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ronnie wrote:Ništa ja ne mislim nego znam da ne volim diktatore niti diktatorske režime, jednostavno to mi nije u prirodi. Isto tako ne volim ni Hitlera ni Musolinija ni Staljina zato jer su provodili teror i imali neograničenu vlast što nije dobro.
+1
Ipak, nakolon do poda i kapa do dna bunara za potpuno zaglupljivanje cijelih genracije i ove i ovakve teme to razgolite do kraja. Znaš nekog forumaša i njegove diskusije i stavio bi čovjek ruku u vatru da je protiv tortura nad neistomišljenicima, represija i političkog progona, a ono samo na pomen jednog imena i jedne imenice, sve pada u vodu
Utoliko je moć diktature velika i vremenski prostrana.
Imao je Tito svojih greških, ali su one minorne u odnosu na ono što je uradio za državu i njene građane. Ovi danas političari mu nisu ni do nožnog palca i ne zaslužuju ni ime da mu spomenu, a kamo li šta više.
tvsabina wrote:
Otkud ti znas sta mislim o Jugoslaviji , sta mislim o proslosti I otkud ti pravo da mi govoris cime da se mirim a cime ne ?
"Diktatoru" ce uvijek bi ti polozeno cvijece na grob kao znak zahvalnosti.
Ništa ja ne mislim nego znam da ne volim diktatore niti diktatorske režime, jednostavno to mi nije u prirodi. Isto tako ne volim ni Hitlera ni Musolinija ni Staljina zato jer su provodili teror i imali neograničenu vlast što nije dobro. Nikad nisam bio u kući cvijeća, u kumrovcu jesam, to priznajem, iako imam osjećaj da Tito tamo nije rođen. Znam Zagorce, i znam njihov naglasak, i da žive na Grenlandu oni bi zadržali taj svoj govor ili bi im barem neka riječ pobjegla. Tito je govorio nekim čudnim naglaskom koji ne postoji u Hrvatskoj, ali dobro to je druga priča.
Podrediti Tita sa fašističkim diktatorima koji su pobili pola planete i sa gruzijskim vampirom zbog kog je SSSR izgubio milione nevinih zivota je zlonamjerno i historijski potpuno netacno.
Ukoliko to cinis slučajno , to je vrlo neumjesno jer je Tito i faktički i ideološki bio i antifasist i antistaljinist.
Ne sumnjam u tacnost tvojih opservacija o zagorskom naglasku i u tacnost tvojih zapažanja Titovih govora , ali kao sto bi napisao legendarni Nenad Brixy u svojim prevodima-remek djelima , "fucka mi se" za to kojim naglaskom je Tito govorio.
Tito je bio Velikan i gradjanin svijeta.....
Dovoljno.
Joj, Tito ''antistaljinist''. Je l' to znači da je dozvoljavao sve što Staljin nije dakle slobodne izbore, medije kapitalizam itd...ili se pak protiv Staljina borio staljinističkim metodama?
MEMORANDUM \,
THE WHITE HO USE
WASHINGTON
9EGR]!ill'/NODIS/ XGDS
tito: I would like to hear how you would like to proceed. We don1t have
much time tonight. I think our bilateral relations are good. We dis
cussed international relations in Helsinki. Maybe we coo.ld talk about
the future.
The President: I agree. Mr. President, that our bilateral relations are
excellent. Maybe we could expand on what we touched on earlier - - Greece
and Turkey and the Middle East. Those are areas where the threat of
conflict is great and the dangers that it could bring are very serious. Maybe
we could discuss these things.
Tito: The Middle East is the most troublesome point. I feel that there
is some deterioration and that the situation could get more and more
complicated. Since it is the most serious, I would suggest discussing
it tomorrow.
Perhaps we should discuss security in Europe and what we should
do to promote it. I think that after Helsinki the moral factor will become
important. I have heard that there has been, for example, some new
progress between Greece and Turkey in Vienna. I hear there was also
progress at SALT~
The President: Yes. We made some progress. Not as much as we
hoped, but I think sufficient to lay the ground work for an agreement
this year. The issues are very technical. While I had hoped for more
progress, we did make some and I am reasonably optimistic.
