The 7th Corps Captures Donji Yakuf,
10-14 September 1995
The Bosnian Army's operations against Donji Vakuf had twice been beaten back, on 24 July and 12 August. In the second attack, an estimated 11.000 troops advanced several kilometers to take high ground on Mt. Komar and south of Donji Vakuf, only to lose most of these gains when the Serbs committed their precious infantry reserves to fierce counterattacks. Now, on 10 September, Brigadier General Mehmed Alagic's 7th Corps began yet another string of attacks around Donji Vakuf and in the Komar Mountains northwest of Travnik. Again it looked as if Major General Zec's 30th Division would be impossible to dislodge from its heavily fortified positions, which had frustrated the earlier ARBiH assaults. This time, however, the rapid HV/HVO advance "on the left of the 7th Corps's determined drive added a new clement to the equation, and General Zec at last had to give up Donji Vakuf and swing his right flank back toward Jajce on 13 September to avoid envelopment. As the VRS 30th Division pivoted on its brigade north of Muslim-held Mount Vlasic, the 7th Corps pressed its advance, flooding into the Mt. Komar area in the wake of the retreating VRS and advancing along the eastern bank of the Vrbas River. With the HVO occupation of Jajce, however, most of the 7th Corps's front was pinched out and its envisioned linkage with the 5th Corps fronts blocked by the intervening HVO units. General Delic and the ARBiH General Staff decided that, rather than press 7th Corps operations on a limited front toward Kotor Varos, they would transfer most of its troops to western Bosnia via Bosnian Croat territory and reinforce the 5th Corps by that means.
The 5th Corps Drive to Sana,
13-18 September 1995
While the HV/HVO were breaking through the VRS defenses around Sipovo, the 5th Corps was finishing its preparations for Operation "Sana 95." For reasons of his own, General Dudakovic appears to have held off the start of his operation until 13 September-—five days after the HV/HVO push began. Then he swung his strong right arm. Operational Group "South," with the 502nd Mountain Brigade forming its fist and recently captured Serb armor and field guns adding muscle to HV artillery support. VRS 2nd Krajina Corps defenses cracked under the blow, breaking the four VRS brigades defending on the Grabez; Dudakovic's troops pushed rapidly south toward Bosanski Petrovac. A body of VRS men and equipment, with refugees clinging to its flanks and rear, recoiled along the main road to Petrovac. Kulen Vakuf—where the October ARBiH offensive of 1994 had made its high water mark—fell the next day, and the 502nd Brigade marched into Petrovac on 15 September. The 5th Corps then linked up to HV forces at the Ostrelj pass, some 12 kilometers southeast of Petrovac, on the route to Drvar. From Petrovac, the 501st and 510th Brigades took over the pursuit, driving on toward Kljuc, which they entered two days later. In five days the 5th Corps had advanced some 70 kilometers.
The 5th Corps advance so far was deep, not broad. Not until 15 September did OG "North" attack to widen its gains. This disjointed operation should have allowed General Tomanic's 2nd Krajina Corps to attack and cut off the southern salient, but there were no reserves to exploit the opportunity. Tomanic's two brigades around Krupa and Otoka were able to contain the "North" OG attack for two days, then yielded Krupa to the combined weight of the 5th Corps' 503rd, 505th, and 511th Brigades.
With the capture of Bosanski Petrovac, Kljuc, and Bosanska Krupa, the 5th Corps was ready to shift the direction of its forces and conduct even deeper operations, supported by the forthcoming transfer of several 7th Corps brigades to the theater. After Petrovac fell, a new "Center" OG, comprising the 502nd, 505th, 506th, and 517th Brigades, was formed to begin the march on Sanski Most via the village of Sanica, driving before it the remnants of the VRS Drvar garrison—the 1st Drvar and 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Drina Brigades. The fall of Kljuc on 17 September enabled the 510th Brigade to join this push, driving up the western side of the Sana River. The rest of the
"North" OG moved on Bosanski Novi (Novigrad) and Sanski Most, pushing back the VRS 11th Krupa and 1st Novigrad Brigades and the part of the Drvar forces. The „South“ OG, now comprising the 501st and the newly arrived 17th Krajina Mountain Brigade (from the 7th Corps), moved on Mrkonjic Grad, crossing the Sana River. The eventual objective of OGs "North" and "Center" was Prijedor; the strategic objective of the 5th Corps was BanjaLuka.
