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Geostrategy in Central Asia
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Central Asia has long been a geostrategic location merely because of its proximity to the interests of several great powers. The region itself never held a dominant stationary population, nor was able to make use of natural resources until recently with the development of a natural gas pipeline in Turkmenistan and booming oil industry in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Thus it has rarely throughout history become the seat of power for an empire or influential state. Central Asia has been divided, redivided, conquered out of existence, and fragmented time and time again. Consequently, Central Asia has served more as the battleground for outside powers than as a power in its own right.
Contents
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* 1 Strategic geography
o 1.1 Strategic locations
* 2 The Great Game
* 3 Debated and Debatable zone
* 4 The Heartland
* 5 Soviet collapse
* 6 Oil politics
* 7 War on Terror
* 8 See also

[edit] Strategic geography

Central Asia had both the advantage and disadvantage of a central location between four historical seats of power. From its central location, it has access to trade routes, or lines of attack, to all the regional powers. On the other hand, it has been continuously vulnerable to attack from all sides throughout its history, resulting in political fragmentation or outright power vacuum, as it is successively dominated.

* To the North, the steppe allowed for rapid mobility, first for nomadic horseback warriors like the Huns and Mongols, and later for Russian traders, eventually supported by railroads. As the Russian empire expanded to the East, it would also push down into Central Asia towards the sea, in a search for warm water ports. The Soviet bloc would reinforce dominance from the North, and attempt to project power as far south as Afghanistan.
* To the East, the demographic and cultural weight of Chinese empires continually pushed outward into Central Asia. The Han, Tang, and Ming Dynasties would conquer parts of East Turkestan and Tibet, and the later Manchu dynasty, which conquered China in 1644, consolidated Chinese control over this area. China would project power into Central Asia, most notably in the case of Afghanistan, to counter Russian dominance of the region.
* To the Southeast, the demographic and cultural influence of India was felt in Central Asia, notably in Tibet, the Hindu Kush, and slightly beyond. Several historical Indian dynasties, especially those seated along the Indus River would expand into Central Asia. India's ability to project power into Central Asia has been limited due to the mountain ranges in Pakistan, and the cultural differences between Hindu India, and what would become a mostly Muslim Central Asia.
* To the Southwest, Middle Eastern powers have expanded into the Southern areas of Central Asia (usually, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan). Several Persian empires would conquer and reconquer parts of Central Asia; Alexander the Great's Hellenistic empire would extend into Central Asia; two Arab Islamic empires would exert substantial influence throughout the region; and the modern state of Iran has projected influence throughout the region as well.

[edit] Strategic locations

In terms of strategic geography, Central Asia has several important routes through Eurasia, which conquerors would seek to dominate and utilize.

Passes:

* Wakhan Corridor: In Afghanistan, with Tajikistan to the north, Pakistan to the south and China to the east
* Khyber Pass: Between Afghanistan and the Pakistan
* Torugart Pass: Between Kyrgyzstan and China
* Nathula, Jelepla Pass: Between India and China
* Khunjerab Pass: Between Pakistan and China

Areas:

* The Steppe
* The Hindu Kush
* Aksai Chin

[edit] The Great Game
Main article: The Great Game

From 1813 to 1907 Great Britain and Tsarist Russia were engaged in a strategic competition for domination of Central Asia, known in Britain as "The Great Game", and in Russia as the "Tournament of Shadows." The British sea power and base in the Indian subcontinent served as the platform for a push Northwest into Central Asia, while the Russian empire pushed into the region from the North. The powers eventually met, and the competition played out, in Afghanistan, although the two never went to war with one another.

The British feared that Russian control of Central Asia would create an ideal springboard for an invasion of Britain's territories in the subcontinent, and were especially concerned about Russia gaining a warm water port. They would fight the First and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars in an attempt to establish control over the region, and to counter the slowly creeping expansion of Russia. Losing badly both times, the British signed the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention which divided Afghanistan between the two powers and outlined the framework for all future diplomatic relations.
[edit] Debated and Debatable zone

Alfred Thayer Mahan, the father of U.S. geostrategy, outlined the geostrategic divisions of Eurasia in his 1900 piece The Problem of Asia and Its Effect Upon International Policies. He divided Asia into three parts:

* Russian dominated land to the north of the 40th parallel;
* British dominated lands to the south of the 30th parallel; and
* the Debated and Debatable zone located between the 30th and 40th parallels on the Asian continent.