Tito: These talks were just in passing then.
The President: Yes, but we are hoping they will lead to something in
finality. We are also concerned about MBFR. Do you have any advice
for us in this crucial area? We are deadlocked.
Tito: I know very little about them other than the fact that they are
deadlocked. Perhap s Minic can give us something more.
Minic: I know little more about it. But Palme has made a proposal
that the two sides should reduce on each side.
We think reduction would be good also.
Tito: I think there is a connection between the reduction of arms and
Helsinki. Otherwise we haven't done much.
~~/NODIS/XGDS
SECR-EII'{NODIS/XGDS -3
The President: I assure you that we will do our best. We have a
formula and we will attempt a breakthrotgh'o We think the spirit of
Helsinki should push the negotiations forward.
Tito: Reduction of arms certainly fa11s within the Helsinki concept.
It is important not to let thi..r:gs stagnate.
Minic: Some progress should be made. Otherwise the spirit that we now
have would be dissipated.
The President: There was SOme implication that CSCE would be followed
by MBFR. Not an agreement to do so, only an implication.
Kissinger: So far each side has proposed disarming the other. But we
will put forth a serious proposal this fall and should make some progre ss.
The President: We have turned it off for this year but the Congress, if there
is no progress, will renew its efforts to make unilateral force cuts. I will
resist, but it could happen.
Tito: I couldn't believe the Congress would do such a thing.
The President: My Administration never will. But there are members
who would do so. Thus far they are a minority.
Tito: In 1977, after your elections, there will be a summing up of the
Helsinki follow-on.
The President: I am looking forward to attending it as President. Tito: All the international conferences held in Belgrade have been
successful. For example, the first non-aligned conference.
Kissinger: It is now bigger than the two blocs! It's the biggest bloc now.
Tito: It is not a bloc. [Laughter]. There have been so~ rocky days in
the non-aligned group, but we will get by. It is not good to be exclusive
groups. We will discuss it tomorrow. I would like you to understand
our position. .The President: I know you can imagine how much time I, and I assume
Brezhnev, have spent working to implement the Vladivostok accord. We
think that dividing the world into blocs is not the best way to deal with the
8EGHEtt'/NODIS/XGDS
~§QE'I'/NODIS!XGDS -4
probleIlls. In the kind of world we live in today. there can't be the kind
of confrontation and Illilitary activity which took place during your time
and Illine. I will dedicate Illyself to eliIllinating those sources of conflict
that could lead to Illilitary confrontation. Our orientation will be that Wo/.
As I was saying earlier. I recall Dulles saying how important it
was to establish a good relationship with Yugoslavia. Over the years
that relationship has grown and expanded and been highly b:eneficial
to both side s and to the world. The AInerican people as a result have
developed a great affection for the Yugoslav people. The AInerican
people --if I can say it in the right way -- sOIlletiIlles don't understand
criticisIll of our actions. The feeling for Yugoslavia is very strong, and
under those circUInstances criticisIll is easily Illisunderstood. So I would
hope we could each Illoderate our stateIllents•
.!.i!2: I quite agree. A criticisIll can be expressed with friendly words
or in a not friendly way.
Minic: Yugoslavia is entrusted with the preparation for the 1977 Conference
so we will need consultation with all the parties.
The President: We will cooperate cOIllpletely.
Minic: In past tiIlles we have had close cooperation between the foreign
Illinisters and the aInbassadors of our two cruntries.
Kissin~er: I agree. We hope to continue to consult -- and we will consult
before the Special Session next Illonth because we want to Illake a constructive
effort.
Titoi We also want to be constructive. We have had Illany contacts with the
heads of governIllent in Helsinki and with others with WhOIll we have disagree
Illents, and we agree we won't let the press lead our relations. But if there
are differences. we will Illeet and talk theIll out.
The President: I have a very close and personal relationship with
Secretary Kissinger. There are no differences between us. And the
AIllbassador is Illy appointInent. He has Illy full confidence. so we have
a good situation.
Titoj That is the best way -- only a few sources for passing inforIllation.
The President: At the top. inforIllation should COIlle to Ille through the
Secretary. But AIllbassador SilberIllan does have Illy cOIllplete confidence.
