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The Israeli army never occupied Ayta ash-Sha'b. According to Harel and Issacharoff, the town became "a symbol of Israel's performance in the war, the village where it all began, where the IDF thrashed about for four weeks and never succeeded in taking."[50] Exum described Hizbullah's "tenacity" in the defense of the border villages as "the biggest surprise of the war" and the performance of the village units as "exceptional".[13]
The Carmeli Brigade pulled a battalion out of the town, after one of its soldiers was killed, in what was described as a "tactical retreat".[54] The performance of the Carmeli Brigade was afterwards singled out (together with another unit, the 366th Division) for particular harsh criticism. It displayed a "lack of determination, an unnecessary retreat and a misunderstanding of the bigger picture. Much of the blame was placed on the top brass, but the [two] brigades were left thoroughly shaken by the war."[55] After the war a committee, headed by Col. (res) Yoram Yair, sharply criticized the conduct of 91st Division during the war, including the battle of Ayta ash-Sha'b. The battle was called "the black hole of the war".[56] Brig.-Gen. Gal Hirsch, the commanding officer under which the Carmeli Brigade served during the war, was fired a few months after the war.[57]
The commander of the Northern Command, Gen. Udi Adam, was practically fired already on Aug 8, after the repeated failures to capture Bint Jbeil and Ayta ash-Sha'b. Chief of Staff Halutz sent his deputy, Maj.-Gen. Moshe Kaplinsky, to Northern Command, to serve as his "coordinator" beside Adam. Adam formally resigned from the army in September. Chief of Staff Dan Halutz himself resigned in January 2007.[58][59]
Veteran Israeli war correspondent Ron Ben-Yishai claimed that the problem was not limited to the commanding officers. He claimed that a "crybaby culture" had developed among the soldiers of the Israeli army. Almost every Israeli offensive operation in the war, including those in Ayta ash-Sha'b, were called off as soon as resistance was encountered and casualties were sustained, even though IDF in almost every clash enjoyed superiority, both in terms of numbers and firepower. Soldiers often abandoned their missions and focused all efforts on evacuating casualties from the battlefield rather than pursue their objectives.[60]
Gilad Sharon asked in a column in Yedioth Ahronoth after the war: "How could it be that after a month of war, our soldiers were still being wounded among the still-standing houses of the village of Aita al-Shaab, literately hundreds of meters from the location of the abduction that sparked the war?"[61]
Casualties
Journalist Simon Assaf who visited Ayta ash-Sha'b shortly after the cease-fire says that eight local fighters were killed and six civilians, claiming to have seen the 14 graves at the local cemetery.[3] A Washington Post report, citing local residents, confirmed that eight Hizbullah guerrillas were killed in the town.[4] Nir Rosen and Hannah Alam of McClatchy claimed that nine local fighters died in the battle.[5][8] The Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth confirmed that around ten local Hizbullah fighters were killed in the battle in addition to other fighters that arrived to the battle.[7] The IDF, on the other hand, claimed that 40 Hizbullah guerrillas were killed in the battle.[23] The Lebanese daily as-Safir about a year later published a casualty list that included the names of 11 Hizbullah fighters, including non-locals, and 7 "civilian martyrs" from the town. Another Ayta resident, Muhammad Wahbi Surour, was also named as a martyr of Ayta, but he died in the fighting around the village of Barish further to the north.[6] One of those named by as-Safir, Hassan Da’iq, also appear on a list of martyrs from the town of Tayiba published on the local website.[62] The local website identifies him as a native of Tayiba who was killed in the "battles of Ayta ash-Sha'b". His name was given as Muhammad Mahmoud Da’iq, adding that his "nom-du-guerre" was Hassan.
Two Hizbullah fighters were taken prisoner by the IDF during the battle of Ayta ash-Sha'b.[10] The captured fighters were not recognized as prisoners-of-war.[63] In September 2006 the two prisoners were put on trial, together with a third prisoner, Mahir Kourani, who was captured a few days later at the village of Shihin. The three were accused of a long series of criminal offenses, including "providing service to an illegal association," "weapons training in Iran and Lebanon without government permission," "conspiracy to commit a crime," and "conspiracy to commit murder" as well as participation in the kidnapping and attempted kidnapping of Israeli soldiers.[10] Before the trial was concluded the three prisoners (including the fourth prisoner, Khadr Zaidan, who was captured at al-Ghandouriya) were released in the 2008 prisoner exchange.
According to a spokesman for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, only 100 of the 1300 houses in the town remained after the war.[64] In spite of the wide spread destruction in Ayta ash-Sha'b there were surprisingly few civilian casualties. According to Lebanese sources only seven civilian residents were killed in the war. The main reason for this seems to have been that the great majority of the civilian population had been evacuated from the town early in the conflict.
Za razliku od Al-Kaide, Isila i ostalih ogranaka, Hizbullah je s juga odmah evakuirao civile i momacki, sa par stotina boraca, stao naspram sile od 30000 vojnika, sa svom oklopnomehanizovanom masinerijom i avijacijom... I pobijedio.
Zakljucak:
The Israeli army never occupied Ayta ash-Sha'b. According to Harel and Issacharoff, the town became "a symbol of Israel's performance in the war, the village where it all began, where the IDF thrashed about for four weeks and never succeeded in taking."[50] Exum described Hizbullah's "tenacity" in the defense of the border villages as "the biggest surprise of the war" and the performance of the village units as "exceptional".[13]
The Carmeli Brigade pulled a battalion out of the town, after one of its soldiers was killed, in what was described as a "tactical retreat".[54] The performance of the Carmeli Brigade was afterwards singled out (together with another unit, the 366th Division) for particular harsh criticism. It displayed a "lack of determination, an unnecessary retreat and a misunderstanding of the bigger picture. Much of the blame was placed on the top brass, but the [two] brigades were left thoroughly shaken by the war."[55] After the war a committee, headed by Col. (res) Yoram Yair, sharply criticized the conduct of 91st Division during the war, including the battle of Ayta ash-Sha'b. The battle was called "the black hole of the war".[56] Brig.-Gen. Gal Hirsch, the commanding officer under which the Carmeli Brigade served during the war, was fired a few months after the war.[57]
The commander of the Northern Command, Gen. Udi Adam, was practically fired already on Aug 8, after the repeated failures to capture Bint Jbeil and Ayta ash-Sha'b. Chief of Staff Halutz sent his deputy, Maj.-Gen. Moshe Kaplinsky, to Northern Command, to serve as his "coordinator" beside Adam. Adam formally resigned from the army in September. Chief of Staff Dan Halutz himself resigned in January 2007.[58][59]
Veteran Israeli war correspondent Ron Ben-Yishai claimed that the problem was not limited to the commanding officers. He claimed that a "crybaby culture" had developed among the soldiers of the Israeli army. Almost every Israeli offensive operation in the war, including those in Ayta ash-Sha'b, were called off as soon as resistance was encountered and casualties were sustained, even though IDF in almost every clash enjoyed superiority, both in terms of numbers and firepower. Soldiers often abandoned their missions and focused all efforts on evacuating casualties from the battlefield rather than pursue their objectives.[60]
Gilad Sharon asked in a column in Yedioth Ahronoth after the war: "How could it be that after a month of war, our soldiers were still being wounded among the still-standing houses of the village of Aita al-Shaab, literately hundreds of meters from the location of the abduction that sparked the war?"[61]
