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across the globe—were involved in reconstruction eªorts. On a per
capita basis, the reconstruction of Bosnia—with less than four million
citizens—made the post–World War II rebuilding of Germany and
Japan look modest.
As successful as Dayton was at ending the violence, it also sowed
the seeds of instability by creating a decentralized political system that
undermined the state’s authority. In the past three years, ethnic nationalist
rhetoric from leaders of the country’s three constituent ethnic
groups—Muslims, Croats, and Serbs—has intensified, bringing reform
to a standstill.The economy has stalled, unemployment is over 27 percent,
about 25 percent of the population
lives in poverty, and Bosnia remains near
the bottom of World Bank rankings for
business development.
Most worrisome is the inability of the
leading political parties to agree on a basic
political structure for the country. The
Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik is
openly floating the prospect of secession for
the rs—which is doing better than the federation
in terms of economic growth and stability—and many
Bosnian Croats are pushing for more autonomy within the federation.
Meanwhile, Haris Silajdzic, the Bosnian Muslim representative to
the country’s collective presidency has called for a more centralized
state and the dissolution of the rs, which he regards as an undeserved
reward for Serbian-orchestrated genocide.
The political order established by Dayton seems to be careening
dangerously oª course, just as the guardrails that for 14 years
prevented a descent into violence are being dismantled. As locals
fret about the future, international organizations have already
begun to withdraw from Bosnia. The powerful instruments of authority
that the international community once possessed there
have been diluted by extremist ethnic factions and by fading global
interest in the country. The global financial crisis, the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and the diplomatic challenges in Iran and
North Korea have made it tempting to declare Bosnia a “mission
accomplished” and get out.
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There are at least three problems with such thinking. First,
Bosnia may not remain peaceful for long. Unless checked, the current
trends toward fragmentation will almost certainly lead to a resumption
of violence—and if twentieth-century history is any guide, conflicts
that begin in Bosnia rarely remain within its borders. Second, exiting
Bosnia now will leave Bosnian Muslims isolated and vulnerable,
sending precisely the wrong message to the Muslim world at a time
when Brussels and Washington are trying to mend relationships
frayed by the Iraq war and the “global war on terror.” Finally, if the
international community cannot fulfill its promises in Bosnia—
given the country’s location in the middle of Europe, the leverage
that the eu and nato possess there, and the massive amount of
money invested thus far—the prospects for international state
building elsewhere are extremely grim.
from favorite to failure
The strife that tore the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina apart between 1992 and 1995 resulted in mass ethnic
cleansing, concentration camps, and over 100,000 deaths. Immediately
after the Dayton agreement was signed, dozens of governments,
regional organizations, and ngos descended on Sarajevo and became
deeply involved in stitching Bosnia back together.
Thirty-six countries, led by the United States and backed by
nato, sent a total of 60,000 troops to enforce the treaty. Although the
peacekeeping force was established for only one year, it was extended
in the form of the robust nato-led Stabilization Force (sfor),
which maintained a major security presence in Bosnia for over a
decade. Since World War II, of all the postconflict countries that
have had foreign troops on their soil, only occupied Germany in
1946 had more than Bosnia did in 1996.
Military force played a crucial role in stopping the violence, but
it was only one part of a broader multi-institutional mission that
included restructuring domestic institutions and providing large
cash infusions for reconstruction and reconciliation. From 1996
to 2007, $14 billion in foreign assistance flooded into Bosnia—
amounting to approximately $300 per person per year in a country
The Death of Dayton
foreign affairs . September / October 2009 [71]