S:ECRE'i'/-NODIS! XG DS
...siSGRE9? / NODIS/ XGDS -5
Kissinger: We attach great importance to the understanding between
Yugoslavia and the United States, given the standing of Yugoslavia in
the non-aligned world, and we will do our best to say in close contact.
Tito: Let's clo
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger rti
SUBJECT: Reply to President Tito of Yugoslavia
With the letter at Tab B, President Tito has expressed his appreciation
for the message you sent him on August 10 affirming your commitment
to further improving US-Yugoslav relations, and he has extended an
invitation to you to visit Yugoslavia.
On September 6, Tito sent you another letter (at Tab C) setting forth in
some detail Yugoslav concern over Cyprus, reviewing the diplomatic
contacts his government had undertaken on this is sue, and expressing
the hope that the United States agreed on the need to take every step
possible to resolve the crisis as soon as possible.
Our relations with Yugoslavia were subsequently complicated when Tito
alleged in a September 12 speech that the CIA and NATO had engineered
the Cyprus coup. I took the Yugoslav Foreign Minister to task on this
point during our September meeting in New York. During my visit to
Belgrade on November 4, I had frank and detailed discussions with Tito
and other leading members of the Yugoslav Government, not only on
the even-handed approach we are taking toward Cyprus, but also on the
need to consult at the government-to-government level rather than
voicing any policy disagreement in speeches and in the press. I believe
this point was understood and taken well. As the result of the positive
tone of these consultations with the Yugoslavs, I believe it would now
be appropriate for you to reply to President Tito1
s letters.
A reply at this time would also be propitious because of recent events
in Yugoslavia that have contributed to a more positive attitude toward the
United States. .
zamislite da neki predstavnik balkanskih drzava danas ovako komunicira sa predsjednikom obamom
president:I might say that, back in the times when
I used to talk to John Foster Dulles, he
told me of the excellent relations we had
with Yugoslavia on the question of arms
sales. I realize that there may be some
people in the bureaucracy who have not
given the proper attention and expedited
the request that you have made but when
I get back I will give this my personal
attention and I can assure you that the
matter will be resolved.
tito:We have bureaucrats on both sides. It
was very good of you to raise the question
because that saved me the trouble of
raising it
VjecitiStudent wrote:Da vam nije bilo bravara već decenijama bi živjeli (oni koji prežive) u državi Draže i njegovih potomaka.
5+
ili bolje
čista 10
Ovoj zemlji nema napretka dok ne umru svi oni koji se sjecaju 'dobrih" vremena
Ništa ne brini, s obzirom na izvanredne rezultate kampanje SDA pod nazivom "Raseli i rasprodaj", uskoro u zemlji, osim nekolicine (neo)begovskih porodica, niko drugi neće ni ostati.
drastic wrote:zamislite da neki predstavnik balkanskih drzava danas ovako komunicira sa predsjednikom obamom
Druga su to vremena bila, hladni rat sa SSSR je bio u punom jeku. Interesantno da je NATO smatrao Jugoslaviju svojim igračem, što u principu objašanjava onolike pare i naoružanje.
By May 1955, ... For Western planning purposes, Yugoslavia would continue to function as a strategic necessity and as an unofficial NATO associate member for decades to come.
To se drugu radilo iza leda,nije on jadan znao.
Sto se tice strahota opisanih od strane Zulfikarpasica,indikativno je odsustvo bilo kakve empatije za
stradanja komsija od strane srpskih masa kojima jedino smeta smrad raspadajucih tijela - potpuno identican odnos onome 50-tak godina kasnije(srpska sela u okolini Tomasice kod Prijedora).
drastic wrote:zamislite da neki predstavnik balkanskih drzava danas ovako komunicira sa predsjednikom obamom
president:I might say that, back in the times when
I used to talk to John Foster Dulles, he
told me of the excellent relations we had
with Yugoslavia on the question of arms
sales. I realize that there may be some
people in the bureaucracy who have not
given the proper attention and expedited
the request that you have made but when
I get back I will give this my personal
attention and I can assure you that the
matter will be resolved.