Both OG "North" and "Center" were in for a big surprise as they reached positions near Sanski Most and Bosanski Novi on 18-19 September, for the VRS Main Staff had been shuffling some 14,000 troops from seven brigades or regiments to the Sanski Most area since 15 September, placing them under the command of Colonel Radmilo Zeljaja's reactivated "Prijedor" Operational Group 10/1st Krajina. Belgrade had contributed elements of the Serbian RDB Special Operations Unit ("Red Berets") and Arkan's Serbian Volunteer Guard (SDG)—about 2,000 troops—to the area to help round up VRS deserters and be ready to serve as shock troops in a VRS counteroffensive. The exhausted remnants of the 2nd Krajina Corps were allowed to regroup behind the new line.
The 5th Corps butted and reeled against this line over the next few days, taking some sharp knocks. In three days of hard fighting, 20-22 September, the VRS 5th Kozara and 6th Sanske Brigades swarmed over OG "Center" southeast of Sanski Most on the Sana River, almost capturing the command post of the 502nd Brigade at Zegar and nearly encircling the 510th Brigade at Hrustovo. The 5th Corps troops were pushed back some 6 kilometers. The 505th and 506th Brigades of OG "North" likewise fell back several kilometers, pummeled by the SDG and the VRS Main Staff's elite bodyguard formation, the 65th Protection Regiment. The 503rd and 505th Brigades of OG "North" had more success, grinding forward against stiff resistance around Bosanski Novi and in the Majdan Mountains toward Ljubija and Prijedor.
HV River Fiasco: Operation "Una 95,"
18-20 September 1995
The Croatian Army joined the developing fray on 18 September with Operation „Una 95." The objective of the operation, executed by Major General Marijan Marekovic's Zagreb Corps District, was to cross Una River from Croatia and, before the ARBiH could get there, take Prijedor and then move on Banja Luka. The Zagreb government very likely feared that Bosnian Army forces were gaining too much territory in western Bosnia that could interfere with Croatian domination of the region. In particular, it probably wanted to ensure that the HV, not the ARBiH, controlled Banja Luka—the key to the area. This would explain why the HV did not favor or support the ARBiH attack on Mrkonjic Grad, because the capture of the town probably would have allowed the 5th and 7th Corps to link up and consolidate Sarajevo's hold on western Bosnia.
The HV 1st and 2nd Guards Brigades were to spearhead "Una 95," supported by the 17th Home Defense Regiment and elements of other Home Defense and reserve formations. The 1st Guards Brigade's mission was to seize a bridgehead near Dvor while the 2nd Guards Brigade and the 17th Home Defense Regiment assaulted and captured a bridgehead at Bosanska Dubica. A supporting attack at Bosanska Kostajnica, led by a reconnaissance-sabotage company, would help pin down VRS forces. The Guards would then break out toward Prijedor, surprising the VRS "Prijedor" Operational Group from their rear. In the ensuing disruption, HV forces would be able to march down the main Prijedor-Banja Luka road.
The operation was probably premised as a surprise attack on ill-prepared troops, but from the beginning it was the HV that suffered the surprises. As the assault troops entered the river opposite the positions of the overaged reservists of the VRS 1st Novigrad and 11th Dubica Brigades, a storm of artillery, machinegun, and rifle fire briefly turned the river red. At Dvor, 1st Guards soldiers loaded in assault boats took grievous casualties when a dense mortar volley descended on them. Winnowed by such fire, the three HV assault formations nevertheless managed to take and hold small bridgeheads in their individual sectors. That was as far as they got. None of the three bridgeheads was positioned to support the others, and the VRS defenders kept them huddled in klix landing perimeters. When the Zagreb Corps District tried to reinforce these toeholds into footholds the next day, strong river currents and constant heavy shelling deepened the initial disaster. An entire reconnaissance element of the 2nd Guards Brigade was wiped out in Dubica.
With their advance forces trapped and exposed, General Cervenko and the HV Main Staff wisely called off the operation. As the units pulled back under the zeroed-in guns of the Serbs, they may have suffered even heavier casualties than in their assault. One estimate—by former Main Staff chief Bobetko—put the HV casualty toll at more than 70 killed in action and 250 wounded in the aborted two-day action. The Croatian planners had underestimated the readiness of the VRS to fight, miscalculated the state of the Una River, and overestimated their ability to pull off a classically difficult military operation.
