, there is no central-government ban; the Ayodhya temple remains unbuilt; the uniform code unpassed. For this many Hindu nationalists blame the BJP; but the truth is that, having never won more than 26% of the vote, it has had to rely on coalition partners, who, like most of the country, are less militant. When they think about it, many Hindus would like a temple built at Ayodhya. But they tend not to think about it, and are appalled at the violence the dispute has spawned.

Especially in its frustrations, Hindutva resembles America's religious right. The sprawling offices of the RSS in Delhi are strangely similar in spirit to the Focus on the Family campus in Colorado Springs. Neither organisation is overtly political: the RSS's motto is “United Hindus, capable India” and most of its energy is plainly taken up with social welfare (just as Focus does indeed focus on families). But just like the Christians in Colorado, the Hindus at the RSS are obsessed by politics—and feel just as let down by the BJP as Focus does by the Republicans.

Meanwhile, the Hindutva movement has set off a counter-reaction. Secular members of the Congress party, who privately admit that they may have indulged Muslims too much, adamantly defend secularism in public. Muslims too are on their guard. One Muslim politician says he would get into trouble if he visited a Hindu temple. The minority, he says, will always be insecure—especially if that minority used to rule India. Asked whether religion will ever leave Indian politics, he shrugs his shoulders. “That was the dream—but it did not work out that way.”
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Braca Turci :D:D

RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE

Back to the Ottomans
Nov 1st 2007
From The Economist print edition

Why Turkey matters so much to Islam


FOR many Westerners, Hidayet Tuksal is a confusing figure. Headscarfed and imposing, she grew up in a strict Muslim household in Ankara. At university in the 1980s, she focused on the Koran's teaching about women. She has since made a name arguing that much of the discrimination against women in the Islamic world has scant basis in the sacred text (because Eve was described as weak and flawed, it does not follow that all women are). For this she has got into trouble with traditionalists.

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On the other hand, this 44-year-old mother of three is no fan of Turkey's secularist laws, especially when it comes to that headscarf. Because she wears it, she is currently banned from teaching at university. (Had she been younger, she could not have studied there either: the army tightened up the laws on what students could wear in 1997.) From her perspective, Turkey's secularists are stopping her educating Muslim women about their freedoms.

Turkey is buzzing with such arguments. When the (mildly Islamist) Justice and Development (AK) Party came into power in 2002, people joked that it was like electing the Taliban. So far the experience has been revolutionary in the good sense. Under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the AK Party has occasionally veered off target (at one time he wanted to jail adulterers), but the main emphasis has been on freeing markets and stamping out corruption.

In July Mr Erdogan faced down mutterings from the army and deservedly won a second term. But now secular Turkey is getting worried again. Another Islamist, Abdullah Gul, has become president—an especially controversial appointment because his wife wears the headscarf. Restaurants have become nervous about serving food during the Ramadan fast. Recently a young woman wearing a knee-length tunic and leggings was arrested in Istanbul for “indecent exposure”.

Now Mr Erdogan wants to “modernise” the constitution. The new version would get rid of the headscarf ban at universities. It also keeps some illiberal traits: a clause saying the state should ensure equality between the sexes has gone; an infamous piece of the penal code, which was used to prosecute various writers for “insulting Turkishness”, remains. Many women who supported Mr Erdogan against the army are worried.

How different is Islam?
Turkey matters enormously to two big debates about religion in public life. The first is specifically to do with Islam: how compatible is it with political modernity? The second should be universal: where exactly to draw the line between religion and the modern state? Sadly, Turkey is one of the few Muslim countries where that debate is possible to have.

Merely posing the question of whether Islam is different raises Muslim hackles. They sense a post-September 11th witch-hunt, and with some cause. Every Western schoolboy now “knows” that the Koran promises suicide-bombers will be provided with 72 virgins (not true) and that in Muslim countries you can get stoned to death for being gay (true, sadly, in some places). Yet few Western schoolboys know much about the equally blood-curdling texts of the Old Testament: if you want illiberal family law, Leviticus is hard to beat.