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of less than four million people. (By comparison, since 2002, international
donors have pledged only about $65 for each resident of
Afghanistan per year.)
The Dayton framework had many advantages. It stopped the
bloodshed, and it created the conditions for life to return to normal—
at least on the surface. Bosnia has had several sets of municipal and
national elections; its three armies have been integrated into a single
multiethnic Bosnian army (each of the army’s three major brigades
is comprised of three ethnically based battalions), whose soldiers
even fought alongside multinational forces in Iraq until December
2008. Dayton and the subsequent surge in international attention
provided a high level of internal security, facilitated a widespread
return of refugees and displaced persons, and created the conditions
for a modest level of economic growth.
Areas such as the self-governing Brcko District, in the country’s
northeast, have become success stories. Brcko was the site of some
of the worst violence during the war, but today the Muslim, Croat,
and Serb communities there live in relative harmony. The international
community established a strong protectorate structure in
Brcko, under which the United States led a coordinated eªort involving
international organizations and domestic Bosnian institutions.
At one point, sfor included Russian troops working alongside U.S.
soldiers, patrolling the streets and keeping the peace. Meanwhile,
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe coordinated
a series of municipal elections, the eu and the U.S. Agency
for International Development provided humanitarian relief, and
Western ngos helped reduce prostitution and human tra⁄cking
in the city. Just a decade after Dayton,Brcko was able to demonstrate
the possibility of ethnic cooperation. Unfortunately, it has remained
an exception.
dayton’s defects
The Dayton agreement’s priority was to end the violence, but it
included compromises that laid the foundation for Bosnia’s current
fragmentation. Today, most Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats
live in the federation, whereas most Bosnian Serbs live in the rs—

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but neither entity is completely homogeneous. The brutal ethnic
cleansing carried out during the war was never completed, and many
villages still contain pockets of minority ethnic groups.
Decentralization and power sharing, the twin principles underpinning
this consociational democracy, allow each entity to have its
own government, police force, and educational system.Within the
federation, power is further decentralized to ensure that Muslims
and Croats are able to rule themselves. To prevent any one group
from dominating, quotas were adopted in national institutions.
Bosnia’s three-member presidency, for example, requires one Muslim
representative, one Croat, and one Serb, and each representative
can veto legislation that he believes undermines his own group’s
vital interests. As a result, almost every important issue at the centralgovernment
level is deadlocked.
In addition to political gridlock, this structure has several other
detrimental eªects: it breeds corruption, weakens political moderates,
and stunts economic growth. Almost every public o⁄ce—including
low-level administration jobs—is allotted
according to an ethnic quota, a spoils system
that has led to extensive patronage networks,
corruption, and ine⁄ciencies. As a result,
there are far too many bureaucrats running
around the country. With 160 government
ministers and a bloated public sector that
gobbles up nearly half of the country’s gdp,
the framework is tailor-made for those who
wish to stoke ethnic antagonisms for political
gain. These ethnic chauvinists—in particular, Dodik and Silajdzic—
preach to their respective constituencies and pledge to “protect” their
groups.This, in turn, weakens moderates who advocate greater national
unity and civic, rather than ethnic, identities.
Although Bosnia professes to seek the creation of a unified multiethnic
state, its political institutions support ethnic partition at
every level of government. The city of Mostar, where Muslims,
Croats, and Serbs once intermingled peacefully, provides a clear
example of the harmful eªects of decentralization. Mostar was
scarred by some of the worst violence of the war and remains deeply