tito:We have bureaucrats on both sides. It
was very good of you to raise the question
because that saved me the trouble of
raising it
Druga vremena, Amerika je tad bila nesto drugo i imala drugacije interese. Neuporedivo.
drastic wrote:zamislite da neki predstavnik balkanskih drzava danas ovako komunicira sa predsjednikom obamom
president:I might say that, back in the times when
I used to talk to John Foster Dulles, he
told me of the excellent relations we had
with Yugoslavia on the question of arms
sales. I realize that there may be some
people in the bureaucracy who have not
given the proper attention and expedited
the request that you have made but when
I get back I will give this my personal
attention and I can assure you that the
matter will be resolved.
tito:We have bureaucrats on both sides. It
was very good of you to raise the question
because that saved me the trouble of
raising it
Druga vremena, Amerika je tad bila nesto drugo i imala drugacije interese. Neuporedivo.
da, imali su interes da im tito sredi kod nesvrstanih jer su bili (najveci blok) da ne izbace izrael iz UN-a.
To se drugu radilo iza leda,nije on jadan znao.
Sto se tice strahota opisanih od strane Zulfikarpasica,indikativno je odsustvo bilo kakve empatije za
stradanja komsija od strane srpskih masa kojima jedino smeta smrad raspadajucih tijela - potpuno identican odnos onome 50-tak godina kasnije(srpska sela u okolini Tomasice kod Prijedora).
Meni je interesantan pristup Josipa Broza, koji ne vidi problem u tome što je zlikovce postavio za oficire, nego u muslimanskim selima, koja su naoružana i ne žele da predaju oružje istim tim koji su im poklali komšije. Istorija se čudno ponavlja.
To se drugu radilo iza leda,nije on jadan znao.
Sto se tice strahota opisanih od strane Zulfikarpasica,indikativno je odsustvo bilo kakve empatije za
stradanja komsija od strane srpskih masa kojima jedino smeta smrad raspadajucih tijela - potpuno identican odnos onome 50-tak godina kasnije(srpska sela u okolini Tomasice kod Prijedora).
Meni je interesantan pristup Josipa Broza, koji ne vidi problem u tome što je zlikovce postavio za oficire, nego u muslimanskim selima, koja su naoružana i ne žele da predaju oružje istim tim koji su im poklali komšije. Istorija se čudno ponavlja.
Svakako i to,samo je meni puno strasnije ovo okretanje glave i indiferentnost prema pocinjenim zlocinima.
Did Yugoslav dictator Tito poison Stalin? Historian claims he killed rival after being the target of 22 Soviet assassination attempts
When Russian leader Josef Stalin died, on March 5 in 1953, a letter was found in his office that had been written by Yugoslavian leader Josip Broz Tito.
The two leaders were bitter enemies, after Tito had used World War II as an opportunity to spark a revolution and lead Yugoslavia to independence from Soviet influence.
A combination of pride, fear and jealousy had spurred Stalin to attempt to have Tito killed - and no less than 22 assassination attempts had been made in the years after the war.
Tito's letter in Stalin's office read: 'Stop sending people to kill me. We've already captured five of them, one of them with a bomb and another with a rifle... If you don't stop sending killers, I'll send one to Moscow, and I won't have to send a second.'
Now a Slovenian historian suggests Stalin was poisoned rather than suffering a fatal stroke - and points the finger of suspicion directly at Tito.
In his book Tito In Tovarisi, historian Joze Pirjavec puts forward mainly circumstantial evidence to support his poisoning theory. Crucially, however, he has used former Yugoslav archives that have been overlooked by many historians.
LBVIEW wrote:
Svakako i to,samo je meni puno strasnije ovo okretanje glave i indiferentnost prema pocinjenim zlocinima.
Slažem se. Za to je zaslužna vEkovna propaganda o ugroženosti, koja je i danas aktivna.
Međutim, tema je Joža, pa sam zato i postavio ovaj tekst. Značajan je radi uvida u pristup rješavanja međunacionalnih sukoba, na osnovu čega se može vidjeti razlog doživotnog predsjedovanja.
drastic wrote:zamislite da neki predstavnik balkanskih drzava danas ovako komunicira sa predsjednikom obamom
Druga su to vremena bila, hladni rat sa SSSR je bio u punom jeku. Interesantno da je NATO smatrao Jugoslaviju svojim igračem, što u principu objašanjava onolike pare i naoružanje.