Islamic politics, Muslims continue, is not uniform: Kano is very different from Karachi or Kuwait. And the troubles of Arabia, they maintain, have little to do with religion. They were caused by the Ottoman empire being amateurishly subdivided by the British, invaded by the Americans, occupied by Israel and exploited by the oil companies.

All these things may be true, but they do not stop Islam being different. There are still reasonable questions a dispassionate observer (or a Muslim) should be asking. Why is Islam involved in quite so many modern wars of religion? Why have its believers coped so badly with modernisation? Back in 1700 it controlled three of the world's economic superpowers—the Ottoman empire, Persia and India. Today, despite (or perhaps because of) oil, the Arab world in particular lags behind on most indices of modernity, from the number of books published to investment in science. Political bad luck cannot explain all of this.

The first answer that many Muslims and Westerners jump to—that Islam is stuck in a clash of civilisations with the West—seems unconvincing. Put simply, the main battle is not taking place in that arena. One great irony of the war on terror is that although George Bush has declared war upon jihadism, his enemies devote very little energy to fighting him. The jihadists' main war is not against the West but against apostate Muslim regimes: where they do battle with outsiders, it is mainly against occupying powers—Russia in Chechnya, America in Iraq, India in Kashmir and Israel in Palestine.

New depth to an old split
The two most important arguments about Islam are both internal ones. The first is the doctrinal split between Sunnis and Shias. An ancient disagreement to do with the primacy of various successors of the Prophet has become a greater schism—exaggerated not just by the sectarian killing in Iraq but also by the worries of the Sunni powers, such as Saudi Arabia, about Shiite Iran. Emmanuel Sivan, an Israeli expert on Islam, points out that in the battle for Gaza, Fatah loyalists accused Hamas of being Shia. The same “insult” is used in Nigeria.

The more complicated argument has to do with how much Islam should adapt to the modern world. Westerners, as you might expect, like to split Muslims between traditionalists and modernisers. In fact, the modernisers (people, say, who would like to let women lead prayers) are a klix group. The main argument is between two sets of traditionalists, with both claiming to be the authentic ones.

The first strain, pushed especially by Wahhabi preachers and Saudi money, argues that nothing of much value has happened in Islam since the first couple of generations of the faith. Corrupted by infidel ideas, Islam must re-centre itself on the Koran. For Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab (1703-92), the battle was against the worship of tombs and relics; for his spiritual descendants and other fundamentalists it is against television and Western clothes.

The second strain, while respecting the Koran, points to traditions from a later period—and especially to Islam's capacity to react creatively to new circumstances. The Koran, it argues, is the word of God given to nomadic tribes: it needs to be put into context. This version, which would be the heart of any Islamic reformation, is still the dominant strain in the great universities of Cairo and Damascus. But it has lost out to the Wahhabi strain in countless mosques and madrassas around the world.

Worse, from a modernising point of view, this second strain counts for virtually nothing in the main political battle within the Islamic world. That battle has little to do with religious reformation. Rather, as this newspaper described it earlier this year (see article), it comes down to a separate contest between martyrs and traitors.

The martyrs have a simple, coherent message that goes well with the Wahhabi and other Islamist causes: failure in Muslim countries has been due to moral dissoluteness and secularism. Society should be rebased around the Koran. The martyrs' strength is that organisations like Hamas or the Muslim Brotherhood are relatively incorrupt and democratic. On the other side of the argument are “the traitors”—the Arab world's deeply undemocratic regimes, most of them propped up by some mixture of Western might and oil money. Some, such as Egypt, suppress the Islamists in the name of maintaining secularism; others, such as Saudi Arabia, suck up to the radicals. All the traitors in their different ways feed the sly line that Islam is incompatible with democracy.

Neither martyr nor traitor
Is there an alternative to this dismal choice? Some Asian brands of Islam seem better suited to coping with the modern world. The government of Malaysia (which in 2001 controversially decided it had always been an Islamic state) has actively favoured Islam and has increased the role of sharia courts, to the yelps of human-rights people; yet it has also presided over a vibrant economy. The klix emirate of Dubai in the Gulf is another success. But Turkey offers by far the greatest hope.

