U Londonu uhapsen Ejup Ganic

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http://www.dnevniavaz.ba/dogadjaji/iz-minute-u-minutu/sramno-velika-britanija-odobrila-izrucenje-ganica-srbiji

Pocecu da sumnjam i u Avazove citulje

Hahahahahahaha

[Truba]

kad se sve ovo desilo slušao sam sasvim slučajno
razgovor nekih pripadnika tajne policije za vrijeme rata
čak sam i tražio da napustim prostoriju dok oni o tome razgovaraju
svejedno im je bilo

rekao je jedan da će ganić odležati 15 godina

nadam se da je pogriješio

[vrhbosna]

kad se sve ovo desilo slušao sam sasvim slučajno
razgovor nekih pripadnika tajne policije za vrijeme rata
čak sam i tražio da napustim prostoriju dok oni o tome razgovaraju
svejedno im je bilo

rekao je jedan da će ganić odležati 15 godina

nadam se da je pogriješio

Možda ti pripadnici tajnih policija znaju nešto što mi obični smrtnici ne znamo ?

[Real Khan]

Zanimljivo je da se hapšenje Ganića i sve ostale konsekventne pravne radnje odvijaju ISTOVREMENO i na neki način skoro simultano sa terminima suđenja Karadžiću...Svaki put kada Dabić sjedne za optuženičku klupu, iz londonskog suda nam stižu "taze" vijesti o Ganiću i Dobrovoljačkoj...

[Real Khan]

Možda ti pripadnici tajnih policija znaju nešto što mi obični smrtnici ne znamo ?

Vjeruj meni... pripadnici "tajnih policija" u pravilu pojma nemaju

[osa]

Možda ti pripadnici tajnih policija znaju nešto što mi obični smrtnici ne znamo ?

Vjeruj meni... pripadnici "tajnih policija" u pravilu pojma nemaju

kakvi su to "tajni policajci", za koje svi znaju....

[Soul_Sista]

Možda ti pripadnici tajnih policija znaju nešto što mi obični smrtnici ne znamo ?

Vjeruj meni... pripadnici "tajnih policija" u pravilu pojma nemaju

kakvi su to "tajni policajci", za koje svi znaju....

[kiky]

hočel taj čovjek skoro kuči ...

[Bosnolog]

Bravo profesore Ganicu za ovu izjavu!

[stari grad Visegrad]

Nego slusam Ganicevu izjavu, i mislim mora da ima neki primjer i primjeri u istoji kada se neka manja zemlja oslobodila od rata, kolonizacije, siledzijstva, torture, ubijanja, ponizenja, kradja, mijesanja veceg susjeda.
Pa da taj primjer slijedi nasa drzava.
Ali mi trenutno ne pada na pamet niti jedna zemlja, osim ove najblize Slovenija, Makedonija i C.G.
Pa da se slijedeci dobar primjer oslobodimo jednom zauvjek srbije agresora.

[Goran_35]

hočel taj čovjek skoro kuči ...

Hoce!

Srbija je svjesno odugovlacila sa navodnim "dokazima" da bi Ganic sto duze ostao pod istragom.Vjerujem da ce Srbiju ovo skupo kostati,jer izgubice povjerenje.
Sav ovaj cirkus oko privodjenja Gospodina Ganica je zapravo jedan laicki pokusaj odvlacenja paznje medjunarodne zajednice od sudjenja monstrumu karadzicu i pokusaj odvlacenja paznje od nevjerovatne cinjenice da najveci europski krvnik, poslije hitlera,ratko mladic jos uvjek nije uhapsen vec naprotiv uziva zastitu srbijanske obavjestajne sluzbe i policije

[Bosnolog]

Bitno je da Bota Tralalala otvara Mostarski sajam u reziji Covica i Dodika,nakon lizanja sa Dodikom zbog srebrenicke farse od rezolucije i usput ponovi izlizane floskule kako je za pomirenje i suzivot dok isti sve godine cuva koljaca Mladica,.. prvo kao ministar odbrane u kasarnama Vojske Srbije a sada kao nasljednik Milosevica,Nema razlike izmedu njih dvojice.Prvi je slao granate na Mostar drugi je dosao da vidi sta je predhodnik uradio,....Ljigavluk i licemjerje Srbije sa Tadicem se nastavlja progonom Ganica i presudom Jurisica ,jedno prica drugo radi,dobro ga je Siljdzic upitao ako progon Ganica nije u interesu Srbije onda ko to vlada Srbijom Tadicu????Znamo da si ti samo marioneta,...Srbijom vlada SANU stab,SPS i DB ,nego se ti cuvaj narko mafije,kako stvari stoje mogao bi traziti sigurnije utociste van sludene kriminilizirane Srbije

Srbijansko Engleska farsa se nastavlja s ciljem da skrenu paznju sa sudenja krvoloku Karadzicu,kakve koincidencije da se krvolok pojavio na sudenju isti dana kada se Ganic nastavlja omalovazavati ,....Britanci su samo potvrdili svoj cinizam iz 90 tih,....Kada je u pitanju BiH,.....Englezi su nas samo podsjetili kakvi su bili i ostali,......

[bihpatriot]

Englezi su Andjeli cuvari BiH!

[Edin H.]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8617634.stm

[draganbl]

...
Ja ovo što ti pišeš govorim skoro godinu dana.
Potpuno se slažem sa tobom da je bošnjački narod razjedinjen, ali to nije pokazatelj da je to pogrešno. Bolje je biti razjedinjen, nego biti ujedinjen u "lošu ideju".
Najbolje jeste da je narod ili barem većina naroda ujedinjena oko dobre ideje, bez obzira na to ko narod u datom trenutku predstavlja. Takve slučajeve vidimo svugdje u okruženje. Svugdje, osim kod nas.

Najveci problem i lezi u tome sto ti ujedinjenost svodis na etnos,ili ti narod...mada bi smo mogli diskutovati o samoj definiciji "naroda"...dakle, ti prizeljkujes ujedinjenost bosnjackog naroda, a ja prizeljkujem ujedinjenost drzavljana Bosne i Hercegovine.

