#1 CIA: Jugoslavija poslije Tita, procjena iz 1973.
Posted: 20/09/2008 00:47
The Likely Course in Yugoslavia
18. Given a little more time for emerging succession arrangements to take hold, it now seems likely that the immediate post-Tito period, though troubled, will be fairly orderly. Members of a collective of top party leaders, probably functioning under Dolanc as Secretary of the Executive Bureau (in effect, the Politburo), will initially prefer to face post-Tito uncertainties together. Top state officials and the federal bureaucracy will no doubt feel much the same way; they will not in any case be in a position to challenge the party authorities. The major republican leaders—none of whom seem now to represent militant nationality interests—will also serve in central bodies; this will at least for a time help to constrain those among them who might be inclined to strike off on republican tangents. Disaffected party personnel—e.g., those who were purged in the nation-wide wake of the Croatian crisis and those who seek an ever-expanding democratization of national life—will probably not be able to combine into an effective opposition force for quite some time after Tito's departure, if at all. 6
6) Other potential opposition forces—Cominformists, Maoists, militant students of various persuasions—are neither large nor capable of concerted action. Though they can be swayed by appeals to regional nationalism, and could be aroused to protests in the event of serious economic difficulties, the people at large do not otherwise appear to be supporters of alternatives to the present system.
19. All things considered, the odds would seem to be that the Yugoslavs, left to their own devices, will also be able over the longer term to persist with one form or another of self-managed muddling through. The Titoist heritage—30 or so years of Yugoslav survival in the face of war, cold war, and adversity—will no doubt remain a strong source of national pride. The single decentralized Yugoslav economy, with all its problems, will continue to offer a greater return than the individual and divided alternatives and thus will be seen to provide the citizenry, the politicians, and even many of the regionalists with a heavy stake in federal survival. Finally, the concern that small individual successor states of the Yugoslav union could not by themselves be either prosperous or secure will continue to persuade many Yugoslavs that the unified state, in one form or another, should be preserved.
20. The Yugoslav National Army is an important deterrent to a national collapse. It is generally appreciated in Yugoslavia that, in the event that conflicts threatened to erupt into civil war or to move the country into anarchy, the military might step in to assert at least temporary control. The Army was for a time, and may still prove to be, the only all-national institutional force effectively functioning on the domestic scene. Though not without its own problems, the Army seems as a whole to be loyal to Tito, his system, and his concept of national integrity. It has, in fact, demonstrated this on more than one occasion, most recently during the Croatian crisis in 1971. Its loyalties after Tito is gone are likely to be to those who promote a strong, cohesive Yugoslavia.
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18. Given a little more time for emerging succession arrangements to take hold, it now seems likely that the immediate post-Tito period, though troubled, will be fairly orderly. Members of a collective of top party leaders, probably functioning under Dolanc as Secretary of the Executive Bureau (in effect, the Politburo), will initially prefer to face post-Tito uncertainties together. Top state officials and the federal bureaucracy will no doubt feel much the same way; they will not in any case be in a position to challenge the party authorities. The major republican leaders—none of whom seem now to represent militant nationality interests—will also serve in central bodies; this will at least for a time help to constrain those among them who might be inclined to strike off on republican tangents. Disaffected party personnel—e.g., those who were purged in the nation-wide wake of the Croatian crisis and those who seek an ever-expanding democratization of national life—will probably not be able to combine into an effective opposition force for quite some time after Tito's departure, if at all. 6
6) Other potential opposition forces—Cominformists, Maoists, militant students of various persuasions—are neither large nor capable of concerted action. Though they can be swayed by appeals to regional nationalism, and could be aroused to protests in the event of serious economic difficulties, the people at large do not otherwise appear to be supporters of alternatives to the present system.
19. All things considered, the odds would seem to be that the Yugoslavs, left to their own devices, will also be able over the longer term to persist with one form or another of self-managed muddling through. The Titoist heritage—30 or so years of Yugoslav survival in the face of war, cold war, and adversity—will no doubt remain a strong source of national pride. The single decentralized Yugoslav economy, with all its problems, will continue to offer a greater return than the individual and divided alternatives and thus will be seen to provide the citizenry, the politicians, and even many of the regionalists with a heavy stake in federal survival. Finally, the concern that small individual successor states of the Yugoslav union could not by themselves be either prosperous or secure will continue to persuade many Yugoslavs that the unified state, in one form or another, should be preserved.
20. The Yugoslav National Army is an important deterrent to a national collapse. It is generally appreciated in Yugoslavia that, in the event that conflicts threatened to erupt into civil war or to move the country into anarchy, the military might step in to assert at least temporary control. The Army was for a time, and may still prove to be, the only all-national institutional force effectively functioning on the domestic scene. Though not without its own problems, the Army seems as a whole to be loyal to Tito, his system, and his concept of national integrity. It has, in fact, demonstrated this on more than one occasion, most recently during the Croatian crisis in 1971. Its loyalties after Tito is gone are likely to be to those who promote a strong, cohesive Yugoslavia.
Analiticari?
