IRAN

[Sanjarko]

Transfer tehnologije. Iran če Scila sisteme kopirati i napraviti svoju verziju. Več je kopirao S-200

[Challenger__]

Tvrditi da se američka vlada pomirilia sa postojanjem Islamske Republike je naivno. Aktuelni pristup je samo inteligentniji od rigidnog pristupa Netayahua i njegovih navođenih ekstremista u Kongresu; good cop/bad cop pozornica.

[Fudo Bosna]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jaHxBcqjDXA


Po meni, bez obzira što je riječ o imamu, Šejh Imranu, kao vjerskoj osobi, veoma objektivna i nespristrasna, i nažalost, vizionarska analiza.
Mislim da bi se mnogi slobodoumni novinari i politički analitičari u največem dijelu složili sa ovom analizom, bez obzira na porijeklo/naciju ili religiju...


Da, nažalost, bila bi to žešća glupost, za sve ljude planete, nažalost, jer gdje bi to stalo ???

[Fudo Bosna]

Tvrditi da se američka vlada pomirilia sa postojanjem Islamske Republike je naivno. Aktuelni pristup je samo inteligentniji od rigidnog pristupa Netayahua i njegovih navođenih ekstremista u Kongresu; good cop/bad cop pozornica.

Jeste inteligentniji, ali ko su pravi šefovi i jesu li oni za rigidniji pristup, pitanje je, ali nije možda za ovog topica, više je pitanje za Imrana Davida Icka,bosanca Marića , autore Arrivalsa itd. i one koji smiju da misle svojom glavom. Odgovor , možda, svi mi i ne bi željeli /smjeli čuti...

[Challenger__]

Nikad nemoj podcjeniti ljudsku glupost, a u politici je ima i previse.
Sva vojska je na sva zvona govorila da je glupost napasti Irak, pa se nisu prosli dok nisu nasli generala koji ce ici niz dlaku.

Jedno je Irak a nešto sasvim drugo je Iran. On je crvena linija Kine i strateška dubina Rusije. Napad na Iran bi bio idealana greška iz perspektive oponenata unilateralizma koju - vidimo - administracija ne pravi.

[pirpa]

Apsolutno ih ne svrstavam u isti kos sa Arapima. Arapi za 100 godina nece biti ono sto su danas iranci.
Ali, sve to se svodi: koliko gubitaka Iran moze nanjeti SAD u slucaju napada, prije nego sto to politicki postane preskupo za politicku elitu u SAD?

izvinite sto vam se mjesam u diskusiju.
zar stvarno mislis jeferson da bi amerika sa saveznicima mogla da uradi sa iranom kao sto su uradili sa irakom ???
joos jedno pitanje , od koga vecu korist ima rusija, japan, kina, indija od amerike ili irana ??

Apsolutno NE. KDa li moze izvesti vazdusne napade? Apsolutno DA.
Sta ce biti poslije, e to je vec pitanje.
Od koga vecu korist ima? Sta ti mislis?

moje misljenje, definitivno od irana.
nabrojane zemlje sem indije imaju pretenzije imperialnih sila koje u iranu ne vide protivnika kao sto vide u americi,
sad da ne ulazimo u aspekte prirodnih resursa od koga bi imali vecu korist...

[jefferson]

moje misljenje, definitivno od irana.
nabrojane zemlje sem indije imaju pretenzije imperialnih sila koje u iranu ne vide protivnika kao sto vide u americi,
sad da ne ulazimo u aspekte prirodnih resursa od koga bi imali vecu korist...

Aha, znaci trziste od 340 miliona ljudi, potrosackom ekonomijom (72% ekonomije), i 18 biliona dolara vrijednosti, je manje vazno za Kinu, Indiju itd, od Irana?
Nije Kina ovo sto jeste zato sto eksploatise prirodne resurse drugihz emalja, negoz ato sto proizvede jebeni kompjuter s kojeg svi mi pisemo ovdje pa ga proda u SAD, EU itd. Nisu ovo 1920-te godine i doba mrkog uglja, ovo je 21 vijek, solarna energija, vjetar, cipovi. nafta je dobra, ali eto gdje je Rusija dana kada cijena padne.
Ko to vidi ameriku kao protivnika? Kina? Indija? Daj bolan, malo manje crtanih filmova.

[Kikibombona]

Amerikanci mogu izvesti ograniceni vazdusni napad. To nije problem, uz odredjene gubitke, naravno.
Medjutim, slazem se, lako je opaliti metak, sta poslije toga je vec neka druga prica.
Nije bas tako ni jednostavno pricati o nekom balansu. Balans bi tu trebao biti ako razumno gledamo, pa cak recimo ako i Iran i SA razviju A bombu. Problem je uplitanje vjere, fanatizam (posebno u SA) sa prstom na okidacu. Ja sam uvijek to govorio, i znam, za americku vojsku (ne politicare) nocna mora nije Iran sa bombom, nego SA sa bombom.
Druga stvar je, lobiranje. SA, Izrael imaju ogroman uticaj na americke izbore kroz razne lobisticke kuce. Sva buka oko Irana je ustvari trazenje sadake od Adelsona i slicnih osoba za izbore 2016.
Kada su izbori u pitanju, tu sve svodi: izbor Hillary, koja veze nema sta hoce, osim da bude Predsjednica, i izbor nekog od Republikanaca, sto je izbor raspojasanih budala koji ne vide sta ce biti sutra od para koje lete oko njih.
Trece, Rusi traze jakog saveznika, i ponovo pocinje ta igra koja se igrala prije 25 godina. To je dobro! Nije dobro da jedna Amerika ili jedna Rusija rade sta hoce, nego da se balansiraju.
Kinezi? Mislim da kinezi tu igraju igru: hajte vi, stici cu ja vas.

Pa upravo to. Moze Amerika razvaliti Iran sa distance do odredjene mjere, to uopste nije sporno. Sta poslije? Iranci sigurno nece poruciti 'zlocinci, vidi sta ste uradili, vi ste sotona i neprijatelji covjecnosti/humanosti', nego ce insistirati na nastavku sukoba, da se stvar istjera na cistac. Tu je religijski fanatizam i nacionalizam koji ce dati smisao patnji i borbi za ponos, za naciju, za vjeru! Potpuno je sigurno da bi prisilili Ameriku na invaziju (raketiranje americkih baza u regiji, vjerovatno napad na Izrael itd). I tako ih Amerika moze dobiti, ali samo u slucaju da odrade zestoku propagandu na domacem terenu i kod naroda opravdaju ogromnu zrtvu koja bi bila neminovna. Jos ako bi Iran pokrenuo satelite, nastao bi pravi haos nakon kojeg svijet vise nikada ne bi bio isti. Pa onda Rusija i Kina!? Jako zajebano i mislim malo vjerovatno da ce se desiti u skorije vrijeme....