Sto je vise ujedinjen jedan etnos (oko bilo koje ideje) u Bosni i Hercegovini, to je vise razjedinjena Bosna i Hercegovina kao drzava i drustvo....i plodno tlo za sirenje mrznje i buduce sukobe.

Ne svodim ja ujedinjenost na etnos i tu pogrešno interpretiraš moj stav. Ja sam napisao da je bolje da su Bošnjaci razjedinjeni, nego da su ujedinjeni u "lošu ideju". Dodik trenutno predstavlja većinu Srba ujedinjenu u lošu ideju i to nije dobro, naprotiv.

Međutim, ono što se na ovom forumu stalno provlači jeste neki, ja bih ga nazvao "urbani" stav, o nekakvoj velikoj masi Bošnjaka (samim tim i Bosanaca) koji su nekakvog socijaldemokratskog i antisrbijanskog opredjeljenja, te se, samim tim, svaki Tihićev potez (koji nije ni socijaldemokrata ni antisrbijanac) dočekuje na nož i smatra izdajom. Međutim, objektivno, Tihić je predsjednik najjače bošnjačke stranke koja zadnjih 20 godina pobjeđuje na (skoro) svim izborima. Kada se njemu još pridoda i vjerski lider muslimana (Cerić), pa onda i Silajdžić, koji kao pojedinac ima autoritet, onda se zapravo čitava ta socijaldemokratija i antisrbijanstvo svodi na nevješte Komšićeve pokušaje da se sa nekim posvađa i par kvazibosanaca koji te njegove pokušaje interpretiraju kao anđeosko djelovanje čuvara Bosne i Hercegovine.

Ta priča je meni šuplja, u krajnjoj liniji, činjenice govore drugačije. Činjenica jeste da je Tihić najjači bošnjački političar, Radončića nisam ni spomenuo, činjenica je da Tihić ide u Srbiju da se dogovara sa Tadićem, činjenica jeste da je IZ prihvatila Rezoluciju kao korak naprijed (za razliku od SaX forumaša koji su je napljuvali), činjenica jeste da Srbija uspostavlja odlične odnose sa Turskom (rekao bih i bolje nego BiH) i da tu Tadić i Jeremić šiju Silajdžića, činjenica jeste da je učinak vlasti na svim nivoima u BiH (ne samo gdje su Srbi kočničari) katastrofalan i ono što je najgore, nakon narednih izbora ništa se neće promijeniti.

[Goran_35]

Ne svodim ja ujedinjenost na etnos i tu pogrešno interpretiraš moj stav. Ja sam napisao da je bolje da su Bošnjaci razjedinjeni, nego da su ujedinjeni u "lošu ideju". Dodik trenutno predstavlja većinu Srba ujedinjenu u lošu ideju i to nije dobro, naprotiv.

Međutim, ono što se na ovom forumu stalno provlači jeste neki, ja bih ga nazvao "urbani" stav, o nekakvoj velikoj masi Bošnjaka (samim tim i Bosanaca) koji su nekakvog socijaldemokratskog i antisrbijanskog opredjeljenja, te se, samim tim, svaki Tihićev potez (koji nije ni socijaldemokrata ni antisrbijanac) dočekuje na nož i smatra izdajom. Međutim, objektivno, Tihić je predsjednik najjače bošnjačke stranke koja zadnjih 20 godina pobjeđuje na (skoro) svim izborima. Kada se njemu još pridoda i vjerski lider muslimana (Cerić), pa onda i Silajdžić, koji kao pojedinac ima autoritet, onda se zapravo čitava ta socijaldemokratija i antisrbijanstvo svodi na nevješte Komšićeve pokušaje da se sa nekim posvađa i par kvazibosanaca koji te njegove pokušaje interpretiraju kao anđeosko djelovanje čuvara Bosne i Hercegovine.

Ta priča je meni šuplja, u krajnjoj liniji, činjenice govore drugačije. Činjenica jeste da je Tihić najjači bošnjački političar, Radončića nisam ni spomenuo, činjenica je da Tihić ide u Srbiju da se dogovara sa Tadićem, činjenica jeste da je IZ prihvatila Rezoluciju kao korak naprijed (za razliku od SaX forumaša koji su je napljuvali), činjenica jeste da Srbija uspostavlja odlične odnose sa Turskom (rekao bih i bolje nego BiH) i da tu Tadić i Jeremić šiju Silajdžića, činjenica jeste da je učinak vlasti na svim nivoima u BiH (ne samo gdje su Srbi kočničari) katastrofalan i ono što je najgore, nakon narednih izbora ništa se neće promijeniti.

Cinjenica je da je Sulejman Tihic definitino izgubio povjerenje sto ce se dokazati na sljedecim izborima.Socijaldemokratija je dobro rjesenje za BiH ali ne nacional-soc-demokratija kakvu sprovodi Dodik.Osim soc-demokratskog rjesenja,postoji i malo desnija-gradjanska opcija,koja je takodjer dobro rjesenje za BiH.Sve ostalo,citaj nacionalizam,huskanje i zatvaranje u nacionalne torove,nije dobro za gradjane BiH vec za susjedne zemlje koje nas na taj nacin drze u kolonijalnom polozaju i koce napredak ka EU,NATO i boljoj buducnosti u sakom smislu.
To sto je demokratsko-naprdjivacki ljubavni dvojac Jeremic-Tadic trenutno u ljubavi sa Turskom,za BiH ne znaci nista,kada isti putem trabanta i produkta njihove ljubavi,Mila Fergusona,koche napredak BiH i njene gradjane na svaki moguci nacin,ukljucujci i put ka EU i NATO-u

[Goran_35]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8617634.stm

sa ovim,se je receno...

