Bihać / V Korpus A RBiH

[Van Halen]

Mislim da se premalo spominje da je Hv napravio najveći dio posla...

Osim Oluje,koje je prvenstveno u Zapadnim očima bila operaciaj deblokade Bihaća, HV je oslobodio Glamoč,Šipovo,Jajce,Mrkonjić grad...

Šipovo i Mrkonjić grad su u Daytonu vraćeni,a Srbi su napustili okpirane djelove Sarajeva npr.

Hrvati nisu dobili ništa u Daytonu što već nisu držali,a morali su vratiti mnogo, jedino je kao dobijen Odžak,ali to je samo mali dio Posavine...

U pravu si, HV je uradila veliki dio posla, ali ovdje najviše pišu ljudi koji su bili na licu mjesta. Zato ne bi bilo loše da se javi neko ko je tada bio pripadnik HV, i da kaže svoje viđenje tih operacija.

[Nosferatu]

Mislim da se premalo spominje da je Hv napravio najveći dio posla...

Osim Oluje,koje je prvenstveno u Zapadnim očima bila operaciaj deblokade Bihaća, HV je oslobodio Glamoč,Šipovo,Jajce,Mrkonjić grad...

Šipovo i Mrkonjić grad su u Daytonu vraćeni,a Srbi su napustili okpirane djelove Sarajeva npr.

Hrvati nisu dobili ništa u Daytonu što već nisu držali,a morali su vratiti mnogo, jedino je kao dobijen Odžak,ali to je samo mali dio Posavine...

U pravu si, HV je uradila veliki dio posla, ali ovdje najviše pišu ljudi koji su bili na licu mjesta. Zato ne bi bilo loše da se javi neko ko je tada bio pripadnik HV, i da kaže svoje viđenje tih operacija.

Kako to Hrvati nisu dobili nista sto nisu drzali?

Da nije onih 200.000 Srba iz Hrvatske kao jedan geneocid koji bi ti unucic trebali da uce, jerbo ne mozes ti "cistiti" nikoga pa cak i ako su oni "pocistili" Hrvate - ponajvise jerbo Franjo Tudjman nije bas skrbio mnogo o pravima nekih nekonstitutivnih Srba, koji svako malo nalazese u Hrvatskoj pocevsi od Nikole Tesle za kojeg ni Hrvati ne znaju ciji je i koji do kojekakvih fudbalera koji igraju za Hrvatsku. Tamo gdje je RH imala najvise razloga da vojno udari - a to je Vukovar - nije jer nije smjela. Glupost je govoriti da je na sacicu Srba na koji nije RH ispalilia ni 1/10 onog sto je poslala na jedan Mostar u BiH - odradila najveci posao. Te vrleti i vukojebine u kojima nikad nisi bio, a za koje si cuo, Srbi su napustili jer im je pala linija, a pala je nakon sto je rastezana, nju nije razvlacio HV, da te napomenem jerbo Hrvati su tada krojili svoju "Republiku Srpsku" u BiH - tkz. Herceg Bosnu pa se nije nasao osim rijetkih niko da kaze - ako Srbi nisu u pravu za ono ucinjeno u Hrvatskoj, kako to Hrvati mogu biti u pravu za ono ucinjeno u BiH, dakle ne samo da su Hrvati sprali ljagu genocida 200.000 Srba koji su uspjeli haman da prepolove drzavu od 4 miliona na 2 dijela i drzali skoro 30% teritorije sto ti svjedoci o vizionarstvu Franje Tudjmana i njegovoj soldateski koja je po BiH po logorima drzala pripradnike neke HVO koji su bili muslimani, dok je su po Zagrebu padali kojekakvi Orkani i prijetili Srbi da ce po Karlovcu bacati Lune rakete. Dakle Hrvatska ne samo da je jedan kolektivni genocid sprala, nego je i u BiH - sve sto je nakaradno krojila, htjela da pocisti i smete u smicak, a sve jerbo Uncle Sam je naostrio kitu a Hrvati nisu Srbi, Hrvati sa Franjom na celu i ekonomskih sankcijama bi preselili svi diljem dijaspore i cekali, kao sto su NDH-ovci cekali 50 godina, neke druge levate da kreiraju tu RH, ako je vec ne moze biti, dakle Hrvati su dobili itekako - drzavu bez Srba, Hrvatima u BiH koji su kurbani Franje Tudjaman dali su neki status konstitutivnog naroda, pa sad neka im Bosnjaci biraju clana predsjednistva, a na kraju od te silne pizdarije raspade se i HDZ u koliko ono stranaka svaka od kojih vodi fels politiku.

Franji mozemo zhvaliti i sto nije oslobodila se Banja Luka a i Posavina. Pa to je njegova razmjena terena za Hrvatsku i bofl robu Bosanskih vrleti Dinare i vukojebine u kojima ne moze normalan Sokac da 20 dana sastavi a ne poludi, a kamoli da se zivi cijeli zivot. Dje ce narod iz Banjaluke i Posavine - zivjeti po Drvaru i Kninu? Jel to ta vizija, i to oslobodjenje? Ili je to kukavicluk jednog ustase koji se plasio jake Bosnice, zbog toga ju je zajebao onako kako nisu mogli svi cetnici iz Srbije zajedno. I sad bi jos da se hvali taj herojski cin. Hrvatska je u Oluju usla s vise ljudstva nego sto je Srba bilo u Hrvatskoj. Da ne napominjem da je 5 korpus oslobodio dobar komad, sto, pa sto su znali budu li docekali Sokadiju donji - da ce biti popuslici - nije dovoljno sto jedan Hrvatski Kulen Vakuf je trebalo koliko godina dok se je vratio Bosni i Hercegovini a sto to, sto jedne noci uleti HV u njega, i dize sahovnicu dok je 5 korpus glibo po vukojebina cerajuci se sa djikanima.

Helem, nadje nama Franjo posla, da se zabavimo cijeli zivot poslje njega, dok je Hrvatske europska drzava. Sjetih se te Europe dok je nepismena marva Zadar rokala svaki dan, i ne bude prioritet Hrvatskoj Hrvatska nego moze se sa Srbima Bosna prvo dijeliti. Sto bi mi ginuli - kad ima onih nekih balija? Ko je Hrvatskoj od 1992 proljeca do 1995 godine kupio primirije? Uz pokojeg Orkana koji bi pao sam kad bi nadjubrilo 20-30 Srba u nekim mini akcijama koje su se do besvjesti hvalile.

Sve su to bedastoce i prljavstine, sad pricaju pricu kako su oslobodili Bihac, HV. Sto ne kazes da ste prvo poslali gen. Santica da on sa Fikretom napravi AP ZB koja bi bila garant prezivljavanja HZ HB koja je pocela da trune jerbo nije se mogla vise siriti a ono Hrvata u Srednoj Bosni skontase sta su im na ledja navukli - da ih kolju mujahedini iz bog te pita kuda i oni njih - da bi se uspostavio sukob kojeg nije moralo biti jerbo ja ne mogu reci za Hercegovinu, nisam upoznat, ali u Bosni nije bilo Hrvata koji nije bio za Bosnu, a sve ih je Tudjman zajebao sa svojim kanadskih menadzerom KFC-a, koji je povukao se iz Posavine, hrarbo, cak postoje svjedocenja da odakle se povukla HV ljudima koji su bili muslimani nisu dali preko mostova da predju vec trazile se pare, ili to ili da te ubije neka budala jer ima sve ovlasti HV-a i kojekakvih "ho-ruk" dobrovoljackih jedinica koima su na Vukovaru oci zakrvavile. A i Vukovar je prica za sebe. Nije nikad morao biti takav krvav. Nego je namjerno napravljen - da bi Hrvatski narod imao tumor na malom mozgu, tumor konflikta sa svim koji nisu Sokadija. Tudjman namjerno nije htjeo Vukovar odbraniti nego je odabrao mu sporu i dugu smrt, na tv kamerama. Slicno je i sa Srebrenicom bilo, na drugoj strani, sve u svemu, igre i igrice.

Sto se stalo ovdje i nije islo do tamo. Istina je
a) nije se moglo (nije Armija mogla, da napomenem te 1995 godine je neki Vrhovni stab jos uvijek planirao da deblokira Sarajevo - i to tako uspjesna akcija 400-500 ljudi poginulo, za sta, ni za sta, najuspjesnija akcija deblokiranja Sarajeva je bila ho-ruk mudzahidska akcija, i neka se zna da je A BiH tada zavalila te Arapcice i Turke, i nije im poslala zamjenu ni hranu ni logistiku, nista, a ljudi dosli do starog Ilijasa, sve da su se vratili na prve linije - neka ta bruka sama svjedoci o tome koliko se je Sarajevo htjelo deblokirati, u stabovima, crtali oficiri koje linija nije vidjela markerima planove deblokade, oficiri tj. kontra-informativci, kojekakvih uhapseni oficiri JNA, i kojekakvih vjerski radnici koji su Islamom davali ljudima podstrek za borbu, tj. prazni vaz, vidjeli smo kako su prosli svi, od onih koji su dosli - do onih koji su branili svoje).
b) nije bilo Banjalucana u armiji 100.000 ljudi otici iz grada, a nije imao 1 brigadu svoju. Sramota je to, ali ne samo Banjalucana nego svih nas, prvo onog predsjednistva koje nije znalo da organizuje ljude i vani i da ih ubaci ako nista - da cuvaju sto je oslobodjeno, ali takodje prezentira kako su se svirepo Srbi obracunali da je ljudima motivacija bilo kakva za bilo kakvu borbu kao i misao da ce jednog dana osloboditi Banja luku - to je bio Sci-Fi film.
c) nije htjeo Franjo (oslabice mu Hrvatska a i dje bi Srba iz Hrvatske smjestio, pa oni su mu primarna briga bili, on je njihov predsjednik, bez obzira na negiranje autonmnog statusa i konstitutivnosti).
d) nije htjeo Alija (Njegovo je od Marin Dvora do Bascarsije. Sta zna beg sta je Krajina, a i nije da su neki muslimani ti Banjalucani sve komunjare, slizali se sa Srbima, grad im po-Srbise, ko ih jebe).
e) kuces s tolikim Srpskim izbjeglicama

I jos nesto. Srbi su deblokirali Sarajevo zbog Srebrenice, a ne Sipova i Mrkonjica. Sipovo je vukojebina samo koja a Mrkonjic su htjeli samo da presjeku auto-put Bihac Sarajevo tj. da nas zajebu. A Srbi iz Mrkonjica? Ko ih sisa i onako im nije HV kuce sacuvao nego je gorilo sve sto je suho bilo, uz kojekakve grafite tipa slova =u=. Iako je Mate Granic u Daytonu suze lio, jebi ga nije on pjeske oslobadajao ni Sipovo ni Mrkonjic, stoga - nakon akta ostre kite, doslo se je na ustupak, kakav, minimalan, ja ne znam koliko je Hrvata bilo u Mrkonjicu ili u Sipovu ali znam da tad ,u to doba, osim vojske, nije bilo civila, stoga - to se ne moze porediti s etnicki cistom Istocnom Bosnom i 8000 muskaraca poklanih koji su bili zaklani 1:1 za svakog Srbina koji je nadjubrio oko Sarajeva. To je ono sto je deblokiralo Sarajevo, a sto se tice Hrvata narucito onih iz Kiseljaka - poznato je da su tvrdili da ako Armija i prodje VRS, da ce oni biti sljedeci obruc oko grada, ili si ti mislio da dok je zemlja osiromasila i svak ziv za dlaku izbjegao smrt od bolescuge, gladi, fukarestine i granate, da se oparise toliki Hrvati onako slucajno - ili je bilo, tisu misu, zadjeni za dzepic. Mojne reci da je u BiH bio jedan veliki Hrvatski eksperiment ciji rezultati fasciniraju do dana danasnjeg, ali evo tebi neki privatluk, neka semica u Hrvatskoj da imas poslovne partnere, sljakaj i suti.