Ako bi se Ameri odlucili za unistenje iranskog aktuelnog rezima, uvjeren sam da bi prethodno neutralisali satelite i iscenirali veliki sunitsko-siitski sukob. Sa icrpljevnim Iranom bi se bilo lakse izboriti..... Zato Ameri rasplamsavaju mrznju na BI izmedju sunita i siita, a ovi nasjedaju kao posljednje budale. Sa lakocom siju strah i mrznju, stvaraju uslove za laksu manipulaciju u buducnosti.

[jefferson]

Nikad nemoj podcjeniti ljudsku glupost, a u politici je ima i previse.
Sva vojska je na sva zvona govorila da je glupost napasti Irak, pa se nisu prosli dok nisu nasli generala koji ce ici niz dlaku.

Jedno je Irak a nešto sasvim drugo je Iran. On je crvena linija Kine i strateška dubina Rusije. Napad na Iran bi bio idealana greška iz perspektive oponenata unilateralizma koju - vidimo - administracija ne pravi.

Bila bi greska, ali........
Nece Kina svoje ekonomske odnose sa SAD da uzdrma zbog par vazdusnih napada na Iran koji nista nece promjeniti osim podici ego saudijskom kralju i onom kretenu u izraelu.
Ja mislim da ce dogovora biti, ali, nikad ne reci nikad....

[jefferson]

Amerikanci mogu izvesti ograniceni vazdusni napad. To nije problem, uz odredjene gubitke, naravno.
Medjutim, slazem se, lako je opaliti metak, sta poslije toga je vec neka druga prica.
Nije bas tako ni jednostavno pricati o nekom balansu. Balans bi tu trebao biti ako razumno gledamo, pa cak recimo ako i Iran i SA razviju A bombu. Problem je uplitanje vjere, fanatizam (posebno u SA) sa prstom na okidacu. Ja sam uvijek to govorio, i znam, za americku vojsku (ne politicare) nocna mora nije Iran sa bombom, nego SA sa bombom.
Druga stvar je, lobiranje. SA, Izrael imaju ogroman uticaj na americke izbore kroz razne lobisticke kuce. Sva buka oko Irana je ustvari trazenje sadake od Adelsona i slicnih osoba za izbore 2016.
Kada su izbori u pitanju, tu sve svodi: izbor Hillary, koja veze nema sta hoce, osim da bude Predsjednica, i izbor nekog od Republikanaca, sto je izbor raspojasanih budala koji ne vide sta ce biti sutra od para koje lete oko njih.
Trece, Rusi traze jakog saveznika, i ponovo pocinje ta igra koja se igrala prije 25 godina. To je dobro! Nije dobro da jedna Amerika ili jedna Rusija rade sta hoce, nego da se balansiraju.
Kinezi? Mislim da kinezi tu igraju igru: hajte vi, stici cu ja vas.

Pa upravo to. Moze Amerika razvaliti Iran sa distance do odredjene mjere, to uopste nije sporno. Sta poslije? Iranci sigurno nece poruciti 'zlocinci, vidi sta ste uradili, vi ste sotona i neprijatelji covjecnosti/humanosti', nego ce insistirati na nastavku sukoba, da se stvar istjera na cistac. Tu je religijski fanatizam i nacionalizam koji ce dati smisao patnji i borbi za ponos, za naciju, za vjeru! Potpuno je sigurno da bi prisilili Ameriku na invaziju (raketiranje americkih baza u regiji, vjerovatno napad na Izrael itd). I tako ih Amerika moze dobiti, ali samo u slucaju da odrade zestoku propagandu na domacem terenu i kod naroda opravdaju ogromnu zrtvu koja bi bila neminovna. Jos ako bi Iran pokrenuo satelite, nastao bi pravi haos nakon kojeg svijet vise nikada ne bi bio isti. Pa onda Rusija i Kina!? Jako zajebano i mislim malo vjerovatno da ce se desiti u skorije vrijeme....

Ako bi se Ameri odlucili za unistenje iranskog aktuelnog rezima, uvjeren sam da bi prethodno neutralisali satelite i iscenirali veliki sunitsko-siitski sukob. Sa icrpljevnim Iranom bi se bilo lakse izboriti..... Zato Ameri rasplamsavaju mrznju na BI izmedju sunita i siita, a ovi nasjedaju kao posljednje budale. Sa lakocom siju strah i mrznju, stvaraju uslove za laksu manipulaciju u buducnosti.

Mislim da zato niko im nije potreban, pa ni Amerika.

[p206]

ne znam je li bilo...uglavnom sve rečeno, bez uvijanja

[zrakomlat]

sa s-300 (vjerovatno nadogradjivana verzija) iranci zaokruzuju pvo sistem, nije neprobojan ali sigurno garantuje gubitke napadacu.

Koji kada bi se sutra isporucio, nece biti operativan bar jos dvije godine. Nije to Strijela.
Da bi iranci bili efikasni sa tim sistemom moraju:
1. Vrlo dobro obuciti posade, sto uz rusku poslovicnu aljkavost moze uzeti vise vremena nego je potrebno. Svi PVO sistemi (radarski) su se pokazali uspjesni SAMO ako je posada obucena. Postoji razlog zasto kozojebi sirom Bliskog Istoka nisu bili u mogucnosti oboriti avione kada su pokusali, dok su Srbi uspjeli eto i F-117 oboriti, iako nista nisu dobili time, te jos par aviona.
2. Kada bi i dobili super obuku (sto bi bio prvi slucaj da Rusi to urade do kraja), koliko baterija kupuju?
3. Kada bi i kupili dovoljno baterija, rezervni djelovi (neka samo pitaju Srbijance, Hrvate, Grke, Fince itd, kako oni posluju sa Rusima) mogu biti veliki problem.

Suma sumarum: Iran hoce kupiti sistem koji je tu da SAD, izraelu itd, napravi odredjene gubitike i da se nada da ce ti gubici biti dovoljni da javnost u tim zemljama, a pogotovo u SAD, digne buku.
Naravno, u obe zemlje se vec planovi koriguju i prave kao da Iran ima S-300.

ne znam bas da irance u isti kos sa arapima mozes bacati, kakvi god da su, trude se i pokusavaju nesto sopstveno razvijati. sto se tice radara dugog dometa mislim da su usvojili domacu proizvodnju i da vec imaju podosta iskustva na tom polju, a i dok je ovo natezanje sa s-300 bilo nesto su pokusavali da reversuju te su i tu nekih iskustava stekli sigurno. oni i sad imaju zajebanu tackastu odbranu, s-300 im treba da to brani, a to je u principu ono sto ih i interesuje.