By May 1955, ... For Western planning purposes, Yugoslavia would continue to function as a strategic necessity and as an unofficial NATO associate member for decades to come.
Ma da.....sticaj okolnosti je zapravo posljedica Titove politike......sve i jedna komunisticka zemlja je mogla reci ne Staljinu i biti nezavisna.....u cemu je razlika izmedju Poljske, Cehoslovacke i Jugoslavije ? Zasto su sve cutale a samo Jugoslavija nije ?
E pa reci cu ti u cemu je razlika , Jugoslavija je imala Tita......
drastic wrote:zamislite da neki predstavnik balkanskih drzava danas ovako komunicira sa predsjednikom obamom
Druga su to vremena bila, hladni rat sa SSSR je bio u punom jeku. Interesantno da je NATO smatrao Jugoslaviju svojim igračem, što u principu objašanjava onolike pare i naoružanje.
By May 1955, ... For Western planning purposes, Yugoslavia would continue to function as a strategic necessity and as an unofficial NATO associate member for decades to come.
Ma da.....sticaj okolnosti je zapravo posljedica Titove politike......sve i jedna komunisticka zemlja je mogla reci ne Staljinu i biti nezavisna.....u cemu je razlika izmedju Poljske, Cehoslovacke i Jugoslavije ? Zasto su sve cutale a samo Jugoslavija nije ?
E pa reci cu ti u cemu je razlika , Jugoslavija je imala Tita......
Jugoslavija- Nagodba 50 % utjecaja zapadni saveznici 50 % utjecaja sovjeti. Mađarska se također pokušala osamostalit 1956 no brzo je reokupirana od crvne armije,CH 1968 bez uspjeha isti razlog,Poljka 1980 - poljska vojska izvela puč da ne došli sovjeti, na istoku Njemačke jake sovjetske snage nisu ni odlazile od svršetka wwii,rumunjska se je jedino djelomično distancirala od Moskve što su ovi tolerirali
daddy-kool wrote:
Druga su to vremena bila, hladni rat sa SSSR je bio u punom jeku. Interesantno da je NATO smatrao Jugoslaviju svojim igračem, što u principu objašanjava onolike pare i naoružanje.
Ma da.....sticaj okolnosti je zapravo posljedica Titove politike......sve i jedna komunisticka zemlja je mogla reci ne Staljinu i biti nezavisna.....u cemu je razlika izmedju Poljske, Cehoslovacke i Jugoslavije ? Zasto su sve cutale a samo Jugoslavija nije ?
E pa reci cu ti u cemu je razlika , Jugoslavija je imala Tita......
Jugoslavija- Nagodba 50 % utjecaja zapadni saveznici 50 % utjecaja sovjeti. Mađarska se također pokušala osamostalit 1956 no brzo je reokupirana od crvne armije,CH 1968 bez uspjeha isti razlog,Poljka 1980 - poljska vojska izvela puč da ne došli sovjeti, na istoku Njemačke jake sovjetske snage nisu ni odlazile od svršetka wwii,rumunjska se je jedino djelomično distancirala od Moskve što su ovi tolerirali
I Mađarska je bila dogovorena 50:50, pa na kraju bi, ko je šta jamio, jamio.
VjecitiStudent wrote:
I Mađarska je bila dogovorena 50:50, pa na kraju bi, ko je šta jamio, jamio.
Preinake nagodbe! https://hr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gr%C4%8Dk ... 1anski_rat
U tom trenutku je malo toga stajalo na putu ELASu da preuzme potpunu kontrolu nad cjelokupnom državom. Ali ELAS to nije ni pokušao, slijedivši ipak instrukcije SSSRa, a one su glasile da se nikako ne smije ugroziti jedinstvo Antihitlerovske koalicije, i time ugoziti Staljinove veće poslijeratne planove. Generalno to je bio i rezultat Teheranske konferencije i dogovora Churchill - Staljin o podjeli utjecaja na Balkanu, po kojem Grčka ulazi/ostaje u zapadnoj sferi utjecaja.
