jefferson wrote:djonko brajs wrote:General War wrote:
Pa "tri" (gdje su od toga dva puta ceceni poderali "sami" ruse)puta cecenija kad se vec castimo...samo ne znam u cemu je poenta ovog nabrajanja...kad vidis da ti tvoj prvi komentar nije na mjestu.
a ne. cecenija je dio rusije. to je slicno napadu drzave na branch dividians u waco texasu 1993 godine.
Ja koliko znam Sovjeti su bili upetljani u svaki prevrat vlade u Juznoj Americi, samo sto su to Amerikanci daleko bolje radili.
I danas se petljaju isto tako u Venecuelu, Boliviju itd, vidjet cemo kako ce se zavrsiti, ali kako stvari stoje u venecueli, slabo se nesto taj Putinov anti-imeprijalizam pije vode na duze vrijeme.
Moras gledati malo dalje od Edward Bernay propagadne masine koji je koristio komunizam kao izgovor za prevrate i intervencije. Propaganda koju je npr kreirao oko Gvaemale koja uopste nije imala cak ni Sovjetsku ambasadu su dobro dokumentovane i kasnije koristene kao model a vise detalja mozes naci ispod .
" The United Fruit company even hired a public relations expert to take measures on its behalf,
Edward Bernays, whose work history included being the adviser to the U.S. delegation to the Paris peace conference after the first world war (Schlesinger and Kinzer 80). <br />When Edward Bernays was hired by United Fruit to solve their public relations problem, he set out initially to influence Central American opinion by establishing newspapers in and throughout the area. Employee newspapers were distributed in Guatemala, Panama, Costa Rica, and Honduras and a weekly "Latin American Report" was created. Bernays supplied facts and figures of his own making to Latin and American journalists . In 1950 Bernays got the New York Herald Tribune to send a reporter to Guatemala. The reporter did not veer far from United Fruit Company officials in his search for a report when he wrote a piece called "Communism in the Caribbean" which appeared on the front page of the paper for five days. Bernays also got a friend at the New York Times to send a reporter to Guatemala, and this reporter returned with a story which made unfounded claims of a vast communist infiltration in the country. In a masterful stroke of omission, the American press barely reported on a press conference held by Samuel Guy Inman, an American professor and writer, who had interviewed President Arevalo of Guatemala in 1950. I
n the interview Arevelo expressed solidarity with the major capitalist powers, proclaiming that Guatemala had no ties to Europe or Asia, and that in the event of a major conflict, his country was completely on the side of the United States (Schlesinger and Kinzer 82-85). Bernays's first wave had been successful in spreading the UFC message and in eliminating opposing voices.<br />Bernays's second major propaganda offensive on United Fruit Company's behalf began in 1951. In similar fashion of the year before, Bernays relied on the New York Times to provide a reporter who would visit Guatemala and return with a message which echoed that of Bernays's. The journalist, Crede H. Calhoun, used the term "Red" for communist in his report of the ominous threat of communism in the banana republic, yet Bernays praised Calhoun for his objectivity. The media's need for sensationalism became larger and Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report, Time, and the Atlantic Monthly all responded to Calhoun's report by sending their own journalists to Guatemala to cover the growth of Marxism. Bernays in 1952 began to organize field trips for journalists of major media agencies and newspapers.