Šta ovo znači, šta je "tačkasta" odbrana?

[Albosnawe]

Mali osvr na "pobjedu IR"u pregovorima.

Prvo krenuti sa istorijatom.

History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue

Press Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Nonproliferation Analyst, (202) 463-8270 x102

Updated: January 2014

Diplomatic initiatives to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue have produced several proposals for a negotiated settlement or to build confidence between Iran and the international community. Thus far, none of those proposals have gained acceptance from all of the involved parties and efforts to address Iran’s nuclear program continue. As Iran progresses down a path towards a nuclear-weapons capability, the difficulties in finding a compromise that would protect against a nuclear-armed Iran while being acceptable to the leadership in Tehran have grown.

Tehran devised a number of these proposals between 2003 and 2005, some of which included provisions to initially limit operations at its key nuclear facilities and implement transparency measures for its nuclear activities. Iran's IAEA envoy Ali Asghar Soltanieh said during a September 2011 Arms Control Today interview however, that those proposals are "obsolete." Since that time, proposals offered by Iran have generally not addressed concerns that it is seeking a nuclear-weapons capability.

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the EU3) also offered Iran several proposals to resolve the nuclear issue during negotiations with Iran in 2004 and 2005. China, Russia, and the United States joined the three European countries in 2006 as part of a format known as the “P5+1”—in reference to the permanent five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany—offering similar comprehensive proposals to Iran. The P5+1 have described their negotiations with Tehran regarding these proposals as one track of a “dual track strategy” to address Iran’s nuclear program. The second track consists of Security Council resolutions which impose sanctions on Iran and demand that it suspend all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, as well as construction of a heavy water reactor.1 The West fears that Iran might enrich uranium to high levels necessary for use in nuclear weapons, or reprocess spent nuclear fuel to acquire plutonium for weapons.

Recent initiatives have focused more on short-term confidence-building measures rather than a negotiated agreement resolving the nuclear issue, with the goal of bridging the trust deficit between the two sides before entering more difficult and long-term negotiations.

Spring 2003 Proposal

According to Tim Guldimann, former Swiss ambassador to Tehran, Iran issued a proposal to the United States in May 2003 calling for negotiations on a variety of contentious issues between the two countries. The document listed a number of agenda items that the two countries would negotiate and proposed the creation of three parallel working groups to carry out negotiations on disarmament, regional security, and economic cooperation. Key among the agenda items were:

Relief of all U.S. sanctions on Iran
Cooperation to stabilize Iraq
Full transparency over Iran’s nuclear program, including the Additional Protocol
Cooperation against terrorist organizations, particularly the Mujahedin-e Khalq and al-Qaeda
Iran’s acceptance of the Arab League’s 2002 “land for peace” declaration on Israel/Palestine
Iran’s full access to peaceful nuclear technology, as well as chemical and bio-technology

The Bush administration dismissed the proposal in favor of placing additional pressure on Iran.

EU3-Iran Proposals

Several months later, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom agreed to discuss with Iran a range of nuclear, security, and economic issues as long as Tehran suspended work on its uranium enrichment program and cooperated fully with an investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, that agreement unraveled the following year when Tehran continued work on uranium conversion, the precursor to enrichment. Iran then agreed with the EU3 in November 2004 to implement a more stringent suspension. Negotiations between the two sides began shortly afterward.

Iran presented four proposals during the course of these negotiations. In addition to Iran’s nuclear program, the proposals covered subjects such as Tehran’s support for terrorist organizations, regional security issues, and economic cooperation.

The Iranian proposals were as follows:

January 17, 2005 This Iranian proposal to the EU3/Iran Political and Security Working Group outlined commitments on both sides in general terms, including:

An Iranian commitment not to pursue weapons of mass destruction
A rejection of any attacks, threats of attack, or sabotage of Iran’s nuclear facilities
Cooperation on combating terrorism, including intensifying the exchange of information and the denial of safe havens
Regional security cooperation, including on Iraq and Afghanistan
Cooperation on strategic trade controls and the EU removal of restrictions on transfers of conventional arms and dual use goods to Iran

March 23, 2005

The Iranian proposal to the EU3/Iran steering committee in March provided greater detail into the “objective guarantees” Iran was willing to discuss regarding its nuclear program, including:

Iran’s adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol and continuous on-site inspections at key facilities
Limiting the expansion of Iran’s enrichment program and a policy declaration of no reprocessing
Immediately converting all enriched uranium to fuel rods
An EU declaration recognizing Iran as a major source of energy for Europe
Iran’s guaranteed access to advanced nuclear technology along with contracts for the construction of nuclear plants in Iran by the EU
Normalizing Iran’s status under G8 export controls

April 29, 2005

In April Iran’s proposal repeated some of the items in the March proposal, but focused more on short-term confidence-building measures than long term resolutions. Its key terms included:

Iran’s adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol
A policy declaration of no reprocessing by Iran
Continued enrichment suspension for six months
Establishment of joint task forces on counter-terrorism and export control
An EU declaration recognizing Iran as a major source of energy for Europe

July 18, 2005

Iranian Message from Hassan Rowhani, then-Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In his statement Rohani proposes:

An agreement on initial limitations on uranium enrichment at Natanz
Negotiations for the full-scale operation of Natanz
Arrangements to import material for uranium conversion and the export of UF6
Negotiation of an “optimized” IAEA monitoring mechanism for Natanz

In August 2005 the three European countries presented their own comprehensive proposal for a long-term agreement, outlining the following:

Arrangements for the assured supply of low enriched uranium for any light water reactors constructed in Iran
Establishing a buffer store of nuclear fuel located in a third country
A commitment by Iran not to pursue fuel cycle technologies, reviewable after 10 years
A legally binding commitment by Iran not to withdraw from the NPT and Iran’s adoption of the Additional Protocol
Arrangements for Iran to return spent nuclear fuel to supplier countries
EU recognition of Iran as a long-term source of fossil fuel energy
EU-Iran cooperation in a variety of political-security areas, including Iraq and Afghanistan, terrorism, and drug trafficking

Iran rejected that proposal days later, claiming that it did not recognize Iran’s right to enrichment. Tehran proceeded with uranium conversion, breaking the suspension agreement with the EU3 and ending negotiations.

