Egipat (pročitati prvi post)

[Fantassin]

Ts,ts,ts... Bože sačuvaj.

Sta je pa zar ti nisi na strani Iranaca koji kupe znanje sa zvijezda

[Avetinho]

Sad bi ti o semantici. Trolaš.

_____

Dakle, ISIL napada sudije na SInaju, poziva na njihovu likvidaciju širom Egipta a djeluje i napada i u Libiji.

Neko mora doci glave korumpiranoj bandi koja masovno osudjuje na smrt samo zbog pripadnosti politickoj partiji.

[japin_mutapi]

Sad bi ti o semantici. Trolaš.

_____

Dakle, ISIL napada sudije na SInaju, poziva na njihovu likvidaciju širom Egipta a djeluje i napada i u Libiji.

sami su si krivi
mislim kontraisil sam ali mi nije žao tih sudija sami pali sami se ubili

zapravo bih volio da ih stigne ruka pravde na način da ih osude ti isti sudovi koje sada te "sudije" zloupotrebljavaju
smrt "sudijama" sloboda narodu

[Klavikula]

Rusija ce Egiptu isporuciti 46 Mig-29. oni bi trebali zamijeniti preostale Mig-21 i J-7. u parama to dodje 2 milijarde dolara.

[japin_mutapi]

Rusija ce Egiptu isporuciti 46 Mig-29. oni bi trebali zamijeniti preostale Mig-21 i J-7. u parama to dodje 2 milijarde dolara.

al je selman kralj široke ruke što jes jes

[sarajevoxxxx]

Nakon što je ostavljena da čeka 48 sati na egipatskom prelazu Refah, palestinska starica Jusra En-Nedžar je pred očima egipatske vojske i policije umrla.Nakon toga njeno tijelo je stavljeno na prtljag koji se nalazio u blizini, i na prtljagu se nalazila 5 sati, to jest do podne njeno tijelo je ostavljeno na putničkom prtljagu po najvećoj vrućini.Jusra je čekala da se otvori prelaz i da uđe u Gazzu.

[sarajevoxxxx]

Egipatski novinar Abdulhalim Kindil je u TV emisiji pozvao vođu egipatske vojne hunte Abdulfetaha Sisija da zakolje pripadnike opozicije riječima:Predsjednik treba da napravi novi ''Masakr Memluka'', koji bi bio presudni udarac opoziciji''

Masakr Memluka ili Masakr tvrđava, je događaj koji se zbio 1. marta 1811. kada je Muhamed Ali Paša usmrtio oko 1000 Memalika nakon što ih je pozvao da ga posjete i pod izgovorom da se dogovaraju:

[Avetinho]

To Sisoje, pokazi im kako se vlada.

CAIRO — For decades, Egyptian regimes have robbed the Shiite Muslim minority of their right to practice their religion freely and publicly, fearing this would lead to the spread of Shiism in the predominantly Sunni country, at a time when their sense of belonging has also been in question.

Egyptian Shiites have been subject to persecution, detention and imprisonment. On May 18, the prosecution accused Shiite leader Al-Taher al-Hashimy of attempting to spread Shiism, disturbing social peace and conducting covert activities, according to a statement Hashimy emailed to Al-Monitor after his release.

Hashimy was detained and interrogated for three days and released after paying a bail of 1,000 Egyptian pounds (about $131), pending trial, the statement read.

On May 12, a physician was sentenced to six months in prison for practicing Shiism, according to a statement released by the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR). He was found guilty of blasphemy, attempting to cause sectarian strife, as well as threatening national security by attempting to spread Shiite ideology.

“I’m bitterly disappointed about the state Egypt has reached … we have done nothing other than practicing our religion,” Hashimy told Al-Monitor.

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/origina ... z3biixQTW9

[Co0l]

...„Otako je Al-Sisi došao na vlast, broj terorističkih napada u Egiptu se povećao. Također je povećana i radikalizacija. Upravo je strategija masovne represije širokih slojeva društva i dovela do radikalizacije“, smatra političarka zelenih. Oko 20 posto egipatskog stanovništva su pripadnici Muslimanskog bratstva. To, što su isključeni iz društvenog i političkog života, ugrožava stabilnost zemlje.