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divided: the Muslims now live primarily on the east side of the city,
and the Croats dominate most of the city’s west side. Prior to the
war, there were nearly 24,000 Serbs living in the city, but today only
a handful remain. Furthermore, most Croats in Mostar also hold
Croatian citizenship and can vote in Croatia—a fact that has contributed
to a significant immigration of Bosnian Croats to Croatia.
Despite the rebuilding of Mostar’s famous sixteenth-century bridge,
which was bombed during the war, the city remains extremely polarized.
Unlike in Brcko, the international community decentralized its eªorts
in Mostar—a policy that gave rise to a number of absurd situations.
Just a few years ago, for example, it was not possible to pay for a night’s
stay in a hotel in the Croatian section of the city with Bosnian currency
because these hotels only accepted Croatian kuna. Even the markets
in Mostar are segregated: for the most part, cigarettes and beer from
Zagreb companies are sold in the Croatian section of the city; only
cigarettes and beer from Sarajevo are sold in the Muslim district.
It is no small financial burden for federation o⁄cials and municipal
authorities to have to support separate hospitals, postal services, fire
stations, and educational systems.
The federation as a whole is similarly dysfunctional. This year, the
federation government is facing a 250 million euro budget deficit and
will have to institute a ten percent budget reduction to qualify for a new
1.2 billion euro International Monetary Fund standby agreement (a
short-term loan). The resulting cuts have already triggered a wave of
protests from war veterans and trade union members who were lavished
with social payments in the run-up to the 2006 and 2008 elections.
Sarajevo’s bustling urban landscape—with its smattering of skyscrapers,
rebuilt mosques, and charming outdoor cafés—masks a
crucial fact: its citizens are embittered and frustrated by the country’s
institutional structure, which has left the federation economically
worse oª than the rs.
money for nothing
As institutional fragmentation and unnecessary parallel structures
drain the Bosnian Treasury, corruption has become endemic
throughout the country, and the international community has been
Patrice C. McMahon and Jon Western
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powerless to stamp it out. In 1999, a high-profile investigation uncovered
that more than $1 billion in aid—nearly one-fifth of the total dispersed
between 1996 and 1999—had disappeared. Corruption is common to
all transitional societies, but the political impact of corruption in
Bosnia is particularly corrosive.
The police, political parties, the federation and rs governments,
and the health-care and construction industries are generally cited as
the most corrupt institutions and sectors. Bosnia’s courts are also
weak and susceptible to interference from ethnic nationalist elites.
The establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (icty), in 1993, has left little energy and few
resources for the development of Bosnian courts. Furthermore, now
that the icty has begun referring war crimes cases back to Bosnia’s
domestic court system, the judiciary is simply overwhelmed by the
number of cases. As a result, it is di⁄cult to uphold the rule of law or
control the rampant corruption, which has discouraged foreign direct
investment and stifled private-sector development. In March 2009,
for example, the Czech energy group cez canceled a 1.4 million euro
contract because of pervasive corruption in the rs.
Bosnia’s weak and disjointed domestic institutions have been
further undermined by a series of international missteps. For more
than a decade after Dayton, Bosnia was a hotspot for international
do-gooders intent on making a diªerence. But good intentions and
deep pockets were often accompanied by little historical knowledge
and incoherent plans. Organizations that worked at cross-purposes
or initiated eªorts only to abandon them in the face of distraction,
complacency, or fatigue undermined the entire state-building enterprise.
As one Bosnian ngo o⁄cer put it, “Bosnians have come to
understand the bargain well.Westerners come here with money and
ideas, wanting to do good. In the end, we waste their money and they
waste our time.”
By default, civil-society development gained cachet as the central
strategy for political development and ethnic reconciliation. If
the international community’s eªorts were focused on supporting
marginalized groups and encouraging citizen involvement from
the bottom up, a culture of tolerance, it was assumed, would take
root. Those advocating such ideas, however, lacked an understanding

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of the complexities of managing a postconflict transition overlaid
on the postcommunist transition that had begun prior to the war.
The strategies for a smooth postcommunist transition elsewhere
in central and eastern Europe focused largely on decentralizing
political and economic authority. In ethnically fractured postwar
Bosnia, however, such decentralization further weakened eªorts to
build a coherent state.
The international community could have used a strong hand to
stamp out corruption and strengthen national institutions. Unfortunately,
it did not.The Dayton accord created the O⁄ce of the High
Representative to coordinate and implement the accord’s civilian
aspects.The work of the ohr is overseen by the Peace Implementation
Council—a grouping of 55 countries and international organizations
that was charged with overseeing Bosnia’s reconstruction. Yet pic
representatives rarely see eye to eye, and they have frequently been
unable to press for the full implementation of Dayton for fear of
rocking the boat. Even after the pic gave the ohr expanded executive
powers in 1997 to impose national policy and to remove political
elites who obstructed the long-term goals of the peace agreement,
the ohr was unable and often unwilling to demand the necessary
reforms to develop a functional central governing system. Even
when international organizations were successful in their own discrete
areas, they often failed to coordinate their actions with others or
carry out extensive evaluations to hold themselves accountable. As
achievements slowed and as average Bosnians grew frustrated by
the lack of success and the failure of the international community
to solicit input from them, the credibility of the international
community waned.
drifting toward chaos
In April 1999, the world’s attention was once again focused on the
Balkans by the war in Kosovo. Paradoxically, Kosovo’s relative instability
fueled the perception that Bosnia had succeeded in becoming
just another eastern European country in transition.
Following the Kosovo war, the Stability Pact for South Eastern
Europe oªered all countries in the region a road map for possible
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[76] foreign affairs . Volume 88 No. 5