Within this vast zone lie significant parts of Central Asia, including sections of what are now Tibet, Xinjiang, Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Iran, and the Caucasus.

Mahan believed that the clash between the Russian land power from the North, pushing down toward warm water port, and the opposing coalition of sea powers from pushing upward from the South (including Britain, the U.S., Japan, and Germany), would play out their conflict in the Debated and Debatable zone. This zone featured areas of political vacuum, underdevelopment, and internecine conflicts which made it both unstable and ripe for conquest.

Even today, the above areas of Central Asia are politically weak or unstable, and riven by separatism, ethnic, or religious conflict.
[edit] The Heartland

Halford J. Mackinder, a British geographer and geopolitician, would describe this region of the world as the Heartland in a 1904 speech The Geographical Pivot of History to the Royal British Geographical Society. This idea would become the foundation of his contribution to geostrategy. Geographically, the Pivot encompasses all of Central Asia, with the addition of large parts of Iran, and Russia as well.

The Geographic Pivot is an area on the continent of Eurasia which is either landlocked, or whose rivers and littoral fed into inland seas or the ice-locked Arctic Ocean. The Volga, Oxus, and Jaxartes drain into lakes, and the Ob Yenisei and Lena drain into the Arctic. The Tarim and Helmund rivers also fail to drain into the ocean. Most of the region Mackinder defines is steppe land, mottled with patches of desert or mountains. Because of the rapid mobility that the steppe lands allow, Mackinder points to the historical tendency of nomadic horseback or camel-riding invaders coming from the east into the west.

The Pivot's projection into Central Asia is defined on one side by the Caspian Sea and Caucasus, and on the other side by a mountain range running from Pakistan northeast up to Mongolia and southern Russia. This triangular projection south into Central Asia was part of an area inaccessible to the sea powers (Britain, the U.S., Japan, and France primarily). As such, it was a strategically important area from which land power could be projected into the rest of the Eurasian landmass, virtually unimpeded by the sea powers.
[edit] Soviet collapse

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 once again created a situation of political vacuum in Central Asia. The resultant authoritarian but weak former Soviet satellite republics were still considered part of Russia's sphere of influence, but now Russia was only one among many competitors for influence in the new Central Asian states. By 1996, Mongolia would also assert its independence from Russia's influence. Further, the North Caucasus Russian republic Chechnya would claim independence, leading to the First and Second Chechen Wars with Russia winning the latter.

Geostrategist and former United States National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski analyzed Central Asia in his 1997 book The Grand Chessboard, terming the post-Soviet region the "Black Hole" and post-Soviet Central Asia (the Caucasus, former SSRs, and Afghanistan) in particular the "Eurasian Balkans." The area is an ethnic cauldron, prone to instability and conflicts, without a sense of national identity, but rather a mess of historical cultural influences, tribal and clan loyalties, and religious fervor. Projecting influence into the area is no longer just Russia, but also Turkey, Iran, China, Pakistan, India and the United States:

* Russia continues to dominate political decision-making throughout the Caucasus, Central Asia, and former SSRs in general. As some of these countries shed their post-Soviet authoritarian systems and integrate with Western organizations such as the EU and NATO, Russia's influence has decreased in those nations. Yet, Russia continues to be the primary power in both the Caucasus and Central Asia, especially in light of the Russian victory over Georgia - and by proxy Western powers - in August of 2008, and the many hydrocarbon deals signed between Moscow and the Central Asian states.
* Turkey has some influence because of the ethnic and linguistic ties with the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, as well as serving as the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline route to the Mediterranean and a route for natural gas pipelines (South Caucasus Pipeline; Nabucco Pipeline).
* Iran, the seat of historical empires which controlled parts of Central Asia, has historical and cultural links to the region, as is vying to construct an oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf.
* China, already controlling Xinjiang and Tibet, projects significant power in the region, especially in energy/oil politics.
* Pakistan, armed with nuclear weapons, and employing its security forces, among the largest in the world, has massive influence in and around Kashmir and Afghanistan. Kashmir is hotly contested for with India, while Afghanistan has been used by the Pakistan army as part of its 'strategic depth' in case of war and is now a new proxy war between India and Pakistan.
* India, as a nuclear-armed rising power, exercises some influence in the region, especially in Tibet with which it has cultural affinities. India is also perceived as a potential counterweight to China's regional power. The Farkhor Air Base in Tajikistan gives the Indian military the required depth and range in seeking a larger role in South Asia and is a tangible manifestation of India’s move to project its power in Central Asia, a policy goal formally enunciated in 2003–2004.
* And the United States with its military involvement in the region is also significantly involved in the region's politics but on a lower level than either China or Russia whose relations with the Central Asian states are more comprehensive, and lack the democratization factor which Washington espouses.

