Ne blamiraj se. Ako iko vadi stvari iz konteksta onda si to ti jer uporno ponavljas jednu te istu stvar nadajuci se da ce postati istina.
Da se ne bi izvlacilo iz konteksta moze li da postavimo sve opcije opisane u dokumetnu? Naravano da moze..evo ih a ako ti treba prevod na Bosanski jezik slobodno se obrati mojoj malenkosti..
Possible Roads Ahead
Bosnia’s Future Crisis Group Europe Report N°232, 10 July 2014 Page 35 VII. Possible Roads Ahead Bosnia’s problems go down to its foundation s. Conflicts over basic constitutional is- sues infect everything and make progress on everyday matters achingly slow. A new constitutional compact is needed urgently, yet the leadership is unprepared and un- ambitious. A long period of gradual, unco ntroversial reform related to EU candidacy could help create a context in which to handle harder, deeper issues but may be im- possible, due to EU insistence on resolving Sejdi ć -Finci first. Something drastic must change, but how? One of the two schools of thought favours a “big bang” – compre- hensive constitutional reforms to set the country on a firm foundation – the other evolution, ideally via EU accession. Some want bigger bangs than others, ranging from a few amendments to a new constitution. The evolutionary approach varies between a fast or glacially slow pace. But Bosnia’s preference seems to be neither approach.
In a sense, there is no dilemma: there is no real possibility of a big bang now. “No one has the capacity for a big reform, beca use anyone who tries will be destroyed by rivals using it against him”. Bosnia would do well to set controversial issues aside for a time and focus on unco ntroversial reforms related to EU accession. There is a vicious circle here, however: everything takes a long time because of deficiencies in the constitutional architecture, and there ma y not be the luxury to take this course. The February 2014 “Bosnian spring” shows ho w easily crisis can arise that might re- quire addressing some of the most divisiv e questions raised by the war and Dayton. The minimum required by the EU, implementation of the ECtHR Sejdi ć -Finci deci- sion, is hardly a small or easy reform. Twenty or more laws hinge on the constitu- tional articles in question, and much jurisprudence would have to be unravelled and rewoven.
Bosnia is in effect a strongly decentralise d federation and will remain one. There is nothing wrong with that as a basic design; decentralisation is common and growing in Europe. Bosnia’s troubles with it stem in part from a struggle for power between government levels and in part from its unique feature: it is a federation both of two entities and of three constituent peoples. Th e latter problem is more acute, keeping the larger FBiH entity locked in near-permane nt political conflict, embittering Bosniaks and Croats and blocking the road to the EU. Bosnians think they cannot agree on anything. The current situation entrenches ethnic identity, with Dayton acting as a mirror of the past, not a roadmap for the fu- ture. Constitutional reform is vital for the EU process but impossible to achieve in practice. The Croats are a fundamental difficulty. In Dayton, they were forced to merge with Bosniaks in FBiH, partly due to the West’s effort to expatiate its sense of guilt for allowing a genocidal war of ethnic se paration to go so far. The result is that no credible, overall solution seems to have a constituency. The EU must and should be engaged, but on what grounds is not yet clear. Still, Bosnians must start the discus- sion of alternatives, quickly and deeply, be cause some of the most plausible ideas re- quire a leap of imagination. To focus the de bate, Crisis Group sketches five options.
A. Muddling Through
It is too late to amend the election law before the October 2014 elections. The win- ners will be under a cloud, having been chosen under a code the ECtHR condemned. With few potent policy levers at their disposal, they will confront simmering popular anger and a bleak economy. The first challeng e will be to form state and entity coali- tions, usually a long, dispiriting process. By convention, the Council of Ministers chair will rotate to a Bosniak, ideally one with strong community backing and disposed to compromise with Croat and Serb leaders.
The temptation to return to business as usual (patronage, management of social payments, shuffling of foreign loans and grants) should be resisted. The “Bosnian spring” has quieted, but the grievances that brought people onto the streets have not been assuaged. Renewed mass protests could easily go wrong. In Mostar they could turn into street fighting between the Bosniak east and Croat west banks; fatalities would sour relations with Croatia and the EU for years. Banja Luka could take its long threatened but unwise decision to secede.