"The British government also volunteered to help Serbs to rewrite the chapter of Srebrenica and other places where genocide has been committed."
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clare Montgomery QC, for Mr Ganic, says the allegations have already been rejected by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

[ultima_palabra]

činjenica jeste da Srbija uspostavlja odlične odnose sa Turskom (rekao bih i bolje nego BiH) i da tu Tadić i Jeremić šiju Silajdžića

Malo licemjerno? Pa SNSD-ovi jastrebovi pokušavaju sve da pokvare odnose dvije zemlje, što uključuje i vrijeđanje predsjednika Parlamenta Vijeća Evrope u bh.parlamentu
I inače je to politika Srbije u zadnjih nekoliko godina, prave se dobri i kooperativni, a preko svog eksponenta Dodika u svijet šalju sliku o BiH kao nazadnoj i nakaradnoj zemlji

[visocicaguy]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8617634.stm

vidi se kako veslaju englezi.. naslov ispod slike

"Ejup Ganic is a former president of the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia"

mame im se

[Truba]

Možda ti pripadnici tajnih policija znaju nešto što mi obični smrtnici ne znamo ?

Vjeruj meni... pripadnici "tajnih policija" u pravilu pojma nemaju

al su dovoljno pametni da ne napuštaju teritorij federacije... ne idu na svadbe djece van granica... upoznati su sa užim i proširenim spiskovima...

[Real Khan]

Oslobadjanje Ganica svih laznih optuzbi,zasigurno ce baciti novo svjetlo na slucaj nevino optuzenog i zatvorenog Gospodina Ilije Jurisica,sto ce dovesti srbiju u nezavidan polozaj pred medjunarodnom zajednicom,te srusiti pojerenje koje je navodni "demokratski" rezim stekao

Ovo je tačno. Na dobrom si tragu...ako nije teško, jeste da je malo duži članak, ali molim uvažene forumaše da pročitaju šta piše o Srbiji u ovom članku...U suštini, međunarodna zajednica je i te kako prepoznala ciljeve, strategiju i taktiku Srbije čija reputacija tone u skladu sa ekonomskim padom. Očigledna je nemoć Srbije da "zabije gol" a lopta je sve više u njihovom šesnaestercu...

Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia
Rige od Fere str. # 20, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia
tel./fax +381 11 30 32 408 ; e-mail: [email protected]
http://www.helsinki.org.rs

Helsinki Bulletin No 62 * March 2010

Serbia Trapped In A Vicious Circle: From Republika Srpska To Kosovo

Serbia's behavior - notably at international level - is dictated by its proclaimed strategic goals and priorities summed up in the slogan "Both Kosovo and EU." These are mutually opposed goals and contrary to the criteria and preconditions for EU membership.

Controversial behavior at both domestic and international scenes stems from inner tensions and the pressure from the actors who actually determine Serbia's strategic goals. On the one hand, "realpolitik" (necessitated by the country's almost catastrophic economic situation in the first place) calls for rationalization of these goals along European course.

On the other hand, the once "warring lobby" (patriotic bloc) insists on the attainment of warring goals by legal and diplomatic means. After the fall of Milosevic's regime this bloc was reinforced with intellectual "followers" of the nationalistic-conservative option.

Application for EU candidacy (in late 2009) implies acknowledgment of the new realities in the region, i.e. recognition of all the states emerging from ex-Yugoslavia. Intent to "close down the Balkan question" as soon as possible, international factors such as US and EU keep reminding of this fact and of Serbia's obligations. A closed Balkan question opens up the avenues to EU for all newly emerged states, including Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, within their present borders.

Trapped in vicious circles of its own, official Belgrade acts inconsequently and confusingly. As it tries to reconcile incompatibilities, its actions oscillate between "Europe" and "patriotism." On the one hand, the government and President Boris Tadic are under pressure from the international community, under pressure from the economic reality at home and under pressure from their own promises to the citizens who voted for the European option in 2008. On the other hand, the conservative bloc insists that "there is an alternative to the EU."

The conservative bloc, led by Vojislav Kostunica and Tomislav Nikolic, is strong. It is also backed by mighty informal centers of power and individuals advocating the attainment of national goals at all costs, even at the cost of refraining from EU. A part of the Democratic Party itself is also close to this bloc and its actions generate inter-party tensions. Former head of ex-Premier Kostunica's office, Aleksandar Nikitovic, says the incumbent government's policy - "EU has no alternative" - "is entirely without any political wisdom and elementary statesmanship vision." (Danas, March 17, 2010).

This circle strongly criticizes any fresh advance towards acceptance of European values. It argues that such advances are at the detriment "of the state and the nation." Editor-in-chief of the New Serb Political Thought /Nova srpska politicka misao/ magazine Djordje Vukadinovic, who also belongs to this circle, calls President Boris Tadic's avoidance of the regional summit at Brdo by Kranj, Slovenia, "a small diplomatic triumph." Along the same lines is the statement by Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic. Should Serbia be forced to choose between Europe and Kosovo, it would opt for Kosovo, said Jeremic.

According to him, adoption of the parliamentary Resolution on Srebrenica was a mistake. "The moment something clever is done and a right move taken, three wrong moves are taken to make them senseless and everything starts from the beginning or becomes even worse than it was," says Jeremic. (Politika, March 30, 2010).

Trapped as it is, the official Belgrade wavers between concessions (in Kosovo) and oscillating over Bosnia. Financial difficulties and the economic stalemate impose adoption of realistic goals. Serbia's potential for blackmail is smaller and smaller: neighboring countries and the international community have understood its strategy at long last. Insistence on the goals advocated by the conservative bloc reflects the spirit of provincialism and misunderstanding of the new context of international relations.

"Step-by-step" strategy for north Kosovo

The international strategy for Kosovo is effective regardless of everything. Though slowly and with inadequate efficiency, international actors are "conquering" North Kosovo. Their objective is to have Northern Mitrovica and another three municipalities gradually integrated into Kosovo governance. The plan is not formally backed by the European Union but surely has its silent support. The opening of an "EU House" in Northern Mitrovica (March 25, 2010) testified to this. The EU has developed a strategy for North Kosovo and will be indirectly assisting the implementation of the strategy by the International Civilian Office /ICO/ and the Kosovo government.

