zrakomlat wrote:
A to je. Zanimljivo. Mogao sam vala i pretpostaviti o čemu se radi, ali me cifra od 500.000 ljudi kako sa-x napisa, uvjerila da pogrešno zaključujem. Znači ipak je nula manje, ma dobro, ko da je nula neki broj
Ovi generali kao da su školu usavršavali u zemljama Balkana, s tim da je završni ispit bio u BiH.
Hvala
Tu se omaklo kolegi.
A realno Arapske generale i vojske muci ta muka odkako su se osamostalili posle drugog svetskog rata.
Ako ti je otac general bices i ti general.
Ako ti je otac radnik ili seljak ostaces potporucnih do kraja zivota pa makar bio sledeci Napoleon.
Cak se predavaci na vojnim akademijama osiguravaju da pitaju sinove generala samo ako su 100% sigurni da znaju tocan odgovor. Inace ispadne da ga "ponizavaju" pa se leti sa posla.
Negde sam citao da su pre invazije na Irak 2003, neke "face" oficiri Iracke armije dobili pare iz budzeta da srede 50-ak tenkova kojima je nisanski sistem bio star i za zamenu. Oni su pare potrosili, nijedan tenk nije popravljen a oni su raportirali da je stvar sredjena.
Sledece godine ide invazija, ta jadna jedinica dobije naredbu da blokira napredovanje neprijatelja i oni (da ne bi letele glave jer je Sadam jos ziv) su mrtvi-ladni poslali te posade u smrt. Na njih je naisao bataljon Britanskih Challenger 2 tenkova koji su Iracane zbrisali za 10-15 minuta bez svojih gubitaka. Cak nisu ni boju ogrebali na svojim tenkovima jer ovi nisu mogli da ih nisane.
Najbolje objasnjeno
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Is ... rabs1.html od strane Americkog pukovnika koji ima iskustva sa Arapskim vojskama.
Nista cudno sto su ih Izraelci zbrisali svaki put.
Ukratko:
• First, the well-known lack of trust among Arabs in anyone outside their own families adversely affects offensive operations. In a culture in which almost every sphere of human endeavor, including business and social relationships, is based on a family structure, this basic mistrust of others is particularly costly in the stress of battle. Offensive action, at base, consists of fire and maneuver. The maneuver element must be confident that supporting units or arms are providing covering fire. If there is a lack of trust in that support, getting troops moving forward against dug-in defenders is possible only by officers getting out front and leading, something that has not been a characteristic of Arab leadership. (Exceptions to this pattern are limited to elite units, which throughout the Arab world have the same duty — to protect the regime rather than the country.)
• Second, the complex mosaic system of peoples creates additional problems for training, as rulers in the Middle East make use of the sectarian and tribal loyalties to maintain power. The `Alawi minority controls Syria, east bankers control Jordan, Sunnis control Iraq, and Nejdis control Saudi Arabia. This has direct implications for the military, where sectarian considerations affect assignments and promotions. Some minorities (such the Circassians in Jordan or the Druze in Syria) tie their well-being to the ruling elite and perform critical protection roles; others (such as the Shi`a of Iraq) are excluded from the officer corps. In any case, the careful assignment of officers based on sectarian considerations works against assignments based on merit. The same lack of trust operates at the inter-state level, where Arab armies exhibit very little trust of each other, and with good reason. The blatant lie Gamal Abdel Nasser told King Husayn in June 1967 to get him into the war against Israel — that the Egyptian air force was over Tel Aviv (when the vast majority of planes had been destroyed) — was a classic example of deceit. Sadat’s disingenuous approach to the Syrians to entice them to enter the war in October 1973 was another (he told them that the Egyptians were planning total war, a deception that included using a second set of operational plans intended only for Syrian eyes). With this sort of history, it is no wonder that there is very little cross or joint training among Arab armies and very few command exercises. During the 1967 war, for example, not a single Jordanian liaison officer was stationed in Egypt, nor were the Jordanians forthcoming with the Egyptian command.
• Third, Middle Eastern rulers routinely rely on balance-of-power techniques to maintain their authority. They use competing organizations, duplicate agencies, and coercive structures dependent upon the ruler's whim. This makes building any form of personal power base difficult, if not impossible, and keeps the leadership apprehensive and off-balance, never secure in its careers or social position. The same applies within the military; a powerful chairman of the joint chiefs is inconceivable. Joint commands are paper constructs that have little klix function. Leaders look at joint commands, joint exercises, combined arms, and integrated staffs very cautiously for all Arab armies are double-edged swords. One edge points toward the external enemy and the other toward the capital. Land forces are at once a regime-maintenance force and threat to the same regime. This situation is most clearly seen in Saudi Arabia, where the land forces and aviation are under the minister of defense, Prince Sultan, while the National Guard is under Prince Abdullah, the deputy prime minister and crown prince. In Egypt, the Central Security Forces balance the army. In Iraq and Syria, the Republican Guard does the balancing.
No Arab ruler will allow combined operations or training to become routine, for these create familiarity, soften rivalries, erase suspicions, and eliminate the fragmented, competing organizations that enable rulers to play off rivals against one another. Politicians actually create obstacles to maintain fragmentation. For example, obtaining aircraft from the air force for army airborne training, whether it is a joint exercise or a simple administrative request for support of training, must generally be coordinated by the heads of services at the ministry of defense; if a large number of aircraft are involved, this probably requires presidential approval. Military coups may have gone out of style for now, but the fear of them remains strong. Any large-scale exercise of land forces is always a matter of concern to the government and is closely observed, particularly if live ammunition is being used. In Saudi Arabia a complex system of clearances required from area military commanders and provincial governors, all of whom have differing command channels to secure road convoy permission, obtaining ammunition, and conducting exercises, means that in order for a coup to work it would require a massive amount of loyal conspirators. The system has proven to be coup-proof, and there is no reason to believe it will not work well into the future.
Najbolje je objasnio jedan Izraelski oficir. Nesto u stilu "Egipatska i Siriska ceta pesadijaca je jednaka Izraelskoj ceti, ali Izraelski bataljon ili brigada ce uvek slomiti Egipatski ili Siriski bataljon ili brigadu. 
