respo wrote:joj madner
ne pravi se pametan
ako si osumljicen da si pronevjerio ukrao ili ne znam na koji nacin dobio neke pare imas vilu auto
onda je na tebi da dokazes jeli to legalno ili ilegalno
zato se valjda i dizu optuznice
uzmi bilo koju eu drzavu i vidjet ces stotine takvih slucajeva
xy osumljicen da je to i to uradio zbog koristi pa nek dokazuje na sudu
Ne i ne.
U vecini zemalja EU je na tuzilastvu da dokaze da si nesto stekao nelegalno.
Kada ti dokazu da je nelegalno onda ti mogu otet, tebe bacit u rupu i bacit kljuc itd... Ali na tuzilastvu je da dokaze.
Malo duzi tekst o Italiji:
In 1982, in the wake of a series of assassinations of prominent public figures by "the Mafia," Italy passed its Pio La Torre Law, popularly named after the murdered head of the Sicilian Communist party who had campaigned for the principles the law embodied.25 This widely heralded (and badly misunderstood) law introduced to Italy two fundamental legal departures. It created a new crime, the Mafia conspiracy, making membership in such an organization an offense per se. And, it opened the books of the Italian financial system to police probes. It waived bank secrecy in the event of a criminal investigation and allowed the courts to seize the assets of persons belonging to a "Mafia conspiracy" as well as those of any relatives or associates suspected of fronting for them.26 The two initiatives were linked - anyone guilty of membership in a criminal organization could lose the right to financial privacy and have their assets seized without any need by the state to demonstrate their participation in any specific criminal act.27
The law was intended to address certain fundamental underlying realities. Traditionally the Mafia was seen as a Sicilian problem, and a symptom of cultural isolation, social introversion and economic backwardness. But during the 1970s, a new "entrepreneurial Mafia" supposedly emerged. This transformation was reputedly fueled by the burgeoning drug trade. Not only did a drive for wealth displace the traditional concern with "honour" among Mafiosi, but the availability of drug-derived wealth permitted members to infiltrate deeply into the economy of certain southern areas (in Sicily and Calabria, reputedly, 15-20% of all economic activity came to be controlled by Mafia-linked firms and individuals), and to spread throughout Italy. Most alarming was the alleged tendency of Mafia entrepreneurs to take control of businesses offering legitimate goods and services, and to apply to them criminal principles of operation. Given the supposed ability of Mafia-linked firms to tap great pools of underground cash, push down wages, corrupt government functionaries and employ violence to drive out competitors, Mafia entrepreneurs were perceived to be a serious threat, not just to this or that local firm, but to the entire Italian economy.28
Therefore the Pio La Torre law attempted to deal with both the flow of new criminal money and the stock of accumulated criminal wealth. Against the on-going flow, it hoped to deter mob money from taking control of legal businesses, as well as stopping legal money from moving into illegal activity where higher rates of tax-free return were available. Against the accumulated stock of criminally-derived wealth, it was the explicitly stated hope of the intellectual author of the law that a serious threat of asset seizure would lead, not so much to the klix confiscation of huge amounts, as to the encouragement of a rapid and massive asset transfer. Mafia money would shift from illegal businesses (including legal ones operated in illegal ways) into the strictly legal economy. And it would shift from the ownership of assets like land and commercial property into passive financial holdings. There was an implicit amnesty at work here - money that made the transition was de facto (though not de jure) immune to the asset seizure apparatus. The result would be that the money accumulated through criminal means could be made accessible to the legitimate economy through passive investments without bringing with it the threat of criminal takeover (and criminalization) of klix businesses. Needless to say most of these subtleties escaped the notice of North American legislators.
There are many points at which the underlying theory of the Pio La Torre law could be subject to criticism.29 Did the theory exaggerate the overall amounts of criminal money actually pouring into the Sicilian economy? Did it put too much emphasis on the role of drug money in the transformation from "men of honour" to criminal entrepreneurs? Indeed, was the typical Mafiosi really becoming a criminal entrepreneur, or did he remain essentially an extortionist, simply shifting, as the economy itself changed, from draining money out of agriculture and construction to milking the commercial and financial system as well?30 In creating a Mafia conspiracy offense, was the new law in danger of accepting, even implicitly, the fundamental American error, of seeing Mafia as an "organization" instead of a pattern of behavior? If so, was there really any advantage to be gained from criminalizing association, particularly in light of the potential human rights abuses such a development might permit? Furthermore, was the crucial distinction between legal and illegal sectors, the logical foundation of the law, really a matter of black and white, or was the situation better seen as a continuum of various shades of grey?
Thus, at the end of the day, in Italy asset seizure was conceived not an end in itself. And it was more than just a deterrent in the standard sense of the term. Rather, the threat of such seizure was to work as an incentive for a long-term change of economic behavior.
Ali izgleda da je u Americi stvarno moguce obrnuti princip.
Contemporary laws that facilitate the freezing and confiscating of criminally-derived assets are of two main types. Some involve strictly in personam procedures – an individual must be charged with a crime, and that crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt, before specified property, also proven on criminal criteria to be the proceeds of that crime, can be seized. Standard safeguards - presumption of innocence, right to counsel, and protection against double jeopardy or disproportionate punishment – apply. Other laws, like those prevalent in the contemporary U.S., involve in rem procedures – property can be seized if it can be established by civil criteria (balance of probabilities) that the property was the proceeds of or means to commit a crime. With the U.S. approach, there is no need to even charge the owner with, let along prove, a specific crime. Once probable cause to freeze property is established, the burden of proof is shifted onto the owner who has no right to counsel, nor any protection against double jeopardy or disproportionate punishment.2 There are also mixed systems (as in England and Canada) where property can be frozen in advance of a trial and, if an individual is found guilty under criminal criteria, property can be forfeited using civil (balance of probabilities) criteria that it is likely the proceeds of a crime.3
2 See especially David Fried, "Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture," Journal Of Law And Criminology, Vol. 79, No. 2, 1988; Steven Kessler, Civil And Criminal Forfeiture: Federal and State Practice, Clark, Boardman and Callaghan, New York: 1994; and especially Leonary Levy, A License to Steal: the Forfeiture of Property, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill:1996,
isl... smijesno. to je sica, plijene se milioni ne par hiljada vrijednosti imovine.
kruske i jabuke, babe i zabe, kontas?