The United Fruit Company planned and carried out two-week tours of Guatemala for journalists who would have all their expenses paid, be shown around a beautiful country, and given an official line to tout by the local public relations officer Ed Whitman. Journalists interviewed people whom the United Fruit Company selected and they all returned to their agencies having been shown how United Fruit was doing good things in Guatemala but was being attacked and pressured by communist forces. Immediately after the land expropriations of the Arbenz government which took place within the agrarian reform, Bernays dispatched another team of journalists to cover what he claimed was proof that Guatemala had finally fallen to Communism; he ultimately succeeded in saturating the American public with his propaganda message (Schlesinger and Kinzer 86-88). <br />In 1952 the United Fruit Company commissioned John Clements to write a report on Communist infiltration in the Guatemalan government. Clements was a vice-president of the infamous Hearst newspaper corporation, an ex-marine, and an editor of The American Mercury, a right-wing publication. He was paid $35,000 for the 235-page study, and his report soon found its way into the hands of politically influential people within American government. His work even became a reference and a resource for official government business. In 1953 he came out with another report, which complained that the U.S. needed to overthrow President Arbenz immediately. Clements later went on to represent Castillo Armas's (the U.S.-chosen replacement president) interests in the United States for $8,000 a month after Armas was put in power. When Clements died in 1975 Hearst Corporation executives retrieved and burned his files to avoid any potential lawsuits (Schlesinger and Kinzer 94-96). The United Fruit Company had lobbied the government and controlled the press, capturing the hearts and minds of the American public and enlisting the might of the U.S. federal government.<br />The United States Information Agency was also instrumental in creating and publishing propaganda. Schlesinger and Kinzer (166-167) write:<br />"In June alone, USIA propagandists wrote more than 200 articles about Guatemala based on information from CIA sources, and distributed them for anonymous placement in scores of Latin newspapers. The agency shipped more than 100,000 copies of a pamphlet called "Chronology of Communism in Guatemala" throughout Latin America. Twenty-seven thousand copies of anti-Communist cartoons and posters were also distributed. The USIA also produced three special movies on Guatemala, including one on the Caracas OAS meeting, as well as reels of news footage favorable to the United States for showing free in movie houses in Latin America. The agency persuaded radio stations in friendly countries like Cuba to run 'hard-hitting commentaries' on Guatemala at peak listening hours as the Castillo Armas invasion neared. An experienced USIA press officer was sent to the American Embassy in Honduras to brief 'selected correspondents' on 'inside' accounts of events once the coup began as a way of offsetting anticipated hostile foreign news reports about the invasion. One internal State Department memo reported that 'the program of smearing Guatemalan maneuvers in advance was proceeding satisfactorily."<br />The CIA also set up a radio station seven weeks before Operation PBSUCCESS with the express purpose of broadcasting anti-Arbenz propaganda and to urge Guatemalans to side with Castillo Armas. It was called La Voz de la Liberacion, or the Voice of Liberation, and it claimed to be broadcasting "deep from within the jungle" of Guatemala, although it was actually being broadcast from neighboring countries. The radio station played popular music and had programming from a regionally famous comedian. The target audience were women, soldiers, workers, and young people. The CIA wanted to influence the soldiers to not defend Arbenz in the event of an armed conflict, and the station reported that Arbenz's secret plan was to disband the armed forces and form a peasant militia, a message which the CIA eventually printed onto leaflets and airdropped into the country. The broad purpose of the radio station was to intimidate Guatemalan listeners (Schlesinger and Kinzer 167-168). During the invasion of Castillo Armas the radio station issued false reports of troop movements causing many Guatemalans to flee to the countryside and at the same time wonder why there weren't any invading forces to fight through (Schlesinger and Kinzer 192).<br />special techniques to maximize effect<br />The Central Intelligence Agency went on the offensive searching for any dissenting voices that might provide any formidable opposition. Their main target was Sydney Gruson, a journalist for the New York Times. Assigned to Mexico City, Gruson's circuit included the country of Guatemala. Gruson was fairly objective, and when compared to the journalists who were being courted by the United Fruit Company, he was the benchmark for objectivity. Gruson had been kicked out of Guatemala after writing a piece that made President Arbenz out to be a communist sympathizer. Later he was readmitted to Guatemala, but once again caught Guatemalan ire when he covered the Alfhem incident, depicting Guatemalans and other Latins getting behind Arbenz to oppose America. Gruson said that the major theme in Central America was not communist, anti-communist, anti or