Brantnerova u intervjuu za Deutsche Welle ukazuje na nedavno objavljeni izvještaj egipatskog Nacionalnog vijeća za ljudska prava. U izvještaju se tvdi da u egipatskoj istoriji stanje ljudskih prava nije bilo lošije od ovog kakvo je trenutno. To je pored ostalih na svojoj koži jučer osjetio i poznati borac za ljudska prava i advokat Muhamed Lotfy. Izvršni direktor „Egyptian Commission for Reights and Freedoms“ (ECRF) spriječen je na aerodromu u Kariu da putuje u Berlin. Klub poslanika stranke Zelenih ga je pozvao u Berlin, gdje je trebao govoriti o stanju u Egiptu.
Brantner i predsjednica kluba poslanika Zelenih, Katrin Göring-Eckardt osudile su mjere egipatskih snaga sigurnosti. Zabrana izlaska iz zemlje samo služi da se spriječe poznati pripadnici opozicije da govore o pravom stanju u Egiptu: masovnim hapšenjima, zlostavljanjima, samovolji pravosuđa, ponovnom uvođenju smrtne kazne...

http://www.dw.de/te%C5%A1ka-posjeta-egi ... 87-html-cb

Sisoje,faktor stabilnosti u Egiptu.

[Kikibombona]

Deutsche Welle....

Sve im vjerujem....

[Co0l]

Jako je bitno da li im ti vjerujes ili ne
U svakom slucaju,sve navedeno je istina.

[japin_mutapi]

Deutsche Welle....

Sve im vjerujem....

udri hin feldmaršale naš lijepi

[limeni]

Egipat je slika i prilika zemalja bliskog istoka...Nema slobode govora, nema slobode medija, nema izbora, nema parlamenta, ljude osudise na hiljade na smrt, povecaje se broj teroristickih napada, povecaje se nezadovoljstvo i broj onih koji u inat ovim diktatorom postaju sve radikalniji.
Zapad u svemu ovome je posebna prica, u kataru im smeta sto nema ljudskih prava i slobode govora a uistinu im smeta sp 2022 godine kod "balija" dok u egiptu to ne predstavlja problem cak sta vise treba svrgnuti one koji rade u korist svojih naroda samo da bi vjecno narod u tim zemljama bio zaostao.
O erdoganu se moze pricati sta hoce, ni meni ne pasu oni populisticki ljudi koji dizu ton ali cinjenice govore za njega, digao je tursku ekonomski, vojno i svakako za makar 30%. Tako je dobar za njih bio alkoholicar boris jelcin koji je raskucio rusiju dok putin koji ne da na svoje odmah od "strateskog partnera" postaje "najbrutalniji diktator".
Najzalosnije u svemu ovome je da narod na zapadu, za kojeg se govori da postaje sve pametniji i skolovaniji guta ove price nekontajuci da nikada nisu bili u vecoj zabludi.
Iducih godina ocekujem opsti rat na bliskom istoku koji ce se prosiriti dalje do rusije uz granicu sa evropom, nazalost sve manje je ljubavi, tolerancije i osjecaja na ovoj zemlji, slicno kao i pred 1. svijetski rat kada su ljudi pjevajuci isli na front da bi kasnije zaplakali svi.
Nek je mir sa nama svima.

[Avetinho]

Evo sta Human Rights Watch izvjestava o Egiptu:

Egypt: Year of Abuses Under al-Sisi
President Gets Western Support While Erasing Human Rights Gains
June 8, 2015

(Beirut) – President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of Egypt has presided over the flagrant abuse of human rights since taking office a year ago pledging to restore stability. Violence by armed groups and the government has escalated.

The United States and European governments should stop overlooking Egyptian government abuses, including a lack of accountability for many killings of protesters by security forces, mass detentions, military trials of civilians, hundreds of death sentences, and the forced eviction of thousands of families in the Sinai Peninsula.

Over the past year, al-Sisi and his cabinet, governing by decree in the absence of an elected parliament, have provided near total impunity for security force abuses and issued a raft of laws that severely curtailed civil and political rights, effectively erasing the human rights gains of the 2011 uprising that ousted the longtime ruler Hosni Mubarak.

http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/08/egyp ... er-al-sisi

[Klavikula]

[japin_mutapi]

[Truba]

sisi pozvo papu u egipat
to sam negdje krajičkom oka vidio

neće ovaj dugo
il će biti kao novi mubarak

[Opetja033]

On vec jeste novi Mubarak, samo je bitno da zavrsi kao Sadat.

