Forum Klix.ba

Rugafet wrote:

decembar2017 wrote: Ali mnogo je lakse , iz razlicitih razloga, prebaciti krivicu na politicare, na oficire, na drugoga umjesto priznati da iako je neko na terenu da nemas uvijek pregled citave situacije i da nekada desavanja imaju skroz drugaciji razlog nego sto to izgleda na prvi pogled. I to je samo jedan primjer od nebrojenih da " ja bio tu, ja znam " ne znaci bas puno. Isto tako i to tvoje " ja bio , ja znam ".

Hehe da bas, jadni politicari vazda njih za nesto krive. Pogotovo u ratu kad se zna da su vojnici glavni krivci za sve. Oni bezobraznici oslobadjaju teritoriju suverene medjunarodno priznate drzave, pa kasnije jadni politicari moraju da se crvene pred neprijateljem i naredjuju povlacenje. Sram ih moze biti, dok je Alija do po'ne mislio jedno od po'ne drugo i razbijao glavu, oni tamo napreduju prema Banjoj Luci i ka ozrenskim selima.

madner wrote:Vise je Sarajevo visilo

Izasla je neki dan monografija prvog korpusa, pogledaj brojno stanje i bice ti jasno da VRS nije 95 imao apsolutno nikakvu sansu da ugrozi isto.

Stvarno mi zao covjeka, 101 se klonirao.

Point. wrote:Činjenica je da je međunarodna zajednica zaustavila ARBiH i zaprijetila sankcijama ukoliko se ne zaustavi ofanziva. To su potvrdili i rahmetlije Alija i Richard Holdbrook. Ima ja mislim u onom dokumentarcu Pad Jugoslavije ili tako nekako.

madner wrote:

Point. wrote:Činjenica je da je međunarodna zajednica zaustavila ARBiH i zaprijetila sankcijama ukoliko se ne zaustavi ofanziva. To su potvrdili i rahmetlije Alija i Richard Holdbrook. Ima ja mislim u onom dokumentarcu Pad Jugoslavije ili tako nekako.

Cinjenica je da to ne bi uradila.

Clintonu je trebao brz rezultat prije izbora, ali da se nisu prihvatili uslovi nista lose se ne bi dogodilo po BiH. Congres je tada vec izglasao vojnu pomoc, javnost je bila potpuno ujedinjena i na strani Sarajeva u svim zapadnim zemljama.

decembar2017 wrote:

madner wrote:Vise je Sarajevo visilo

Izasla je neki dan monografija prvog korpusa, pogledaj brojno stanje i bice ti jasno da VRS nije 95 imao apsolutno nikakvu sansu da ugrozi isto.

Stvarno mi zao covjeka, 101 se klonirao.

A to brojno stanje na papiru mozes da koristis kao papir u hali i ni za sta drugo. Sarajevo nije moglo da doceka jos jednu zimu , ni fizicki a ni psihicki, pod granatama, opkoljeno, bez vode, struje, hrane, lijekova. Gdje su najblizi cetnicki polozaji od grada bili na pistoljskom odstojanju a do BL Armija ni sa haubicama nije mogla da dobaci al eto, BL visila u zraku i samo sto nije pala

decembar2017 wrote:

madner wrote:

Point. wrote:Činjenica je da je međunarodna zajednica zaustavila ARBiH i zaprijetila sankcijama ukoliko se ne zaustavi ofanziva. To su potvrdili i rahmetlije Alija i Richard Holdbrook. Ima ja mislim u onom dokumentarcu Pad Jugoslavije ili tako nekako.

Cinjenica je da to ne bi uradila.

Clintonu je trebao brz rezultat prije izbora, ali da se nisu prihvatili uslovi nista lose se ne bi dogodilo po BiH. Congres je tada vec izglasao vojnu pomoc, javnost je bila potpuno ujedinjena i na strani Sarajeva u svim zapadnim zemljama.

Upravo tako kada se cita samo Avaz i tiket iz kladionice. Kada bi se pogledalo sta su Ameikanci planirali za stranu koja ne bi potpisala Dejton stvari izgledaju mnogo drugacije.

madner wrote:

decembar2017 wrote:

madner wrote:
Cinjenica je da to ne bi uradila.

Clintonu je trebao brz rezultat prije izbora, ali da se nisu prihvatili uslovi nista lose se ne bi dogodilo po BiH. Congres je tada vec izglasao vojnu pomoc, javnost je bila potpuno ujedinjena i na strani Sarajeva u svim zapadnim zemljama.

Upravo tako kada se cita samo Avaz i tiket iz kladionice. Kada bi se pogledalo sta su Ameikanci planirali za stranu koja ne bi potpisala Dejton stvari izgledaju mnogo drugacije.

