gost iz ZG wrote:
bez puno polemiziranja i "navijanja" za bilo koju stranu ... činjenice su:
Njemci tj. Afrika korpus i Rommel su došli u sjevernu Afriku 1941.pomoći Talijanima nakon katastrofalnih vojnih poraza(Talijani su ispušili i u Grčkoj neposredno prije afričke kampanje)
Izjednjačavati zasluge 41-42 je malo smiješno
Danas, nakon 60+ godina, kao glavna Rommelova taktika se spominje kombinacija panzer-tenkovskog napada, privremeno povlačenje i uništavanje britanske tehnike čuvenim topovima 88 ... uz konstantno nadgledanje bitke iz malih izviđačkih aviona
'43 El Alamein ... čak i Britanci danas priznaju, bitka je dobivena zbog loše opskrbljenosti/logistike Rommelovih trupa, demoraliziranosti Talijana i uz pomoć puno sreće
Slažem se da je nakon toga, Rommel pri povlačenju koristio Talijanske zalihe - ali ništa više od toga
Također, slažem se da je nakon zadnje bitke kod Casserine u Tunisu, dio zarobljenih bio i Talijani, no činjenice govore o približno istom broju zarobljenih Njemačkih vojnika i u sj. Africi kao i u Staljingradu
italijanske trupe koje su unistene prije dolaska romela su bile pjesadiske trupe koje su britanci unistili zahvaljujuci tome sto su njihove jedinice bile skoro sve motorizovane i sto protiv njihovih oklopnih jedinica italijani nisu nista imali efikasno
italijani u grckoj su razbijeni radi toga sto je musolini nekoliko mjeseci ranije povukao 60% trupa iz albanije i to boljeg djela i onda da bi se dokazao hitleru poslao je preostale jedinice u invazije grcke bez pomnijeg planiranja i brzo su iste bilo brojcano nadmasene od strane grka
a ono sto si ti gore nabrojao vec neko vrjeme je pobijeno od vodesih historicara, u ostalom dovoljno je da koristis matematiku, tj. zar mislis da je 1/4 (koliki je bio udio njemackih snaga) afrika pancer armije uspio uraditi sve sam i usput taktika koju si naveo je stereotipna i zar stvarno mislis da su britanci idioti pa da ih mozes navuci na istu taktiku skoro 2 godine
evo ti malo linkova pa procitaj vise
http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com/Ita ... n_army.htm
ili citata
The Italian Royal Army fought this battle in a way that can be summarized by the sacrifice of the Division Folgore: the historian Renzo De Felice wrote that "...of the 5.000 "Folgore" paratroopers sent to Africa 4 months before, the survived were only 32 officers and 262 soldiers, most of them wounded. Before the surrender, they shot until the last ammo and the last hand-grenade...
Allied press reports of Italian military prowess in the Second World War were almost always dismissive. British wartime propaganda trumpeted the destruction of the Italian 10th Army by a significantly smaller British force during the early phase of the North African Campaign. The propaganda from this Italian collapse, which was designed to boost British morale during a bleak period of the war, left a lasting impression. The later exploits of Rommel and German accounts of events tended to disparage their Italian allies and downplay their contributions; these German accounts were used as a primary source for the Axis side by English-language historians after the war.Kenneth Macksey wrote in 1972 that after the split in the Italian state and the reinforcement of fascist Italy by German troops, "the British threw out the Italian Chicken only to let in the German Eagle," for example.
Some more recent scholars have attempted to reassess the performance of the Italian forces, notably James Sadkovich, Peter Haining, Vincent O'Hara, and Ian Walker. Contemporary British reports ignored an action of Bir El Gobi where a battalion of a battalion of Giovani Fascisti held up the 11th Indian Brigade and destroyed dozens of tanks, and Sadkovich, Walker, and others have found numerous other examples of actions where Italian forces performed strongly, yet are rarely discussed by most histories. During the Tunisian Campaign, where Italian units were involved in most encounters, such as Kasserine Pass, Mareth, Akarit and Enfidaville, it was observed by General Alexander that "...the Italians fought particularly well, outdoing the Germans in line with them". Rommel himself also conceded praise on several occasions. Other times, German mistakes were blamed on Italians, or the Germans left the Italians in hopeless situations where failure was unavoidable. Questionable German advice, broken promises, and security lapses had direct consequences at Matapan, in the convoy war and North Africa. Rommel often retreated leaving immobile infantry units exposed, withdrew German units to rest even though the Italians had also been in combat, would deprive the Italian's of their share of captured goods, ignore Italian intelligence, seldom acknowledge Italian successes and often resist formulation of joint strategy.
In addition, Italian 'cowardice' did not appear to be more prevalent than the level seen in any army, despite claims of wartime propaganda. Ian Walker wrote:
....it is perhaps simplest to ask who is the most courageous in the following situations: the Italian carristi, who goes into battle in an obsolete M14 tank against superior enemy armour and anti-tank guns, knowing they can easily penetrate his flimsy protection at a range where his own small gun will have little effect; the German panzer soldier or British tanker who goes into battle in a Panzer IV Special or Sherman respectively against equivalent enemy opposition knowing that he can at least trade blows with them on equal terms; the British tanker who goes into battle in a Sherman against inferior Italian armour and anti-tank guns, knowing confidently that he can destroy them at ranges where they cannot touch him. It would seem clear that, in terms of their motto Ferrea Mole, Ferreo Cuore, the Italian carristi really had "iron hearts", even though as the war went on their "iron hulls" increasingly let them down.
The problems that stand out to all historians, however, pertain to Italian strategy and equipment. Italy's equipment was not up to the standard of either the Allied or the German armies; an account of the defeat of the Italian 10th army noted that the incredibly poor quality of the Italian artillery shells saved many British soldiers' lives. More crucially, they lacked suitable quantities of equipment of all kinds and their high command did not take necessary steps to plan for most eventualities. This was compounded by Mussolini assigning unqualified political favourites to key positions. Mussolini also dramatically overestimated the ability of the Italian military at times, sending them into situations where failure was likely such as the invasion of Greece.
alibegoa u africi jeste zarobljeno vise njemaca, ali operacija blue je kostala njemce i saveznike preko 750 000 ljudi, a u staljingradskom djepu okruzeno je 300 000 njemaca, ali do okoncanja operacije prezivjelo ih je oko 60-70 000
sam Musolini je rekao Hitleru da je Italija spremna za ulazak u rat ali tek 1942! Uvidio je Badoljo i Duče propuste i slabosti svoje armije u španskom ratu...talijani su imali još uvijek municiju za svoje puške iz 19 vijeka sa tupim zrnom 
dok je većina oružja i pješadijske opreme bila napotpuna za rat. Avijacija je tek počela da uvodi jednokrilce i moderne lovce zamijenjuje dvokrilcima, dok je mornarica bila veoma moderna ali je komandni kadar bio katastrofa 
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