pro-American, but that it was nationalism (Schlesinger and Kinzer 154). This concept proved an obstacle for the CIA and United Fruit, whose interest was much better served if they could cast all the events in Guatemala as being a heinous plot by communist agents to sabotage the great fruit machine and subvert democracy. Any other context might cause people to consider that the internal events of Guatemala reflected a growing disgust with globalization and a strong desire to assert political and economic independence. <br />The CIA contacted the New York Times and got publisher Arthur Hays Sulzberger to keep Gruson in Mexico City and out of Guatemala. The CIA told Sulzberger that Gruson had been at an event in Mexico City along with Czech diplomats and that he might be a sympathizer. Sulzberger complied and kept Gruson out of Guatemala, and Gruson never got to complete an investigation into Castillo Armas's connection with a possible invasion of Guatemala (Schlesinger and Kinzer 154).<br />In 1949 the United States cut off military aid to Guatemala. Two years later it had organized an international arms boycott against in Guatemala in 1951 and then continued to take active measures in preventing the importation of arms into the country. When President Arbenz sought weapons from Czechoslovakia, an eastern bloc country under communist control, the United States used this "illegal" arms shipment from a communist country as proof that the communists were gaining power in Guatemala (Streeter 27).<br />The CIA also made an effort to utilize the Catholic church in Guatemala in order to raise awareness of a Communist threat. A Cardinal in New York was approached by the CIA to arrange contact with the Guatemalan archbishop. In April of 1954, a pastoral letter was read in all Guatemalan churches urging all Guatemalans to stand up against "this enemy of God and country." The CIA then took this letter and made pamphlets which it later airdropped over Guatemala (Schlesinger and Kinzer 155).<br />A man named Pepe, one of the Guatemalans with the CIA at the Voice of Liberation radio station, approached a retired Air Force Colonel who had defected, Mendoza Azurdia, on June 4, 1954 and proposed he create a taped message imploring Guatemalan Air Force pilots to defect with their aircraft and to give instructions on how to do it safely. The Colonel was against the idea and refused. However, as the two men had drinks together, Pepe insured that the Colonel's glass was never empty and the Colonel soon became drunk. Pepe asked the Colonel how he might speak if he were to broadcast a message of the sort had he agreed to do so. The Colonel stood up and gave an enthusiastic demonstration. Little did the Colonel know that Pepe was secretly recording their cocktail party and that his performance would be edited and then broadcast as the message the CIA had originally desired (Schlesinger and Kinzer 168-169).<br />During the invasion of Castillo Armas and his forces, President Jacobo Arbenz chose to ward off the invasion delicately, fearing that a strong reaction might provide a pretext for a U.S. invasion. Arbenz is quoted as saying "This invasion is a farce. We can shoo them away with our hats. What I'm afraid of- and this is why I ordered Diaz to let the mercenaries advance into our territory- what I'm afraid of is that if we defeat them right on the border, the Honduran government will manufacture a border incident, declare war on us, and the United States will invade. (Gleijeses 324)" Maybe the United States did not realize it but by sending in a lackluster force it served to make any counterattack by the trained Guatemalan army a potential massacre for the rebels, an event which might only stir up more anti-Arbenz feelings.<br />During Operation PBSUCCESS, a P-47 aircraft flew over a Honduran town and mistakenly bombed it. Secretary Dulles used the mistake against Arbenz, saying that it was Guatemala which was attacking its neighbor. The government of Honduras believed Dulles and threatened retaliation against Guatemala (Gleijeses 340).<br />John Foster Dulles went on national radio the day after the overthrow of Arbenz with a great deal of enthusiasm, proclaiming that the Guatemalans had patriotically rose to overthrow the Communist regime themselves. Not everyone around the world on the allied side believed him, and he received criticism from Labour Party leader Clement Attlee in Britain, who described the events in Guatemala as a "putsch" (Schlesinger and Kinzer 216-217).<br />audience reaction to various techniques<br />The propaganda campaign undertaken by the CIA was effective in convincing the officers of the Guatemalan army that if they fought back and defeated Castillo Armas, then a U.S. invasion would inevitably follow (Gleijeses 341). While the Guatemalan army was impressive by Central American standards, it was no match for the potential military might of the United States.<br />United Fruit Company propaganda was successful in convincing the American public to get on its side. The UFC also succeeded in lobbying the U.S. government to take action which would be mutually beneficial.