Not Dead Yet: The VRS Counteroffensive,
24 September-6 October 1995
Despite the pummeling it was taking all over the country, the VRS still displayed its abilities as a counter-puncher. In western Bosnia in particular, the Serbs made a determined drive to roll back Bosnian Army gains around Bosanski Novi and Kljuc. After the HV's Operation "Una 95" and the ARBiH 5th Corps attacks on Sanski Most had been contained and in some cases pushed back in the fighting of 18-22 September, the VRS moved quickly to strike at the 5th Corps forces moving toward Bosanski Novi and Prijedor-Ljubija. Moving on the night of 23-24 September. Arkan's SDG and the VRS's veteran 65th Protection Regiment, 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade, and the 43rd Motorized Brigade struck hard against 5th Corps's OG "North." General Mladic personally supervised the operation. In six days of fighting, the OG's four brigades were driven back as much as 15 kilometers in some places. Then, with Bosanska Krupa and Otoka in sight, the VRS had to abruptly halt its attack as ARBiH gains around Mrkonjic Grad forced the VRS to shift reserves to this important sector.
Beginning about 20 September, the 5th Corps's OG "South" had undertaken its drive on Mrkonjic Grad. With the 17th Krajina on the left and 501st Mountain on the right, ARBiH troops pushed back parts of the demoralized 17th Kljuc Brigade, together with scattered parts of other formations. In over a week of advances, the two ARBiH brigades pushed forward some 17 kilometers, coming within 3 kilometers of Mrkonjic Grad and reaching the edge of the Manjaca Mountains, which protected Banja Luka from the south. By 1 October, VRS forces around Mrkonjic Grad were in a desperate situation.
Thus it was that the 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade and the SDG had to break off their successful counter-drive toward Bosanska Krupa and rush to newly threatened Banja Luka, coming under the command of Colonel Milenko Lazic's Operational Group 2/30th Division. To conduct the counterattack, two tactical groupings were created around Mrkonjic Grad. On the right, the 2nd Krajina Infantry and 16th Krajina Motorized Brigades were to drive west toward the Sana River northeast of Kljuc; while on the left, the Bosnian Serb Special Police Brigade, reinforced with the SDG (and probably Serbian RDB troops) pushed the 5th Corps away from Mrkonjic Grad. This group would then move on Kljuc itself. At least one armored battalion from the 1st Armored Brigade supported the attack. In addition, the reinforced 5th Kozara and 6th Sanske Infantry Brigades from "Prijedor" Operational Group 10 were to push south from the Sanski Most area toward Kljuc. The VRS hoped to crush OG "South" in the converging jaws. By 3 October, the VRS counterattack began to gain steam, driving back the 17th Krajina and the 501st, which had been reinforced with only one independent battalion. Additional 7th Corps reinforcements were on the way, but they were late in arriving. By 6 October, the VRS had pushed to within 1 kilometer of Kljuc from the east, having advanced some 17 kilometers in three days.
With the town of Kljuc on the verge of capture, the VRS apparently felt able to withdraw the 16th Krajina Brigade to reinforce threatened VRS positions in the Ozren Mountains. Just as the 16th Krajina departed, however, the ARBiH defenses stiffened with the arrival of the new 7th Corps formations. VRS troops—now primarily "Prijedor" OG forces from the 5th and 6th Brigades—continued to press against the 5th/7th Corps line near Krasulje, gaining little ground in heavy fighting through 8-9 October. The tables, however, were about lo turn again. The Croatian Army was preparing to reenter the battle. It was again the Serbs' turn to be surprised.
End Game—The Fall of Sanski Most and Mrkonjic Grad, October 1995
With Kliuc threatened, the Bosnian Army had again requested HV/HVO assistance. Zagreb agreed, since the capture of Mrkonjic Grad and a drive into the Manjaca Mountains—the objective for the HV/HVO operation—would give Zagreb a stranglehold over Banja Luka. With their forces poised to drive on the city, the Croatians would be in a position to ensure that the Serbs (the FRY and Republika Srpska) lived up to the tentative cease-fire agreement or to an eventual peace deal for Bosnia—or, even more important, for eastern Slavonia, the last Serb-controlled part of Croatia. If the Serbs refused to deal, Zagreb would take the city, conquering western Bosnia for itself and leaving Sarajevo with an enlarged Bihac pocket. In either case, Zagreb would further demonstrate and cement its role as the region's power broker.