Prishtina-based Koha Ditore daily writes that the "step-by-step" approach aims for three major moves forward: visible and functional presence of EULEX north of the Ibar River, opening of an EU house dominated by Serbs and visibility for the EC projects for betterment of people's everyday life (Koha Ditore, March 24, 2010). EU envoy to the North Kosovo and head of European House, Michael Giffoni, says that all 27 EU member-states have provided him their support in his capacity as mediator for Kosovo's north. "My role is very clear. My task is to promote the values cherished by the European Union, and these values concern all people - in the North and in the entire Kosovo alike - and to initiate settlement of the problems dealing with the quality of people's life in a pragmatic manner," he said (Blic, March 22, 2010). Mr. Giffoni also underlines that opening of the EU House in Northern Mitrovica creates preconditions for the "EU's credibility and
implementation of the projects dealing with improvement of living conditions for local population" (ibid.). Such a course of events in the field counteracts the official Belgrade's strategy for partition of Kosovo. Belgrade has planned to "peg" Northern Kosovo to Serbia through parallel institutions it had installed there solely for this purpose.

Nervous tension grows

Tensions in Belgrade grew when the International Court of Justice /ICJ/ unofficially released that its advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo's independence would be available only by the end of the year (and not before November 2010) rather than in the first half of 2010 as expected. That was a piece of bad news for Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic because, as he put it, an early advisory opinion suited Serbia. "We feel confident about our legal argumentation. The more time passes from today and the moment of decision, the more opportunities for pressurizing the court," he said (Politika, March 29, 2010).

Be that as it may, Serbia will not be in a position to use (the hoped for) advisory opinion of ICJ for initiating a debate on Kosovo at the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly (this September) and possibly induce another UN resolution calling for renewed status negotiations between Belgrade and Prishtina. The strategy itself is based on the plan for Kosovo's partition.

In this context, critical remarks about Serbia's attitude towards Kosovo such as "it knows what it wants not but doesn't know what it wants" are already circulating. So, for instance, Politika daily runs in its regular column, "What Serbia could possibly give up? The territory with majority Albanian population that has been denying, de jure and de facto, the state of Serbia for two decades? And if it gives it up, what it wants in return? What are Serbia's minimal claims? Ahtisaari's negotiations are over long ago and citizens have the right to know what it is Serbia would never accept... And finally: has Serbia a card up its sleeve? Does it plan to demand the same rights for Republika Srpska the Albanian Kosovo has been granted by most EU member-states?" (Politika, March 26, 2010).

Dodik's assignment

Serbia's attitude towards Republika Srpska is the "key" to understanding its 150-year-long territorial aspirations in Bosnia. The wars of the 1990s have to be considered from that angle in the first place. For Serbia's elite the Dayton Peace Accords (1995) equaled the attainment of that goal under the then international circumstances. For fifteen years now, Serbia has been doing all in its power to prevent constitution of a functional Bosnian state - and has been successful. This is why the thesis that Bosnia cannot sustain within its present borders is being kept alive.

Fully aware of that, key international factors agreed on the necessity for revision of the Dayton Constitution to strengthen cohesion of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In order to question the sustainability of the Bosnian state, Republika Srpska and its leader, Milorad Dodik, have been skillfully hampering all efforts and initiatives in that direction. Milorad Dodik is the one who takes all the actions that incite tensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina (threats with a referendum on independence, denial of Sarajevo as a capital of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, mock defense of the Dayton Accords, etc.).

The Premier of Republika Srpska has extended his initiativeness to Kosovo as well. Not long ago, he appealed to Serbs and Albanians to make "a historical agreement" that would put an end to their territorial disputes. "Partition of Kosovo is the only sustainable solution that could be acceptable to both Serbs and Albanians," he said (Danas, March 15, 2010). Albanians can hardly govern North Kosovo, he argues and suggests, "North Kosovo should be offered in return for a lasting peace and border demarcation with Serbia." Serbia, too, he adds, "must not allow to be blocked for yet another 50 years for the sake of Kosovo." (Ibid.).

In the case of Kosovo the implications of the "territories for peace" plan are far-reaching, as they presuppose recomposition of other borders in the Balkans. Serb nationalists would gladly see Albania as a partner in initiating another round of border corrections. Formerly, Belgrade was counting on Tirana and taking its pulse about partition of Kosovo. But that much hoped for partnership has never come true.

Dodik used Kosovo to make another offer for Bosnia. He came public with the option of "peaceful separation." Should other parties and international actors insist on the amendment of the Dayton Accords and Constitution, "all other possibilities would be open and legitimate," he argues. In the event of a debate on rearrangement of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he says, "a peaceful separation becomes a valid option because Republika Srpska also has the right to decide on the status" (Kurir, March 27, 2010).

Torment of Belgrade

Constantly supervised and pressurized by the international community Belgrade must be constructive vis-à-vis Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, for the time being it restraints from reacting at Dodik's statements. In addition, the government is faced with really serious economic problems mirrored in the sudden resignation of the Central Bank governor Jelasic, frictions at the economic forum at Mt. Kopaonik and the spiraling downward living standards. Serbia's official policy for Bosnia-Herzegovina is formulated by the stand about "supporting any solution the three constitutive peoples agree on." However, "Dodik's options" are in play in the conservative bloc, formal and informal. The recent "scholarly" meeting (Belgrade, late March) marking the 15th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Accords (convened eight months before the proper date) called for "restoration of Dayton's original principles." Participants in the meeting were the well-known promoters of the
Serb national program - from Dobrica Cosic, Svetozar Stojanovic and Ljiljana Smajlovic to Djordje Vukadinovic, Slobodan Antonic and the others.

The meeting's keynote speaker, Milorad Dodik, put across a clear message saying, "The Dayton Agreement is a document for Bosnia-Herzegovina's political history and political future…Should a debate on a new constitution and rearrangement of Bosnia-Herzegovina take place, the only viable concept would be, in my view, a peaceful separation and peaceful coexistence of two entities" (Danas, March 27-28, 2010).