[Opetja033]

Is Egypt's Brotherhood choosing escalation over peace?

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has been in a state of crisis for quite some time. Will the Brotherhood emerge from this crisis with a new strategic vision? What effect might that have on the broader Brotherhood movement beyond Egypt?

After the arrest of President Mohammed Morsi following widespread protests against him in the early summer of 2013, the Brotherhood opted to contest the military’s takeover. While there were isolated pro-Morsi elements that engaged in limited political violence, the group itself did not engage in a militant struggle against the state. Instead, it focused on protests and marches and an international lobbying effort with groups like the Turkish-based "Egyptian Revolutionary Council," mostly active in Western capitals.

Today, the demonstrations in the country calling for Morsi’s reinstatement have dwindled and have little political impact. The controlled use of violence that the pro-Morsi protest movement engages in as part of what it considers defensive has made it easier for the Egyptian media apparatus to consider the Brotherhood directly linked to more radical groups like Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis. The rhetoric the Brotherhood indulges in, particularly in Arabic, or permits on its platforms, does not help to distinguish the movement from far more extreme groups.

The national Egyptian media apparatus needs few excuses — all Egyptian media channels based in Egypt, whether public or private, are opposed to the Brotherhood. The international lobbying effort led by the "Egyptian Revolutionary Council" likewise has had little political impact for a variety of reasons. The new political dispensation headed by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Cairo has become normalized on the international scene.

The strategy of protest within Egypt and lobbying outside the country nonetheless has persisted until fairly recently, based on an assessment by the Brotherhood that the majority of Egyptians support them, based on the electoral successes it had in 2011 and the narrow election victory of Morsi in 2012. It is an assessment few analysts considered as valid in 2013, and certainly not in 2015, but given that empirical calculation, the strategy seemed to be worthwhile. Yet, today in 2015, the Brotherhood is weaker, not stronger. While Sisi’s political dispensation faces a broad array of challenges, the chances of Morsi being reinstated via prolonged protests are marginal.

The old guard of the Brotherhood, which has controlled the leadership for years, has been attempting to hold the group together around that strategy. The younger ranks have grown impatient. For them, the violent dispersal of the Rabia al-Adawiya sit-in in August 2013, which Human Rights Watch described as "likely crimes against humanity," was probably the defining moment of their political lives. Many of them — if not the majority — are moving to escalate the confrontation with the authorities.

The old guard has prioritized the continued cohesion of the group above all else, but has also tried to reduce the possibility of escalation the younger ranks are seeking. At the same time, it does not have the same sort of command and control over the younger ranks as it once did. Most of the top Brotherhood leaders are in jail or outside the country. The younger ranks are not quite operating as though they were AWOL, but the control structures between the top tier and the fourth tier, which is active on the ground, have been virtually broken.

Moreover, the old guard has permitted, and in some cases encouraged, an intense kind of belligerent rhetoric through Brotherhood media, which only feeds into the sense that confrontation is desirable. That sort of rhetoric began prior to the June 30 protests in 2013 and it has only deepened. The rhetoric on the anti-Brotherhood side has likewise become far removed from the notion of reconciliation.

The "escalationist" tendency is not only in ascendance within the Brotherhood, but also on the ground in Egypt. Recently, a group of 150 Muslim preachers issued a statement noting that the time had come for a far more aggressive posture vis-a-vis the Egyptian authorities — although it is unclear if all signatories actually signed it.

The language could be interpreted as support for the violent targeting of Egyptian officials such as police, army and judicial personnel. The Brotherhood publicly praised the declaration, indicating that the escalationist tendency in the group, at least on the ground in Egypt, has won.

It remains unclear what escalation may actually mean. Rather vague words like "resistance" and "by all means necessary" have been used in the Brotherhood's different statements. Their language may be elastic precisely to ensure that all elements that make up the Brotherhood support base feel included. The English statements are obviously far more directed toward international media and Western capitals, so certain language is to be expected, such as the emphasis on "nonviolence."

Within the Arabic statements, the language is more inflammatory, but the discourse is also aimed at an entirely different audience. It is unlikely that the group intends to become like al-Qaeda or Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, but an even more pliable definition of "violence in self-defense" is likely to take hold. Already, there are signs that isolated members of the Brotherhood have taken it upon themselves to engage in rather unsavory activities without being restrained from the old guard — if that old guard had the capacity, let alone the will, to restrain anyway.