Historically, the heirs to the Ottoman empire have fallen into the “traitor” category. The West tolerated military interference in Turkish politics, partly because it was told that the alternative—religious extremism—was worse. The AK Party has disproved that caricature. Indeed it marks something new: a party of fervent Islamists, neither traitors nor martyrs. Provided it sticks to its course, it could help normalise the argument about Islam. It would also make it possible for Muslim countries to engage in a more reasonable debate about religion's role in the public square.

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Ms Tuksal's problems to do with headscarves and universities might be serious for her; but in many ways they are excitingly normal. France has a similar dispute over whether Muslims can wear headscarves to school. And virtually every rich country is debating the role of religion in education or the acceptability of religious symbols in public life. Britain has had arguments not just about Muslim veils but also about Christian crucifixes, Sikh turbans and Hindu nose studs.

Why has the public square become so fiercely contested? One reason is that both religious people and their secular opponents are getting more uppity: now that they are both choosing their beliefs, they are damned if they are going to let others boss them around. But in truth drawing a strict line between church and state has always proved enormously difficult.

This newspaper, for example, has always leant towards strict separation, but, like most liberals, it has frequently found that goal conflicting with other ones. For instance, if you support giving poor parents vouchers to choose schools, why shouldn't they pick religious schools—especially when in many inner cities they may be the best choice? In northern Nigeria American aid agencies seeking to promote female literacy faced a choice between giving money to secular schools (which Muslims shun) or to hybrid ones, which mix the standard madrassa fare with some Western basics (and are popular with Muslims). The aid people rightly chose the latter—even though some congressman is bound to complain about taxpayers' money going to help Islam.

So it is normal to have disagreement about the public square. But Islam stands out as the religion that brooks the least difference between church and state. In the Christian world, with the klix exception of the Vatican, clerics have no urge to rule anybody. The Church of England seems embarrassed by having 26 bishops in the House of Lords (as it should be). Christian Democrat parties everywhere tend to treat the first part of their name as silent.

The idea of a firm division between God and Caesar is embedded not just in the gospels but also in Christian history: hence the Holy Roman Emperors' multiple disagreements with the pope. Islam has always left less room for the secular. Unlike Jesus, Muhammad was a ruler, warrior and lawmaker. Islam, which means “submission”, teaches that the primary unit of society is the umma, the brotherhood of believers, and it provides a system of laws—sharia—for people to live by. As Mark Lilla, an American academic, has argued, there has been no “great separation”: pious Muslims still turn to holy texts for guidance on all aspects of their lives.

In some extreme Islamic countries sharia, a system rooted in medieval traditions, is so strictly interpreted that it is hard to see how women in particular can lead modern lives. In Saudi Arabia a woman cannot drive or go to a mixed gym. Sharia seems to work better when there is recourse to a secular system, as there is in Bosnia and northern Nigeria. In Nigeria most Muslims do not bother to go through the federal legal system, because sharia is cheaper and quicker.

Turkey is quite different. Its courts are secular. Several of the erotic exhibits at its modern-art fair would have had Saudi Arabia's religious police reaching for their scimitars. But even Ataturk could not stop politics and Islam being intertwined.

Religion in Turkey is run by a government department. The diyanet's main function is bureaucratic: it distributes money to mosques, regulates prayer times and so on. The current diyanet president, Ali Bardakoglu, who serves in the AK government, has followed a liberal course. Ms Tuksal approves of his fierce opposition to honour killings. He has also sent out the firm message that Christian evangelicals (who in the past have sometimes been beaten up) should be left alone.

This all sounds very enlightened. But does it make sense for religion to be answerable to the state? The same question could be asked about Britain, where the new prime minister, Gordon Brown, wants to get rid of his powers to appoint bishops, or about the money France spends on Catholicism. But it matters much more in the Islamic world.

Ms Tuksal is a refreshingly modern figure. But Islam plainly is different. Turkey marks the beginning of the faith's debate about the modern world, not the end.
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Damned Darwin :D

RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE

Stop in the name...
Nov 1st 2007
From The Economist print edition

Religion and modernity have a love-hate relationship


WILLIAM BUCKLEY, the grand old man of the American right, once argued that a conservative's duty was to stand athwart history shouting “Stop!” So far this special report has argued that modernity has been surprisingly helpful to religion. The reverse is not necessarily true. Pious people are shouting “Stop!” (or at least “Slow down!”) to things liberals regard as progress. The three main battlefields are culture, science and economics.