[michaelvukovar]

Ej čovječe, kao prvo bez Oluje ne bi bilo Daytona...

Bihać nikada ne bi bio deblokiran,a Jajce ne bi bilo oslobođeno...

PS
1993. Bila je najveća bitka nakon Vukoavra i Oluje, Maslenica, gdje se borilo i čak 10.000 Krajišnika,a potučeni su, i ond ana poziv međunaordne zajednice i prijetnje Britanaca i Francuza sankcijama se povlačimo i onda to opet moramo oslobađat u Oluji...

Toliko o tome da nam je sve bilo na pladnju...

Što je Armija BiH osvojila više od HV-a i HVO-a te 1995.?

[kv99]

Ej čovječe, kao prvo bez Oluje ne bi bilo Daytona...

Bihać nikada ne bi bio deblokiran,a Jajce ne bi bilo oslobođeno...

PS
1993. Bila je najveća bitka nakon Vukoavra i Oluje, Maslenica, gdje se borilo i čak 10.000 Krajišnika,a potučeni su, i ond ana poziv međunaordne zajednice i prijetnje Britanaca i Francuza sankcijama se povlačimo i onda to opet moramo oslobađat u Oluji...

Toliko o tome da nam je sve bilo na pladnju...

Što je Armija BiH osvojila više od HV-a i HVO-a te 1995.?

Da se to nama ne javlja @ MichelColins iz Vukovara , "ekspert za treci entitet i tursku agresiju na neduzne hrvate" i to sve sa Dunava ?
Reci mi ko se to borio 3, 5 godine bas protiv cetnika iz Hrvatske dok je HV cekala i uzimala 50 -70 % naoruzanja sa svake posiljke koju je ABiH platila ? Da li bi ikad vise vidio Knin da nije bilo 5 Korpusa ABIH koji je izdrazao opkoljen 3,5 godine i boreci se protiv 4 neprijatelja ? I za koga si to Jajce oslobodio, je li za one koje si ubijao , kuce palio , sikanirao i koji su opet vecina u gradu

[eskim00]

ARBiH je '95 zauzela vlasic. Nek neko nadje usporedbu. Pokojni general HV-a Bobetko kad je bio u posjeti se divio kuda su se i kako vojnici ispentrali gore i u kojem broju .
Ovo je '94, Armija je uzela i Kupres, ustvari 'poskidala' sve kote oklo i onda pozvali HVO da se ukljuci u dejstva da povrati cast u borbi protiv VRS.

Znam da je malo offtopic al ka se pocelo nabrajati ko je vise, sto nema smisla. Moglo bi se nasto napisati o tome sta su HV i HVO uradili u Jajcu kad su usli u grad.

Ove ratne teme su pravo teske, al treba ih pisati da se ljudi malo rasterete i da sagledamo istinu koliko se moze i vidimo bar djelic onoga sto se stvarno desavalo.

[kv99]

....

[Nosferatu]

Ej čovječe, kao prvo bez Oluje ne bi bilo Daytona...

Bihać nikada ne bi bio deblokiran,a Jajce ne bi bilo oslobođeno...

PS
1993. Bila je najveća bitka nakon Vukoavra i Oluje, Maslenica, gdje se borilo i čak 10.000 Krajišnika,a potučeni su, i ond ana poziv međunaordne zajednice i prijetnje Britanaca i Francuza sankcijama se povlačimo i onda to opet moramo oslobađat u Oluji...

Toliko o tome da nam je sve bilo na pladnju...

Što je Armija BiH osvojila više od HV-a i HVO-a te 1995.?

Izvini ali nedorastao si diskusiji ovdje.

Niste vi dosli oslobadjati Bihac kako pricate vec stvarati Hrvatsku pa veliki ili malu bilo je kako papa Tudjman odluci. Niste dosli mene iz okruzenja oslobadajt vec nabacivati fasadu na svoju RH. Nije nijedan Hrvat iz Hrvatske dosao u BiH stvarati Bosnu vec je mislio da ce biti neka satelit drzavica/autonomija u BiH. Gdje su god dosli postavili su svoj punkt sa sahama, a mislili da je ono gdje su - zauvijek od tad Hrvatsko. Takvo jedno ponasanje agresivno i ustasko vrlo dobro pamtim, narucito po punktovima pretresanje i slicno maltretiranje kao da sam ja u najmanju ruku cetnik.

HV nije nijedan grad oslobodio. Cak ni Vukovar. Knin ja ne racunam u gradove, ni Grahovo, ni Drvar, ni Kupres, ni Sipovo, a ni Mrkonjic ni Jajice iz kojeg se masovno dzal-tabanisalo. Zbog poslusnosti i korektnosti naspram Srpske strane koju su mogli pobiti kao janjce - Hrvati i jesu dobili Vukovar i Hrvatsku do Dunava. Uz to su zaradili ono sto je njih najvise strasilo a to je da Srbija ne sprovede generalnu mobilizaciju. To bi se i dogodilo moguce je da je pala Banjaluka i RS sve do Brckog. Jerbo - u Brckom si u avliji Beograda i Novog Sada. Zbog toga je Tudjman uvijek pazljivo nabacivao fasadu na svoju drzavu, u isto vrijeme pazeci da ne rasrdi sefove ni one na Zapadu a ni one preko Dunava.

Sto se tice Bihaca, Srbi da su mogli uzeti Bihac, uzeli bi ga. Posto nisu pokusali kad su mogli jer je bilo preceg i lakseg biznisa tipa Posavina, onda nisu nikada. I ne samo to. Bihac je odrzao u zivotu Republiku Srpsku Krajinu. Ti to ne znas i nisi svjestan od cega su Srbi u Hrvatskoj zivjeli a ja cu ti reci od cega. Od Bihaca. Zbog toga mani se svojih gluposti, ti Srbi iz Hrvatske su prodavali sve - nama u Krajini - za marke i silinge koje su slali - baustelci Krajski - i tako se je Bihac i odbranio, a i deblokirao, tj. da niste dosli od Livna sve se plasim da 7 korpus nebi iz Kljuca dosao do Bosanskog Petrovca, i obrnuto.

Kljuc svega toga lezi u nemogucnosti srpske soldateske da se bori na vise od 1 fronta. Od samo pocetka oni nisu mogli. Od Posavine. Ali Franjo nije nikada htjeo otvoriti im 2 front u Hrvatskoj, na ustrb civila koji bi nastradali, da se rat skrati za godinu-dvije dana u BiH i Hrvatskoj. Nego mu se je moralo dokazati da ne mozes sam. I da ne moze biti onako kako bi voljeo, cijelu Hrvatsku i frtalj Bosne samo za Hrvate. To i jest san koji su mu Amerikanci razbili, i ako se kome mozete zahvaliti u Hrvatskoj sto imate drzavu to je Amerika jer do tada ste izgubili Vukovar i nadjubrili na Livinu i prodali Hrvatski patriotizam za konc logore i slepere svercerima po Hercegovini, i kojekakve carine od Iranskog oruzija do slobodne trgovine babi Fikretu Abdicu - koji kad je u Rijeku dovlacio robu sta mislis - s kim je djelio, da nije s onim Srbima u Hrvatskoj i Bosni, a oni njemu oruzije i vojsku ako treba?

[VjecitiStudent]

ARBiH je '95 zauzela vlasic. Nek neko nadje usporedbu. Pokojni general HV-a Bobetko kad je bio u posjeti se divio kuda su se i kako vojnici ispentrali gore i u kojem broju .
Ovo je '94, Armija je uzela i Kupres, ustvari 'poskidala' sve kote oklo i onda pozvali HVO da se ukljuci u dejstva da povrati cast u borbi protiv VRS.

Znam da je malo offtopic al ka se pocelo nabrajati ko je vise, sto nema smisla. Moglo bi se nasto napisati o tome sta su HV i HVO uradili u Jajcu kad su usli u grad.

Ove ratne teme su pravo teske, al treba ih pisati da se ljudi malo rasterete i da sagledamo istinu koliko se moze i vidimo bar djelic onoga sto se stvarno desavalo.

Uzimanje Vlasica je bio jedan od herojskih dogadjaja proslog rata. Medjutim, nakon vrha, uzeo se jos Babanovac, Koricani i ... nije moglo dalje, zasto?

[homar]

Tema je vrlo zanimljiva, čini mi se da u diskusijama nema puno analitičnosti. 1995.godine međunarodna zajednica je na osnovu nekih parametara pripremala rješenje "zapadnog balkana", tako su se crtale karte. Karta BiH koju su pripremile SAD početkom 1995.godine se ne razlikuje mnogo od Dejtonske karte BiH.

Operacija "Oluja" je vođena planski i u sadjejstvu sa snagama A R BiH na cijelom ratištu BiH. Prvo je izvršeno tzv. strateško maskiranje-priprema deblokade Sarajeva, a ustvari "deblokada sarajeva" je imala za cilj da se što više snaga VRS veže na tom dijelu ratišta, kako nebi mogle intervenisati u operaciji "Oluja". Za ovo "strateško maskiranje" je znao samo uži dio vrha HV i A R BiH. Da je ovo tačno govore i alarmantna zapomaganja rukovodstva RSK da im karadžić pomogne kada je već bilo izvjesno da će "Oluja" nastupiti. I stvarno Karadžić nije mogao ni jedan vod vojnika uputiti u RSK da im pomognu, jer su mu sve strateške rezervne snage bile vezane za Sarajevo i Koridor. Po otpočinjanju "Oluje", 5.korpus je donekle sa leđa zbacio jedan teret Martićevaca, Abdićevci su već bili razbijeni, te je mogao grupisati snage i izvršiti proboj prve linije VRS, koja nije bila uopšte organizovana po dubini. Paralelno sa probojem obruča i napredovanjem 5.dorpusa, Armija R BiH dio snaga koje su bile ranije pripremljene za oslobađanje Sarajeva upućuje kao pomoć 5.korpusu.
Sadejstvo jedinica A R BiH, HVO i HV je bilo dosta dobro i napredovale su začuđujuće brzo. Svi oni koji tvrde da je panika bila u Prijedoru, Bosankom Novom i Banja Luci je tačna, izbjeglice i vojnici VRS panično su bježali prema Banja Luci, narod je bio spreman za put prema Srbiji.