In order to support Iran’s talks with the EU, Russia proposed to Iran in October 2005 that Tehran share ownership of a uranium-enrichment plant located in Russia. Following months of discussions on that proposal, Iran ultimately rejected it in March 2006.

P5+1 Proposals

China, Russia, and the United States joined the three EU3 countries in June 2006 to offer another proposal for comprehensive negotiations with Iran. The proposal mirrored some of the previous offers for negotiations and included the following key points:

Iran’s suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities
The establishment of a mechanism to review this moratorium
Iran’s resumption of the Additional Protocol
The provision of state-of-the-art light water reactors to Iran through joint projects, along with nuclear fuel guarantees and a 5-year buffer stock of fuel
Suspension of the discussion of Iran’s nuclear program in the UN Security Council
Cooperation on civil aviation, telecommunications, high-technology, and agriculture, and other areas, between the United States, EU, and Iran

Tehran responded to this proposal in August 2006. It rejected the terms of the proposal due to its requirement that Iran suspend its enrichment-related activities, but noted that the proposal contained “useful foundations and capacities for comprehensive and long-term cooperation between the two sides.” It did not, however, identify what those useful foundations were.

In March 2008, the P5+1 agreed to “repackage” the June 2006 proposal in order to specify some of the benefits that they would offer Iran as part of a long-term agreement on its nuclear program and to better demonstrate the nature of those benefits to the Iranian public. This agreement to revise the 2006 proposal coincided with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1803, the third UN sanctions resolution on Iran.

Before that package was formally submitted to Iran, however, Tehran issued its own proposal to the six-country group. While the Iranian proposal also called for comprehensive negotiations leading to cooperation on nuclear energy, and political and economic concerns, it offered very few details regarding the steps Iran would take to resolve concerns related to its nuclear program. Some of its key provisions were:

“Establishing enrichment and nuclear fuel production consortiums in different parts of the world-including Iran”
Improved IAEA supervision “in different states”
Cooperation on nuclear safety and physical protection
Cooperation on export controls
Cooperation on regional security and global economic issues

The P5+1 group presented their revised package during a June 2008 meeting in Tehran which included participants from five of the six countries, excluding the United States. During the meeting, the six-countries relayed an understanding that preliminary talks could begin under a six-week “freeze-for-freeze” period in which Iran would halt the expansion of its enrichment program while the six countries would agree not to pursue additional sanctions against Tehran. The proposal also entailed:

The 2006 package remains on the table
Consideration of nuclear energy R&D and treatment of Iran’s nuclear program as any other NPT non-nuclear-weapons state once confidence is restored
Technological and financial assistance for Iran’s nuclear energy program
Reaffirmation of the UN Charter obligation to refrain from the use and threat of use of force in a manner inconsistent with the Charter
Cooperation on Afghanistan, including drug-trafficking, refugee return, reconstruction, and border controls
Steps towards normalizing economic and trade relations, including support for WTO membership for Iran
Further details on the prospect for cooperation on agriculture, the environment and infrastructure, civil aviation, and social development and humanitarian issues

Representatives of the six-country group, including the United States for the first time, followed up the June meeting with a meeting in July 2008 in Geneva. At the meeting, Iran issued a non-paper proposing a process for negotiations, highlighting that such discussions would be “based on the commonalities of the two packages” issued by Iran and the P5+1 group in May and June. Both the P5+1 and Iranian proposals called for political, economic, and security cooperation but the Iranian proposal did not address steps that Tehran would take in regard to its nuclear program. The Geneva discussions were inconclusive.

Following the election of U.S. President Barack Obama, who sought to abandon the previous U.S. policy requiring Iran to fulfill UN Security Council demands to suspend nuclear fuel cycle activities prior to negotiations, the P5+1 sought to renew their negotiations with Iran. They issued a statement in April 2009 in which the other five countries welcomed “the new direction of U.S. policy towards Iran,” formally inviting Iran to talks once again.

Iran did not respond to that invitation until that September, when Tehran issued a revised proposal. Although that proposal repeated several of the provisions of the one Iran issued in 2008, it did not include a section on the nuclear issue. Instead, the proposal covered the following:

Cooperation to address terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and piracy
UN and Security Council reform
The codification of rights for the use of space
Promoting a “rule-based” and “equitable” IAEA oversight function
Promoting NPT universality and WMD nonproliferation

Tehran Research Reactor “Fuel Swap” Proposal

In June 2009, Iran informed the IAEA that it was seeking assistance to refuel its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), a U.S.-supplied 5 megawatt research reactor that produces medical isotopes. Following Iran’s entreaty, the United States proposed that, in return for a supply of 120 kilograms of fuel for the TRR, Iran ship out an equivalent amount of uranium enriched to 4%, totaling about 1,200 kilograms. The 1,200 kilograms accounted for roughly 80% of Iran’s LEU stockpile at that time, a percentage that diminished as Iran continued to produce LEU. At an initial meeting between the United States, France, Russia, Iran, and the IAEA October 1, 2009, Iranian officials agreed “in principle” to the exchange.

Iran exports 1,200 kilograms of LEU in a single batch before the end of the 2009
Russia further enriches Iran’s LEU to about 20%, a process producing about 120 kilograms of 20%-enriched uranium for the TRR fuel rods
France manufactures the TRR fuel rods for delivery about one year after the conclusion of the agreement, prior to the depletion of the current TRR fuel supply
The United States works with the IAEA to improve safety and control implementation at the TRR

Following reservations expressed by Iran about the terms of the deal, the P5+1 indicated their readiness to take some steps to facilitate the arrangement:

A political statement of support by the six countries to guarantee that the TRR fuel would be delivered to Iran
Financing for the movement of LEU and fuel
An option for the IAEA to hold Iran’s LEU in escrow in a third country until the TRR fuel is delivered

In the months following the initial agreement of the TRR proposal Oct.1, Iran delayed giving the IAEA and the P5+1 a definitive response to the proposal, with many prominent Iranian politicians voicing their opposition to the arrangement, motivated at least in part by their opposition to President Ahmadinejad. Iranian officials publicly suggested alterations to the fuel swap proposal, including: staggering the export of Iran’s LEU over the course of a year or transporting 400 kilograms of LEU to Iran’s Kish Island to exchange for TRR fuel. These proposals, however, undermined or eliminated the confidence-building nature of the export of the bulk of Iran’s LEU. Tehran began to increase the enrichment level of some of its LEU to 20% in February 2010, ostensibly for TRR fuel.

