Tom Cooper objasnio, sve sto se htjeli da znate o Bajraktaru u Ukrajini a niste znali.
The reason is that – once again: by all respect for the courage of Ukrainian combat pilots – operations by their interceptors and fighter-bombers are nowhere near as effective as operations by Turkish-made Bayraktar TB.2 UCAVs of the Ukrainian Air Force and Navy. Before the war, Ukraine acquired 12 of these, and placed an order for 24 additional examples. I’ll not go into details about how many were delivered or are currently operational: is a sensitive issue, and I also do not have ‘latest’ details. Sufficient to say the Russians were convinced there were only five (5) in Ukraine and they have shot down four with as many days of the war.
That much about news from some other planet.
By now it’s obvious that the GenStab fell for its own illusions regarding the RFA’s capability to counter such advanced UCAVs like the TB.2. So much so, it assigned the task to ground-based short-range air defence systems (SHORADs), like Pantsyr (ASCC/NATO-codename ‘SA-22 Greyhound), Tor (‘SA-15 Gauntlet’), and Buk (‘SA-17 Grizzly’), plus electronic-warfare systems, while leaving VKS’ interceptors entirely out of the game. It is perfectly possible that, on basis of experiences from Libya, Syria, and Azerbaijan of the last three years, the Turks have further refined their TB.2s. Whatever is the case, the net result is this:
- RFA actually has no effective counter-UCAV doctrine, and – for the first three weeks of this war - was surprisingly ineffective in countering TB.2s.
- Ukrainian TB.2-operators have exploited this opportunity to savage RFA’s forward-deployed SHORADs. Based on cross-examination of released videos and obituaries for fallen air-defence officers of the Russian Army, they seem to have obliterated about a dozen of Buk and Tor batteries, while Pantsyrs are as ineffective as they were already in Syria.
- This has left large portions of the RFA along three major frontlines de-facto defenceless against TB.2. See: 35th CAA west of Kyiv, 41st CAA and 2nd GTA/CAA east of Kyiv, and the 58th CAA in the Mykolaiv-Kherson area – with unsurprising results:
- once they were free of Russian air defences, the Ukrainians went began deploying their TB.2s for their other two important tasks. For reconnaissance and for close-air-support. In the Kyiv area, they have mauled many of Russian armoured formations; in the south they have directed massive and precise artillery barrages on the Kherson airport and the RFA units besieging Mykolaiv – with unavoidable (and undisputable) consequences.
- On top of this, by now it’s certain that the TB.2s have tracked down and precisely hit at least the field HQs of the 35th CAA in the North, plus numerous field-HQs of different of RFA’s battalion-tactical-groups, and several electronic warfare systems.
- Atop of physical damage they are causing, TB.2s are also wrecking the Russian nerves: we’ve seen several videos shown entire Russian BTGs turning around and fleeing after losing only a few vehicles to TB.2s (or to other means, thanks to TB.2-support).
With other words: a ‘far smaller number’ of TB.2s in Ukrainian service has achieved ‘far more’ than all the Su-24s, Su-25s, MiG-29s, and Su-27 – combined.
How is this possible?
Crucial capability of the TB.2 is its loitering capability. It can remain airborne for about 24 hours; alternatively, it has a range of 3,000km at optimum speed. At least as important is its capability to fly slow: if the wind is optimal, the operator can turn it ‘into the wind’. The wind is then providing the uplift necessary to keep it airborne while the UCAV is, de-facto, ‘hoovering’, i.e. has next to no speed over the ground.
Why’s that as important? Because of the TB.2 has a low radar-cross-section, because it’s relatively silent and emitting very little infra-red emissions, the Russian have immense problems just with detecting them, not to talk about tracking them. Furthermore, one should keep in mind that, while most of the Ukrainian terrain is flat, there are low hills, there are forests, and there are buildings that are disturbing the Russian radar picture. I.e. there are means for TB.2s to approach target zones entirely unobserved. They can be deployed anywhere, and approach from any direction, and there is no way for the Russians to find them all the time in the vast Ukrainian airspace (not even if they would grow 20 eyes on the heads of their troops).
Atop of that, the TB.2 is using satellite communications with directional antennas: they’re extremely hard to jam (except the source of jamming is very close and very powerful). In the West, most of SHORADs have a combination of computers and integrated electro-optical sensors that can ‘automatically’ verify what’s a ‘bird’ and what a UCAV. The Russians simply lack such high-tech.
Unsurprisingly, while claiming to have shot down over 120+ Ukrainian UAVs over the first three weeks of the war – including four Bayraktars in the first week - the Russians have so far proved unable to show the wreckage of more than one (in digits: 1) Ukrainian TB.2.
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