Cio tok svih ovih događaja su pomno pratile američke obavještajne službe i izvještavali svoje štabove. Kada je bilo očigledno da se donekle stiglo na zamišljene linije (po američkim mapama), a koje su najvjerovatnije znali Tuđman, Alija i Milošević, uslijedilo je naređenje iz NATO (SAD)..."do 14.00 sati zaustaviti sva djejstva na frontu ili ćete biti bombardovani...", ovo je dio tog naređenja.

[revolver amidza]

ARBiH je '95 zauzela vlasic. Nek neko nadje usporedbu. Pokojni general HV-a Bobetko kad je bio u posjeti se divio kuda su se i kako vojnici ispentrali gore i u kojem broju .
Ovo je '94, Armija je uzela i Kupres, ustvari 'poskidala' sve kote oklo i onda pozvali HVO da se ukljuci u dejstva da povrati cast u borbi protiv VRS.

Znam da je malo offtopic al ka se pocelo nabrajati ko je vise, sto nema smisla. Moglo bi se nasto napisati o tome sta su HV i HVO uradili u Jajcu kad su usli u grad.

Ove ratne teme su pravo teske, al treba ih pisati da se ljudi malo rasterete i da sagledamo istinu koliko se moze i vidimo bar djelic onoga sto se stvarno desavalo.

Uzimanje Vlasica je bio jedan od herojskih dogadjaja proslog rata. Medjutim, nakon vrha, uzeo se jos Babanovac, Koricani i ... nije moglo dalje, zasto?

odgovor je veoma jednostavan-jer se nije moglo!
a zašto?,.pa jebo ga ti,nije armija bih imala kapacitete staljiinove crvene armije,da iskače iza svake bukve,čuke i grma,.ima tenkova i topova koliko lišća na grani,.ta je armija 3,5 g konstantno bila u borbi,umorna , iscrpljena,gdje je već dosta odličnih boraca bilo izbačeno iz stroja,.ne možeš ti guštera mobilisanog 94 i 95 porediti sa onima koji su se dobrovoljno sa četama ganjali po vrletima,a ti su ili ranjeni ili mrtvi već mnogi bili ,.95 kad već o tome pričamo nakon one debilane zvane deblokada sarajeva,..i srebrenice i žepe,..armija je vidjela da se radi tamo gdje se može,a te je jeseni značilo da je moguće u krajini gdje je već spominjano i gore oko doboja na ozrenu,..ovaj dio što ga ti spomenu preko rijeke ugar prema banjaluci via skender-vakuf je najjebeniji,.za ići napredovati,..bezbroj čuka,uvala,šume,.na karti možda djeluje lagano,ali u stvarnosti se to pretvara u jednu noćnu moru,.e ta armija nije imala ni ljudi ni mts-a da ide prema banjaluci iz pravca vlašića,.gdje ti na tom putu moraš sve bukvalno pješice ići,.gdje se u onoj šumetini puk vojske skrije a da pojma o tome nemaš,..a imaš 2 vruća fronta,..jednostavno nije se tada to moglo,..i to je to,što je bilo u planu da se zauzme na vlašiću zauzelo se,.da nije možda bilo otvoreno u krajini,.vjerovatno bi se moralo otvoriti gore,ali napominjem da je od svih mogućih pravaca prema banjaluci ovaj najzahtjevniji i najopasniji

[VjecitiStudent]

Uzimanje Vlasica je bio jedan od herojskih dogadjaja proslog rata. Medjutim, nakon vrha, uzeo se jos Babanovac, Koricani i ... nije moglo dalje, zasto?

odgovor je veoma jednostavan-jer se nije moglo!
a zašto?,.pa jebo ga ti,nije armija bih imala kapacitete staljiinove crvene armije,da iskače iza svake bukve,čuke i grma,.ima tenkova i topova koliko lišća na grani,.ta je armija 3,5 g konstantno bila u borbi,umorna , iscrpljena,gdje je već dosta odličnih boraca bilo izbačeno iz stroja,.ne možeš ti guštera mobilisanog 94 i 95 porediti sa onima koji su se dobrovoljno sa četama ganjali po vrletima,a ti su ili ranjeni ili mrtvi već mnogi bili ,.95 kad već o tome pričamo nakon one debilane zvane deblokada sarajeva,..i srebrenice i žepe,..armija je vidjela da se radi tamo gdje se može,a te je jeseni značilo da je moguće u krajini gdje je već spominjano i gore oko doboja na ozrenu,..ovaj dio što ga ti spomenu preko rijeke ugar prema banjaluci via skender-vakuf je najjebeniji,.za ići napredovati,..bezbroj čuka,uvala,šume,.na karti možda djeluje lagano,ali u stvarnosti se to pretvara u jednu noćnu moru,.e ta armija nije imala ni ljudi ni mts-a da ide prema banjaluci iz pravca vlašića,.gdje ti na tom putu moraš sve bukvalno pješice ići,.gdje se u onoj šumetini puk vojske skrije a da pojma o tome nemaš,..a imaš 2 vruća fronta,..jednostavno nije se tada to moglo,..i to je to,što je bilo u planu da se zauzme na vlašiću zauzelo se,.da nije možda bilo otvoreno u krajini,.vjerovatno bi se moralo otvoriti gore,ali napominjem da je od svih mogućih pravaca prema banjaluci ovaj najzahtjevniji i najopasniji

Hvala na odgovoru!

[VjecitiStudent]

Operacija "Oluja" je vođena planski i u sadjejstvu sa snagama A R BiH na cijelom ratištu BiH. Prvo je izvršeno tzv. strateško maskiranje-priprema deblokade Sarajeva, a ustvari "deblokada sarajeva" je imala za cilj da se što više snaga VRS veže na tom dijelu ratišta, kako nebi mogle intervenisati u operaciji "Oluja". Za ovo "strateško maskiranje" je znao samo uži dio vrha HV i A R BiH. Da je ovo tačno govore i alarmantna zapomaganja rukovodstva RSK da im karadžić pomogne kada je već bilo izvjesno da će "Oluja" nastupiti. I stvarno Karadžić nije mogao ni jedan vod vojnika uputiti u RSK da im pomognu, jer su mu sve strateške rezervne snage bile vezane za Sarajevo i Koridor. Po otpočinjanju "Oluje", 5.korpus je donekle sa leđa zbacio jedan teret Martićevaca, Abdićevci su već bili razbijeni, te je mogao grupisati snage i izvršiti proboj prve linije VRS, koja nije bila uopšte organizovana po dubini. Paralelno sa probojem obruča i napredovanjem 5.dorpusa, Armija R BiH dio snaga koje su bile ranije pripremljene za oslobađanje Sarajeva upućuje kao pomoć 5.korpusu.
Sadejstvo jedinica A R BiH, HVO i HV je bilo dosta dobro i napredovale su začuđujuće brzo. Svi oni koji tvrde da je panika bila u Prijedoru, Bosankom Novom i Banja Luci je tačna, izbjeglice i vojnici VRS panično su bježali prema Banja Luci, narod je bio spreman za put prema Srbiji.

Cio tok svih ovih događaja su pomno pratile američke obavještajne službe i izvještavali svoje štabove. Kada je bilo očigledno da se donekle stiglo na zamišljene linije (po američkim mapama), a koje su najvjerovatnije znali Tuđman, Alija i Milošević, uslijedilo je naređenje iz NATO (SAD)..."do 14.00 sati zaustaviti sva djejstva na frontu ili ćete biti bombardovani...", ovo je dio tog naređenja.

Svakakvih ti ovdje stvari i isprica i propusti ispricati.
Da krenemo od ovoga: Kad je pocela, a kada zavrsila akcija na deblokadi Sarajeva 1995.?

[Warhead]

Nadam se da ce ova analiza koju su uradili operativci CIA-e razjasniti mnostvo nedoumica u ovoj raspravi:

Operation „Maestral“ and „ Operation „Sana 95“ – Decision in Western Bosnia

Campaign Planning and Order of Battle

While NATO crancked uu and flew its air campagin to bring Bosnian Serbs to heel, the HV/HVO and the Bosnian Army were collaborating on plans for their own forthcoming ground campaign against the VRS. Other than its defiant standoff against NATO around Sarajevo, the VRS in western Bosnia had been relatively quiet since the end of "Oluja " The exception occurred the night of 11-12 August when the 2nd Krajina Corps hit HV reserve infantry units around Bosansko Grahovo with a strong attack that broke through one brigade and carried VRS troops into the outskirts of the town. Two HV Guards battalions, however, quickly counterattacked and drove the VRS back out of town. The rest of the month saw regular clashes along the frontlines near Bihac, south of Drvar, and north of Glamoc. These appeared to be probing actions as all three sides spent most of the time reorganizing their forces in operations in western Bosnia that would coalesce into decisive campaign of the war.

The main part of the joint campaign was to be undertaken by HV/HVO forces in Operation "Maestral (Breeze). By seizing the towns of Jajce, Sipovo, and Drvar, the operation would roll up large swathes of territory on the approaches to the Sana and Vrbas River valleys. The capture of these areas would also place Banja Luka in jeopardy, though not in imminent danger.

General Gotovina, the commander of the HV Split "Corps District was placed in overall command of what the HV/HVO officially designated the "Croatian Forces." The attack plan devised by Gotovina and his staff consisted of three phases, the first two of which focused on the Jajce-Sipovo axis. In the opening assault the joint HV/HVO Operational Group "North" would tight its way through the VRS frontline defenses along a string of mountains northeast of Glamoc, especially the Mliniste pass and the 1,900-meter Vitorog heights that dominated it. After breaking into and through these defenses, OG "North" troops would exploit their breakthrough by advancing rapidly toward Sipovo and Jajce. Gotovina acknowledged the magnitude and importance of this aspect of the operation by assigning to OG "North" all of the elite shock units available, including the 4th and 7th Guards Brigades, the 1st Croatian Guards Brigade (1st HGZ), all three HVO Guards brigades, and other special units totaling 11,000 troops. Supporting the main effort during phase one and two, five HV Home Defense regiments and three reserve infantry brigades deployed southeast and southwest of Drvar were to conduct holding attacks against VRS 2nd Krajina Corps troops in these areas. Although these forces— organized into OG "West" and OG "South"—were to gain ground as possible on the approaches to Drvar, the klix capture of the town would be the object of the third phase, after the fall of Sipovo and Jajce.