<br />counterpropaganda<br />One of the reasons the United Fruit Company was so successful in its propaganda campaign was that Guatemala never had an organized effort in making a case for itself in the U.S. press (Schlesinger and Kinzer 90). The U.S. considered Guatemalan agrarian reform to be propaganda itself. In the U.S. it was thought that agrarian reform would spread across Central America because it appealed to such a wide audience and because it represented in some peoples' eyes an end to "colonialism" and "feudalism", two powerful propagandistic terms used to describe the structures of the economy throughout the area (Streeter 22). <br />Jacobo Arbenz had discovered plans for his overthrow six months prior to the execution of Operation PBSUCCESS. When he disclosed documents related to the plan, the press rejected it as being his own propaganda, and not much more. It was also interpreted as Arbenz issuing his own propaganda as a pretext to seize dictatorial powers. By this time there was very little belief that he was not somehow guilty of the charges of communism (Cullather 55). <br />On the night Arbenz stepped down as President he addressed Guatemalans on radio, however the transmission was partially jammed by the CIA and was largely ignored as many tuned into the Voice of Liberation radio station, which would be shut down the next day. Arbenz's speech was not allowed to be printed for over a month after it was made. Arbenz talked to Guatemala:<br />"Workers, peasants, patriots, my friends: people of Guatemala: Guatemala is enduring a most difficult trial. For fifteen days a cruel war against Guatemala has been underway. The United Fruit Company, in collaboration with the governing circles of the United States, is responsible for what is happening to us.... In whose name have the carried out these barbaric acts? What is their banner? We know very well. They have used the pretext of anti-communism. The truth is very different. The truth is to be found in the financial interests of the fruit company and the other U.S. monopolies which have invested great amounts of money in Latin America and fear that the example of Guatemala would be followed by other Latin countries... I was elected by a majority of the people of Guatemala, but I have had to fight under difficult conditions. The truth is that the sovereignty of a people cannot be maintained without the material elements to defend it... I took over the presidency with great faith in the democratic system, in liberty and in the possibility of achieving economic independence for Guatemala. I continue to believe that this program is just. I have not violated my faith in democratic liberties, in the independence of Guatemala and in all the good which is the future of humanity..."<br />In a nearly prophetic voice Arbenz went on to say:<br />"A government different from mine, but always inspired by our October revolution, is preferable to twenty years of fascist bloody tyranny under the rule of the bands which Castillo Armas has brought into the country...(Schlesinger and Kinzer 199-200)" <br />events and evaluation <br />Castillo Armas returned all expropriated land to the United Fruit Company upon taking power and returned their original contract. <br />The Department of Justice had its eye on the United Fruit Company for some time and filed an antitrust suit right after Armas became President of Guatemala. John Dulles did not mind as it served to distance the U.S. government from the UFC. The suit gave an appearance of objectivity for the Eisenhower administration and did not end until 1958, despite heavy lobbying by United Fruit. United Fruit Company eventually had to give land to locals and give them a share of the market by order of the Department of Justice and in another suit had to relinquish their controlling interest in the IRCA Railroad Company. Eventually United Fruit Company sold all remaining land holdings to the Del Monte corporation (Schlesinger and Kinzer 220,229). Even the United Fruit Company did not come out a winner in the years after the replacement of Arbenz. <br />In documents later found at United Fruit Company warehouses many years later, correspondence of company lobbyists in Central America showed how the company enjoyed access to generals, presidents, and labor inspectors. These letters joked of how the company was lying about corporate profits to local officials, how they were able to get taxes lowered and how they were able to change labor laws (Bourgois 107). It was this far-reaching influence and advantage which eventually earned the United Fruit Company the nickname "El Pulpo", which means "The Octopus". <br />Three years of Armas in office was less than stable, and he survived multiple internal attempts to overthrow him. Armas endured a scandal from which he never recovered regarding the importation of corn, corn which later turned out to be unfit for consumption. Armas had received an amount of money from the importers and many students in Guatemala interpreted it as bribery. Armas denied any foul play, claiming that it was a repayment for a personal loan. Sometime later Armas's government officers were treated with hostility in a public ceremony, and Arbas declared a state of siege, ordering the military to suppress all strikes from labor groups because it was part of a larger Communist plot. Armas was killed on July 27, 1957 in his official palace residence by a lone gunman who then immediately killed himself (Schlesinger and Kinzer 235). <br />From 1955 to 1985 in Guatemala about 150,000 people died and another 40,000 went missing as a result of the unrest in the country."
za to su i mnogi ZAPADNI analiticari upozorili da ce se kad tad obiti o glavu (sto se evo upravo desava). UN vijece sigurnosti NIJE DALO ODOBRENJE za to bombardovanje i to taj cin cini nelegitimnim.