The international community needs to strengthen its role in the Balkans so as to truly contribute to the region's stability. In this sense, the year 2009 marked a breakthrough in the entire region, including Serbia. But Belgrade's aspirations enliven whenever the international community pays less attention to its doings.

Regional reconciliation excludes any country's leadership in the Balkans. Serbia's leadership - Belgrade is always claiming - is just another form for its regional aspirations.

Economic difficulties impose a new economic policy. However, so far nothing indicates that the Serbian government or any other political actors are ready for such a change. The situation, therefore, might get even worse. Under such circumstances, Serbia may easily shift its focus on neighbors and radicalize relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

For all those reasons, Bosnia-Herzegovina's and Montenegro's membership of NATO needs to be speeded up. Membership of NATO puts an end to border issues. Economic policies adjusted to local capacities, notably in agriculture, would invigorate the region.

[nokia6170]

Ovako izgleda optuznica kada je pise srbijansko tuzilastvo:

ГРУЈИЋ БРАНКА, из Малог Зворника отац двоје деце, завршио средњу и Вишу економску школу, по занимању економиста, Србин, држављанин Републике Српске и Србије, неосуђиван,

За време оружаних сукоба на територији Републике Босне и Херцеговине (БиХ), бивше Републике СФРЈ, који су се водили између наоружаних формација на страни Српског, Муслиманског и Хрватског народа у периоду од почетка 1992. – 1995.године, као припадници српске стране у сукобу, на подручју Општине Зворник, кршили правила Женевске конвенције о заштити грађанских лица


Dakle, ni rijeci o drzavljanstvu Bosne i Hercegovine, pa onda ni rijeci o etnickom ciscenju i pravnim kvalifikacijama koje je dao Haski tribunal, pa onda vidimo i kakav je rat vodjen u BiH i izmedju koga, ni rijeci o medj. priznatoj vladi RBiH, ni rijeci o Armiji BiH kao legalnoj i legitimnoj vojsci medj. priznate RBiH, ni rijeci o paradrzavnoj tvorevini RS i njenoj paravojsci VRS, ni rijeci o ucescu zvanicne Vojske Jugoslavije u ratu u BiH.

Eto tako srbijansko pravosudje pise istoriju ovih prostora.


p.s. isti je slucaj i sa Ilijom Jurisicem cija optuznica broji cijelih 5 strana A4 formata kucanih fontom 14 i velikim razmacima izmedju pojedinih paragrafa, sto ce reci da se mogla staviti na jednu i po normalnu stranu papira. U toj optuznici je isto rat u Bosni i Hercegovini okarakterisan kao :

За време оружаних сукоба на простору Босне и Херцеговине – БиХ (бивша република Социјалистичке Федеративне Републике Југославије - СФРЈ), између наоружаних формација Бошњачког, Хрватског и Српског народа који живе у БиХ, те оружаних сукоба између наоружаних формација Бошњачког и Хрватског народа са оружаним формацијама Југословенске Народне Армије – ЈНА (бивше оружане снаге СФРЈ),

[veljaca]

Ta priča je meni šuplja, u krajnjoj liniji, činjenice govore drugačije. Činjenica jeste da je Tihić najjači bošnjački političar, Radončića nisam ni spomenuo, činjenica je da Tihić ide u Srbiju da se dogovara sa Tadićem, činjenica jeste da je IZ prihvatila Rezoluciju kao korak naprijed (za razliku od SaX forumaša koji su je napljuvali), činjenica jeste da Srbija uspostavlja odlične odnose sa Turskom (rekao bih i bolje nego BiH) i da tu Tadić i Jeremić šiju Silajdžića, činjenica jeste da je učinak vlasti na svim nivoima u BiH (ne samo gdje su Srbi kočničari) katastrofalan i ono što je najgore, nakon narednih izbora ništa se neće promijeniti.

draganbl - rado citam tvoje postove i cijenim ih. Medjutim skrecem ti paznju , dobronamjerno, na tvoju pogresno iznesenu cinjenicu. Tihic nije najjaci bosnjacki politicar - ne mijesaj SDA i Tihica ..... Jasno ti je da je u direktnom sudaru za izbor u Predsjednistvo BiH izgubio .... Od tada mu je rejting ( njemu licno ) jos vise opao .....Cak ga pojedinci tretiraju kao izdajicu Bosnjaka ....
Za ovo drugo - nikad Srbija nije imala, niti ima sada a niti ce imati u budusnosti bolje odnose sa Turskom nego BiH. Valjda ti je jasno zbog cega ... A u svezi Tadica i Jeremica - pa to je zato sto Srbija nema ovakav nakaradan sistem kao kod nas i svaku odluku moze stopirati entitetsko/etnicko glasanje. A tu je Dodo - neprevazidjen .....

[Goran_35]

Oslobadjanje Ganica svih laznih optuzbi,zasigurno ce baciti novo svjetlo na slucaj nevino optuzenog i zatvorenog Gospodina Ilije Jurisica,sto ce dovesti srbiju u nezavidan polozaj pred medjunarodnom zajednicom,te srusiti pojerenje koje je navodni "demokratski" rezim stekao

Ovo je tačno. Na dobrom si tragu...ako nije teško, jeste da je malo duži članak, ali molim uvažene forumaše da pročitaju šta piše o Srbiji u ovom članku...U suštini, međunarodna zajednica je i te kako prepoznala ciljeve, strategiju i taktiku Srbije čija reputacija tone u skladu sa ekonomskim padom. Očigledna je nemoć Srbije da "zabije gol" a lopta je sve više u njihovom šesnaestercu...

Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia
Rige od Fere str. # 20, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia
tel./fax +381 11 30 32 408 ; e-mail: [email protected]
http://www.helsinki.org.rs

Helsinki Bulletin No 62 * March 2010

Serbia Trapped In A Vicious Circle: From Republika Srpska To Kosovo

Serbia's behavior - notably at international level - is dictated by its proclaimed strategic goals and priorities summed up in the slogan "Both Kosovo and EU." These are mutually opposed goals and contrary to the criteria and preconditions for EU membership.