Instead, the new leaders should revive the spirit of the initiative launched by the SDA’s Sulejman Tihić , the SNSD’s Milorad Dodik and the HDZ’s Dragan Čovi ć in 2008. They initialled several agreements, including the budget, census law and first amendment to Bosnia’s constitution. A later meeting produced a tantalising sketch of a new constitutional design: BiH would have three levels of government (central, regional and municipal), each with execut ive, legislative and judicial powers; the middle level would have four regions. The proposal soon was destroyed by contro- versy over the boundaries of the four regions. Yet, for the first time since Dayton, leaders had negotiated the deepest questions of state structure and, briefly, agreed on a way forward. The design was ideal for no ne of their parties but was a big advance over the status quo.
The initiative failed not only because its authors did not secure the support of their parties and potential allies and addressed th e most controversial issues too soon, but also because Bosnia was not ready. Tihi ć , in particular, kept some very close associ- ates out of the loop. The core four-unit middle level implied territorial rearrange- ment and guaranteed bitter dispute. However, Bosniak opposition to RS survival in anything like its current form is no longer as strong. A more careful approach might work today.
B. A Three-Entity Bosnia
If Bosnians are unsatisfied with muddling through, they must cut the Gordian knot of their constitution. One way would be to give the Croats the entity they want. The FBiH would be split into two entities, with a Bosniak and Croat majority respective- ly. To avoid “third entity” language toxic fo r Bosniaks, a federal district around Sara- jevo could be added as a fourth entity. The RS could remain as it is, since a large ma- jority of its residents support its continued existence. That option was explored in the 2008 initiative, and it may return in the future. Croat leaders insist that any new dispensation must include control of their own middle level of government, with ex-ecutive, legislative and judicial branches.
There is nothing inherently wrong with a Croat entity. It would solve many prob- lems: there would be no further need for cantons, and relations between state and entity, and between entity and municipality , could be consistent throughout Bosnia. Instead of a tangled federation of entities and peoples, the country would be a normal federation of territorial units, a design with many successful European examples. Ethnic quotas could be replaced by region al representation and protection of funda- mental human rights.
At the beginning, FBiH was a federation not of cantons but of two political com- munities and the areas they controlled: the “Muslim-Croat Federation”. The federal partners were the rump Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina headquartered in Sarajevo with its army, and the breakaway Croatian Community (later Republic) of Herceg-Bosna, with its military wing, the Croatian Defence Council. Traces of Herceg- Bosna persist, notably in the electricity ut ility Elektroprivreda HZ H-B, which covers most areas of Croat habitation. Croat leaders ci te this to illustrate their vision for selfrule. The utility’s structure, divided into several non-contiguous areas, is in this view a model for a future Croat-majority political unit. The Croatian postal service is another vestige.
The main obstacle to a Croat-majority entity is political: it is highly offensive to Bosniaks. Yet, rationales for their rejection ring hollow. A senior SDA leader ruled out the entity because its leaders allegedly would call a referendum and secede. RS has not done this, and a small, scattered Croa t unit would lack capability to break away and face opposition from Zagreb and Brussels. Others have emotional objections to realisation of the wartime “dream” of Herceg-Bosna, an ethnically clean Croat territory achieved by war crimes. Some simply ask the international community to rule a third entity out of bounds.
C. National Communities
An alternative to a three-entity structure might be found in development of the polit- ical communities into a formal basis for government. The advantage would be to avoid the bruising business of creating new territorial divisions. As a constitutional category, the idea has one main problem: it does not match the two-entity structure. However, ingenuity could remedy this disadv antage. The concept of constituent people could be dropped and replaced with the civic nationality of the political communi- ties. In place of three privileged peoples and “Others”, there would be three equal communities: Bosnian, Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb. Each would be understood as inclusive civic identities open to minority residents without question. The elabo- rate structure of ethnic civil service quotas – the “national key” – would have to be dismantled and replaced by prohibition of discrimination against minorities.