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Such a sweeping generalisation requires an immediate caveat. The three battlefields are reasonably well defined, but the people fighting on them are not. On the secular side, progressive Parisians and New Yorkers may both be modern, but often have very different attitudes to economics. The religious side is even more fragmented. Conservative American churches tend to embrace modern capitalism, but are suspicious of biotechnology and modern culture; by contrast, leftish American evangelicals are much more bothered about globalisation than about stem cells. The technophobic Catholic hierarchy in Europe is mildly hostile to modern culture, science and capitalism, and technophile Muslim fundamentalists loathe all three.

Slowly a phenomenon that America knows as “the culture wars” is going global. Abortion, gay marriage, stem cells and euthanasia are popping up all over the place as rallying calls for religious people. In many developed countries politics is increasingly driven by problems of identity and values rather than economics.

Another export from America is secular overreach. For instance, liberal-minded judges and politicians from Colombia to South Africa have moved to legalise gay unions. That is admirable, but it often does not reflect the views of their countrymen. In Mexico, Red Familia (Family Network), which has ties to conservative businesspeople and politicians, argues that strong family values provide the basis of economic prosperity. Nigeria's Peter Akinola, who runs the largest province in the Anglican Communion, is against gays forming associations. He has a lot of supporters—not least in America, where 35 conservative Episcopalian churches have defected to Nigeria's outfit. Bishop Akinola also illustrates the importance of competition—especially with Islam, a religion that has never been in favour of sexual liberation. The most conservative parts of the Anglican Communion are those fighting hardest for customers.

The traditional culture warrior in the West has been the Catholic church. Under John Paul II, the Holy See increased the number of countries where it has diplomatic representation from 85 to 174. The church concentrates much of its political activity on poverty, health care and education; but it also stoutly defends “the sanctity of life”, fighting against euthanasia, abortion, the death penalty, cloning and, less aggressively than before, contraception. The church makes less noise about gay issues—possibly because of its own recent troubles with child abuse by clerics.

American Protestants are now rallying to the global fight. Focus on the Family has sister organisations in 54 countries. The Mormons' World Family Policy Centre sponsors pro-family scholarship. Human Life International, a Catholic outfit run from Virginia, opposes contraception as well as abortion, campaigns against sex education in schools and defends traditional marriage “open to the creation of life and to caring for children”.

Not all the religious right's crusades overseas are loathsome to liberals. American Christians have helped expose the Sudanese government's atrocities in Darfur and sex-trafficking in Europe. They have also fought hard to get more aid money for Africa and to fight AIDS—even if cash has come with strings attached (notably preventing any dollars going to abortion). But just as in America, much of their fury is aimed at liberal shibboleths.

One target is the United Nations. In Tim LaHaye's wildly popular “Left Behind” series of books the Antichrist returns to earth as the UN Secretary-General. Two UN conferences particularly roused the religious right's fury: one on population and development in Cairo in 1994 and one on women in Beijing in 1995. Both were dominated by liberal NGOs and the language of “reproductive choice”. Now the UN's proceedings are monitored by the Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute; and various right-wing organisations including Concerned Women for America (which was founded by Mr LaHaye's wife) have become accredited lobbyists at the UN. In March 2005 the General Assembly voted to ban all forms of human cloning, a non-binding vote that still enraged several European countries, particularly Britain.

Meanwhile, down at the lab
Cloning is a reminder that science and religion remain uneasy bedfellows. The anti-scientific nature of church history is sometimes exaggerated. Galileo, after all, got into trouble precisely because he was sponsored by one part of the Vatican. On the other hand, by discovering evolution, Charles Darwin, a respectable Victorian, probably did more damage to religious faith that any priest-hating revolutionary.

Now religion is fighting back. Perhaps the most dramatic single example of its power was George Bush's curtailing of stem-cell research in America, which prompted a mini-exodus of scientists to Europe. But the longer-running dispute remains over evolution.