The role of the ARBiH would be a broad flanking advance on both sides of the HV/HVO attack by the 5th and 7th Corps. The entire 15,000-man 5th Corps, led by General Dudakovic, had the primary ARBiH mission, designated "Sana 95," of driving toward Prijedor and seizing the towns of Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Petrovac, Kljuc, and Sanski Most on the way. General Dudakovic grouped his eight brigades into two operational groups. The first, comprising four brigades, was to drive on the Bosanski Petrovac-Kljuc axis. After seizing Kljuc, the group would split into two with one part of the force heading toward Mrkonjic Grad and the other toward Sanski Most. The second group, with the other four brigades, was to attack on the Krupa-Bosanski Novi-Prijedor axis. Brigadier General Mehmed Alagic's 7th Corps was to take Donji Vakuf, which had resisted repeated ARBiH assaults since 1994, then push on in the general direction of Banja Luka, passing through Skender Vakuf and Kotor Varos. If possible, the 5th and 7th Corps were to link up near Mrkonjic Grad. Although Col. Senad Dautovic's reinforced 77th Division would spearhead the 7th Corps drive on Donji Vakuf, virtually all of Alagic's 12 combat brigades, comprising 20,000 men, were to be involved.

Lieutenant Colonel General Manojlo Milovanovic— Chief of the VRS Main Staff—was in overall command of the VRS operations in western Bosnia, as he had been since late 1994; his headquarters was located in Drvar. Major General Tomanic's long-suffering 2nd Krajina Corps would again bear the brunt of the HV/HVO/ARBiH operations, together with Major General Momir Zec's 30th Infantry Division/lst Krajina Corps. To absorb the HV/HVO attack, Tomanic and Zec had one motorized brigade and as many as six infantry or light infantry brigades in the frontline plus one in reserve, but only three of these formations, including the reserve brigade—some 5,000 to 6,000 troops—were arrayed along the main Sipovo-Jajce axis. Opposite the ARBiH 5th Corps, Tomanic had six infantry or light infantry brigades with about 8,000 troops on the Grabez plateau or at Bosanska Krupa and Otoka. Against the 7th Corps, General Zec deployed a strong force, with more than 8,500 troops in five infantry and light infantry brigades. Overall, the force dispositions selected by the VRS in this theater were flawed, with the bulk of the force apparently deployed, opposite the 5th and 7th Corps instead of the far more powerful HV/HVO.

"Maestral" Breaks the VRS Line, 8-15 September 1995

The HV/HVO assault began on the morning of 8 September, despite heavy fog that hindered artillery fire control. Two HV Guards Brigades led the attack, the 7th Guards attacking toward Mliniste while the 4th Guards to the light pushed against the 1,500-meter Jastrebnjak feature. By 1000 they had broken through VRS frontline positions, allowing the 1st HGZ to pass through the 4th Guards and seize its objective, village of Pribelja, and then outflank the tough Vitorog defenses. As soon as Pribelja was taken, the HVO 60th Guards Battalion and Bosnian Croat Special Police were inserted to reinforce the 1st HGZ in tackling Vitorog. The 4th Guards made the largest advance that day, thrusting 5 kilometers into the defensive zone of the 3rd Serbian Brigade. The 7th Guards and the forces led by the 1st HGZ had gained far less ground. The supporting attacks of Groups "South" and "'West" had made little headway against the VRS troops southeast and southwest of Drvar.

The next day's attack—9 September—proved to be the crucial one, despite continuing poor weather. HV/HVO forces seized most of the primary VRS defensive zone from the 3rd Serbian and 7th Motorized Brigades. The 7th Guards Brigade advanced some 8 kilometers, capturing the Mliniste pass, while the 1st HGZ and its accompanying units rolled up the Vitorog position. In the center, the 4th Guards completed the capture of the Jastrebnjak area. On 10 September, the Guards' advance was held to about 2 kilometers as the VRS threw in an armored battalion of M-84 tanks from the 1st Armored Brigade. Nevertheless, HV/HVO forces were rapidly reaching a position from which they could break out and roll the defenders toward Sipovo and Jajce. OGs "South" and "West," however, were still held up by a tenacious VRS defense around Drvar.

On the next day, 11 September, most of OG "North" rested and reorganized; the 4th and 7th Guards Brigades were withdrawn into reserve and replaced on the line by the 1st and 2nd HVO Guards Brigades. OG "North's" lineup now included the 3rd HVO Guards, 1st HVO Guards, 1st HGZ, and 2nd HVO Guards Brigade. A probing attack led by 2nd HVO Guards Brigade seized the important Demirovac hill and parts of the Kupres Valley on the route to Jajce. The main action of the day, however, was a concerted attempt by OGs "South" and "West" to capture Drvar. The 1st Drvar Light Infantry Brigade and the composite 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Drina Light Infantry Brigades quickly stymied the HV assault, heavily supported by artillery and rocket fire, including 262-mm "Orkans".

The second phase of "Maestral" -the advance to Sipovo and Jajce—began on 12 September. As expected in the planning, the VRS forces – primarily the 7th Motorized Brigade—had been forced to pull back from their exposed positions near Vitorog to defend the Sipovo area. The rapid HV/HVO push, however, gave the Serbs little time to coordinate a positional defense, and they had to use their armor and artillery to slow the Croatian attack while they tried to consolidate their positions. During the day, OG "North" was able to break up the VRS defenses with strong artillery and multiple rocket launcher fire, supported by three Mi-24 helicopter gunship sorties. The reinforced 1 st HVO Guards Brigade then broke into Sipovo, supported on the right by 1st HGZ. As the VRS crumpled around Sipovo, the 2nd HVO Guards Brigade began its dash toward Jajce as planned, reaching positions some 10 kilometers directly south of the town by the end of the day. On 13 September, Jajce—the jewel of the operation—was restored to Croat hands, avenging its loss to the VRS in 1992. The VRS forces that had fallen back now concentrated on holding Mrkonjic Grad and brought up reinforcements from the 30th Division to consolidate the defenses around the town.

The planners of "Maestral" had achieved their major purpose with the capture of Jajce, but, as anticipated, the weaker part of the operational force had been unable to seize the secondary target, Drvar, still held by the stubborn VRS 2nd Krajina Corps. To bolster phase three and complete the operation, General Gotovina assigned a reinforced battalion-sized battle group from the 7th Guards Brigade to put a new spearhead on OG "South. On 14 September he launched a general attack on the city by OG "South" and "West," with the 7th Guards troops coming from the southeast. As the HV closed in on its defenses from three directions and the ARBiH 5th Corps threatened the fourth with an advance on Bosanski Petrovac to the north, the VRS decided to call it quits and pulled out of the town. "Maestral" had netted the HV/HVO over 2,500 square kilometers of territory and penetrations in some places of up to 30 kilometers.

[Warhead]

The 7th Corps Captures Donji Yakuf,
10-14 September 1995

The Bosnian Army's operations against Donji Vakuf had twice been beaten back, on 24 July and 12 August. In the second attack, an estimated 11.000 troops advanced several kilometers to take high ground on Mt. Komar and south of Donji Vakuf, only to lose most of these gains when the Serbs committed their precious infantry reserves to fierce counterattacks. Now, on 10 September, Brigadier General Mehmed Alagic's 7th Corps began yet another string of attacks around Donji Vakuf and in the Komar Mountains northwest of Travnik. Again it looked as if Major General Zec's 30th Division would be impossible to dislodge from its heavily fortified positions, which had frustrated the earlier ARBiH assaults. This time, however, the rapid HV/HVO advance "on the left of the 7th Corps's determined drive added a new clement to the equation, and General Zec at last had to give up Donji Vakuf and swing his right flank back toward Jajce on 13 September to avoid envelopment. As the VRS 30th Division pivoted on its brigade north of Muslim-held Mount Vlasic, the 7th Corps pressed its advance, flooding into the Mt. Komar area in the wake of the retreating VRS and advancing along the eastern bank of the Vrbas River. With the HVO occupation of Jajce, however, most of the 7th Corps's front was pinched out and its envisioned linkage with the 5th Corps fronts blocked by the intervening HVO units. General Delic and the ARBiH General Staff decided that, rather than press 7th Corps operations on a limited front toward Kotor Varos, they would transfer most of its troops to western Bosnia via Bosnian Croat territory and reinforce the 5th Corps by that means.



The 5th Corps Drive to Sana,
13-18 September 1995

While the HV/HVO were breaking through the VRS defenses around Sipovo, the 5th Corps was finishing its preparations for Operation "Sana 95." For reasons of his own, General Dudakovic appears to have held off the start of his operation until 13 September-—five days after the HV/HVO push began. Then he swung his strong right arm. Operational Group "South," with the 502nd Mountain Brigade forming its fist and recently captured Serb armor and field guns adding muscle to HV artillery support. VRS 2nd Krajina Corps defenses cracked under the blow, breaking the four VRS brigades defending on the Grabez; Dudakovic's troops pushed rapidly south toward Bosanski Petrovac. A body of VRS men and equipment, with refugees clinging to its flanks and rear, recoiled along the main road to Petrovac. Kulen Vakuf—where the October ARBiH offensive of 1994 had made its high water mark—fell the next day, and the 502nd Brigade marched into Petrovac on 15 September. The 5th Corps then linked up to HV forces at the Ostrelj pass, some 12 kilometers southeast of Petrovac, on the route to Drvar. From Petrovac, the 501st and 510th Brigades took over the pursuit, driving on toward Kljuc, which they entered two days later. In five days the 5th Corps had advanced some 70 kilometers.

The 5th Corps advance so far was deep, not broad. Not until 15 September did OG "North" attack to widen its gains. This disjointed operation should have allowed General Tomanic's 2nd Krajina Corps to attack and cut off the southern salient, but there were no reserves to exploit the opportunity. Tomanic's two brigades around Krupa and Otoka were able to contain the "North" OG attack for two days, then yielded Krupa to the combined weight of the 5th Corps' 503rd, 505th, and 511th Brigades.

With the capture of Bosanski Petrovac, Kljuc, and Bosanska Krupa, the 5th Corps was ready to shift the direction of its forces and conduct even deeper operations, supported by the forthcoming transfer of several 7th Corps brigades to the theater. After Petrovac fell, a new "Center" OG, comprising the 502nd, 505th, 506th, and 517th Brigades, was formed to begin the march on Sanski Most via the village of Sanica, driving before it the remnants of the VRS Drvar garrison—the 1st Drvar and 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Drina Brigades. The fall of Kljuc on 17 September enabled the 510th Brigade to join this push, driving up the western side of the Sana River. The rest of the

"North" OG moved on Bosanski Novi (Novigrad) and Sanski Most, pushing back the VRS 11th Krupa and 1st Novigrad Brigades and the part of the Drvar forces. The „South“ OG, now comprising the 501st and the newly arrived 17th Krajina Mountain Brigade (from the 7th Corps), moved on Mrkonjic Grad, crossing the Sana River. The eventual objective of OGs "North" and "Center" was Prijedor; the strategic objective of the 5th Corps was BanjaLuka.