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eu and nato membership, on the condition that they develop certain
institutions to help facilitate their eventual integration into these
organizations. This seemed a necessary corrective for Dayton’s
deficiencies; both Brussels and Washington assumed that the allure
of eu and nato membership would override other political dynamics
in Bosnia and finally give the international eªort there some
much-needed momentum.
But the international community faltered at the very moment when
Bosnia needed a more robust commitment.After 9/11, the United States
and much of the international community
shifted its attention away from the Balkans.
The Bush administration, which was at
the time focused on defeating the Taliban
in Afghanistan and mobilizing support for
an invasion of Iraq, was reluctant to commit
resources to Bosnia. Russia’s increasing
obstructionism within the pic, a lack of international
unity on Kosovo, and disagreements
within the eu over Bosnia pushed France,
Germany, and the United States to the point of wanting to declare
victory in Bosnia and leave. Meanwhile, the allure of eu and nato
membership was not enough of an incentive to convince Bosnia’s ethnic
elites to scrap the institutions that had given them extraordinary power
bases and to replace them with ones that would reduce their influence
and strengthen the central government.
Rather than expend more eªort, which might have generated a
backlash from nationalist parties, the international community
delegated much of its power in a misguided eªort to let the Bosnians
rule themselves. Given the dysfunctional institutional structure
that the international community had helped create, this merely
shifted power to obstructionist political elites rather than to those
committed to improving Bosnia’s situation. The transatlantic tensions
that erupted over the Iraq war, along with Brussels’ and
Washington’s subsequent scrambles for military resources to cope
with the simultaneous conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, diverted
attention away from Bosnia even more, laying the groundwork for
the country’s slow disintegration.

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Although Bosnia experienced modest economic growth from
2000 to 2006 and seemed to be plodding along, major fault lines
existed just beneath the surface. In 2006, the pic announced its intention
to close down the ohr and end Bosnia’s status as an international
protectorate. At the same time, the international community embarked
on its first major eªort to persuade Bosnia’s elites to reform
the constitution set up by Dayton to rid it
of its flaws. In an eªort spearheaded by the
U.S. Institute of Peace, eight of the leading
Bosnian political parties were urged to
develop a series of constitutional reforms
to centralize decision-making and state
institutions. These reforms led to a tentative
agreement to strengthen the central government’s
Council of Ministers and create
two new national government ministries,
one for a unified agricultural policy and one for science, technology,
and the environment. The so-called April package broke down,
however, due to last-minute obstructionism by Silajdzic and the
leaders of a breakaway faction of the Croatian Democratic Union.
In the end, the proposed amendment failed by two votes to garner
the necessary two-thirds majority in Bosnia’s parliament.
As the constitutional reform process faltered, the European Commission
warned Bosnia that it would not move forward on a Stabilization
and Association Agreement (saa)—the precursor to eu membership—
until the country adopted a series of significant reforms. Most urgently,
the eu wanted reforms that put the central government, rather than the
ethnic entities, in charge of the country’s police force. But rs o⁄cials
refused to relinquish control over any of their entity’s institutions. This
impasse, coupled with the failure of the constitutional talks, became
the central issue in the 2006 national elections, which both Dodik
and Silajdzic successfully exploited to gain strong showings for their
respective Serb and Muslim exclusivist ethnic parties.
The issue of police reform remained deadlocked for more than a
year, until the summer of 2007, when the Slovak diplomat Miroslav
Lajcak became the un high representative for Bosnia and tried to
break the impasse. Lajcak instructed Bosnia’s parliament to pass po-

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lice reform, threatening to use his powers to remove obstructionist
o⁄cials from power.When Dodik refused in early October, Lajcak
made a series of moves intended to secure the reform and break other
important deadlocks by restricting the ability of entity representatives
to boycott or veto decisions in the executive branch’s Council of Ministers
or legislation in the Parliamentary Assembly. For the next six
weeks, however, Dodik and the rs parliament stood firm, vowing to
protect Serbs’ interests under any circumstances.
In early December 2007, at this critical juncture in the statebuilding
eªort, the international community blinked. Instead of
facing down ethnic nationalism and addressing institutional contradictions,
it gave in. Javier Solana, secretary-general of the
Council of the European Union and high representative of the eu’s
Common Foreign and Security Policy, along with the pic and Lajcak,
agreed to negotiate with Dodik. With uncertainty over Kosovo’s
independence looming and ambivalence regarding Bosnia growing
in Brussels and Washington, no one wanted trouble. In the end,
Lajcak and the eu accepted watered-down commitments from the
rs, and six months later Bosnia signed an agreement with the eu,
starting it on the path to accession.
The ohr’s capitulation to Dodik and the rs caused severe damage
to the ohr’s legitimacy. As the International Crisis Group put it in a
March 2009 report, the episode revealed the worst of the international
community: “It overreached in its demands on police reform,
overreacted to its failures, and was unprepared for the consequences.”
As this situation was unfolding, the international community
decided to transfer the international peacekeeping mission from
the nato-led Stabilization Force to a smaller, weaker eu-led mission,
eufor. Between 2005 and 2007, the international security presence
declined from roughly 7,000 troops to fewer than 2,000, and these
soldiers had less military capability. In 2007, eufor withdrew all
the 1,000 troops stationed in Banja Luka, the capital of the rs and the
only rs city with a significant international troop presence. Today,
eufor has fewer than 2,000 troops deployed throughout the entire
country. Soon, it will be reduced to a 200-person training presence
without Chapter 7 un peacekeeping authority, which is what has
allowed the international security force to actively enforce key security