Bosnian national communities could resemble Belgium’s language communities and might even be defined in linguistic te rms, with language serving as a proxy for community loyalty, and thus political orientation. The law recognises three lan- guages, Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian, with equal status, and unlike the constituent peoples, languages leave no one out. Bosnians overwhelmingly use their own na- tional name to refer to the language they speak. Roma, Jews and other minorities already describe themselves as Bosnian, Croatian or Serbian speakers without feeling their identity is eroded.
In other divided states, language serves as a proxy for communal identity. Belgium has four linguistic regions, and the member s of its House of Representatives divide based on language. Switzerland requires its Federa l Executive Council to represent both regions and language communities. Using language to refer to people has a ancient pedigree in the region too. The ECtHR has ruled that language-based elec- toral qualifications are legitimate.
Whether defined in national or language terms or otherwise, three Bosnian com- munities could become the basis for a supple, inclusive governing structure. For coordination and representation in Sarajevo, one way would be to group municipalities into three units based on election results. All municipalities in which Croat or Serb parties won a plurality would comprise the election district for those communities’ representatives in the state executive and the upper house of the legislature. The municipalities in which parties without a national name, or Bosniak parties, won would be the district for Bosn ian community representatives. The process would be repeated in each national election.
This would give territorially flexible political substance to the three communities. One objective would be to allow them to act together without creating a new level of government, thus allowing a virtual Croat unit or units to emerge within FBiH with- out threatening that entity’s territorial integrity. The municipalities where Croat par- ties won could become the self-governing unit, with the upgraded powers outlined in Section VI.C. RS obviates the need for a si milar Serb unit, though Serb-majority mu- nicipalities in the FBiH could form a smaller association to pursue common interests. But it should be easy to opt out: local communities should have the right to organise services in whatever language they choose; a Bosniak village in a Serbian-language municipality should have the option of Bosnian-language primary education. Reform on these lines would resolve the Sejdić -Finci case and contradictions be- tween ethnic and citizen interests that are choking growth. All public offices would be open to persons of any ethnicity, resolving issues in another ECtHR case in litiga- tion. This structure, like the three-entity option, would empower citizens and give communities a better forum for setting state policy.
D. Dissolve the FBiH
Instead of dissolving cantons or breaking the FBiH into two or more entities, Bosni- ans could follow a think tank proposal to:
Progressively abolish the Federation, and with it the constitutional category of “Entity”. The result would be a simplified , three-layered federal state with twelve autonomous units: the ten cantons of the current Federation, Republika Srpska and the District of Brčko. This would represent a fundamental change to the struc- ture of the state, turning it into a norm al, European federal sy stem with central, regional and municipal governments. ESI launched this idea in 2004 with broad support among leaders of all three com- munities, but it assumes a much stronger ro le for central state institutions than RS leaders are willing to consider today. Some FBiH competences could be trans- ferred to the cantons, but others would have to be raised to the state level to avoid ruinously costly duplication, so would come up against RS opposition to most new state powers. The proposal aims at the same goal as some others discussed here – a simpler, three-level structure – but would need to be revised to work in today’s political constellation. The National Communities described in Section VII.C as a middle ground between the Croat third entity and ESI’s twelve units may offer a compro- mise. Another could be a Bosnia of five, six or seven entities tailored from the RS (in one piece or divided into its eastern and western parts), the Sarajevo and Tuzla regions, Central Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The ESI idea offers possible shock therapy: by abolishing itself, the Federation could force the hand of RS leaders and make addressing state-level constitutional reform unavoidable. The Dayton constitu tion cannot operate without the FBiH; Bosnian leaders would have to negotiate over a new framework. The stakes would be high, with all options, including dissolution and a unilateral RS decl aration of independ- ence on the table. Such a risky FBiH move makes sense only if the country faces hope- less stagnation and decline or worsening communal strife.
E. A Federal but Liberal Bosnia
The simplest solution is also the most radi cal: abolish entities and cantons and build the state anew without reference to community rights, protecting only individual rights. Middle layers of go vernment could be eliminated, replaced by stronger mu- nicipalities or federal regions. New constitutional guarantees could protect minorities, languages, education and religion. The Party for BiH, among others, has proposed something like this. Yet, almost no one in RS and few politically active Croats will even discuss it today. The civic model has attractions, including simplicity and an emphasis on equality, but in Bosnia it would be easy to abuse institutions blind to ethnicity. Government largesse could be funnelled to favoured places and peoples, leaving minority areas neglected if not actively oppressed.