Ne lupetaj.
Govorim upravo o tome sta su planirali.

madner wrote:Ko je planirao i kako je to mislio sprovesti?

Jos jednom, Kongres USA je vec izglasao vojnu pomoc za BiH.
Lupas gluposti jer je SDA itekako odgovaralo da ne poteze ovo pitanje. Ovako je odgovornost kod drugog.

decembar2017 wrote:

madner wrote:Ko je planirao i kako je to mislio sprovesti?

Jos jednom, Kongres USA je vec izglasao vojnu pomoc za BiH.
Lupas gluposti jer je SDA itekako odgovaralo da ne poteze ovo pitanje. Ovako je odgovornost kod drugog.

stavio sam ti link deklasifikovanih zvanicnih dokumenata o americkoj poltici u to vrijeme, od 1991-1995, prijedlozi, planovi, analize, sve ti je tu , treba samo citati.

To sto je kongres izglasao pomoc nema nikakve veze, klinton je mogao to da blokira, direktno ili indirektno ali nije ni to bilo ono najgore. Mogao je, da je bilo prisiljen i da potpise da amerika prodaje oruzje za Armiju ali je isto tako mogao da namigne franji da ovaj to blokira i sta imas od papira kada oruzje ne moze fizicki da stigne na teren ?

Da li je tebi poznato da su ustase blokirale prolazak onih prvih pojacanja za Krajinu kada su krenuli iz Travnika ? Kada je svaki vojnik vrijedio zlata oni su blokirali citav konvoj i tek poslije intervencije i pritiska na franju od amerikanaca oni su pusteni ali i tada bez teskg naoruzanja ? Da li ti je to poznato da su ustase blokirali kretanje Armije i njeno naoruzavanje ?

I po tebi da je alija odje*o klintona i naredio armiji da nastavi dalje franjo bi sjedio sa strane i gledao kako armija ide prema BL i postaje sve jaca i jaca a time njegov san o granicama hrvatske u Bosni sve slabiji i slabiji ???? Pricamo o realnosti a ne o bajkama iz kafana i kladionica.

Bosnian Government leaders appear divided over how far to compromise on their
long-standing goal of building a unitary multi-ethnic state. ---
Izetbegovic's own statements show that he probably would prefer to head a compact
Muslim state rather than enter into complicated power-sharing arrangements with
Croats and Serbs.
Despite his personal preferences, however, the government's long-standing goal of
creating a unitary state and the broad support this objective enjoys with the Bosnian
population, limit Izetbegovic's room to compromise unless the unitary state option is
foreclosed.by outside developments, such as a major breakdown of the Federation. In
fact, official Bosnian Government statements between the signing of the Geneva
principles and the talks this week in New York were marked by their commitment to a
unitary state and strong denials that Sarajevo would agree to a weak central
government.

Izetbegovic's bottom line that a settlement is needed to gain back
Muslim territory at the negotiating table is undercut by their recent.
military successes, while strengthening support for Silajdzic's
maximalist demands for creating a unitary state.
If Croatian support for the Bosnian Government wanes--as Bosnian leaders already
fear--and the Bosnian Serbs stabilize the front, Sarajevo probably will see the limits
of its military ca abilities, and this will strengthen advocates of a negotiated
settlement

madner wrote:
Budi dobar pa nam daj link za planove ako Alija ne prihvati Deyton.

Clinton je mogao jednom da blokira, ali posto su i D i R bili za, ne dugo.

Naravno da mi je poznato, zatvorili su napredak 7. korpusa prema BL. Zato i prebacivanje snaga na prostor 5. korpusa. Nije bila intervencija USA nego su dobili ultimatum od ARBiH, spremila se ofanziva na enklave HVO u Bosni kao odgovor.

Franjo je imao mnoge planove, vecina mu je propala. Imao je problem da su sve zapadne sile bile za intervenciju, a Hrvatska nije sama dobro stajala. No to je rizik kada si glavni.
Mozda bi i Slobo poslao VJ. Moze biti svasta, ali ne govorimo o tome, nego o cinjenici da je Alija imao izbor i svjesno se odlucio za ovo.

madner wrote:Dobro znaci taj dokument ne postoji, lagao si.

Nije ljepo lagati, pogotovo ovako ofirno.

