Hocete surovu realnost, necete Kuperove bajke evo vam onda Stefana, Madner je vec citao, nisam htio dijeliti jer je bio vikend da ne kvarim navijanje. Sve ovo Cooper zna jer se redovno cuje sa Stefanom moze se reci da su prijatelji Stefan redovno komentarise njegove upise na FB...
Stavljam na engleskom jer Stefana katastrofalno prevode masinski..
August 30 – Day 553 – Rabotyne
Hi FB!
More missiles and drones last night in Kyiv, I guess that was to punish us for all the Russian air force planes UAF drones have been burning in Russia. Whatever.
OK, I have been trying to post a review for about the last 24 hours and when I do Facebook deletes it on grounds I "violated cybersecurity". No idea what that means.
As a work-around the FB thing and a test, here is a piece of that review. It's about Rabotyne. I would add that today the news reports continue, situation basically unchanged, the UAF seems to hold the village and maybe is expanding its footprint, but we really can't be sure. But at minimum, this isn't a breakthrough, this is armies fighting over ground.
Now the text on Rabotyne. I am all for the UAF winning the war, but, I think it's time to take a breath. Let's not forget the UAF has been announcing Robotyne was cleared of the enemy and under UAF control, for pretty much every day for the past week. This is not to say I don’t believe the Ukrainians have the ville, as noted I think they do. But my points are:
1. The Russians keep trying to take it back, clearly by re-occupying several buildings in the south of the town. By my count they appear to have forced the Ukrainians to go through the blast-and-reoccupy some "un-liberated" buildings in the south of the village, on at least three separate days.
2. The Ukrainian army was under some kind of internal pressure to declare Rabotyne “captured”. Their public relations people clearly were trying very hard to make liberation an established fact – at times apparently a little in the face of the klix situation – for the last several days. Please understand me clearly, I’m not accusing the UAF of outright lying.
But I know of news agencies that published material, confirmed, from the front, of the situation in Rabotyne, and the UAF got in touch lickety-split and forced the reports pulled out of public view. This is both “Ukraine controls Rabotyne” and “The Russians are still in Rabotyne”. It is obvious there is a big internal pressure in the UAF to show progress and keep the narrative of progress going.
I assume this is because the Ukrainians understand the Republicans in America are debating Ukraine among other things right now, and the last thing Kyiv needs is documented proof of a stalled offensive in Ukraine, hence the more than normal willingness by the UAF to torque down on the media. Again, I’m not saying they’re inventing stories or faking facts, but it’s pretty obvious when the UAF is ueber-sensitive about what’s being reported about Ukrainian military activity and when it doesn’t really care, and definitely keywords “Rabotyne” and “Ukrainian offensive” are under UAF laser-focus right now. They are obsessing about managing that narrative.
As for me, more generally, if we are talking "Ukrainian offensive" I see the UAF advancing slowly and VERY deliberately woodline to woodline, in company-sized attacks with plenty of reconnaissance.
How? Well, a lot of this is speculation because the UAF doesn't let independent media see, (@lajkujMe blokiran im je pristup frontu samo Butusov i slicni mogu doci na ratiste) but it based on various sources it looks to me they pick a time and place, shell the woodline and the Russian positions, and then move in and clear the woodline and positions from one end to the other.
This is very clearly the Ukrainian tactics vs. the Russian fortifications, over time you can see it getting better honed, and the impression I get is that the losses although continuing are under control and the main thing is the Russians do not seem to have a counter. If the Ukrainians choose to attack a Russian position and kill, wound or force to run the defenders, there doesn’t seem to be much the Russians can do to stop it.
The bottom line on that tactic is, that means the UAF until something changes will be advancing one field at a time, at a pace of deliberate attacks, consolidating after every attack. Assuming no delays from Russian counterattacks – and as we have seen, the Russians do counterattack and it does introduce delay – the real-life on the ground pace of places where the UAF chooses to attack, AT BEST, is maybe a kilometer a week. That's the real life sustained rate of advance we're seeing right now, and that's over three months.
Of course that pace may accelerate. Perhaps the UAF is past one of the RF main defense belts, but, if we are prudent we need to assume the RF is building more directly in the UAF's path.
There is always a change of a major break in morale, as I have noted more than once the scenario of 1905, 1917, 1941 and 1989 when the Russian army just decides it is sick of fighting and basically quits, remains a possibility. The Russian economy is getting worse, prices are rising, the funerals are more frequent. Public unrest in Russia forcing a curtailment of the war is far from impossible.
But, until that or some other tipping point comes, if you want to predict the progress of the war and the UAF’s counteroffensive, look at a map, find the current southern front line, count kilometers from that front line to roughly the Perekop Isthmus, and multiply by weeks to figure out how long it will take the UAF to get there. Roughly, that's 40-50 weeks, assuming the pace of the offensive doesn't slow.
Again, there is always a chance the Russian army’s morale will break, or the Russians will run out of troops to feed into to the fight. Western 155mm shell deliveries to the UAF will certainly increase over time.
But hoping something like that will deliver a breakthrough and a decisive defeat of Russian forces really isn't a coherent war strategy.
That's why the Ukrainians, I think, have added systematic deep strikes by drones to the mix. More on that in a subsequent post (assuming FB allows it). Meanwhile, here's a link to a KP news article on the drone bombardment theme.
Stefanov odlican clanak u Kijev Postu
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/21010
