MTIBOSNIE - A sada ako vas konkretno zanima a koje su posljedice tako nedemokratskog konstitutisanja i ko zapravo govori istinu evo imate fantastican clanak da se Dejtonski Ustav Bosne i Hercegovine sada posmatra cisto kao eksperiment - posto je svakako bio nametnut mimo volje Bosanaca pa sami procitajte: 
There is a consensus about Dayton--that is repeated so often it is virtually a mantra of international officials--that the 1995 peace agreement was a treaty 'designed to end a war, not to build a state' (for example, Ashdown, 2004; Denitch, 1996). Commentators regularly argue that Dayton was negotiated by the nationalist parties, whose leaders caused the war in the first place, and that it therefore secured the power of these ethnically-based political parties (for example, Kaldor, 1997: 28-30).
Dayton is 'legitimated by the principle of consent'. Rather than an external imposition, Dayton formally appears to be a treaty made by the local powers--Bosnia and its neighbours, Croatia and the rump former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The parties on the ground who consented to the agreement and had formal 'ownership' of it were coerced into signing it and had little say over the content of the 'agreement'.
The Dayton process was an ambiguous, ad hoc and unaccountable one from the outset. The Dayton peace agreement was unlike any other peace treaty of modern times, not merely because it was imposed by powers formally external to the conflict, but because of the far reaching powers given to international actors, which extended well beyond military matters to cover the most basic aspects of government and state. The majority of annexes to the Dayton agreement were not related to the ending of hostilities, traditionally the role of a peace agreement, but the political project of state-building in Bosnia, of 'reconstructing a society' (Bildt, 1996a).
It was 'ambitious' because, under the guise of a negotiated peace settlement, it sought to build a state--a state which was not a product of popular consensus or popular involvement and was seen by many Bosnians as an external imposition The marginalisation of the people of Bosnia from their own political system by external powers was summed up in Bildt's (1998: 139) observations on the new constitution (Annex 4 of the Dayton framework agreement): 'No-one thought it wise to submit the constitution to any sort of parliamentary or other similar proceeding. It was to be a constitution by international decree'.
From May 2000, the main objectives of European Union assistance have not been couched in terms of supporting Dayton but in the much more inclusive terminology of support for Bosnia within in the framework of the Stabilisation and Association Process (EC, 2003a). More importantly, the framework used by the PIC and the OHR has increasingly been shaped by the EU Road Map and subsequent EU strategies of engagement rather than by Dayton itself. In fact, too strong an attachment to the Dayton settlement, through the defence of entity rights and 'vital interests' protections for Bosnia's constituent peoples, have been interpreted as a barrier to legislative progress towards EU integration (EC, 2003c: B.1.1).
As far as the engagement of the people of Bosnia or the elected representatives is concerned, little has changed over the ten years since the Dayton agreement. The Bosnia public have been excluded from the transition process; and while there is general support for EU membership, there has been little public discussion of the costs and benefits involved.
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-148575771.html
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Zato im ne odgovara cak ni na anketi.