Much of it is pretty unsophisticated. For instance, Christians in Kenya recently denounced the exhibition of the Turkana Boy—the most complete prehistoric human skeleton—because he inconveniently lived thousands of years before Adam is supposed to have met Eve. A lavish new $27m Creation Museum in Petersburg, Kentucky, aims to set the record straight, showing how huge dinosaurs could have mingled with humans shortly after time began in 4004BC, and how Noah managed to squeeze all the world's animals into a boat only 135 metres long.

The next level up is intelligent design—the notion that evolution does not explain everything, so there must be an intelligent creator. Much of this is refashioned creationism: believers still trying to prove that man might be descended from angels not apes. Intelligent design is now taught in some Turkish schools—thanks in large part to Adnan Oktar, a preacher who set up the Bilim Arastirma Vakfi (Scientific Research Foundation). He claims to have 4.5m followers, and his “Atlas of Creation” has been distributed around the Muslim world and Europe. His organisation also sees links between Darwin and terrorism, fascism and communism.

The battle to get intelligent design taught in schools has suffered a number of legal setbacks—in Russia (where it was supported by the Orthodox church), in Britain and most notably in America, where a judge ruled against a Pennsylvania school board in 2005. But scientists would be wrong to think the issue is dead. In a Newsweek poll earlier this year 48% of those Americans surveyed reckoned that God had created humans in their present form in the past 10,000 years.

Nor is the intellectual argument quite won. Most of the cleverer intelligent-design outfits, notably the Seattle-based Discovery Institute, distanced themselves from the Pennsylvania case, where the defendants were too close to creationism for their liking. And a fierce theological debate is under way in the Catholic Church about how to describe the extent to which man is different from other creatures.

The main underlying emotion, even for religious people, does not seem to be belief in God so much as scepticism about science. The worry is that man is getting arrogant, playing with things he barely understands—such as the climate and his genetic code. “The debate is moving away from evolution to scientific ethics,” points out Harvey Cox at Harvard. The fuss about stem cells may have been prompted by abortion, but it has led into a much wider argument about cloning. Crucially, whereas many moderate Christians support stem-cell research, they take a much dimmer view of anything that looks like genetic manipulation. The big battle on science is yet to come.

Learning to love the moneylenders
The last part of progress that some pious people seem bent on restraining is capitalism. Ever since Jesus in the Temple dealt harshly with the hedge-fund managers of his time, many Christians have been suspicious of finance. Some Fabians even hailed Jesus as the first socialist. For a time the Catholic church banned usury; many versions of Islam still do.

But capitalism is also the place where the religious front is least constant. Muslims like to point out that Muhammad was a merchant. Many Protestants claim that the free market stemmed from the reformation. In many countries Pentecostals sell their creed as a way to improve your lot: self-restraint and discipline will make you rich (some churches in Central America even sell management books). The wonderfully named Reverend Creflo Dollar, a New York televangelist, who owns several houses and a private aeroplane, has presumably found his own way to get his camel through the needle's eye.

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Doubts about capitalism have tended to be voiced by liberal Protestants and European Catholics. Thus the Anglican Church denounced Thatcherism, and Pope John Paul II sounded off against globalisation. A straightforward battle against “neo-liberalism” is still being fought in many parts of the world. Evangelicals have backed left-wingers in some of the poorer parts of Brazil. But increasingly the battle is moving away from opposing capitalism per se to restraining its excesses. Hence the number of Christian organisations attached to fair-trade and workers' rights movements.

One cause that could bring many pious people together is the environment. Religious people, argues Mr Cox, are questioning “an economic system based on the infinite expansion of finite resources”. The religious left has long been involved in greenery. The big change has come on the right. Conservative Protestants in America originally backed their political allies in the oil industry; now more of them are concerned about “creation care”. Biblical disaster seems to suit fundamentalists; hence their interest in greenish books such as Martin Rees's “Our Final Century”.

