(C) SBiH, under the leadership of the mercurial and
power-hungry Haris Silajdzic, proved an even more destructive
force. A participant in the constitutional reform
negotiations for the past year, it ceased to participate in
the end-game ostensibly over a single issue -- retention of
the existing complex voting procedure in the House of
Representatives (the so-called practice of "entity voting").
But that was just their cover.
The real reason was the
Presidential ambitions of Silajdzic, who has spent most of
his time in recent years outside the country but now seeks to
seize the political moment by preying on fissures within the
leading Bosniak SDA party. Though Silajdzic was not
physically present in the Parliament, observers quickly
identified his proxy: Zlatko Hadzidedic, an aide to SBiH
Minister of Civil Affairs Halilovic, who orchestrated efforts
by SBiH, HDZ 1990 and various radical independents to sow
dissent. Hadzidedic focused his efforts (and money) on
getting the two additional "no" votes against the package
needed for the HDZ 1990 and SBiH alliance to prevail.
¶4. (C) He found those votes not among rejectionist Serb
fringe parties but among the Bosniak ranks. Many here
believe that at least one of two crucial Bosniak "no" votes
was literally bought and paid for by SBiH. Over the 48 hours
prior to and during the debate, Mehmed Zilic, the SDA
defector, appeared to be a man who had promised his vote to
someone else for a price. He was alternately intractable,
unreachable and deliberately ambiguous despite a wave of
successive entreaties by long-time friends, political allies
and even religious leaders including the Reis (in response to
a plea from the Ambassador). Zilic's position hardened
perceptibly in the last day before the Parliament session;
...
MCELHANEY
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06SARAJEVO966.html
Od plate se ne mogu kupiti sve one nekretnine po Turskoj rivijeri i centru grada vrijedne nekoliko miliona KM koje posjeduje Haris.