Brazil, Turkey, Iran Tehran Declaration

Brazil and Turkey carried out a diplomatic initiative in the Spring of 2010 to broker the TRR fuel swap with Iran. In an April 20 letter to the leaders of the two countries, President Obama said Iran’s agreement to export 1,200 kilograms of LEU “would build confidence and reduce regional tensions by substantially reducing Iran’s LEU stockpile.” The initiative resulted in the May 17 Tehran Declaration agreed between Presidents Lula da Silva, Erdogan, and Ahmadinejad.

The three countries “recall the right of all State Parties, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy (as well as nuclear fuel cycle including enrichment activities)”
Iran transfers 1,200 kilograms of LEU to be held in escrow in Turkey within one month
Pending their approval of the Tehran Declaration, the IAEA, France, Russia, and the United States (the Vienna Group) would agree to provide 120 kilograms of 20%-enriched uranium fuel to Iran within one year
If the terms were not filled by the Vienna Group, Turkey would transfer the LEU back to Iran (which maintains legal possession of the material)

France, Russia, and the United States rejected the Tehran Declaration on a number of grounds identified in a June 9 letter to IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano. The key critique was that the declaration did not address Iran’s production of 20%-enriched uranium and Iran’s accumulation of a larger amount of LEU.

Russian Step-by-Step Proposal

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov first publicly proposed a “road map” to implement the P5+1’s proposed incentives package July 12, 2011 during a speech in Washington. The proposal itself has not been made public, but its key elements have been described by former Iranian deputy nuclear negotiator Hossein Mousavian.

Step 1

Iran limits enrichment to Natanz, does not install any additional centrifuges, and halts the production of advanced centrifuges.
The P5+1 suspends some UN sanctions, including financial sanctions and ship inspections.

Step 2

Iran agrees to provide early design information to the IAEA under Code 3.1, caps its enrichment level at 5%, and allows greater IAEA monitoring over its centrifuges.
The P5+1 suspends most UN sanctions and gradually lifts unilateral sanctions.

Step 3

Iran implements the IAEA Additional Protocol.
The P5+1 suspends all UN sanctions in a phased manner.

Step 4

Iran suspends all enrichment-related activities for 3 months.
The P5+1 lifts all sanctions and begins to implement the group’s proposed incentives.

Other P5+1 members have not voiced public opposition to the Russian proposal, but some do not appear to support it in its current form. U.S. officials have said that Washington is studying the proposal, and have held meetings with Moscow regarding the plan. Similarly, Iran publicly welcomed the proposal but has been non-committal regarding its terms, claiming it would take several months to study.

2012 Proposals

In April 2012, the P5+1 and Iran renewed diplomatic negotiations in Istanbul. Two more rounds of talks were held May 23-24 in Baghdad, and June 18-19 in Moscow. The negotiators decided in Istanbul to adopt a step-by-step process with reciprocal actions, in order to create momentum towards a long-term solution. Two proposals are being discussed in the ongoing negotiations, one proposed by the P5+1 and another from the Iranians. Both sides agreed to expert-level talks, which took place in Istanbul on July 3, to discuss the technical aspects of each proposal. A fourth round of top-level political meetings has not yet been scheduled.

Iranian 5 Step Proposal

Step 1 - Guidelines

Iran emphasizes commitments under the NPT and its opposition to nuclear weapons based on the Supreme Leader's fatwa.
P5+1 recognizes and openly announces Iran’s nuclear rights, particularly its enrichment activities, based on NPT Article IV.

Step 2 - Transparency Measures

Iran continues broad cooperation with IAEA and will transparently cooperate with the IAEA on “possible military dimensions.”
P5+1 will end unilateral and multilateral sanctions against Iran outside of the UNSC resolutions.

Step 3 - Confidence Building Steps

Beyond continuous IAEA monitoring of enrichment activities for Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) fuel, Iran will cooperate with P5+1 to provide enriched fuel needed for TRR.
P5+1 will terminate the UN sanctions and remove Iran’s nuclear file from UNSC agenda.

Step 4 - Strengthening Cooperation on Mutual Interests

Parties will start and boost cooperation on: designing and building nuclear power plants and research reactors (Iran’s priorities);
And light water research reactors, nuclear safety and security, nuclear fusion (P5+1 priorities).

Step 5 - Strengthening Joint Cooperation

Parties will start cooperating on: regional issues, especially Syria and Bahrain (Iran’s priorities);
And combating piracy and countering narcotics activities (P5+1 priorities).

P5+1 Proposal

Iranian actions:

Iran halts all 20 percent enrichment activities.
Iran transfers all 20 percent enriched uranium to a third country under IAEA custody.
Iran shuts down the Fordow facility.

P5+1 Actions:

P5+1 will provide fuel assemblies for the Tehran Research Reactor.
P5+1 will support IAEA technical cooperation to modernize and maintain the safety of the TRR.
P5+1 could review the IAEA technical cooperation projects and recommend to the IAEA Board restarting some of them.
P5+1 has put together a detailed package to provide medical isotopes for cancer patients in Iran.
The United States is prepared to permit safety-related inspection and repair in Iran for Iranian commercial aircraft and provide spare parts.
The P5+1 will cooperate in acquiring a light water research reactor to produce medical isotopes.

2013 Proposals

Iran and the P5+1 held talks in Almaty, Kazakhstan April 5-6. The two sides had resumed negotiations in Almaty in February 2013 after a nine-month interval. Each side brought a proposal to the April talks, but failed to reach consensus on a way forward and no further meetings were scheduled.

Iran’s proposal on day 1 of the April Almaty talks was similar to the five-step proposal Tehran brought to the negotiations in 2012. However, after the P5+1 expressed dissatisfaction with this proposal, which it viewed as a step backward, Iran revised its proposal for the second day of talks.

Iranian Proposal

Iranian Actions

Iran freezes centrifuge installation at Fordow.
Iran continues talks with the IAEA.
Iran continues converting 20 percent enriched urnaium hexalfouride to uranium oxide.
Iran suspends enrichment of uranium to 20 percent.

P5+1 Actions

The P5+1 lifts all sanctions against Iran.
The P5+1 recognizes Iran's nuclear rights.

The P5+1 proposal was based on the proposal from the 2012 negotiations. The 2013 proposal, however, leaves open the possibility of resuming activities at Fordow, allows Iran to keep part of its stockpile or uranium enriched to 20 percent, and provided some sanctions relief.