This debate may soon acquire a geographical dimension. Philip Jenkins points out that by 2050, the time when climate change is expected to start biting, most of the largest Christian countries will be located in the global South: Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Congo, Ethiopia, Uganda, the Philippines, China. He thinks that environmental change could spark inter-communal rivalry, recalling the “little ice age” at the end of the 13th century which caused starvation and pogroms, with Christians turning on Jews in Europe and Muslims turning on Christians in Africa and Asia. Mr LaHaye may yet get his Antichrist.
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Veliki Sejtan - Amerika :D

RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE

The lesson from America
Nov 1st 2007
From The Economist print edition

The superpower has mastered the politics of religion at home, but not abroad


WRITING of Calvin Coolidge, H.L. Mencken once observed that he might be dull and smell of boiled cabbage but at least “the president of the United States doesn't believe that the earth is square, and that witches should be put to death, and that Jonah swallowed the whale. The Golden Text is not painted weekly on the White House wall, and there is no need to keep ambassadors waiting while Pastor Simpson, of Smithville, prays for rain in the Blue Room.”

my place.....
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...or yours

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There is no firm evidence that George Bush has ever kept an ambassador waiting so that he could talk to his pastor, but given the number of religious figures flowing through the White House it would be surprising if that had never happened. And Mr Bush has done plenty of other Godly things that would have surely made the secular Mencken wince, such as naming Jesus Christ as his favourite philosopher.

Two great questions have run through this special report: where exactly is the line between church and state? And what, if anything, can be done to ameliorate the wars of religion? Both questions lead to America. It is the spiritual home of modern choice-based religion and pluralism. It is also the world's most powerful country. Virtually every conflict to do with religion has ramifications for the White House. And America's experience has been interesting: success in dealing with religion at home, failure abroad.

Squaring the public
The idea that America might offer some form of model will annoy many Europeans: they detest its moralistic side. Yet the main explanation for America's culture wars is that it is a country full of religious people; not that the system set up by the First Amendment is wrong.

The line that the Founding Fathers drew between church and state still causes controversy. The Supreme Court spends a lot of time on issues such as whether a Christmas crib in a public place can be rendered secular by the presence of a plastic reindeer (yes, though preferably with a Santa as well), or where a state court can display the Ten Commandments (the garden is fine; the building not).
So the detail is messy, but the First Amendment still achieves its two goals. First, churches are firmly kept apart from the state. It is noticeable how religious Americans have to frame their issues in non-religious terms. “Our goal is not the presence of more religion in the public square,” says Father Richard John Neuhaus, the author of the seminal “The Naked Public Square”. “The goal is to advance a society characterised by more moral deliberation over how we order our life.” His complaint is that secularists have used laws that were supposed to separate church and state to promote their own atheistic ideas.

That is a long-standing argument. There was certainly a period in the 1960s when a liberal Supreme Court banned some things that a religious country considered normal (such as school prayers) and permitted others it disliked (such as pornography). But the principle that formal religion should be kept out of politics has been accepted by all. There are no bishops in the Senate, as in Britain, no church taxes, as in Germany, and no theocracies of the sort that hold back the Arab world.

The constitution, in turn, has also protected churches from the state. Unlike France's avowedly secularist laïcité, which is written into the legal code, America has been content to let religious people get on with their business: for example, there has been no fuss about headscarves. As a result, the country's religious life is marvellously varied. Mark Silk of Trinity College in Connecticut argues that there are in fact eight regions of American religion, varying from California's new-age spirituality to Southern Protestantism. The pagan Pacific north-west's unofficial religion, says Mr Silk, is environmentalism.

Nobody would claim the American system is perfect. It did not prevent Protestants in the 19th century using the state to give both Mormons and Catholics a hard time. And it has pushed moral debates, notably the one about abortion, towards the courts, rather than towards the lawmakers (who find them easier to fudge). But if the intention is to create a pluralistic society, America's church-state divide has the same advantage as democracy under Winston Churchill's definition: it is the worst way for a modern society to deal with religion, “except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time”.

The strange thing is that when America has tried to tackle religious politics abroad—especially jihadist violence—it has drawn no lessons from its domestic success. Why has a country so rooted in pluralism made so little of religious freedom? In the cold war, America gained the high ground on human rights by getting friends and foes (including the Soviet Union) to sign the Helsinki Accords. That made it hard to be accused of favouritism.