Controversial behavior at both domestic and international scenes stems from inner tensions and the pressure from the actors who actually determine Serbia's strategic goals. On the one hand, "realpolitik" (necessitated by the country's almost catastrophic economic situation in the first place) calls for rationalization of these goals along European course.

On the other hand, the once "warring lobby" (patriotic bloc) insists on the attainment of warring goals by legal and diplomatic means. After the fall of Milosevic's regime this bloc was reinforced with intellectual "followers" of the nationalistic-conservative option.

Application for EU candidacy (in late 2009) implies acknowledgment of the new realities in the region, i.e. recognition of all the states emerging from ex-Yugoslavia. Intent to "close down the Balkan question" as soon as possible, international factors such as US and EU keep reminding of this fact and of Serbia's obligations. A closed Balkan question opens up the avenues to EU for all newly emerged states, including Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, within their present borders.

Trapped in vicious circles of its own, official Belgrade acts inconsequently and confusingly. As it tries to reconcile incompatibilities, its actions oscillate between "Europe" and "patriotism." On the one hand, the government and President Boris Tadic are under pressure from the international community, under pressure from the economic reality at home and under pressure from their own promises to the citizens who voted for the European option in 2008. On the other hand, the conservative bloc insists that "there is an alternative to the EU."

The conservative bloc, led by Vojislav Kostunica and Tomislav Nikolic, is strong. It is also backed by mighty informal centers of power and individuals advocating the attainment of national goals at all costs, even at the cost of refraining from EU. A part of the Democratic Party itself is also close to this bloc and its actions generate inter-party tensions. Former head of ex-Premier Kostunica's office, Aleksandar Nikitovic, says the incumbent government's policy - "EU has no alternative" - "is entirely without any political wisdom and elementary statesmanship vision." (Danas, March 17, 2010).

This circle strongly criticizes any fresh advance towards acceptance of European values. It argues that such advances are at the detriment "of the state and the nation." Editor-in-chief of the New Serb Political Thought /Nova srpska politicka misao/ magazine Djordje Vukadinovic, who also belongs to this circle, calls President Boris Tadic's avoidance of the regional summit at Brdo by Kranj, Slovenia, "a small diplomatic triumph." Along the same lines is the statement by Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic. Should Serbia be forced to choose between Europe and Kosovo, it would opt for Kosovo, said Jeremic.

According to him, adoption of the parliamentary Resolution on Srebrenica was a mistake. "The moment something clever is done and a right move taken, three wrong moves are taken to make them senseless and everything starts from the beginning or becomes even worse than it was," says Jeremic. (Politika, March 30, 2010).

Trapped as it is, the official Belgrade wavers between concessions (in Kosovo) and oscillating over Bosnia. Financial difficulties and the economic stalemate impose adoption of realistic goals. Serbia's potential for blackmail is smaller and smaller: neighboring countries and the international community have understood its strategy at long last. Insistence on the goals advocated by the conservative bloc reflects the spirit of provincialism and misunderstanding of the new context of international relations.

"Step-by-step" strategy for north Kosovo

The international strategy for Kosovo is effective regardless of everything. Though slowly and with inadequate efficiency, international actors are "conquering" North Kosovo. Their objective is to have Northern Mitrovica and another three municipalities gradually integrated into Kosovo governance. The plan is not formally backed by the European Union but surely has its silent support. The opening of an "EU House" in Northern Mitrovica (March 25, 2010) testified to this. The EU has developed a strategy for North Kosovo and will be indirectly assisting the implementation of the strategy by the International Civilian Office /ICO/ and the Kosovo government.

Prishtina-based Koha Ditore daily writes that the "step-by-step" approach aims for three major moves forward: visible and functional presence of EULEX north of the Ibar River, opening of an EU house dominated by Serbs and visibility for the EC projects for betterment of people's everyday life (Koha Ditore, March 24, 2010). EU envoy to the North Kosovo and head of European House, Michael Giffoni, says that all 27 EU member-states have provided him their support in his capacity as mediator for Kosovo's north. "My role is very clear. My task is to promote the values cherished by the European Union, and these values concern all people - in the North and in the entire Kosovo alike - and to initiate settlement of the problems dealing with the quality of people's life in a pragmatic manner," he said (Blic, March 22, 2010). Mr. Giffoni also underlines that opening of the EU House in Northern Mitrovica creates preconditions for the "EU's credibility and
implementation of the projects dealing with improvement of living conditions for local population" (ibid.). Such a course of events in the field counteracts the official Belgrade's strategy for partition of Kosovo. Belgrade has planned to "peg" Northern Kosovo to Serbia through parallel institutions it had installed there solely for this purpose.

Nervous tension grows

Tensions in Belgrade grew when the International Court of Justice /ICJ/ unofficially released that its advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo's independence would be available only by the end of the year (and not before November 2010) rather than in the first half of 2010 as expected. That was a piece of bad news for Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic because, as he put it, an early advisory opinion suited Serbia. "We feel confident about our legal argumentation. The more time passes from today and the moment of decision, the more opportunities for pressurizing the court," he said (Politika, March 29, 2010).

Be that as it may, Serbia will not be in a position to use (the hoped for) advisory opinion of ICJ for initiating a debate on Kosovo at the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly (this September) and possibly induce another UN resolution calling for renewed status negotiations between Belgrade and Prishtina. The strategy itself is based on the plan for Kosovo's partition.

In this context, critical remarks about Serbia's attitude towards Kosovo such as "it knows what it wants not but doesn't know what it wants" are already circulating. So, for instance, Politika daily runs in its regular column, "What Serbia could possibly give up? The territory with majority Albanian population that has been denying, de jure and de facto, the state of Serbia for two decades? And if it gives it up, what it wants in return? What are Serbia's minimal claims? Ahtisaari's negotiations are over long ago and citizens have the right to know what it is Serbia would never accept... And finally: has Serbia a card up its sleeve? Does it plan to demand the same rights for Republika Srpska the Albanian Kosovo has been granted by most EU member-states?" (Politika, March 26, 2010).