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elements of the Dayton accord. The reduced force levels and more
limited mandate will cripple the international community’s ability
to deter an outbreak of interethnic violence or respond rapidly to
local incidents that could potentially escalate.
pandora’s box
The failed eªorts at constitutional reform, the loss of the ohr’s
credibility, and the declining international security presence in
Bosnia are all strengthening the country’s nationalist politicians
and parties. As a result, the international community is now in its
weakest position since the war’s end, with factions from all three
ethnic groups now challenging the Dayton structure.Waning U.S.
and eu interest in Bosnia has coincided with rising Russian commercial
and diplomatic involvement in the Balkans, which Dodik
has actively exploited to stabilize his political position within the
rs and to strengthen the rs’s hand in Bosnian politics. In particular,
Dodik has used Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August of 2008 and
its diplomatic opposition to the United States and the eu’s position
on Kosovo as a rallying cry for his increased obstructionism when
it comes to strengthening Bosnia’s central institutions. Reversing
these centrifugal trends will require a renewed focus on Bosnia to
address core issues: rising ethnic nationalist pressure, weak central
governance, and endemic corruption.
First, a strong U.S. commitment is necessary. One of the central
features of Bosnian politics over the past three years has been
the systematic and eªective exploitation by nationalist parties of
international complacency and of disagreements between the ohr,
Brussels, and Washington. These divisions must be reconciled. Eu
policy currently reflects a diverse range of motivations and interests,
and U.S. leadership is needed to refocus the international
community’s eªort, starting with the appointment of a U.S. special
envoy for the Balkans to spearhead a new initiative on Bosnia and
the region as a whole. U.S.Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to Sarajevo
in May, his decision to travel there with Solana, and his sharply
worded rebuke of the increasingly nationalist rhetoric emanating
from Bosnia’s political elite were all necessary and important first

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steps for U.S. reengagement. However, a single visit will not on its
own produce lasting changes in policy.
Second, eu accession remains the most significant diplomatic
lever available to the West, although its allure has diminished in
recent years due to the global financial crisis. Many Bosnians now
wonder what tangible benefits eu membership would provide in
the midst of a worldwide economic downturn.
Given how easily Brussels watered
down the conditions for Bosnia’s saa,
most Bosnians believe that the conditions
for eu membership will also be flexible, if
not inconsequential. But they should not
be. Brussels needs to launch a much more
aggressive public diplomacy campaign to
highlight not only the potential benefits of
eu membership but also the costs of not meeting the eu’s standards.
As Kurt Bassuener of the think tank the Democratization Policy
Council has noted, the failure to develop a centralized Bosnian
agriculture ministry, for example, means that Serb farmers in the
rs who grow high-quality organic fruits and vegetables cannot sell
this lucrative produce in the eu market. Dodik’s politically motivated
obstructionism is thus costing Serbs in the rs jobs and income.
Likewise, within the federation, disagreements between Muslims
and Croats over ownership of state property continue to deter foreign
direct investment, costing citizens jobs.
Exposing the costs of obstructionism and corruption to all
Bosnians would weaken political support for the ethnic nationalists,
create a stronger domestic constituency for reform and for the development
of a functioning central state, and increase the allure of eu
membership. Furthermore, the eu needs to impose more specific
and strict conditionality for membership by demanding basic
functionality, transparency, and accountability in Bosnia’s state institutions.
These institutions, as currently structured, are not even
remotely consistent with eu standards. The Bosnian government
needs to be given specific prescriptions on privatization, on the
necessary cuts to bloated and ine⁄cient public-sector spending, on
the needed reform of government hiring practices, on creating a