Both OG "North" and "Center" were in for a big surprise as they reached positions near Sanski Most and Bosanski Novi on 18-19 September, for the VRS Main Staff had been shuffling some 14,000 troops from seven brigades or regiments to the Sanski Most area since 15 September, placing them under the command of Colonel Radmilo Zeljaja's reactivated "Prijedor" Operational Group 10/1st Krajina. Belgrade had contributed elements of the Serbian RDB Special Operations Unit ("Red Berets") and Arkan's Serbian Volunteer Guard (SDG)—about 2,000 troops—to the area to help round up VRS deserters and be ready to serve as shock troops in a VRS counteroffensive. The exhausted remnants of the 2nd Krajina Corps were allowed to regroup behind the new line.

The 5th Corps butted and reeled against this line over the next few days, taking some sharp knocks. In three days of hard fighting, 20-22 September, the VRS 5th Kozara and 6th Sanske Brigades swarmed over OG "Center" southeast of Sanski Most on the Sana River, almost capturing the command post of the 502nd Brigade at Zegar and nearly encircling the 510th Brigade at Hrustovo. The 5th Corps troops were pushed back some 6 kilometers. The 505th and 506th Brigades of OG "North" likewise fell back several kilometers, pummeled by the SDG and the VRS Main Staff's elite bodyguard formation, the 65th Protection Regiment. The 503rd and 505th Brigades of OG "North" had more success, grinding forward against stiff resistance around Bosanski Novi and in the Majdan Mountains toward Ljubija and Prijedor.

HV River Fiasco: Operation "Una 95,"
18-20 September 1995

The Croatian Army joined the developing fray on 18 September with Operation „Una 95." The objective of the operation, executed by Major General Marijan Marekovic's Zagreb Corps District, was to cross Una River from Croatia and, before the ARBiH could get there, take Prijedor and then move on Banja Luka. The Zagreb government very likely feared that Bosnian Army forces were gaining too much territory in western Bosnia that could interfere with Croatian domination of the region. In particular, it probably wanted to ensure that the HV, not the ARBiH, controlled Banja Luka—the key to the area. This would explain why the HV did not favor or support the ARBiH attack on Mrkonjic Grad, because the capture of the town probably would have allowed the 5th and 7th Corps to link up and consolidate Sarajevo's hold on western Bosnia.

The HV 1st and 2nd Guards Brigades were to spearhead "Una 95," supported by the 17th Home Defense Regiment and elements of other Home Defense and reserve formations. The 1st Guards Brigade's mission was to seize a bridgehead near Dvor while the 2nd Guards Brigade and the 17th Home Defense Regiment assaulted and captured a bridgehead at Bosanska Dubica. A supporting attack at Bosanska Kostajnica, led by a reconnaissance-sabotage company, would help pin down VRS forces. The Guards would then break out toward Prijedor, surprising the VRS "Prijedor" Operational Group from their rear. In the ensuing disruption, HV forces would be able to march down the main Prijedor-Banja Luka road.

The operation was probably premised as a surprise attack on ill-prepared troops, but from the beginning it was the HV that suffered the surprises. As the assault troops entered the river opposite the positions of the overaged reservists of the VRS 1st Novigrad and 11th Dubica Brigades, a storm of artillery, machinegun, and rifle fire briefly turned the river red. At Dvor, 1st Guards soldiers loaded in assault boats took grievous casualties when a dense mortar volley descended on them. Winnowed by such fire, the three HV assault formations nevertheless managed to take and hold small bridgeheads in their individual sectors. That was as far as they got. None of the three bridgeheads was positioned to support the others, and the VRS defenders kept them huddled in klix landing perimeters. When the Zagreb Corps District tried to reinforce these toeholds into footholds the next day, strong river currents and constant heavy shelling deepened the initial disaster. An entire reconnaissance element of the 2nd Guards Brigade was wiped out in Dubica.

With their advance forces trapped and exposed, General Cervenko and the HV Main Staff wisely called off the operation. As the units pulled back under the zeroed-in guns of the Serbs, they may have suffered even heavier casualties than in their assault. One estimate—by former Main Staff chief Bobetko—put the HV casualty toll at more than 70 killed in action and 250 wounded in the aborted two-day action. The Croatian planners had underestimated the readiness of the VRS to fight, miscalculated the state of the Una River, and overestimated their ability to pull off a classically difficult military operation.

Not Dead Yet: The VRS Counteroffensive,
24 September-6 October 1995

Despite the pummeling it was taking all over the country, the VRS still displayed its abilities as a counter-puncher. In western Bosnia in particular, the Serbs made a determined drive to roll back Bosnian Army gains around Bosanski Novi and Kljuc. After the HV's Operation "Una 95" and the ARBiH 5th Corps attacks on Sanski Most had been contained and in some cases pushed back in the fighting of 18-22 September, the VRS moved quickly to strike at the 5th Corps forces moving toward Bosanski Novi and Prijedor-Ljubija. Moving on the night of 23-24 September. Arkan's SDG and the VRS's veteran 65th Protection Regiment, 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade, and the 43rd Motorized Brigade struck hard against 5th Corps's OG "North." General Mladic personally supervised the operation. In six days of fighting, the OG's four brigades were driven back as much as 15 kilometers in some places. Then, with Bosanska Krupa and Otoka in sight, the VRS had to abruptly halt its attack as ARBiH gains around Mrkonjic Grad forced the VRS to shift reserves to this important sector.

Beginning about 20 September, the 5th Corps's OG "South" had undertaken its drive on Mrkonjic Grad. With the 17th Krajina on the left and 501st Mountain on the right, ARBiH troops pushed back parts of the demoralized 17th Kljuc Brigade, together with scattered parts of other formations. In over a week of advances, the two ARBiH brigades pushed forward some 17 kilometers, coming within 3 kilometers of Mrkonjic Grad and reaching the edge of the Manjaca Mountains, which protected Banja Luka from the south. By 1 October, VRS forces around Mrkonjic Grad were in a desperate situation.

Thus it was that the 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade and the SDG had to break off their successful counter-drive toward Bosanska Krupa and rush to newly threatened Banja Luka, coming under the command of Colonel Milenko Lazic's Operational Group 2/30th Division. To conduct the counterattack, two tactical groupings were created around Mrkonjic Grad. On the right, the 2nd Krajina Infantry and 16th Krajina Motorized Brigades were to drive west toward the Sana River northeast of Kljuc; while on the left, the Bosnian Serb Special Police Brigade, reinforced with the SDG (and probably Serbian RDB troops) pushed the 5th Corps away from Mrkonjic Grad. This group would then move on Kljuc itself. At least one armored battalion from the 1st Armored Brigade supported the attack. In addition, the reinforced 5th Kozara and 6th Sanske Infantry Brigades from "Prijedor" Operational Group 10 were to push south from the Sanski Most area toward Kljuc. The VRS hoped to crush OG "South" in the converging jaws. By 3 October, the VRS counterattack began to gain steam, driving back the 17th Krajina and the 501st, which had been reinforced with only one independent battalion. Additional 7th Corps reinforcements were on the way, but they were late in arriving. By 6 October, the VRS had pushed to within 1 kilometer of Kljuc from the east, having advanced some 17 kilometers in three days.

With the town of Kljuc on the verge of capture, the VRS apparently felt able to withdraw the 16th Krajina Brigade to reinforce threatened VRS positions in the Ozren Mountains. Just as the 16th Krajina departed, however, the ARBiH defenses stiffened with the arrival of the new 7th Corps formations. VRS troops—now primarily "Prijedor" OG forces from the 5th and 6th Brigades—continued to press against the 5th/7th Corps line near Krasulje, gaining little ground in heavy fighting through 8-9 October. The tables, however, were about lo turn again. The Croatian Army was preparing to reenter the battle. It was again the Serbs' turn to be surprised.

End Game—The Fall of Sanski Most and Mrkonjic Grad, October 1995

With Kliuc threatened, the Bosnian Army had again requested HV/HVO assistance. Zagreb agreed, since the capture of Mrkonjic Grad and a drive into the Manjaca Mountains—the objective for the HV/HVO operation—would give Zagreb a stranglehold over Banja Luka. With their forces poised to drive on the city, the Croatians would be in a position to ensure that the Serbs (the FRY and Republika Srpska) lived up to the tentative cease-fire agreement or to an eventual peace deal for Bosnia—or, even more important, for eastern Slavonia, the last Serb-controlled part of Croatia. If the Serbs refused to deal, Zagreb would take the city, conquering western Bosnia for itself and leaving Sarajevo with an enlarged Bihac pocket. In either case, Zagreb would further demonstrate and cement its role as the region's power broker.

The new HV/HVO operation, 'Juzni Potez* (Southern Move), was scheduled to begin on 8 October. General Gotovina, using HVO Brigadier Zeljko Glasnovic's OG "East," again led the HV/HVO assault. The main shock forces came from the redoubtable 4th and 7th Guards Brigades and the 1st HGZ. The three HVO Guards brigades and other independent battalions and companies were in the second echelon, giving Gotovina 11,000 to 12,000 troops. During the first phase of the operation, the HV Guards formations were to seize Mrkonjic Grad itself, together with the adjoining Podrasnica Valley and the road junction of Cadjavica—an advance of about 12 kilometers. During the second phase, the HVO Guards formations would take over the advance, seizing the southern edge of the Manjaca Mountains and the important Bocae hydroelectric plant—the last major source of electricity for Banja Luka and Serb-held western Bosnia. The whole operation was scheduled to take four days.

VRS Colonel Milenko Lazic's Operational Group-2/30th Division had consolidated its defenses around Mrkonjic Grad after Operation "Maestral" in September. The town was now defended by three brigades—the 7th Motorized, 3rd Serbian, and 11th Mrkonjic Light Infantry Brigades. The VRS force probably numbered about 5,500 troops. These formations had covered the rear of the VRS units undertaking the Kljuc counterattack, watching the HV/HVO.

The HV/HVO assault began on 8 October, with a diversionary attack by the HV 126th Home Defense Regiment and 1st HVO Guards Brigade against the VRS 11th Mrkonjic Brigade, some 15 to 20 kilometers west of Mrkonjic Grad. Gotovina hoped to mislead the VRS as to the direction and timing of the main attack. This came the next day, although the start was delayed for two hours by thick fog. A strong artillery-rocket bombardment was followed by Mi-24 helicopter gunship strikes on VRS positions. Despite this display of preparatory and supporting firepower, the opening HV/HVOattack encountered strong opposition. General Gotovina states that,

. . . the enemy offered strong resistance in all directions, through a well-organized and fortified defense, but also with strong, synchronized artillery fire.

The 1st HGZ, 4th Guards, and 7th Guards Brigades weathered the onslaught to punch their way into the VRS defenses, although the 7th Guards in particular had difficulties against its VRS namesake, the 7th Motorized Brigade, southeast of Mrkonjic Grad. By the end of 9 October, the HV had moved forward about 5 kilometers, partially enveloping the town and giving the defenders no respite.