[edit] Oil politics

* Pipelines
* Caspian Sea
* Petroleum politics

[edit] War on Terror

In the context of the United States' War on Terror, Central Asia has once again become the center of geostrategic calculations. Pakistan's status has been upgraded to a "major non-NATO ally" because of its central role in serving as a staging point for the invasion of Afghanistan, providing intelligence on Al-Qaeda operations in the region, and leading the hunt on Osama bin Laden, believed to still be in the region as of 2005[update]. Afghanistan, which had served as a haven and source of support for Al-Qaeda, under the protection of Mullah Omar and the Taliban, was the target of a U.S. invasion in 2001, and ongoing reconstruction and drug-eradication efforts. U.S. military bases were also established in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (the Uzbek presence was later withdrawn), causing both Russia and China to voice their concern over a permanent U.S. military presence in the region.

Western observers and governments have claimed that Russia, China and the former Soviet republics have taken advantage of the War on Terror to increase oppression of certain ethnic groups, including minority separatist movements, as well as some religious groups. Washington, which considers Russia and China as strategic partners in the War on Terror, has largely turned a blind eye to these claims. The ethnically diverse former SSRs, especially Uzbekistan have reclassified ethnic separatist attacks as terrorist attacks and pursued more aggressive policies.

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Jedna drugačija verzija priče o Kirgistanu

Kyrgyzstan Destined To Become Another Narco-State?
by Andre Fomine / April 19th, 2010


On April 13 the prominent US research center STRATFOR published an analytical brief ‘Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Insurgence’. The main idea was spinning around the recent bloody riots in Kyrgyz’s capital Bishkek culminated with 84 dead, more than 1500 injured and the expulsion of the former President Bakiev and his corrupt family members. The report clearly states that the Russian authorities are behind the scene of the upraising in that remote and pauper Central Asian republic, once a part of the Russian Empire. Despite such allegations are apparently making credit to the emerging new Russian abilities in their traditional area of influence, few facts still contradict to the assumption of the Russian involvement and ‘success’ there.



First, Kyrgyzstan is indeed a country of unique geopolitical location. It encircles Fergana valley – a heavily populated oasis at the core of Central Asia, shared with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Besides the vital Russian interest to control Fergana as the first outpost defending vast and open deserts and steppes on the way to the Volga, all Chinese moves in Uyghur Autonomous Region can be easily monitored from Kyrgyz Tien Shan highlands as well. Perhaps that is the main reason why the USAF installed Manas military base few kilometers away from Bishkek soon after the start of NATO operations in Afghanistan in 2001. The base is still operating there in full fledge as the ‘US military transit centre’.

Another key point is that since then Kyrgyzstan became the most notable hub for distribution of the Afghan drugs to Eurasian ‘markets’, a business that had multiplied in times under the NATO guardianship in Afghanistan. The town of Osh, the ‘southern capital of Kyrgyzstan’, has long ago become a major cross-point for the Great Heroin Way through non-controllable mountainous Tajik-Kyrgyz border and transparent way to the north-west. Most likely the illicit profits proceeding from narco-trafficking were the main sources of spectacular enrichment of Bakiev’s clan during his presidency in 2005-2010. There were numerous evidences that the very arrival of Kurmanbek Bakiev to power in March 2005 as a result of ‘Tulip revolution’ was financed and supported by prosperous international narco-mafia. It is also notable that while in office Bakiev liquidated Kyrgyz Anti-Drug Agency.