VIII. Conclusion
Bosnia needs to break from its decades-long political tradition of a system based on constituent peoples and their rights. This is not a conclusion Crisis Group has reached lightly or expects Bosnians to accept overni ght. It reflects cumulative experience as much as observation that no one has been able to frame a broadly attractive vision for BiH on such a flawed foundation. Stresses and frustrations are accumulating in all three communities. If the country is to survive, it must search for new founda- tions. That may take many years and involve much experimentation, but it should begin now.
Raising a possible new approach to citize nship and identity does not imply rejec- tion of the existence of Bosnia’s three pe oples or endorsement of the civic ideal of Bosnian patriotism. No constitutional project can succeed unless it takes the citizens as they are, and they are overwhelmingly divided into three communities. Any new approach would mean a big change but benefit from the fact that many working parts of such a change have been widely discussed and have significant constituen- cies of Bosnian support.
Bosnian patriots, and the Bosniak people as the largest group, bear the heaviest responsibility for the country’s success. Bosnian patriotism may some day win over most citizens, but its adherents should reflect on the trajectory of Yugoslav identity, in which pressure to conform to the civic ideal strengthened rather than weakened Croat, Serb, Slovene and Bosniak identity . Unity cannot be forced or won through foreign pressure. It must be built on th e engagement and consent of a broad cross- section – more than a majority – of the population. Nor can RS be shifted by litiga- tion or parliamentary manoeuvre. A better way for Bosnian patriots to affect change in the RS character is by moving (back) there, becoming part of its civic life at all lev- els and accepting that most Serbs are loyal to the entity.
Objectively, Banja Luka is in the strongest position. It has overcome the foreign dictates of OHR and stopped state building in its tracks. Dayton gives it a chokehold on the state legislature. It can sink Bosn ia, but the shipwreck would most probably take RS down too, since few would want to reward the entity that caused another Bosnian disaster. Serb leaders should understand that RS needs a viable Bosnian framework to thrive. It would be important to acknowledge the depth of Bosniak suf- fering at the hands of those who built RS. Sarajevo still views it through the war- time prism; the burden of changing that is with RS.
Croats’ importance outweighs their small size: Bosnia cannot be reformed or reli- ably governed without their consent. With di sgruntled Croats, it breaks down into two roughly equal camps, with little common ground: Bosnian patriots and revisionists. But Croats and Bosnian patriots together form a critical mass. Croatia’s EU member- ship enhances its kin’s weight in Bosnia. Yet, Bosnia’s Croats should not seek com- munal equality in every respect nor insist on over-compensation due to their status as a constituent people. Experience shows the limits of this legal fiction. Their key in- terests are self-rule and a place at the state an dentity tables, with the ability to choose who represents them there.
Neither Bosnia’s survival nor its integr ation into the EU and NATO are guaran- teed. A well-performing federation is the be st outcome, on the lines sketched above and within NATO and the EU. The current hobbled environment has brought some predictability, areas of progress and three community-based telecommunications companies that increasingly compete countrywide, showing that the right structure can make Bosnia work. But ot her outcomes are possible, and disintegration is not the worst. BiH might reform sufficiently to complete EU accession but split peacefully. It might hold together but stagnate and never join the EU. Worst, it could split into parts that would languish in corruption and conflict.
Hard years separate Bosnia from its Euro pean future. Its people must answer, at least tacitly, the questions of state identity and loyalty that drove it apart in 1992. Its leaders must find common ground in circum stances that reward those who denounce compromise and promise to deliver nation alist demands. However, the country has come far since 1995. With the help of thos e in Europe who have travelled from war to federalism and union, Bosnia can go on to build a country in which all its peoples find their home.
Sarajevo/Brussels, 10 July 2014
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.Istina je da nije protjeran ni jedan.Kraljevina bila normalna i za to vrijeme liberalna država.Agrarna reforma je sprovedena u čitavoj Evropi čak i u Turskoj.