The next day, VRS defenses began to disintegrate under the professional pounding of the HV/HVO. Mrkonjic Grad fell after the 4th Guards Brigade apparently broke through the 3rd Serbian Brigade's defenses southwest of town. This outflanked the 7th Motorized Brigade's staunch defenders, and the VRS troops had to pull out. The 1st HGZ and 4th Guards occupied Podrasnica and Cadjavica as they moved on Manjaca. On the right, the 7th Guards and the newly inserted 2nd HVO Guards Brigade advanced toward Bocac.

On 11 October, the HV units wore withdrawn and the two rernaiiung HVO Guards Brigades moved forward |n their place, Although VRS artillery fire roked the attackers, Ihe withdrawing VRS infantry and armor formations were disorganized, and the HVO troops were able reaeh their operation stop line along the southern edge of Manjaca—only 25 kilometers from Banja Luka
Meanwhile, General Dudakovic had been planning a counterstrike of his own against troops of the VRS "Prijedor" Operational Group 10, which were still attempting to push South toward Kijuc. The addition of some 10,000 troops from the 7th Corps and other ARBiH commands greatly strengthened his ability to renew the drive on Sanski Most while still vigorously "defending KJjuc. With the arrival of these formations, Dudakovic regrouped his brigades, shifting OG "Center"—now reinforced with the ARBiH Guards Brigade and the 501st Brigade—to the left, while filling OG "South" with five 7th Corps brigades.

On 9 October, Dudakovic attacked with OGs "Center" and "South.The most important assault came in the middle under OG "Center," where the 502nd and 510th Brigades faced their old nemeses from the Grabez plateau—the 15th Bihac and 17th Kljuc Brigades. Again these VRS formations disintegrated under the 5th Corps blow, exposing the VRS formations on their flanks. Colonel Zeljaja's troops had to fall back or face encirclement. The next day, 10 October, elements of the 43rd Motorized Brigade and the 11th Dubica Brigade tried and failed to halt the 5lh Corps at the outskirts of Sanski Most, and the Bosnians seized the town. Despite the national ceasefire agreement scheduled to go into effect on the morning of 12 October, it looked as if Dudakovic had the VRS on the run, and so he continued the offensive. OG "Center" suddenly took a sharp check, however, when the undaunted 43rd Motorized Brigade rallied northeast of Sanski Most. Now the battles seesawed for most of a week, both sides continuing to jockey for position around Sanski Most without either being able to force significant changes in the frontline. The fighting faded to a fruitless finish on 20 October.

[Warhead]

Evaluation—The Cease-Fire Agreement and the Final Offensives

Operation "Oluja" and die final offensives in western Bosnia were the most important of the several military actions that brought an end to the Bosnian war. "Oluja" was the key to the chain of military and diplomatic events that led to the final cease-fire in October. It was "Oluja" that suddenly forced on Mladic and the VRS die realization that the military balance had decisively shifted against the Serbs; a cease-fire and a peace agreement were all they had left to protect the existence of Republika Srpska. First Mladic and Milosevic had to force this same realization on Karadzic and the SDS leaders and then, on 29 August, persuade them to sign over their negotiating authority to Milosevic as the head of a unified Serb negotiating team over which he would exert a final veto as necessary. To the US Special Representative, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, this signed inter-Serb agreement provided the jolt necessary to jump-start the US diplomatic initiative for ending the Bosnian war, even while the armies continued to battle for chunks and scraps of disputed territory.

On 1 September, Holbrooke announced that the three primary parties—the Croatian, Bosnian Government, and joint FRY/Republika Srpska delegations—would meet in Geneva on 18 September to discuss constitutional arrangements for the new Bosnian state. At the meeting the three sides reached a preliminary "basic principles" agreement on a proposed constitution, which would be die basis for further negotiations. Croatia also clearly indicated, however, that any deal on Bosnia would have to include aimultaneous settlement with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Serb holdouts in eastern Slavonia.819 As negotiators sought to expose Serb positions to the light of reason, the launching of the key "Maestral" and "Sana" operations focused the heat of battle on the Bosnian Serbs. This timely development provided dramatic confirmation of Mladic's fears that the military balance was shifting dangerously and that Serb ambitions must be compromised. The VRS counterattacks that threw their opponents off balance kept the Serbs in the diplomatic game during Holbrooke's shuttle diplomacy that September. Nevertheless, it was now the Serbs who wanted to gel a cease-fire as soon as possible while the Bosnian Government wanted to continue fighting to gain as much territory as possible to lexer its position in future bargaining over a territorial division. When Bosnian President Izetbegovic Finally bowed to US pressure to halt the fighting, he set additional conditions for the Serbs to argue over so that the ARBiH would have increased time to gain more ground.

This final jockeying over the cease-fire, tentatively agreed to on 5 October, kept all three sides moving military forces up to the last minute. Croatia had craftily retired to the military sidelines after the completion of "Maestral," apparently in hopes of putting a brake on the Bosnian Government's military gains lest the Muslims gain too much weight in the Balkan balance of power. President Tudjman was also under US pressure to refrain from shattering the military and diplomatic balancing act by capturing Banja Luka. Zagreb nevertheless went ahead with its final 8 October offensive—"Juzni Potez"—that made it a little plainer to the Serbs that they must deal now or face the loss of the city. Zagreb also had achieved a tentative deal with the Serbs—initialed on 4 October—on the full return of eastern Slavonia to Croatia, and the offensive helped underscore that essential requirement.

The Bosnian cease-fire finally went into effect on the morning of 12 October. Although the fighting in western Bosnia rumbled on for another week, the war in Bosnia was over. After the country-wide ceasefire—a successful and lasting one this time—took hold in mid-October, representatives of the Croats, the Muslims, and the Serbs met for a long and arduous round of negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, in November, co-chaired by the United States, the European Union, and Russia. The talks seemed perpetually to be on the verge of collapse, yet at the last minute enough compromises were devised so that an agreement could be signed on 21 November 1995. This was followed by a "London Conference" on 8 December, where ministers and officials from no fewer than 42 countries and 10 international organizations attempted to work out how best to deal with the daunting challenges of implementing the peace and reconstructing the country. The results of their negotiating efforts were soon to be manifested in Bosnia in the multinational "implementation force" whose responsibilities and powers had been specified and agreed upon in the Dayton Agreement—IFOR.

Evaluations of the Forces at the End of the War

How had the armies performed during the last battles in Bosnia's Wild West? All three forces (considering the HV/HVO as a single military force) had amply demonstrated their strengths and weaknesses during a full month of some of the most intense combat of the war. The Croatian Army had again established its position as the premier military organization in the Balkans. The HV's strengths included excellent staff planning, its employment of professional shock brigades, and the ability to support its elite infantry with strong artillery fire and air support. The HV had developed a true combined arms capability in which picked infantry units backed by armor and artillery could fight their way through tough defenses and then rapidly exploit their breakthrough to the final objective. These traits made the HV almost impossible to stop. The weak spots in any HV campaign remained the Home Defense and reserve formations, most of which had little offensive punch and were no match for the majority of VRS units.

As for the ARBiH, it is true that the HV provided the main impeuis in defeating the VRS, but the Bosnian Army played a key role in these operations as well. ARBiH operations throughout the country kept VRS units tied down and made it difficult to shift reserves to halt the HV's attacks. General Dudakovic was not wholly reliant on Croatian attacks to ease the way for ARBiH advances, even though analysts have argued that the 5th Corps was able to break out from the Gra-bez plateau on 13 September only because of a coordinated VRS withdrawal made necessary by the success of „Maestral." On the contrary, it is clear that the 5th Corps defeated the 2nd Krajina Corps at Grabez on its own and that the VRS had no intention of pulling out of the area and was still holding out in Drvar against the HV the day of the ARBiH's successful attack. It was the arrival ot the 5th Corps at Petrovac that aided the HV attack rather than the other way around. The 5th Corps won its unique victory because of the moral and tactical ascendancy that its elite infantry units had established over the VRS forces during three years of hard fighting on die Grabez plateau. Time and again Dudakovic's forces had demoralized the Serb defenders with sophisticated diversion and infiltration tactics, and they were no longer able to resist them. What kept the ARBiH from triumphing over the VRS in other situations was its persistent weaknesses in heavy weaponry, which made it vulnerable to the VRS's strengths in armor, artillery, and solid staff work. The effects of this mismatch in capabilities were fully demonstrated during the late September-early October VRS counterstrikes and exacerbated in the open warfare of the last campaign. In those battles, ARBiH troops had to fight offensively, unprotected by fortifications, against VRS units that did not have the same fear of the ARBiH infantry that had been impressed upon the 2nd Krajina Corps troops. The 5th Corps' final capture of Sanski Most was, in fact, something of a fluke because the VRS had placed its luckless Grabez units opposite their most feared opponents.

The ARBiH commanders—particularly Generals Delic and Dudakovic—firmly believed that they could have quickly gained substantially more ground from the VRS around Prijedor and Banja Luka after the victory of Sanski Most. In this belief they are probably overrating their capabilities against VRS forces that had regrouped and regained their footing between Sanski Most and Prijedor. In most of the VRS-ARBiH combat following the 15 September 5th Corps breakout from Bihac, the VRS had held the upper hand. Even after the ARBiH captured Sanski Most, the VRS was able to halt the 5th Corps drive on Prijedor. It therefore seems unlikely that the 5th Corps, even reinforced by units from 7th Corps and other formations, could have beaten the 1 st Krajina Corps without the help of a new HV operation directed at Banja Luka.

The Bosnian Serb Army, denigrated throughout the war as armed thugs good only at slaughtering civilians, proved in the last months of its existence that it could still light hard against a Croatian Army that clearly overmatched its military capabilities. Analysis of the latter-day war operations refutes many claims and rumors that the VRS voluntarily withdrew from its positions in western Bosnia rather than being forced from the region by the HV/HVO and ARBiH. In the first place, the VRS had firmly maintained no withdrawals would be made, even from territory not required by the Serbs, until after a cease-was signed; then, if territory had to be given up, the population could depart in an orderly way. In keeping with this position, the VRS everywhere stood up to the initial attacks made on it but proved unable to stem the flood of the Croat-Muslim tide. Against the HV, its fatal flaw almost predictably proved to be the lack of adequate corps-level reserves to seal breaches in VRS lines. Generally the VRS appears to have been able to hold the HV for about a day in its forward defenses before the HV was able to chew through its positions. Because it had virtually no reserve brigades in western Bosnia and because its positions there generally consisted only of a single defensive zone no more than 5 to 10 kilometers deep, the VRS was unable to mount the counterattacks by which it had maintained these positions against the ARBiH. In fighting the HV/ HVO, VRS units were faced for the first time with an opponent that not only matched but also exceeded their own firepower in armor and artillery while also outnumbering them in manpower. Finally, what tipped the balance, even when the offense/defense ratio favored the VRS, was the HV/HVO's elite shock infantry brigades. The VRS could defeat Croatian reserve units. The well-trained, doggedly persistent Guards were another matter.