Dodik's assignment

Serbia's attitude towards Republika Srpska is the "key" to understanding its 150-year-long territorial aspirations in Bosnia. The wars of the 1990s have to be considered from that angle in the first place. For Serbia's elite the Dayton Peace Accords (1995) equaled the attainment of that goal under the then international circumstances. For fifteen years now, Serbia has been doing all in its power to prevent constitution of a functional Bosnian state - and has been successful. This is why the thesis that Bosnia cannot sustain within its present borders is being kept alive.

Fully aware of that, key international factors agreed on the necessity for revision of the Dayton Constitution to strengthen cohesion of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In order to question the sustainability of the Bosnian state, Republika Srpska and its leader, Milorad Dodik, have been skillfully hampering all efforts and initiatives in that direction. Milorad Dodik is the one who takes all the actions that incite tensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina (threats with a referendum on independence, denial of Sarajevo as a capital of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, mock defense of the Dayton Accords, etc.).

The Premier of Republika Srpska has extended his initiativeness to Kosovo as well. Not long ago, he appealed to Serbs and Albanians to make "a historical agreement" that would put an end to their territorial disputes. "Partition of Kosovo is the only sustainable solution that could be acceptable to both Serbs and Albanians," he said (Danas, March 15, 2010). Albanians can hardly govern North Kosovo, he argues and suggests, "North Kosovo should be offered in return for a lasting peace and border demarcation with Serbia." Serbia, too, he adds, "must not allow to be blocked for yet another 50 years for the sake of Kosovo." (Ibid.).

In the case of Kosovo the implications of the "territories for peace" plan are far-reaching, as they presuppose recomposition of other borders in the Balkans. Serb nationalists would gladly see Albania as a partner in initiating another round of border corrections. Formerly, Belgrade was counting on Tirana and taking its pulse about partition of Kosovo. But that much hoped for partnership has never come true.

Dodik used Kosovo to make another offer for Bosnia. He came public with the option of "peaceful separation." Should other parties and international actors insist on the amendment of the Dayton Accords and Constitution, "all other possibilities would be open and legitimate," he argues. In the event of a debate on rearrangement of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he says, "a peaceful separation becomes a valid option because Republika Srpska also has the right to decide on the status" (Kurir, March 27, 2010).

Torment of Belgrade

Constantly supervised and pressurized by the international community Belgrade must be constructive vis-à-vis Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, for the time being it restraints from reacting at Dodik's statements. In addition, the government is faced with really serious economic problems mirrored in the sudden resignation of the Central Bank governor Jelasic, frictions at the economic forum at Mt. Kopaonik and the spiraling downward living standards. Serbia's official policy for Bosnia-Herzegovina is formulated by the stand about "supporting any solution the three constitutive peoples agree on." However, "Dodik's options" are in play in the conservative bloc, formal and informal. The recent "scholarly" meeting (Belgrade, late March) marking the 15th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Accords (convened eight months before the proper date) called for "restoration of Dayton's original principles." Participants in the meeting were the well-known promoters of the
Serb national program - from Dobrica Cosic, Svetozar Stojanovic and Ljiljana Smajlovic to Djordje Vukadinovic, Slobodan Antonic and the others.

The meeting's keynote speaker, Milorad Dodik, put across a clear message saying, "The Dayton Agreement is a document for Bosnia-Herzegovina's political history and political future…Should a debate on a new constitution and rearrangement of Bosnia-Herzegovina take place, the only viable concept would be, in my view, a peaceful separation and peaceful coexistence of two entities" (Danas, March 27-28, 2010).

The international community needs to strengthen its role in the Balkans so as to truly contribute to the region's stability. In this sense, the year 2009 marked a breakthrough in the entire region, including Serbia. But Belgrade's aspirations enliven whenever the international community pays less attention to its doings.

Regional reconciliation excludes any country's leadership in the Balkans. Serbia's leadership - Belgrade is always claiming - is just another form for its regional aspirations.

Economic difficulties impose a new economic policy. However, so far nothing indicates that the Serbian government or any other political actors are ready for such a change. The situation, therefore, might get even worse. Under such circumstances, Serbia may easily shift its focus on neighbors and radicalize relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

For all those reasons, Bosnia-Herzegovina's and Montenegro's membership of NATO needs to be speeded up. Membership of NATO puts an end to border issues. Economic policies adjusted to local capacities, notably in agriculture, would invigorate the region.

odlican clanak

[nokia6170]

Oslobadjanje Ganica svih laznih optuzbi,zasigurno ce baciti novo svjetlo na slucaj nevino optuzenog i zatvorenog Gospodina Ilije Jurisica,sto ce dovesti srbiju u nezavidan polozaj pred medjunarodnom zajednicom,te srusiti pojerenje koje je navodni "demokratski" rezim stekao

Ovo je tačno. Na dobrom si tragu...ako nije teško, jeste da je malo duži članak, ali molim uvažene forumaše da pročitaju šta piše o Srbiji u ovom članku...U suštini, međunarodna zajednica je i te kako prepoznala ciljeve, strategiju i taktiku Srbije čija reputacija tone u skladu sa ekonomskim padom. Očigledna je nemoć Srbije da "zabije gol" a lopta je sve više u njihovom šesnaestercu...

Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia
Rige od Fere str. # 20, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia
tel./fax +381 11 30 32 408 ; e-mail: [email protected]
http://www.helsinki.org.rs

Helsinki Bulletin No 62 * March 2010

Serbia Trapped In A Vicious Circle: From Republika Srpska To Kosovo

Serbia's behavior - notably at international level - is dictated by its proclaimed strategic goals and priorities summed up in the slogan "Both Kosovo and EU." These are mutually opposed goals and contrary to the criteria and preconditions for EU membership.

Controversial behavior at both domestic and international scenes stems from inner tensions and the pressure from the actors who actually determine Serbia's strategic goals. On the one hand, "realpolitik" (necessitated by the country's almost catastrophic economic situation in the first place) calls for rationalization of these goals along European course.