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more equitable distribution of state property, and on the adoption
of formal rules on budgeting and accounting. Brussels must also
refrain from accepting compromises to the existing conditions it
has specified for the closure of the ohr.
Third, as was true with the Dayton agreement, any solution for
Bosnia will require the active support of its neighbors. Bosnian Serbs
and Bosnian Croats look to Belgrade and Zagreb, respectively, for
support, and Brussels currently has more leverage over Serbia’s and
Croatia’s leaders than it does over ethnic elites in Bosnia. It must use
this leverage to pressure the Croatian and Serbian governments not
only to keep their ethnic brethren in line but also to actively support
reform eªorts within Bosnia.
Finally, the international security force should be maintained at
current levels.Weakening it further would leave the international
community without the capability to respond to a crisis. And withdrawing
troops would further lessen the international community’s
diplomatic leverage. One possible solution would be to use Bosnian
military installations as training camps for eu and nato forces
about to deploy to Afghanistan. Conducting predeployment training
in Bosnia would be cheaper than maintaining a full peacekeeping
operation and at the same time would rea⁄rm the international
community’s commitment to Bosnia, provide the means to begin
the process for possible nato membership for Bosnia, and help
prevent a return to war.
closing the deal
After 14 years of the international community’s eªorts in the
Balkans, eight in Afghanistan, and six in Iraq, it is clear that state
building is not for the faint of heart. It is impossible to create a functional
state that can be sustained and governed by local actors merely
by throwing money and resources at the problem. As the experience
in Bosnia has proved, state building is not a problem to be solved but
a process to be managed.
The Dayton peace agreement is a model to emulate because it
ended the violence and built the conditions for a return to normal life

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(zadnja, ima jos samo naslovna)


for many. At the same time, it oªers a cautionary tale of the potential for
institutional structures to create perverse incentives, spawn extremists,
and eventually undermine national unity. Diplomats engaged in
peacemaking in Bosnia and elsewhere must learn to weigh the longterm
implications of the deals they make and ensure that both peace
agreements and postconflict implementation strategies are flexible
and open to adaptation as situations change.
Compared to the other major international state-building projects
today—such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo—the one in
Bosnia appears to have the most going for it. Although it is not
considered completely neutral, the international community has
never been viewed as an occupying force in Bosnia, and global public
opinion has largely seen Bosnia as a legitimate humanitarian project.
Bosnia is also a small state with a postwar population of just under
four million—a stark contrast to Afghanistan and Iraq, which are both
six times as large as Bosnia in terms of population. Finally, although
Bosnians may not feel blessed by their geography, their location in
Europe prevents them from being ignored by their wealthy neighbors,
a luxury that most conflict-ridden countries do not have.
It is tempting to assert that it is now time—nearly 14 years after
Dayton—for Bosnians to take charge. But this is impossible within
an institutional structure based on ethnicity that rewards those who
appeal to fear and ethnic chauvinism. If the international community
does not reverse these trends, the result may well be the redivision of
Bosnia and a return to war.∂

[dallton]

nek neko pozove reisa cerica da ucenjem fatihe i minutom cutnje ispratimo naseg rahmetliju dejtona...

.....................

slava mu

[dallton]

BiH i Crna Gora ostvarile ozbiljan progres kroz Partnerstvo za mir
U Kongresu Sjedinjenih Američkih Država u prvom čitanju jučer je prihvaćen Zakon o podršci članstvu Bosne i Hercegovine u NATO-u. Ovim zakonom (S 1559 IS, 111th Congress), koji bi, nakon usvajanja u Senatu trebao postati pravosnažan, podržavaju se napori vlada i građana Bosne i Hercegovine i Crne Gore na postizanju ciljeva iz oblasti demokratizacije i sigurnosti (kao i dalji napori Srbije) kako bi ove države ostvarile puno članstvo u najznačajnijoj vojnoj alijansi na svijetu.