Interests and Objectives
Throughout the conflict, we have sought to protect several core
U.S. interests: maintaining our strategic relationship with key
Allies and protecting the credibility of NATO; avoiding a
conflict with Russia that could undermine our efforts to promote
reform and international cooperation; preventing the spread of
the Bosnian conflict into a wider Balkan war that could
destabilize southeastern Europe and draw in U.S. allies; and
ensuring that the use of force to change borders and acts of
.genocide do not become legitimate forms of behavior in post-Cold
War Europe.
Along with these core interests, we have pursued a range of more
specific objectives, but have never set clear priorities among
them:
* To stop or limit the fighting.
* To maintain relief supplies and reduce human suffering.
- -To prevent the establishment by force of a Greater Serbia.
* To achieve a negotiated settlement acceptable to all parties
that reverses at least some Serb territorial conquests and
preserves the territorial- integrity and international identity
of Bosnia,- Croatia and other ex-Yugoslav states.
* To prevent the spread of conflict to Kosovo, Macedonia,
Albania and beyond.
e To keep U.S. ground forces out except in the context of
implementing a political settlement,

3. On training pro-government forces in Bosnia in
response to a request last month from Senator Dole. OSD and
JCS are recommending a very limited effort that would
include include training for a few federation officers at US
military schools. They conclude that more robust efforts--
including unit level training in neighboring countries, as
advocated by Dole--would undermine the spirit of the arms
embargo and lead the US to become a co-belligerent. TAB E
behind MEETING PAPERS includes the options paper on training
issues.

madner wrote:Nije ljepo lagati, cekamo dokument sta se spremalo ako Alija ne bi prihvatio Deyton.

Inace taj dio koji citiras je razlog za podrsku koju smo i dobili, malo si i nepismen.

Principals-agreed-that-we should continue to support the BosnianGovenment's goal of a political settlement consistent with the Contact Group proposal, but that we should seek to lower public expectations. of immediate success; we should also avoid nurturing any illusions on the part of the Bosnian Government that we can deliver a settlement or that the U.S. or NATO will intervene militarily on their behalf.

One obvious way to put pressure on the Muslims to
extend the cease-fire would be to cut off the flow
of weapons to them. (This probably will not
appear in the State paper!)

Effective enforcement of arms embargo,especially the cut-.off of Iranian air-deliveries ,culd make Sarajevo more receptive to a diplomatic settlement.

Croatia's attitudes are almost as crucial as Serbia's in determining the
outcome of the conflict in Bosnia. Zagreb remains focused on its goal of reintegrating
the Serb-controlled. regions of Croatia and views the fighting in Bosnia as subordinate
to achieving this aim. At the same time, Croatia does not want to see a vastly
improved Bosnian Government army that could threaten Bosnian Croat regions.
Because any supplies to the Bosnian Government must transit Croat territory, Zagreb
has ultimate controls over the Muslims' access to outside world and will use this
control to prevent any actions that it considers threatening.

Zagreb will allow enough support through to the Muslims to ensure
that they can continue to tie down the maximum number of Bosnian
Serb forces, thereby maintaining the conflict for several years or until
Croatia has retaken the Krajina. It will probably continue to urge
Bosnian Croat forces to support the government in retaking territory of
mutual interest.

Croatia would block any major shipment of heavy weapons to the
Bosnian Government because of concern over a substantially
strengthened Muslim force. In addition, Zagreb is not likely to allow
the deployment or resupply of major Islamic forces to Bosnia.

Croatia, especially if it had already
retaken the Krajina, could accelerate the defeat of the Bosnian
Government by cutting off outside support completely or through
direct intervention against the Muslims. Senior Croat officials
continue to worry about the long-term effects of Islamic influence in
Bosnia, and a variety of reporting indicates that Serbian leader
Milosevic and Croatian President Tudjman have discussed dividing
Bosnia. A complete cutoff of supplies, and the intervention of the
Serbian Army could lead to the collapse of Bosnian Government
resistance in less than six months. If the Croatian Army joined in this
assault Bosnian Government forces could be quickly overwhelmed.

Pressing for a political settlement this year: The best way of avoiding an UNPROFOR withdrawal
and the new challenges of a post-withdrawal strategy would be to make an all-out effort at
.obtaining a political settlement this year. 'The strengthened UNPROFOR and more aggressive use
of NATO air power described above will restore some of the leverage we have lost over the past
year visa-vis the Bosnian Serbs. But we will also need to offer some new inducements to break the
logjam surrounding "acceptance" of the Contact Group plan. The loss of Srebrenica and Zepa may
open the way to more realistic territorial solutions, and we will need to have a heart-to-heart
discussion with the Bosnians aimed at eliciting greater flexibility on the map, constitutional arrangements,
and possibly the Bosnien Serbs right to secede from the Union after the initial period. We
will also need to sweeten our offers to Milosevic in order to encourage him to put real pressure on
the Bosnian Serbs. At Annex I is a more detailed gameplan for an early diplomatic breakthrough