The new HV/HVO operation, 'Juzni Potez* (Southern Move), was scheduled to begin on 8 October. General Gotovina, using HVO Brigadier Zeljko Glasnovic's OG "East," again led the HV/HVO assault. The main shock forces came from the redoubtable 4th and 7th Guards Brigades and the 1st HGZ. The three HVO Guards brigades and other independent battalions and companies were in the second echelon, giving Gotovina 11,000 to 12,000 troops. During the first phase of the operation, the HV Guards formations were to seize Mrkonjic Grad itself, together with the adjoining Podrasnica Valley and the road junction of Cadjavica—an advance of about 12 kilometers. During the second phase, the HVO Guards formations would take over the advance, seizing the southern edge of the Manjaca Mountains and the important Bocae hydroelectric plant—the last major source of electricity for Banja Luka and Serb-held western Bosnia. The whole operation was scheduled to take four days.
VRS Colonel Milenko Lazic's Operational Group-2/30th Division had consolidated its defenses around Mrkonjic Grad after Operation "Maestral" in September. The town was now defended by three brigades—the 7th Motorized, 3rd Serbian, and 11th Mrkonjic Light Infantry Brigades. The VRS force probably numbered about 5,500 troops. These formations had covered the rear of the VRS units undertaking the Kljuc counterattack, watching the HV/HVO.
The HV/HVO assault began on 8 October, with a diversionary attack by the HV 126th Home Defense Regiment and 1st HVO Guards Brigade against the VRS 11th Mrkonjic Brigade, some 15 to 20 kilometers west of Mrkonjic Grad. Gotovina hoped to mislead the VRS as to the direction and timing of the main attack. This came the next day, although the start was delayed for two hours by thick fog. A strong artillery-rocket bombardment was followed by Mi-24 helicopter gunship strikes on VRS positions. Despite this display of preparatory and supporting firepower, the opening HV/HVOattack encountered strong opposition. General Gotovina states that,
. . . the enemy offered strong resistance in all directions, through a well-organized and fortified defense, but also with strong, synchronized artillery fire.
The 1st HGZ, 4th Guards, and 7th Guards Brigades weathered the onslaught to punch their way into the VRS defenses, although the 7th Guards in particular had difficulties against its VRS namesake, the 7th Motorized Brigade, southeast of Mrkonjic Grad. By the end of 9 October, the HV had moved forward about 5 kilometers, partially enveloping the town and giving the defenders no respite.
The next day, VRS defenses began to disintegrate under the professional pounding of the HV/HVO. Mrkonjic Grad fell after the 4th Guards Brigade apparently broke through the 3rd Serbian Brigade's defenses southwest of town. This outflanked the 7th Motorized Brigade's staunch defenders, and the VRS troops had to pull out. The 1st HGZ and 4th Guards occupied Podrasnica and Cadjavica as they moved on Manjaca. On the right, the 7th Guards and the newly inserted 2nd HVO Guards Brigade advanced toward Bocac.
On 11 October, the HV units wore withdrawn and the two rernaiiung HVO Guards Brigades moved forward |n their place, Although VRS artillery fire roked the attackers, Ihe withdrawing VRS infantry and armor formations were disorganized, and the HVO troops were able reaeh their operation stop line along the southern edge of Manjaca—only 25 kilometers from Banja Luka
Meanwhile, General Dudakovic had been planning a counterstrike of his own against troops of the VRS "Prijedor" Operational Group 10, which were still attempting to push South toward Kijuc. The addition of some 10,000 troops from the 7th Corps and other ARBiH commands greatly strengthened his ability to renew the drive on Sanski Most while still vigorously "defending KJjuc. With the arrival of these formations, Dudakovic regrouped his brigades, shifting OG "Center"—now reinforced with the ARBiH Guards Brigade and the 501st Brigade—to the left, while filling OG "South" with five 7th Corps brigades.
On 9 October, Dudakovic attacked with OGs "Center" and "South.The most important assault came in the middle under OG "Center," where the 502nd and 510th Brigades faced their old nemeses from the Grabez plateau—the 15th Bihac and 17th Kljuc Brigades. Again these VRS formations disintegrated under the 5th Corps blow, exposing the VRS formations on their flanks. Colonel Zeljaja's troops had to fall back or face encirclement. The next day, 10 October, elements of the 43rd Motorized Brigade and the 11th Dubica Brigade tried and failed to halt the 5lh Corps at the outskirts of Sanski Most, and the Bosnians seized the town. Despite the national ceasefire agreement scheduled to go into effect on the morning of 12 October, it looked as if Dudakovic had the VRS on the run, and so he continued the offensive. OG "Center" suddenly took a sharp check, however, when the undaunted 43rd Motorized Brigade rallied northeast of Sanski Most. Now the battles seesawed for most of a week, both sides continuing to jockey for position around Sanski Most without either being able to force significant changes in the frontline. The fighting faded to a fruitless finish on 20 October.
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