The VRS generals, Mladic and Milovanovic, and the VRS Main Staff displayed to the end their prowess at engineering strategic shifts of their limited formations. The move of seven major formations from halfway across the country despite heavy damage to its command and control structure during the NATO air campaign was a triumph of the VRS Main Staff's professionalism and skill. The Serbs' rapid execution of major counterattacks also showed how powerful the VRS remained at the end of the war, particularly against the ARBiH. In his last campaign, however, the western Bosnia theater commander, General Milo-vanovic, appears to have made some initial errors in his force dispositions that cost the VRS dearly. His forces were split too evenly among the Donji Vakuf, Glamoc-Drvar, and Grabez sectors, rather than concentrated in what the VRS considered a vital sector. Given that the HV was the main threat, he should have either concentrated more troops opposite the Glamoc-Drvar area sooner or sent in his reserves before the enemy breakthrough. The VRS Main Staff, too, either did not recognize how brittle the 2nd Krajina Corps had become or was unable to do anything about it; Genera] Tomanic's command appears to have been through the wringer one too many times and collapsed fatally on the Grabez under yet another 5th Corps attack. In all, the VRS simply faced too many competing priorities throughout Bosnia so that the Main Staff could no longer focus its forces on one theater.

One of the most discussed hypothetical questions of the final campaign is whether the HV (and/or the ARBiH) could have taken Banja Luka. The answer is a heavily qualified "probably," the main qualifier being timing. An HV dash for Banja Luka soon after the completion of "Maestral" probably would have got to the city quickly or forced the VRS to divert all of the reserves it was sending to Prijedor instead to Banja Luka, in which case the 5th Corps could have taken Prijedor. The same holds true for "Juzni Potez" in that, the more quickly the HV moved, the less time the VRS would have had to prepare. On the other hand, if the VRS had been given time to transfer more units after "Juzni Potez," Banja Luka most likely would have proved a difficult nut for even the HV to crack. In the immediate aftermath of Mrkonjic Grad's fall, the VRS had already shifted the veteran 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade—probably the best brigade in the VRS—to Manjaca. If the VRS believed an HV operation against Banja Luka was imminent, the Main Staff would most likely have transferred all available reserves to the Manjaca area, building up a force that could have numbered at least nine and maybe 11 brigades including a full-armored brigade, with upward of 15,000 to 20,000 troops. The VRS troops would very likely have fought even harder for Banja Luka than the SVK did at Knin, for they would not lhave been encircled. Such a large-scale movement of reserves, however, would have left the VRS vulnerable to attacks elsewhere, particularly around Doboj and-depending on whether the HV/HVO wanted it-in the Posavina area opposite Orasje.

Iz knjige "Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995", Vol. I, CIA, Washington 2002

[smurf]

Uf, sve ovo je velika drama i po mom skromnom misljenju samo stavovi pojedinaca koji su iz svoga ugla vidjeli pojedine situacije. Ne volim nesto kuckati niti piskarati, ne volim ni pricati o svim cirkusima u navedenom periodu, uvijek me muka spopadne, uvijek se preznojim od glave do pete i iz godine u godinu sve je jaca ta anksioznost.... A da ne pisem kako cu se i danas zatvoriti u sebe.... a ne mogu da ne citam, a ne mogu da slusam.
Deblokada Sarajeva.... koliko puta pokusana, koliko puta bila na dohvat ruke i sve i jedan put komanda "stani i vrati se".... Oslobadjanje Krajine..... pa eto recimo da sam bio tamo i slusao preko radija koliko smo "oslobodili" teritorije taj dan, mati mi se bandacila u Sarajevu a ja nisam imao pojma da je bila neka akcija. To bila tajna? E zamislite te vojne tajne da ni ucesnici nisu znali sta se desavalo, a mi uredno nafatali janje i dernecili taj dan..... A isto tako je bilo i momenata kada nas komadant brigade (rahmet mu dusi) stane ispred jedinice i psuje sve jer smo odradili posao a niko nije bio ni ogreban..... Ma mi smo bili jedne obicne male mace kojima se manipulisalo, pri tome mislim na sve koji su zivjeli u BiH ili za BiH.
Imao sam neku ludjacku srecu pa sam ostao citav (do duse u glavi bas i ne) nekako gdje god smo posli tu smo i "prosli", ali sve i jednu kotu, sve i jedan bunker, rov ili metar koji smo oslobodili ne vjerujem vise da je bila "nasa" zasluga vec da je unaprijed dogovoreno. Dobrinja je bila super organizovano naselje u svakom pogledu ali Aerodromsko naselje pade ko da ga dragi Bog nije ni dao. Zasto niski specijalci nisu nastavili gamizati dalje.... Sve su to zafrkancije o kojima mi mozemo samo nagadjati, pisati blogove, postove i sanjati ih, buditi se unezvjereni jer.........
A kada se islo ka Banja Luci niko nije bio sretniji od mene.....

[Van Halen]

Uzimanje Vlasica je bio jedan od herojskih dogadjaja proslog rata. Medjutim, nakon vrha, uzeo se jos Babanovac, Koricani i ... nije moglo dalje, zasto?

odgovor je veoma jednostavan-jer se nije moglo!
a zašto?,.pa jebo ga ti,nije armija bih imala kapacitete staljiinove crvene armije,da iskače iza svake bukve,čuke i grma,.ima tenkova i topova koliko lišća na grani,.ta je armija 3,5 g konstantno bila u borbi,umorna , iscrpljena,gdje je već dosta odličnih boraca bilo izbačeno iz stroja,.ne možeš ti guštera mobilisanog 94 i 95 porediti sa onima koji su se dobrovoljno sa četama ganjali po vrletima,a ti su ili ranjeni ili mrtvi već mnogi bili ,.95 kad već o tome pričamo nakon one debilane zvane deblokada sarajeva,..i srebrenice i žepe,..armija je vidjela da se radi tamo gdje se može,a te je jeseni značilo da je moguće u krajini gdje je već spominjano i gore oko doboja na ozrenu,..ovaj dio što ga ti spomenu preko rijeke ugar prema banjaluci via skender-vakuf je najjebeniji,.za ići napredovati,..bezbroj čuka,uvala,šume,.na karti možda djeluje lagano,ali u stvarnosti se to pretvara u jednu noćnu moru,.e ta armija nije imala ni ljudi ni mts-a da ide prema banjaluci iz pravca vlašića,.gdje ti na tom putu moraš sve bukvalno pješice ići,.gdje se u onoj šumetini puk vojske skrije a da pojma o tome nemaš,..a imaš 2 vruća fronta,..jednostavno nije se tada to moglo,..i to je to,što je bilo u planu da se zauzme na vlašiću zauzelo se,.da nije možda bilo otvoreno u krajini,.vjerovatno bi se moralo otvoriti gore,ali napominjem da je od svih mogućih pravaca prema banjaluci ovaj najzahtjevniji i najopasniji

Hvala na odgovoru!

A šta je sa Dobojem,je li se tu moglo nešto više napraviti?

[Prozor]

Uf, sve ovo je velika drama i po mom skromnom misljenju samo stavovi pojedinaca koji su iz svoga ugla vidjeli pojedine situacije. Ne volim nesto kuckati niti piskarati, ne volim ni pricati o svim cirkusima u navedenom periodu, uvijek me muka spopadne, uvijek se preznojim od glave do pete i iz godine u godinu sve je jaca ta anksioznost.... A da ne pisem kako cu se i danas zatvoriti u sebe.... a ne mogu da ne citam, a ne mogu da slusam.
Deblokada Sarajeva.... koliko puta pokusana, koliko puta bila na dohvat ruke i sve i jedan put komanda "stani i vrati se".... Oslobadjanje Krajine..... pa eto recimo da sam bio tamo i slusao preko radija koliko smo "oslobodili" teritorije taj dan, mati mi se bandacila u Sarajevu a ja nisam imao pojma da je bila neka akcija. To bila tajna? E zamislite te vojne tajne da ni ucesnici nisu znali sta se desavalo, a mi uredno nafatali janje i dernecili taj dan..... A isto tako je bilo i momenata kada nas komadant brigade (rahmet mu dusi) stane ispred jedinice i psuje sve jer smo odradili posao a niko nije bio ni ogreban..... Ma mi smo bili jedne obicne male mace kojima se manipulisalo, pri tome mislim na sve koji su zivjeli u BiH ili za BiH.
Imao sam neku ludjacku srecu pa sam ostao citav (do duse u glavi bas i ne) nekako gdje god smo posli tu smo i "prosli", ali sve i jednu kotu, sve i jedan bunker, rov ili metar koji smo oslobodili ne vjerujem vise da je bila "nasa" zasluga vec da je unaprijed dogovoreno. Dobrinja je bila super organizovano naselje u svakom pogledu ali Aerodromsko naselje pade ko da ga dragi Bog nije ni dao. Zasto niski specijalci nisu nastavili gamizati dalje.... Sve su to zafrkancije o kojima mi mozemo samo nagadjati, pisati blogove, postove i sanjati ih, buditi se unezvjereni jer.........
A kada se islo ka Banja Luci niko nije bio sretniji od mene.....

Jah, koliko si slavio Dejton?

Po mom misljenju, da se nastavilo, moglo se uzeti Prijedor i Bosanski Novi. To sto se ne spominje u ovoj jako dobroj analizi gore postiranoj, je moral, a koji je bio jako bitan.... Moral boraca ARBiH je bio na samom vrhu, jedino usporediv sa 92´, a i daleko bolji od tada, dok je moral cetnika bio na samom dnu.... Moral vojnika je izuzetno bitan.

[mirza11]

Uf, sve ovo je velika drama i po mom skromnom misljenju samo stavovi pojedinaca koji su iz svoga ugla vidjeli pojedine situacije. Ne volim nesto kuckati niti piskarati, ne volim ni pricati o svim cirkusima u navedenom periodu, uvijek me muka spopadne, uvijek se preznojim od glave do pete i iz godine u godinu sve je jaca ta anksioznost.... A da ne pisem kako cu se i danas zatvoriti u sebe.... a ne mogu da ne citam, a ne mogu da slusam.
Deblokada Sarajeva.... koliko puta pokusana, koliko puta bila na dohvat ruke i sve i jedan put komanda "stani i vrati se".... Oslobadjanje Krajine..... pa eto recimo da sam bio tamo i slusao preko radija koliko smo "oslobodili" teritorije taj dan, mati mi se bandacila u Sarajevu a ja nisam imao pojma da je bila neka akcija. To bila tajna? E zamislite te vojne tajne da ni ucesnici nisu znali sta se desavalo, a mi uredno nafatali janje i dernecili taj dan..... A isto tako je bilo i momenata kada nas komadant brigade (rahmet mu dusi) stane ispred jedinice i psuje sve jer smo odradili posao a niko nije bio ni ogreban..... Ma mi smo bili jedne obicne male mace kojima se manipulisalo, pri tome mislim na sve koji su zivjeli u BiH ili za BiH.
Imao sam neku ludjacku srecu pa sam ostao citav (do duse u glavi bas i ne) nekako gdje god smo posli tu smo i "prosli", ali sve i jednu kotu, sve i jedan bunker, rov ili metar koji smo oslobodili ne vjerujem vise da je bila "nasa" zasluga vec da je unaprijed dogovoreno. Dobrinja je bila super organizovano naselje u svakom pogledu ali Aerodromsko naselje pade ko da ga dragi Bog nije ni dao. Zasto niski specijalci nisu nastavili gamizati dalje.... Sve su to zafrkancije o kojima mi mozemo samo nagadjati, pisati blogove, postove i sanjati ih, buditi se unezvjereni jer.........
A kada se islo ka Banja Luci niko nije bio sretniji od mene.....