As a matter of fact, Kyrgyzstan, once a ‘model Central Asian democracy’, as it used to be regarded in 1990s, and the first (!) post-Soviet state that joined WTO back in 1998, has ended up with two illegitimate coup d’etat in 5 years. It makes us believe that the events we witnessed in early April are only partly a result of mismanagement by the Kyrgyz ruling clan, their reckless appropriation of the state funds, international credits and national assets at the expense of their our people. We can assume that the tragedy in Kyrgyzstan reflects a wider diabolic strategy.

The theory of ‘manageable chaos’ as a perfect instrument for dominating the world ‘after tomorrow’ is thoroughly scrutinized by the leading Western minds and political practitioners. The old London’s and later Washington’s habit to impose ‘puppet’ dictators anywhere in the world has proved its ineffectiveness. Sooner or later the dictator starts playing his own game, as it was in case of Saddam Hussein. Much more promising are configurations with a sequence of weak and irresponsible ‘democratic’ governments holding office exclusively thanks to propaganda support from the media centers of global power. Such scheme allows maintaining ‘controllable conflicts’ in any zone, making up ideal environment for elusive ‘terrorist cells’ and drug cartels, targeting the strategic adversaries in the neighborhood.

Kyrgyzstan’s return to the Russian sphere of influence is irreversible. A country lacking any notable resource is living mostly on transfers from relatives who work in Russia (1 out of 5.5 million Kyrgyzs are doing unskilled jobs in the former metropolis). For some time the US rental payment for the base in Manas provided almost half of the national budget of the country. Oscar Akaev, the first president of Kyrgyzstan, once said: “Our mission is to survive until Russia gets richer”. So now, when the time has come, the Washington’s task is to let Kyrgyz elect such ‘pro-Russian’ government, which would be unable to cope with the narco-cartels operating at the Great Heroin Way and criminal-terrorist gangs of any nature. That would either prevent Kyrgyzstan from entering the new Customs Union being formed by Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus and effective since July 1, 2010 or make the policy of narcotization of Eurasia easier after customs procedures on its borders lifted once Kyrgyzstan accepted to the union. So at this time the geostrategic interests of the US and the international narco-mafia happily merged again. It was only logical for the US establishment to use the services of narco-barons to overthrow Bakiev, who demanded from the US more and more pay-offs for his loyalty and even dared engage with Chinese and Russians on multimillion investments in Kyrgyz economy.

Finally the last point of our analysis will be in finding a documentary proof that the ‘spontaneous’ riots in Talas and later in Bishkek on April 6-8 were lavishly sponsored and supplied by a ‘third party’. It did not take long. On April 7, 2010 the Daily Telegraph web-site published a photo report ‘Kyrgyzstan unrest in pictures: state of emergency declared in Bishkek after revolt’.


A protester carries an RPG and a riot shield in Bishkek. Picture: REUTERS


A Kyrgyz riot policeman’s vehicle burns near the government building in the capital Bishkek. Picture: AFP/GETTY.

You will not find Palestine-style stones and sticks in the hands of protesters. They carry RPGs and AKs, of the Russian origin, for sure. A small detail reveals the real source.


A Kyrgyz opposition supporter fires an automatic weapon near the main government building during a protest against the government in Bishkek. Picture: AFP/GETTY

The HWS (holographic weapon sight) attached to the AK gun in the hands of an opposition fighter is the product of the US L-3 Communications EOTech Corporation, 500 series, retail price 600 USD each one (four average monthly salaries in Kyrgyzstan). According to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) of the USA, the commercial sales and exports of this equipment requires a license issued by the US Department of State and Department of Commerce. These models were not officially delivered to Kyrgyzstan or Russia. Hence this AK with an advanced HWS could NOT be used by a regular Kyrgyz special unit officer and then captured by a protester at the ‘battlefield’. The Telegraph snapshot clearly indicates that the ‘pro-Russian revolt’ in Bishkek was surprisingly supplied from a US military site in Kyrgyzstan or, perhaps, Afghanistan.


Kyrgyz riot policemen try to protect themselves during clashes with opposition supporters demonstrating against the government in Bishkek. Picture: AFP/GETTY.

So the only pending question is the following: who is the dominant ‘third party’ in April events in Kyrgyzstan? Whether international narco-mafia is subject to the orders from Washington or maybe in reality the American administration is just a docile servant to those who generously invest into the US political campaigns?

Andre Fomine is the founder of the open dialogue research journal Oriental Review where this article first appeared. Read other articles by Andre.