The US Commission on International Religious Freedom produces interesting annual reports for Congress, but still looks to many foreigners as if it is steered by domestic politics. It has taken the commission until this year to get round to looking at religious freedom in Iraq; and it has not yet looked at Israel (not a leading persecutor, to be sure, but Christians and Muslims moan about things such as security barriers making it hard to visit holy places).

Similarly, in its battle for hearts and minds, America has made scant use of its own Muslim population. “The people of Iran and Pakistan have no idea that American Muslims are free,” laments one Bush adviser. Notwithstanding his use of the word “crusade” once, the president has a good record of visiting mosques and a genuine respect for other religions, founded in his belief that all human rights come from the creator. But this got hopelessly lost in Rumsfeldian shock and awe.

When the West has had to choose between martyrs and traitors in the Arab world, it has backed the latter. It has been hard to do otherwise: who would choose Hamas over Fatah? But when secular Arab governments, like Egypt, lock religious opposition parties like the Muslim Brotherhood out of power, they push pious people towards the extremes. The cost of excluding Islamist groups from discussion is often higher than that of letting them in.

If one part of America's problem has been its failure to exploit its natural advantage, the other, oddly, has been its refusal to admit how much religion is part of public life. A desire to keep religion out of politics may be high-minded (as in the United States Census not asking people about their faith), but it seems unrealistic too. One survey showed that in the period from 1980 to 1999 only half a dozen articles in America's four main international-relations journals dealt with religion.

Not only is religion very much part of this century's politics; it comes in many less clement forms than it does in America. As this special report has made clear, Islam in particular is very different: it demands a greater share of the public square than other religions, and it has adapted least well to modernity. Too often Westerners have made assumptions that turned out not to apply in parts of the Muslim world—such as the idea that religion could be divided from politics or that the prime focus of identity was the nation state and not the umma. Moreover, playing down the role of religion in public life also means missing out on many potential solutions. For once religion is part of politics, it must also be part of the solution.

Let faith speak unto faith
If you gather together a group of self-professed foreign-policy experts—whether they be neoconservatives, realpolitickers or urbane European diplomats—you can count on a sneer if you mention “inter-faith dialogue”. At best, they say, it is liberal waffle; at worst it is naive appeasement. But who is being naive?

Back in the 1990s, Douglas Johnson, a former diplomat, wrote a prescient book called “Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft”. Since then he has laboured to bring together religious leaders. His efforts are easy to mock. Mr Johnson talks proudly about getting groups of southern Sudanese Christian and Muslim leaders together in 2000; the results have not been perfect peace. But the religious dimension in the conflict has decreased—and that has increased the (slim) chances of a solution.

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In northern Nigeria, where this special report began, the Catholic Archbishop of Jos gets a lot of stick from his fellow Christians for setting up meetings with the local imam and visiting mosques. “You are sleeping with a snake,” one Protestant preacher told him. But nowadays if there is a flare-up between Christians and Muslims, the imam and the bishop go together to try to sort it out—and that seems to help.

Doubtless something ghastly will happen again soon in Jos that the archbishop and his new friend will fail to prevent. But that does not mean they are wrong to try. Take Ireland as an example. The cycle of violence that Cromwell did so much to create lasted for well over 300 years. Eventually sectarianism involved a tangle of other ideas, including class, economics and crime. The beginning of the end came when preachers from both sides of Ireland's religious divide began to join together to condemn violence. After each atrocity Catholic priests and Protestant pastors stood side by side on bloodied pavements pointing out that the bombers and God had nothing to do with each other. In most other parts of the world that coming together has yet to happen.
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Bumbar
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#11

Post by Bumbar »

:) odlicno...
ja71
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#12

Post by ja71 »

Bumbar wrote::) odlicno...
ne razumijem engleski
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Bosanac sa dna kace
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#13

Post by Bosanac sa dna kace »

ja71 wrote:
Bumbar wrote::) odlicno...
ne razumijem engleski
radi se o sasvim uobicajnoj analizi americkih neokonzervativaca, gjde su samo oni divni i bajni, a sve ostalo, pogotovo islam je truhlastinja
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pitt
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#14