Ohrabriti saveznike
Zakon, koji su 3. augusta 2009. predložili kongresmeni John Kerry (u ime demokrata) i Richard G. Lugar (u ime republikanaca), u uvodnom dijelu navodi kako „nigdje u Evropi pitanje sigurnosti nije toliko dovedeno kao na području Zapadnog Balkana". Također, u uvodnom dijelu ovog zakona navodi se kako je uspješno okončano članstvo Hrvatske ohrabrilo ostale države na ovom putu, te da su i BiH i Crna Gora već ostvarile ozbiljan progres kroz Partnerstvo za mir. Zakon detaljno opisuje put koji su prošle države našeg regiona, uz podsjećanje na NATO summit u Rigi u novembru 2006., kada su lideri ovog vojnog saveza ponudili Srbiji, Crnoj Gori i BiH članstvo u PfP-u.
Kongres se ovim zakonom, između ostalog, zadužuje da ohrabri saveznike SAD-a i da podrže dalje proširenje NATO-a na BiH i Crnu Goru - „kao evropskih demokracija sposobnih i spremnih da ispune zadatke". Saveznici SAD-a bi morali omogućiti punu podršku kako bi Vlada BiH u razumnom roku ispunila sve standarde - političke, vojne, ekonomske i društvene - koje podrazumijeva članstvo u NATO-u...

eto nas kod vas, a onda ce te i vi kod nas ovi ameri sute po 6,7 godina onda u par mjeseci naprave vise posla nego evropa za 10 godina suplje price

[dallton]

SDA
'Rješevanje pitanja ustava ključno za sve druge probleme'

Stranka demokratske akcije /SDA/ smatra da je rješavanje pitanja Ustava BiH ključ za rješavanje svih problema u BiH, pa i ekonomskih, izjavio je portparol SDA Salmir Kaplan.
"Ovakav Ustav kakvog imamo danas je kočnica za dalji razvoj BiH i rješavanje svih problema, pa tako i ekonomskih", rekao je Kaplan Srni, komentarišući prijedlog premijera Republike Srpske i lidera SNSD-a Milorada Dodika da se u BiH uvede moratorijum na političke teme, da to traje pet ili deset godina i da se da šansa ekonomiji.

Kaplan je dodao da se ekonomski problemi u BiH ne mogu rješavati prije pitanja Ustava i da ovakav stav premijera Srpske, kako je naveo, ne može doprinijeti rješavanju problema u BiH.

Dodik je juče predložio je da se u BiH uvede moratorijum na političke teme, da to traje pet ili deset godina, i da se da šansa ekonomiji.

"Ako svakih mjesec dana otvaramo pitanje o ustavnim promjenama, naravno da imamo vruću političku situaciju. Onaj ko nameće iznova pitanje ustavnih promjena mora da računa sa destabilizacijom političkih prilika. Očigledno je da svi maksimilizuju svoje pozicije", izjavio je Dodik za Radio Slobodna Evropa.

"a ja necu da cutim" ..nista od moratorija, e sad ce namjerno da podgrijavaju situaciju dalje

[Ima Bosne_Bice Bosne]

>>>>Dodik je juče predložio je da se u BiH uvede moratorijum na političke teme, da to traje pet ili deset godina, i da se da šansa ekonomiji.<<<<<<<

Ovo mi lici na jednu pricu iz mog kraja.

Pokosila braca travu na livadi, i drugi dan kada je trava bila potpuno suha oni se pocnu svadjati gdje da je uplaste. Svadjali se oni tako dugo vremena, i ko zna bili i prestali da se na nebu nisu ukazali oblaci koji su nagovjestavali olujnu kisu. Jedan od brace kada je to primjetio rece drugima,"Hajdemo mi na brzinu da saberemo ovo sijeno u naviljke, a onda cemo se nastaviti svadjati gdje smo stali".

I Dodo primjetio da se oluja sprema.

[blackepeace]

Još malo pa će se vremenska prognoza određivati na osnovu Dodikove stolice.
Šta vam je ljudi, pa nije Dodo bog da svi gledate u njega i na osnovu toga procjenjujete budućnost.
Pravo opsesija...

[Ima Bosne_Bice Bosne]

Još malo pa će se vremenska prognoza određivati na osnovu Dodikove stolice.
Šta vam je ljudi, pa nije Dodo bog da svi gledate u njega i na osnovu toga procjenjujete budućnost.
Pravo opsesija...

Nisi skont'o, al' nisam to ni ocekivao od tebe.

[Judge_Dread]

x

[mark II]

velike sile(misli se prvernstveno na (engleze i amere) ce pomocu svojih pravnih eksperata(mislim da je plan vec gotov samo se ceka da se u pogodnom trenutku poturi pod nos BIH politicarima) ponuditi ustavno rjesenje za BIH po sistemu uzmi ili ostavi....

