Zanimljiv tred o potrebama ukr armije za 2024 i 2025.god
Ima i link za cjelokupan tekst ut itu
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Shashank Joshi
@shashj
The current challenge is to be realistic about Russian capacity in Ukraine without being fatalistic about Ukraine's prospects. This short 24-page paper by Estonia's defence ministry is a welcome effort at setting out a potential strategy. Some highlights:
https://kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/def ... cess_0.pdf
"It is inherently simple to fall into a state of despair as Russia continues to wage its brutal war for the second year, with ... its war resources equally limitless. Shaping the information space in such a way is exactly what Russia is counting on"
"While exact estimates vary, there is general consensus that in the very short term (up to 2 years) Russia lacks the conventional capability required for escalating against NATO directly, because of its force degradation and commitments"
"Russia ... increasingly faces the prospect of consistent and expanding war costs flooding the budgetary agenda under the conditions of rapidly declining resources and a very short stack of backup plans"
Agree: "The immediate & urgent objective is changing Russia’s assessment that the war could be wrapped up in 2024. Instead
, 2024 will be a year of strategic defence for Ukraine—a time to build up the necessary military and industrial base to defeat Russia"
"the average yearly growth in real terms [defence spending] among European NATO members and Canada collectively remains around €10 billion—below 1% of NATO’s total budget estimate this year."
Estonia MoD says Ru can train 130,000 troops into "cohered units" every six months. "The objective
therefore should be to inflict a sustained rate of attrition of at least 50,000 killed & severely wounded ... per six months" to prevent offensive capacity. kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/default/…
West has trained "close to 100,000 personnel over 20 months. The 30,000- troop European effort is estimated to have cost slightly over €100 million, placing the total cost estimate as low as approximately €350 million (or €3500 per trained soldier)."
Probably ambitious for '24? "In 2024, the aim should be to expand Ukrainian operations from brigade enabled company actions, to the ability to execute brigade attacks. In 2025, the aim should be for the AFU to conduct simultaneous brigade attacks..."
Estonia MoD, to its credit, sets priorities: 1/ staff officers for Ukr brigades/battalions. 2/ Expansion of collective training at battalion level in Europe. 3/ Better fire control / command & control systems to help provide fire to front line units. kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/default/…
"The EU has delivered around 300,000 out of the one million artillery rounds agreed, in addition to earlier... contributions. The U.S. has provided more than 2,000,000 155mm artillery rounds, complemented by more than a million rounds of other calibres"
Ukraine "requires a minimum of 200,000 rounds per month to retain localised fire superiority. Sustaining this rate of fire will empty European and U.S. stockpiles over 2024 and will require significant foreign purchases of ammunition."
"estimates based on public data [on European shell production] would place the 2023 rate between 480,000 and 700,000 rounds. Current monthly figures could therefore
average at 50,000 rounds, doubling the capacity from early 2023"
"Meeting Ukraine’s minimum demand rate collectively during 2025 would therefore require a European effort of 140% increase over 2024. Efforts to increase European production have been stymied by each European state pursuing separate [and] small orders"
"Russia’s total production & recovery of artillery ammunition will reach 3.5m units in 2023, representing a more than threefold increase from the previous year’s production. In 2024, production and recovery will increase further ... up to 4.5m units" kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/default/…
"It is assessed that Ukraine will need 1500-2000 barrels per year with each unit costing up to €900,000. Given the limited number of barrel machines, particular focus should be provided for companies to expand barrel manufacturing."
"As a minimum, industrial investment therefore should aim to provide Ukraine a supply of 8760 GMLRS per year by 2025 ... With the estimated cost per one rocket approximately €160,000, the total cost of minimum military requirement annually is approximately €1.4 billion"
"
A critical capability in this regard is the manufacture of explosive energetics. There is a strong argument for the EU to pioneer the funding of R&D of new explosive energetics and new methods of manufacturing"
"It is assessed that the EU could refurbish approx. 15,000 rounds per month. Refurbishment is estimated to be priced at 30-50% of the new ammunition price, while delivery times could be considerably faster"
Intriguing idea. "For NATO members to meet Ukraine’s and their own needs for UAVs in conflict and to have a resilient supply chain to build them, it is necessary for Europe to make a simple platoon UAV at scale"
Not sure on this, though. "
The aim should be to produce 5000 per month at a price below €2500 per unit (€150 million annually). These same UAVs should be used to compete with DJI on the civilian market"
"In addition, European NATO members must collaborate to scale the production of fixed wing UAVs with a range beyond 80 km that are able to transmit data in real time and reliably fly in a dense electronic warfare (EW) and GPS-denied environment"
Behold the Euro-Shahed. "This should be able to operate day or night, have a modular payload, and fly...
It should be producible at a unit price below €200,000 and in volumes of at least 3168 airframes per year (€633.6 million annually)."
Russian prod. of longer-range strike systems "could reach 200 strike systems per month over 2024. With intercepts usually requiring the launch of two interceptors, this suggests that there is a sustained demand trending towards 400 interceptors per month"
F-16s by xmas: "the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Belgium have already committed to donating F-16 fighter jets...While the total number of the jets is undisclosed, the first deliveries are scheduled to take place before the end of this year"
"For achieving DCA capacity, Ukraine would need 20 aircraft for two squadrons of eight each, to fly 2x two-ships per day, plus four reserves/attrition replacements. The total cost estimate for the aircraft would be around €3 billion,"
https://kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/def ... cess_0.pdf
Note: attrition, not decisive blow. "By 2025, the collective efforts...will have provided a sufficient increase of critical skills, capabilities and stockpiles for Ukraine, unlocking the power for inflicting the required level of attrition on Russia." kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/default/…
https://kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/def ... cess_0.pdf
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