Post by pitt »

Bosanac sa dna kace wrote:
ja71 wrote:
Bumbar wrote::) odlicno...
ne razumijem engleski
radi se o sasvim uobicajnoj analizi americkih neokonzervativaca, gjde su samo oni divni i bajni, a sve ostalo, pogotovo islam je truhlastinja
kao prvo.....The Economist je engleski magazin,a kao drugo da si procitao vidio bi da nigdje nisu spomenuli islam u negativnom smislu. Stavise, od samog pocetka stav urednika povodom zabrane pokrivanja u francuskoj i turskoj je da je to ogavna i diskriminirajuca zabrana. Kao trece.....nigdje ne brane ameriku vec samo spominju da je vjerski suzivot mnogo bolji u americi (za razliku od evrope) i to pogotovo muslimanima.
Al hajde.....knjiga se i po koricama gleda :D
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danas
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#15

Post by danas »

Bosanac sa dna kace wrote:
ja71 wrote:
Bumbar wrote::) odlicno...
ne razumijem engleski
radi se o sasvim uobicajnoj analizi americkih neokonzervativaca, gjde su samo oni divni i bajni, a sve ostalo, pogotovo islam je truhlastinja
the economist nema veze sa americkim neokonzervativcima, to je britanska publikacija... :wink:
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Bosanac sa dna kace
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#16

Post by Bosanac sa dna kace »

danas wrote:
Bosanac sa dna kace wrote:
ja71 wrote: ne razumijem engleski
radi se o sasvim uobicajnoj analizi americkih neokonzervativaca, gjde su samo oni divni i bajni, a sve ostalo, pogotovo islam je truhlastinja
the economist nema veze sa americkim neokonzervativcima, to je britanska publikacija... :wink:
znam ko je i sta je ekonomist...
ali, pisanje je isto kao i neokonzervativno...
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danas
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#17

Post by danas »

Bosanac sa dna kace wrote:
danas wrote:
Bosanac sa dna kace wrote: radi se o sasvim uobicajnoj analizi americkih neokonzervativaca, gjde su samo oni divni i bajni, a sve ostalo, pogotovo islam je truhlastinja
the economist nema veze sa americkim neokonzervativcima, to je britanska publikacija... :wink:
znam ko je i sta je ekonomist...
ali, pisanje je isto kao i neokonzervativno...
the ekonomist je prije svega ekonomski magazin... a postoji ekonomski i fiskalni konzervatizam, koji nema previse veze sa ideolosko-vjersko-drustvenim konzervatizmom...
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Bosanac sa dna kace
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#18

Post by Bosanac sa dna kace »

danas wrote:
Bosanac sa dna kace wrote:
danas wrote: the economist nema veze sa americkim neokonzervativcima, to je britanska publikacija... :wink:
znam ko je i sta je ekonomist...
ali, pisanje je isto kao i neokonzervativno...
the ekonomist je prije svega ekonomski magazin... a postoji ekonomski i fiskalni konzervatizam, koji nema previse veze sa ideolosko-vjersko-drustvenim konzervatizmom...
znam tetka, znam, ne boj se rastabirili smo mi u komitetu ko je i sta je The Economist :)
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danas
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#19

Post by danas »

:lol:

pa uzmi procitaj yavrum, nije bas tako crno... :-)
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Bosanac sa dna kace
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#20

Post by Bosanac sa dna kace »

danas wrote::lol:

pa uzmi procitaj yavrum, nije bas tako crno... :-)
procito sam.... :) :D
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pitt
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#21

Post by pitt »

bogami ste onda to vi arkadashi sve naopako skontali :D:D Sem ako ne podrzavas generale umjesto AK i Redzu naseg :D:D
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danas
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#22

Post by danas »

pitt wrote:bogami ste onda to vi arkadashi sve naopako skontali :D:D Sem ako ne podrzavas generale umjesto AK i Redzu naseg :D:D
mali je preso u gelenekcije :lol: :lol: :lol:
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