P5+1 Proposal

Iranian actions:

Iran halts all 20 percent enrichment activities.
Iran transfers part of its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium to a third country under IAEA custody.
Iran suspends all operations at the Fordow facility.
Iran provides the IAEA with information to address the klix allegations of possible military activities, commits to the additional protocol and the modified version of the subsidiary arrangement to Iran’s safeguards agreement, known as Code 3.1.

P5+1 Actions:

P5+1 will provide fuel assemblies for the Tehran Research Reactor.
P5+1 will support IAEA technical cooperation to modernize and maintain the safety of the TRR.
P5+1 could review the IAEA technical cooperation projects and recommend to the IAEA Board restarting some of them.
P5+1 has put together a detailed package to provide medical isotopes for cancer patients in Iran.
The United States is prepared to permit safety-related inspection and repair in Iran for Iranian commercial aircraft and provide spare parts.
The P5+1 will cooperate in acquiring a light water research reactor to produce medical isotopes.
The P5+1 will provide sanctions relief on sales of precious metals and petrochemicals.
The P5+1 will not impose any new proliferation related sanctions on Iran.

Fall 2013 Proposal

Negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 resumed in Geneva on October 15-16. Iran was represented by its new negotiating team, headed by Foreign Minister Javad Zarif.

Iran presented a new proposal during the talks. The proposal outlined the broad framework for a comprehensive end-state agreement and specific steps for each side to take in a first-phase agreement.

The parties continued negotiating the specifics of the proposal during two subsequent rounds of talks in Geneva on November 7-10 and November 20-24. On November 24, Foreign Minister Zarif and Catherine Ashton, head of the P5+1 negotiating team, signed the proposal, known as the Joint Plan of Action.

The actions specified under the first-phase of the Joint Plan of Action have a duration of six months. The agreement can be extended if Iran and the P5+1 agree to renew it “by mutual consent.”

The agreement also establishes a Joint Commission, comprised of participants from all seven countries, to monitor implementation of the deal and to work with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the investigation and verification measures that the agency will undertake.

The first-phase agreement also lays out the goal of reaching a comprehensive solution. It details elements of a comprehensive deal, following the principle “nothing is agreed to until everything is agreed to.”

After three rounds of technical level meetings, Iran and the P5+1 reach an agreemend on the details of implementation. The six-month time period for the first-phase of the deal began on Jan. 20. The IAEA will issue monthly reports assessing Iran's compliance with the deal. The first of these was released on Jan. 20.

Joint Plan of Action

Elements of the First Phase

Iranian actions:

Convert half of its stockpile of uranium enriched to 20 percent to oxide form and downblend the remainder to an enrichment level of no more than five percent;
suspend production of uranium enriched to above five percent;
no further advances in nuclear activities at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant, the enrichment plant at Fordow and the Arak heavy water reactor;
convert uranium enriched up to five percent produced during the six months to oxide form when the construction of the conversion facility is completed;
no new enrichment facilities;
research and development practices, including on enrichment, will continue under IAEA safeguards;
no reprocessing of spent plutonium fuel or construction of any facility capable of reprocessing; and
enhanced monitoring including, providing information to the IAEA on plans for nuclear sites and the Arak reactor, negotiating a safeguards approach for the Arak reactor, allow daily IAEA access to Natanz and Fordow, and allow managed access to centrifuge workshops and uranium mines and mills.

P5+1 Actions:

No new nuclear-related sanctions from the UN Security Council, the EU, and the U.S.;
pause efforts to further reduce Iran’s oil sales and partial repatriation of frozen Iranian assets from oil sales;
suspension of U.S. and EU sanctions on petrochemical exports and gold and precious metals;
suspension of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s auto industry;
supply and installation of spare parts for Iranian civil airplanes, including repairs and safety inspections;
establish a financial channel for humanitarian goods using Iran’s oil revenues that are frozen abroad, which can also be used for tuition payments for Iranian student abroad and payment of Iran’s UN dues; and
increase of the EU thresholds for non-sanctioned trade with Iran.

Elements of a Comprehensive Solution

An agreed upon duration;
reflection of the rights and obligations of all NPT parties and IAEA Safeguards Agreements;
lift all multilalteral and unilateral sanctions on nuclear-related measures;
define Iran’s enrichment program with agreed upon limits
resolve concerns about the Arak reactor;
implement agreed up on transparency measures, including Iran’s ratification and implementation of the Additional Protocol of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA;
cooperate on civil nuclear projects, including a light water reactor for power, research reactors, and nuclear fuel.

1. To date, the UN Security Council has adopted six resolutions in response to Iran’s nuclear program. The council first demanded that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities with the adoption of resolution 1696 in July 2006. The following three resolutions, 1737 adopted in December 2006, 1747 adopted in March 2007, and 1803 adopted in March 2008, imposed incremental sanctions on Iranian persons and entities believed to have been involved in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. Resolution, 1835, adopted in September 2008, reiterated the demands made in resolution 1696 without imposing additional sanctions. The UN Security Council significantly expanded sanctions in June 2010 with the adoption of Resolution 1929.

Posted: January 21, 2014

http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/I ... _Proposals

[Albosnawe]

A Comprehensive Nuclear Agreement with Iran at a Glance

Press Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Nonproliferation Analyst, (202) 463-8270 x102

February 22, 2015

A comprehensive nuclear agreement that verifiably limits Iran's nuclear program is in the best interest of U.S. and international security. An effective agreement will constrain Iran's nuclear program and establish an intrusive inspections regime to ensure that Iran's program remains heavily monitored and exclusively peaceful.

The comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran that the United States and its P5+1 partners are pursuing would block Iran’s potential pathways to nuclear weapons development—the uranium enrichment route and the plutonium-separation route—guard against a clandestine weapons program, thus removing a major threat to international security.

Goals of an Agreement

For the United States and its negotiating partners, an effective comprehensive agreement should:

establish verifiable limits on Iran's program that, taken together, increase the time it would take for Iran to produce weapons-usable nuclear material to at least 12 months;
increase the ability of the international community to promptly detect and effectively disrupt any attempt to deviate from the agreed upon limits and to detect any secret nuclear sites; and
decrease Iran's incentives to pursue nuclear weapons in the future.

Blocking the Highly-Enriched Uranium Path

Reducing Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity is about much more than counting centrifuges. The
agreement would limit Iran’s overall capacity to enrich uranium to weapons grade in a number of
ways. Key elements include:

• A cap on enrichment of uranium to <5% uranium-235;
• Limits on the number/capacity/type of operating centrifuges;
• Disablement of centrifuge machines that are installed but not yet operating;
• Limits on research and development of more-advanced centrifuges;
• Reduction of the size of Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium and conversion to more proliferation-resistant oxide form.