The old guard, however, is not down and out, not by any means — particularly if a new set of elections for a Guidance Bureau and Consultative Council take place, as is most likely. But what happens to the old guard is directly linked to how the Egyptian government will respond, and a cynical strategy in that regard appears to be unfolding.

Shortly after the rift between the old guard and the escalationist tendency became a matter of public knowledge, with opinion pieces and press releases being issued on different platforms sympathetic to the Brotherhood, the security forces arrested several senior Brotherhood old guard leaders in Egypt. It surprised many analysts that anyone from the top level of the Brotherhood was even at large on Egyptian territory, but their arrests appeared difficult to put down to coincidence.

Their detention seems to ensure that the more radical voices in the group are freer to pursue whatever escalation they want, even if it turns out to be violent. That, in turn, is likely to lead to an even harsher crackdown by the Egyptian authorities, and also provide a modicum of validation for Cairo’s argument that the Brotherhood has become a terrorist organization. If that is the strategy, then it is a dangerous and potentially extremely risky one.

There are choices that remain ahead for both the Brotherhood and the Egyptian authorities. Those supporting the escalationist tendency on the ground in Egypt can choose to become vigilantes on some kind of violent revolutionary crusade, but they can also pursue other more reasonable routes. Until now, Western capitals have generally rejected the appellation of "terrorist" for the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization. If the group on the ground embraces a more aggressive posture, that position may be challenged from within Western policy circles.

The April 6 movement, for example, which is facing a crackdown by the Egyptian authorities, did not endorse the aforementioned declaration of the 150 Muslim preachers. Rather, it condemned it as "an incitement to violence, which is destructive to any remaining social peace among Egyptians." April 6’s losses during the last two years have been far less than the Brotherhood's, but its position on the call is still a principled one.

The fundamental responsibility for the stability of the Egyptian state, however, continues to be that of the state authorities. The Egyptian state can, via its policies, make it easier — or harder — for more reasonable voices, or at least less radical voices, to be heard among the Brotherhood’s ranks. Ultimately, it is the individual responsibility of every Brotherhood member to choose his or her own path, but those members are also Egyptian citizens, and they are the responsibility of the Egyptian state. Unfortunately, it does not appear as though wisdom is in particularly high supply in either camp.

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/origina ... z3dm4yhErH

[Opetja033]

Ovome se moze dodati i vijest koju je objavio iracki Az Zaman od svojih korespodenata iz Kaira da se covjek broj dva MB u Egiptu Mahmoud Ezzat vratio u zemlju kako bi vodio mlade snage MB i doveo u red ekonomiju organizacije. Isti list navodi da je navodno oformljena vojna formacija od 5000 clanova MB rasporedjenih u naseljima velikih gradova gdje imaju najvecu podrsku. Dodatno (isti izvor) formirano je i 180 odreda smrti koji imaju zadatak da likvidiraju iskljucivo sudije koji su izrekli smrtni kazne i kazne dozivotnog zatvora za pripadnike MB.

Sa druge strane MB tvrdi da se radi o propagandi i pitaju se zasto sigurnosni aparat nije uhapsio nijednu osobu po tim osnovama ukoliko vec imaju te informacije.

[ioannes]

Poznati novinar Al Jazeere Ahmed Mansour
Uhapšen u Berlinu nakon internacionalne potjernice...
U Egiptu je osuđen na 15 god. zatvora....Egipat traži njegovo izručenje

[sumirprimus]

al najaca je optuznica,zlostavljo advookata na trgu... 15 g...

[Co0l]

Kakva tragikomedija.
Usput,pusten je taj novinar.Znaju Nijemci da se radi o fabrikovanim optuznicama.

[Challenger__]

Egypt to remove books of Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Baz and Ibn Uthaymeen from all mosques

The Egyptian Ministry of Religious Endowments have launched a campaign to remove the books of scholars that belong to the Salafi movement from all mosques in Egypt.

LINK

[Kikibombona]

Egypt to remove books of Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Baz and Ibn Uthaymeen from all mosques

The Egyptian Ministry of Religious Endowments have launched a campaign to remove the books of scholars that belong to the Salafi movement from all mosques in Egypt.

LINK

Cekaj, zar nije Sisi sluga selefija?

Sta kazu ihvanije sa teme, Egitom ce vladati Nur stranka...