#2726 Re: juga 1950.-1990.
Posted: 06/02/2017 14:50
Ne samo istok nego i jug.stakasa wrote:Oni su to slikovito opisali da kad oni ostanu bez snicle Istok ce bez hljebamadner wrote:Jah, recesija je dovela do toga da je kapital postao skup. Tako da su dugovi postali puno skuplji za servisiranje + SFRJ nije bila u mogucnosti da finacira svoj izvoz.stakasa wrote: Nista od toga nije dovelo da naseg sloma, niti smo imali prihode od nafte niti smo pojacali trku u naoruzanju. Nije vise bilo potrebe da postojimo u dotadasnjem obliku a uskurceni nismo se znali prilagodit novim okolnostima i - kraj nije ni mogao biti drukciji.
Ekonomska kriza 80ih je kreirana (da ne bude zabune, i Zapad je pretrio posljedice, namjerno).
Nije bio cilj dovesti SFRJ do raspada, samo skloniti KP. Za sve poslje snosimo posljedice.
Large international commercial banks which received the OPEC money decided to reinvest it in developing countries with good growth prospects. Usually, a group of such banks got together and lent money to a developing country endowed with a lot of primary commodity resources or "good" industrial projects (Brazil, Mexico, Korea, Indonesia, etc). Such group lending by banks is called "syndicated loans." These were long-term commercial bank loans to the governments of developing countries (or to SOEs with government guarantee). With ever-rising commodity prices, these investments looked very safe and profitable.
Some of the developing countries were also very aggressive in receiving such loans to promote national development projects. They were optimistic and borrowed happily. As a result, they became heavily dependent on foreign bank loans.
However, not all developing countries enjoyed foreign loans and investment booms. Some non-oil producing developing countries as well as industrial countries in North America, Europe and Japan were experiencing "stagflation"--a situation of high inflation and stagnant output.
How the crisis occurred in the 1980s
In late 1979, Mr. Paul Volcker was appointed as a new chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board (i.e., American central bank). Immediately, he initiated an anti-inflation campaign. From 1979 to 1980, the Fed tightened money supply. As a result, dollar interest rates shot up sharply, even to 20% per year or above. Although this caused serious economic slowdown in the US and the rest of the world, in the long run Mr. Volcker succeeded in stopping the global inflation of the 1970s. But this process caused enormous strain for highly indebted developing countries.
The tightening of American monetary policy impacted indebted countries in three ways:
--As dollar interest rates rose, debt service payments also rose sharply.
--Due to global recession, the quantitative demand for their exports fell.
--As commodity prices declined, they faced lower "terms of trade" (= export price/import price)
Thus, highly indebted countries suddenly faced payment difficulties. Finally, in August 1982, Mexico said, "Sorry, we can't service our debt any more." This ignited a global crisis. It was not just Mexico that had the balance of payments problem. One by one, debtor countries declared similar inability to repay.
As soon as the debt crisis broke out, foreign commercial banks stopped lending to them, and began to think only of getting the money back. The oil dollar recycling and syndicated loans were completely terminated. After this, the financial rescue was extended to them by the IMF and the World Bank in close collaboration with the US government. They extended loans to fill the "financing gap," provided that the government of the affected country took the "correct" adjustment policies. Ultimately, these official loans were financed by developed countries through capital contributions and loans.
Sometimes the amount of financial help needed was so huge that IMF and World Bank loans were not enough. The international community provided larger loans through the Paris Club, a group of official lenders to a particular developing country, which rescheduled existing debt or provided new money in exchange for full servicing of the existing debt. (Technically, rescheduling means delaying the payment of old debt and new money means extending new loans if old debt is repaid as scheduled. But economically, they have the same balance-of-payments impact). The Paris Club rescheduling (or new money) was conditional on the existence of an IMF agreement. Bilateral official lenders extended rescue loans only when the IMF itself had successfully negotiated a new adjustment program (IMF loan with conditionality) with the country in question. Hence the enormous power of the IMF vis-à-vis countries in balance-of-payments trouble.