The P5+1 are pressing Iran to significantly reduce its overall uranium enrichment capacity for at
least ten years in order to increase the time Iran would theoretically require to produce enough
weapons-grade material for one bomb to at least twelve months.

With enhanced international monitoring capabilities, one year is more than enough time to detect
and disrupt any effort by Iran to pursue nuclear weapons in the future.

Blocking the Plutonium Path

A comprehensive agreement will very significantly reduce the proliferation risk posed by Iran’s
unfinished 40-MWt, heavy-water reactor project at Arak by changing the fuel content and
configuration and reducing the power level. These steps would drastically cut its annual weapons grade
plutonium output far below what is required for a nuclear weapon. The agreement will also
prohibit Iran from building a reprocessing facility, which would be needed to separate the
plutonium from spent reactor fuel.

Enhanced Inspections and Monitoring

The comprehensive agreement would put in place additional, intrusive transparency measures
necessary to promptly detect and disrupt any effort to pursue nuclear weapons in the future, even
through a potential clandestine program. The agreement will require the implementation and
ratification of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA’s safeguards agreement.

These measures would allow the U.N. nuclear watchdog the authority to inspect, on very short
notice, any site that it suspects is being used for nuclear weapons work, whether or not it had
been declared as part of Iran’s nuclear program. Once ratified, these arrangements would last in
perpetuity. Additional inspection measures, including on site inspections of centrifuge workshops
will also likely be part of the agreement.

Key Test of the Agreement: Its Impact on Iran’s “Breakout” Potential

Any agreement that is struck between the P5+1 and Iran should not be evaluated on the basis of
how it addresses any single aspect of Iran’s nuclear program, such as the number of centrifuges
Iran will have.

Instead, it should be judged on its overall impact on reducing Iran’s nuclear capacity and
improving existing capabilities to detect and deter any ongoing or future Iranian weapons
program—and it must be compared to the alternative: no constraints on Iran’s nuclear potential.

The Alternative to a Deal

An effective deal that limits Iran's nuclear program is better than no deal.

Policymakers must consider that without a comprehensive diplomatic solution Iran's nuclear program will be unlimited and inspections and access to nuclear sites will decrease. The willingness of international allies to help implement sanctions also could erode. A comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran is within reach and Congressional support for a deal is vital to its success.
Deal
No Deal
Verifiable limits on Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity Unconstrained expansion of uranium enrichment capacity

Caps on the number and type of operating and installed centrifuges
Unlimited use of advanced centrifuge machines
Caps uranium enrichment levels to reactor grade (less than 5 percent) Unlimited uranium-enrichment levels up to weapons grade (greater than 90 percent)
Limits on stockpiles of enriched uranium Growing stockpiles of uranium, including 20 percent, and possibly higher, enrichment levels
End enrichment at the Fordow facility and repurpose it for research Increased uranium enrichment at the Fordow facility
Modifications to the Arak heavy water reactor to reduce the amount of weapons-grade plutonium produced yearly to far less than one bombs worth An operational Arak heavy-water reactor producing enough weapons-grade plutonium for two bombs on a yearly basis
Intrusive, short-notice inspections and monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Limited monitoring and inspections under the IAEA
Ratification of the Additional Protocol resulting in permanent, expanded inspections and IAEA access to additional sites Additional Protocol is not in effect; greater risk of a clandestine nuclear-weapons program
Increase to 12 months the time it would take for Iran to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon Decrease the time it would take to produce enough material it would take to make one bomb to a matter of weeks
Phased relief from proliferation-related sanctions No incentives to comply with restrictions

For further information and analysis, see our report, "Solving the Iranian Nuclear Puzzle: Toward a Realistic and Effective Comprehensive Nuclear Agreement." For updates on the negotiations, sign up for ACA's P5+1 and Iran Nuclear Talks Alert.

Posted: February 22, 2015

http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/A ... t-a-Glance

[Albosnawe]

I na kraju

A step-by-step guide to what the Iran agreement actually means

By Ishaan Tharoor April 2
Negotiators from Iran and major world powers reached agreement on a framework for a final agreement to curb Tehran’s nuclear program in exchange for relief from international sanctions, participants in the talks said. (Yahoo News)

At last, it's happened in Lausanne. Iranian diplomats and their counterparts from six world powers, including the United States, have emerged with a "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action" regarding Iran's nuclear program. This framework of an agreement -- the final deal is supposed to be reached by June 30 -- has been the product of days of intense, closed-door negotiations.

WorldViews explained earlier this week the main sticking points to a deal, which needs to satisfy Western fears over Iran's ability to build a nuclear weapon, while providing Iran sanctions relief and allowing it to maintain a peaceable nuclear program. There's still plenty of work to be done, but the diplomatic efforts of the United States and its interlocutors could now lead to a historic opening with the Islamic Republic, whose leadership -- at least some figures within it -- are desperate for closer ties with the West.

Analysts appear surprised by the thoroughness of this framework agreement, which gives proponents of a deal hope that a real pact may be sealed this summer. Here's what you need to know about what this current round of talks has set in place.

[The key moments in the long history of U.S.-Iran tensions.]

1. The main metric bandied about when calculating how to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb is "breakout time" -- that is, the time it would take for Iran to produce enough fissile material (highly enriched uranium) that could make one nuclear weapon. The importance of breakout time as the main criterion to understanding Iran's nuclear ambitions is a matter of debate, and some experts say it's a bit pointless to obsess over it.

But one of the chief goals of any U.S.-backed agreement has been to extend Iran's supposed breakout time from an estimated two to three months right now to at least a year. A larger window gives the international community more time to respond and take tougher action on Iran. And the assumption is that the harder it is for Iran to produce a weapon, the less likely the chance that it will.

2. As far as the United States and its partners are concerned, the measures announced Thursday are centered on making it difficult for Iran to both produce and maintain stocks of highly enriched uranium. Iran has already diluted its stockpile of uranium enriched at 20 percent and agreed to dramatically reduce other stockpiles of low-enriched uranium. But stricter measures are necessary to prevent any move toward a weapon. (You can see a diagram that shows how uranium gets enriched here.)