Jel se ti salis................

[smurf]

Dejton mi je jedno od zivotnih razocarenja.... Bio nam je svima pun klinac i rata i blata i spavanja po nekakim prasinjavim i peksinavim rupama, najgore sto se moglo desiti je da zijanis glavu, a strah od toga je prevazidjen jos '92. tako da smo htjeli zavrsiti sa tim, naravno u svoju korist. Od kada je pocela cirkuzijada nije mi niko nista mogao (barem sam tako mislio) pa eto, prezivjelo se sve to u jednom komadu, nikada necu ohladiti i povinovati se "masi", jer isto tako da nisam pobjegao od kuce i prijavio se u TO, da sam slusao roditelje i barem 90% sugradjana, ostali bi u svojim kucama i stanovima i popusili foru.
Mirza11, ne salim se ni najmanje, sa ratom i Zeljom se nikada ne salim, ako i izgleda tj. zvuci nesto smijesno to je jer je tako bilo, mozda zato sto smo bili mladi, budalasti, pa koristili i najvece crnjake da okrenemo na segu i salu.

Jah, zaboravih napisati, moral je cudo i mi smo ga morali imati jer nismo imali kuda, a oni koji su nas napali su imali nekakve nebulozne ideale i "morali" su nastaviti. Sa mnom je bilo bezbroj momaka koji su "mobilisani" i vecina njih se i bojala i panicila i "gubila".... sa njima se bas nije moglo puno pametnoga uraditi. A koliko je mojih jarana odradilo samovoljno akcija i nikada niko ih nije spomenuo jer nisu bili u skladu sa komandom, da bi nakon par dana dobili naredbu da to zauzmemo i onda naravno neko bude ranjen, neko zijani, mi to uzmemo na kraju ali zasto nismo zadrzali prvog dana.... Ma sve su to nebuloze zbog kojih ja godinama zivim u ubjedjenju da je ama bas sve u vezi rata dogovoreno unaprijed. Bolje reci kupljeno i prodano, ali bilo-proslo, nikada zaboraviti i uvijek biti spreman.

[bach]

Imao sam neku ludjacku srecu pa sam ostao citav (do duse u glavi bas i ne) nekako gdje god smo posli tu smo i "prosli", ali sve i jednu kotu, sve i jedan bunker, rov ili metar koji smo oslobodili ne vjerujem vise da je bila "nasa" zasluga vec da je unaprijed dogovoreno. Dobrinja je bila super organizovano naselje u svakom pogledu ali Aerodromsko naselje pade ko da ga dragi Bog nije ni dao. Zasto niski specijalci nisu nastavili gamizati dalje.... Sve su to zafrkancije o kojima mi mozemo samo nagadjati, pisati blogove, postove i sanjati ih, buditi se unezvjereni jer.........
A kada se islo ka Banja Luci niko nije bio sretniji od mene.....

Možda je palo zbog ovoga:

Kantonalno tužilaštvo KS podiglo je optužnicu 31.12.2007.godine koja je potvtrdjena u Kantonalnom sudu u Sarajevu 7.1.2008. godine, protiv


ALOJZA MILETIĆA, rođen 27.04.1967.godine u Kiseljaku, stalno nastanjen u Zagrebu R. Hrvatska, , državljanin R.Hrvatske i BiH, određeno jemstvo u vidu hipoteke na nekretninama u iznosu od 222.013,00, Rješenjem Kantonalnog suda broj: 009-0-KPP-06-000 202 od 04.01.2007.godine.


Jer je:

Dana 11.05.1992.godine u Sarajevu ulici Georgi Dimitrova broj 88, a sada Andreja Andrejevića, u Sarajevu, u prizemnim prostorijama Štaba čete TO Aerodromskog naselja, u iste prostorije je došao Kordić Raif, upučujući prijetnje i pogrdne riječii prema prisutnima, koji su se u to vrijeme nalazili u prostoriji štaba, Alojzu Miletiću, Kolji Ibrahimu, Mujezin Ademu, Pavlović Dragom, kao i ostalima, te je prema istima uperivao pušku marke „Tomson“, cal. 9 mm, da bi nakon kraćeg vremena počeo da puca po prostoriji rafalnom paljbom od 3 metka, nakon čega je Kolja Ibrahim, prišao sa leđa Kordić Raifu, uhvativši ga jednom rukom za ruku, a drugom u predjelu vrata, dok je isti sjedio na stolici, u namjeri da omogući Miletić Alojzu da istoga razoruža, da bi mu zatim Alojz prišao s prednje strane, te jednom rukom uhvatio za cijev puške, marke „Tomson“, a drugom rukom pokušavao da od istoga otrgne pušku, dok ju je Kordić Raif držao u rukama, da bi nakon kraćeg gombanja, od istoga uspio da otrgne pušku „Tomson“, nakon čega ju je uperio prema Kordić Raifu, kada je ovaj već bio savladan, a zatim u namjeri da ga liši života, ispalio najmanje 3 hica, koja su oštećenog pogodila u predio njegove glave i grudi, nanijevši mu povrede u vidu prostrelnih rana sa direktnim prijelomom kostiju lica, te u predjelu prvog i trećeg rebra, a zatim u predjelu palčane kosti, kojeg je na ovaj način lišio života,




Čime je počinio krivično djelo ubojstva iz člana 171. stav 1. ranijeg KZ FBiH.

[Warhead]

Po mom misljenju, da se nastavilo, moglo se uzeti Prijedor i Bosanski Novi. To sto se ne spominje u ovoj jako dobroj analizi gore postiranoj, je moral, a koji je bio jako bitan.... Moral boraca ARBiH je bio na samom vrhu, jedino usporediv sa 92´, a i daleko bolji od tada, dok je moral cetnika bio na samom dnu.... Moral vojnika je izuzetno bitan.

Ovo je tacno. Iako moral ARBiH nisu direktno spomenuli ovdje u ovom poglavlju, na mnogim drugim mjestima jesu. Stavise istaknuto je da je visok moral bio jedna od kljucnih stvari za uspjeh ARBiH dok je istovremeno to bio veliki problem u VRS.

Inace po autorima strateske prednosti koje je imala ARBIH su:

1) moral,
2) kvantitet i veliki ljudski resursi (manpower),
3) izuzetno sofisticirane taktike inflitracije diverzantskih grupa u pozadinu neprijatelja.

Osnovni nedostaci za ARBiH:

1) nedostatak tehnike - posebno teske artiljerije (navode da je ARBiH bila u sustini armija lake pjesadije),
2) nedostatak velike mobilnosti (kao direktna posljedica nedostatka tehnike),
3) nedostatak kvalitetnog komandnog kadra na operativnom nivou.

Sto se tice VRS prednosti su:

1) tehnika,
2) kvalitetniji komandni kadar na operativnom nivou.

Nedostaci VRS:

1) Kvantitet - nedostatak ljudskih resursa i teskoce odrzavanja siroke linje fronta sa postojecim brojem vojnika (posebno nedostatak znacajnije rezerve),
2) veoma slab kvalitet i moral pjesadije koja je cuvala prve linije (frontline infrantry).

Generalno, autori isticu i jednu bitnu stvar a to je da je vrijeme radilo protiv VRS a u korist ARBiH. Otprilike to znaci da se prednost VRS u tehnici i komandnom kadru u odnosu na ARBiH polako topila, a istovremeno se faktor brojnosti ljudskih resursa nije popravljao, sto je za VRS bio veliki problem. Autori tvrde da iako je VRS cesto uspjesno odbijala mnogobrojne napade ARBiH na raznim sektorima, gubici koje je trpila u tim borbama su bili ipak znatni, a ljudstvo za popunu nije bilo lako naci. Za razliku od VRS, ARBiH je mogla priustiti vece gubitke u ljudstvu pa su cak i porazi u pojedinacnim bitkama vodili strateskoj pobjedi kroz slabljenje i trosenje VRS u dugom roku. Skupa strategija, ali u datim uslovima jedina koja je mogla dati (a i davala) je rezultate.

[VjecitiStudent]

Ovo je tacno. Iako moral ARBiH nisu direktno spomenuli ovdje u ovom poglavlju, na mnogim drugim mjestima jesu. Stavise istaknuto je da je visok moral bio jedna od kljucnih stvari za uspjeh ARBiH dok je istovremeno to bio veliki problem u VRS.

Inace po autorima strateske prednosti koje je imala ARBIH su:

1) moral,
2) kvantitet i veliki ljudski resursi (manpower),
3) izuzetno sofisticirane taktike inflitracije diverzantskih grupa u pozadinu neprijatelja.

Izgleda da nisu analizirali "sofisticiranu" akciju Podvelezje '94

[karanana]

Ovo je tacno. Iako moral ARBiH nisu direktno spomenuli ovdje u ovom poglavlju, na mnogim drugim mjestima jesu. Stavise istaknuto je da je visok moral bio jedna od kljucnih stvari za uspjeh ARBiH dok je istovremeno to bio veliki problem u VRS.

Inace po autorima strateske prednosti koje je imala ARBIH su:

1) moral,
2) kvantitet i veliki ljudski resursi (manpower),
3) izuzetno sofisticirane taktike inflitracije diverzantskih grupa u pozadinu neprijatelja.

Izgleda da nisu analizirali "sofisticiranu" akciju Podvelezje '94

...ili trebevic

[Warhead]

Ovo je tacno. Iako moral ARBiH nisu direktno spomenuli ovdje u ovom poglavlju, na mnogim drugim mjestima jesu. Stavise istaknuto je da je visok moral bio jedna od kljucnih stvari za uspjeh ARBiH dok je istovremeno to bio veliki problem u VRS.

Inace po autorima strateske prednosti koje je imala ARBIH su:

1) moral,
2) kvantitet i veliki ljudski resursi (manpower),
3) izuzetno sofisticirane taktike inflitracije diverzantskih grupa u pozadinu neprijatelja.

Izgleda da nisu analizirali "sofisticiranu" akciju Podvelezje '94

...ili trebevic

Ovo su vise generalni zakljuci. To sto je neka pojedinacna akcija dozivjela neuspjeh ne znaci da ovo sto je napisano nije tacno.