Zar nismo imali takav plan u aprilu 2006. ?

Sve ostalo: Što je babi milo...

izbjegavas sustinu problema u BIH....srbi kao narod jos nisu prihvatili refrendum o nezavisnosti BIH i ne priznaju i ne dozivljavaju BIH kao svoju drzavu(vecina srba u BIH)...da bi srbi prihvatili BIH potrebno je da se organizuje sira medijska i politicka akcija srpskog vjerskog i politickog rukovodstva i da to kazu srbima kao narodu( a taj dan nece doci nikad jer srbiji nije interes normalna BIH)...posto ti ne razumijes stanje u kome se nalazi srbi kao narod ,normalno je da ce moje pisanje tebi izgledati kao "baba i san"

srbima je BIH i Dejton samo usputna stanica do nekog tetonskog poremecaja na svjetskoj pozornici,gdje ce nastaviti tamo gdje su 95-e stali...

malo jasnije ili da jos sanjam babine sne

Oba posta odlična, zavrzlama , nije nužno da će sve tako ići, ima altenativa, ovisno o svjetskim zbivanjima, ali u principu NATO neće Rusiji prepustiti Bosnu, i Srbi samo mogu popiti žestok degenek i biti maksimalno marginalizirani ukoliko odluče da "zarate" sa NATO-om. Ja priželjkujem da ona harlovina i zadrigli krmak Dodik krene u sukob sa NATO-om, ništa ljepše od malo zatezanja.

[mark II]

ako Srbi zele da se ograde od te genocidne tvorevine.

Ne žele

Fakat, kad kažeš Srbin u svijetu je to aluzija na nekoga ko ubija i čini genocid. Ustrajavanje na rezultatima genocida i veličanje istih donijet će samo potvrđivanje takve slike o Srbima. Šta je to što tebe, blackepeace, čini tako punim mržnje, fašistički nastrojenim i punim želje za ubijanjem drugih ljudi koji ti nisu nanijeli nikakvo zlo osim što su druge vjere i nacije? Zanima me način razmišljanja nekoga kao što si ti, ne pitam te ovo radi provokacije, nego kad si već tu na forumu de nam objasni zašto je to dobro. Zašto misliš da su etnička i vjerska raznilikost bauk? Zašto si pobornik genocida i ponosiš se entitetom koji je nastao na genocidu? Zašto podržavaš genocidnu politiku srpskih mitomana, mada je nauka dokazala da ljudi nisu različiti, manje dobri itd. itd. iako pripadaju različitim nacijama vjerama.... Nemoj mi odgovarati ako će to biti "znaš niiiiiiiiiiisam ja takaaaaaaav, ali iskustva iz posljednjeg rata.....". Jer da nisi takav ne bi zagovarao nacionalnu i vjersku segregaciju podupirući genocidni entitet, te pravdajući time zločine počinjene u ime njegovog stvaranja. Svaka uvreda će biti shvaćena kao suštinska potvrda moje opservacije Hajde nam sada elaboriraj zašto je četnički fašizam i genocid politička parabola kojom se ponose ti i tebi slični, morate imati neke polurazumske argumente, čisto da sebe uvjerite kako je fašizam dobra stvar (ok znam ja da vi to zovete "svetim zavetom predaka" ili nekim drugim otrcanim izrazom). Blagodarim.

[popajic]

Izvinjavam se sto prekidam etnicka prepucavanje.
Imam malo pitanje: Koje su hairlije OVAJ put predvidjene da u nase ime (a bez da nas i pitaju) potpisu eventualni Dayton II ?

[Real Khan]

Izvinjavam se sto prekidam etnicka prepucavanje.
Imam malo pitanje: Koje su hairlije OVAJ put predvidjene da u nase ime (a bez da nas i pitaju) potpisu eventualni Dayton II ?

Dobro pitanje...Odgovor na to pitanje ćeš lako naći po principu križaljke...pod horizontalno: Nedavno obraćanje Parlamentu BiH, a vertikalno: US Vice-President Joe Biden (sjeti se KO onda ostaje među Bošnjacima ) "Korak-po-korak"..."Politika kompromiŠa"..."moramo prihvatiti realnost"..."zaboraviti i oprostiti"..."RS niko ne može ukinuti"..."gulp"