3. One way of controlling this is capping Iran's number of centrifuges -- the whirling devices that enrich uranium gas. Under terms outlined Thursday, Iran will reduce its centrifuges from some 19,000 to 6,104. According to a memorandum circulated by American officials, Iran has agreed that, for the next 10 years, it will enrich uranium at only one facility, in Natanz, which has 5,000 first-generation centrifuges. It will not enrich uranium at levels beyond 3.67 percent -- insufficient for a bomb, but useful for nuclear energy purposes -- for 15 years.

4. Iran appears willing also to suspend enrichment activity at the controversial Fordow nuclear facility for 15 years, and will apparently convert the site into a nuclear physics research center. Fordow, situated inside a mountain outside the holy city of Qom, has particularly worried American and Israeli officials. Iranian authorities will guarantee that the heavy-water reactor in Arak, a site where it's feared Iran intends to produce weapons-grade plutonium, will not do so.

5. A very tight regime of international inspections will be imposed. Inspectors from the IAEA, the U.N. nuclear watchdog, will continuously monitor Iran's centrifuges and nuclear storage facilities for two decades, will have regular access to uranium mines and mills for the next 25 years, and will be able to conduct regular checks on Iran's nuclear sites. "If Iran cheats, the world will know it," said President Obama on Thursday.

6. In return, Iran wins sanctions relief, depending on its ability to follow through with the commitments agreed upon in a final deal. This will likely not happen as swiftly as the Iranians would like, and there seems to be a mechanism by which the sanctions would automatically "snap back" in place should Iran violate the terms of an agreement.

But the promise of the United States and European Union eventually lifting oil and banking sanctions on Iran led to celebrations in Tehran and a dip in the global price of oil on Thursday.
Social video captures Iranians celebrating nuclear deal(1:25)
Iranians celebrated on the streets of Tehran following the announcement that a framework agreement has been reached on Iran's nuclear program between the country and the major world powers. (The Washington Post)

7. Other issues -- including to what extent Iran can use and upgrade more advanced centrifuges, as well as what happens to other military dimensions of its nuclear program -- still need ironing out in the months ahead.

8. The optimism generated by this framework agreement will not be shared by hawks in the United States and Israel, as well as in the Arab states, who still consider Iran a dangerous regional threat. Opponents of a deal in the United States may step up efforts to derail the talks in the coming weeks in Congress.

But the Obama administration can point to a pretty solid agreement that keeps Iran's nuclear ambition "in an iron box," and establishes the means by which the international community may be able to ensure it stays there.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wor ... lly-means/

[asker]

Ni Iranci ne racunaju da ce S-300 previse zabrinuti Ameriku....................ali ce Bibijevoj bagri zednoj krvi opalit disciplinski samar.

[agnostic_front]

A zašto se sad toliko piše o napadu SAD-a, ja sam mislio da je onaj dogovor od prije nekoliko dana i skidanje sankcija korak ka stabilnosti, a ne ratu?

[mirsek]

A zašto se sad toliko piše o napadu SAD-a, ja sam mislio da je onaj dogovor od prije nekoliko dana i skidanje sankcija korak ka stabilnosti, a ne ratu?

Vise se diskutovalo o mogucnosti Irana da se odbrani i nanese gubitke protivniku ako/kad dobije od Rusa najavljen S-300 PVO sistem a i generalno kako su odbrambeno jaki.

[The 51st State]

[quote="j

ne znam bas da irance u isti kos sa arapima mozes bacati, kakvi god da su, trude se i pokusavaju nesto sopstveno razvijati. sto se tice radara dugog dometa mislim da su usvojili domacu proizvodnju i da vec imaju podosta iskustva na tom polju, a i dok je ovo natezanje sa s-300 bilo nesto su pokusavali da reversuju te su i tu nekih iskustava stekli sigurno. oni i sad imaju zajebanu tackastu odbranu, s-300 im treba da to brani, a to je u principu ono sto ih i interesuje.

Šta ovo znači, šta je "tačkasta" odbrana?

odbrana pojedinacnih strateskih ciljeva.

[Avetinho]

A zašto se sad toliko piše o napadu SAD-a, ja sam mislio da je onaj dogovor od prije nekoliko dana i skidanje sankcija korak ka stabilnosti, a ne ratu?

Znas, ovdje mlada putincad misli da je SAD cekala da Iran napravi nuklearku i dobije dobar PVO, pa da ih onda napadnu. Glupi amerikanci.

[zrakomlat]

[quote="j

ne znam bas da irance u isti kos sa arapima mozes bacati, kakvi god da su, trude se i pokusavaju nesto sopstveno razvijati. sto se tice radara dugog dometa mislim da su usvojili domacu proizvodnju i da vec imaju podosta iskustva na tom polju, a i dok je ovo natezanje sa s-300 bilo nesto su pokusavali da reversuju te su i tu nekih iskustava stekli sigurno. oni i sad imaju zajebanu tackastu odbranu, s-300 im treba da to brani, a to je u principu ono sto ih i interesuje.

Šta ovo znači, šta je "tačkasta" odbrana?

odbrana pojedinacnih strateskih ciljeva.

[Sanjarko]

[quote="j

ne znam bas da irance u isti kos sa arapima mozes bacati, kakvi god da su, trude se i pokusavaju nesto sopstveno razvijati. sto se tice radara dugog dometa mislim da su usvojili domacu proizvodnju i da vec imaju podosta iskustva na tom polju, a i dok je ovo natezanje sa s-300 bilo nesto su pokusavali da reversuju te su i tu nekih iskustava stekli sigurno. oni i sad imaju zajebanu tackastu odbranu, s-300 im treba da to brani, a to je u principu ono sto ih i interesuje.

Šta ovo znači, šta je "tačkasta" odbrana?

odbrana pojedinacnih strateskih ciljeva.

Pitanje je šta su im strateški važni ciljevi/mjesta, koji su i sl.

[walter kurtz]

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/14/yem ... ddle-east/

Iran Is Winning the War for Dominance of the Middle East

[insomnia78]

Pitanje je šta su im strateški važni ciljevi/mjesta, koji su i sl.

Nemo zaebava
Ti si stvarno kralj bespotrebnih zakljucaka, pitanja isl

Pa, mislim da je Iran, kao i bilo koja zemlja, savrseno sposoban i kvalifikovan da shvati koja su mu mjesta, objekti i ostalo strateski vazni i koji bi mogli biti ciljevi

Jedino je malo skakljivo sto to isto znaju i potencijalni napadaci

[insomnia78]

Elem, pjesacki most u Teheranu

Most, kojeg Iranci nazivaju "trecim simbolom Teherana", dizajnirala je mlada iranska arhitektica Leila Araghian