On the other hand, the once "warring lobby" (patriotic bloc) insists on the attainment of warring goals by legal and diplomatic means. After the fall of Milosevic's regime this bloc was reinforced with intellectual "followers" of the nationalistic-conservative option.

Application for EU candidacy (in late 2009) implies acknowledgment of the new realities in the region, i.e. recognition of all the states emerging from ex-Yugoslavia. Intent to "close down the Balkan question" as soon as possible, international factors such as US and EU keep reminding of this fact and of Serbia's obligations. A closed Balkan question opens up the avenues to EU for all newly emerged states, including Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, within their present borders.

Trapped in vicious circles of its own, official Belgrade acts inconsequently and confusingly. As it tries to reconcile incompatibilities, its actions oscillate between "Europe" and "patriotism." On the one hand, the government and President Boris Tadic are under pressure from the international community, under pressure from the economic reality at home and under pressure from their own promises to the citizens who voted for the European option in 2008. On the other hand, the conservative bloc insists that "there is an alternative to the EU."

The conservative bloc, led by Vojislav Kostunica and Tomislav Nikolic, is strong. It is also backed by mighty informal centers of power and individuals advocating the attainment of national goals at all costs, even at the cost of refraining from EU. A part of the Democratic Party itself is also close to this bloc and its actions generate inter-party tensions. Former head of ex-Premier Kostunica's office, Aleksandar Nikitovic, says the incumbent government's policy - "EU has no alternative" - "is entirely without any political wisdom and elementary statesmanship vision." (Danas, March 17, 2010).

This circle strongly criticizes any fresh advance towards acceptance of European values. It argues that such advances are at the detriment "of the state and the nation." Editor-in-chief of the New Serb Political Thought /Nova srpska politicka misao/ magazine Djordje Vukadinovic, who also belongs to this circle, calls President Boris Tadic's avoidance of the regional summit at Brdo by Kranj, Slovenia, "a small diplomatic triumph." Along the same lines is the statement by Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic. Should Serbia be forced to choose between Europe and Kosovo, it would opt for Kosovo, said Jeremic.

According to him, adoption of the parliamentary Resolution on Srebrenica was a mistake. "The moment something clever is done and a right move taken, three wrong moves are taken to make them senseless and everything starts from the beginning or becomes even worse than it was," says Jeremic. (Politika, March 30, 2010).

Trapped as it is, the official Belgrade wavers between concessions (in Kosovo) and oscillating over Bosnia. Financial difficulties and the economic stalemate impose adoption of realistic goals. Serbia's potential for blackmail is smaller and smaller: neighboring countries and the international community have understood its strategy at long last. Insistence on the goals advocated by the conservative bloc reflects the spirit of provincialism and misunderstanding of the new context of international relations.

"Step-by-step" strategy for north Kosovo

The international strategy for Kosovo is effective regardless of everything. Though slowly and with inadequate efficiency, international actors are "conquering" North Kosovo. Their objective is to have Northern Mitrovica and another three municipalities gradually integrated into Kosovo governance. The plan is not formally backed by the European Union but surely has its silent support. The opening of an "EU House" in Northern Mitrovica (March 25, 2010) testified to this. The EU has developed a strategy for North Kosovo and will be indirectly assisting the implementation of the strategy by the International Civilian Office /ICO/ and the Kosovo government.

Prishtina-based Koha Ditore daily writes that the "step-by-step" approach aims for three major moves forward: visible and functional presence of EULEX north of the Ibar River, opening of an EU house dominated by Serbs and visibility for the EC projects for betterment of people's everyday life (Koha Ditore, March 24, 2010). EU envoy to the North Kosovo and head of European House, Michael Giffoni, says that all 27 EU member-states have provided him their support in his capacity as mediator for Kosovo's north. "My role is very clear. My task is to promote the values cherished by the European Union, and these values concern all people - in the North and in the entire Kosovo alike - and to initiate settlement of the problems dealing with the quality of people's life in a pragmatic manner," he said (Blic, March 22, 2010). Mr. Giffoni also underlines that opening of the EU House in Northern Mitrovica creates preconditions for the "EU's credibility and
implementation of the projects dealing with improvement of living conditions for local population" (ibid.). Such a course of events in the field counteracts the official Belgrade's strategy for partition of Kosovo. Belgrade has planned to "peg" Northern Kosovo to Serbia through parallel institutions it had installed there solely for this purpose.

Nervous tension grows

Tensions in Belgrade grew when the International Court of Justice /ICJ/ unofficially released that its advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo's independence would be available only by the end of the year (and not before November 2010) rather than in the first half of 2010 as expected. That was a piece of bad news for Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic because, as he put it, an early advisory opinion suited Serbia. "We feel confident about our legal argumentation. The more time passes from today and the moment of decision, the more opportunities for pressurizing the court," he said (Politika, March 29, 2010).

Be that as it may, Serbia will not be in a position to use (the hoped for) advisory opinion of ICJ for initiating a debate on Kosovo at the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly (this September) and possibly induce another UN resolution calling for renewed status negotiations between Belgrade and Prishtina. The strategy itself is based on the plan for Kosovo's partition.

In this context, critical remarks about Serbia's attitude towards Kosovo such as "it knows what it wants not but doesn't know what it wants" are already circulating. So, for instance, Politika daily runs in its regular column, "What Serbia could possibly give up? The territory with majority Albanian population that has been denying, de jure and de facto, the state of Serbia for two decades? And if it gives it up, what it wants in return? What are Serbia's minimal claims? Ahtisaari's negotiations are over long ago and citizens have the right to know what it is Serbia would never accept... And finally: has Serbia a card up its sleeve? Does it plan to demand the same rights for Republika Srpska the Albanian Kosovo has been granted by most EU member-states?" (Politika, March 26, 2010).

Dodik's assignment

Serbia's attitude towards Republika Srpska is the "key" to understanding its 150-year-long territorial aspirations in Bosnia. The wars of the 1990s have to be considered from that angle in the first place. For Serbia's elite the Dayton Peace Accords (1995) equaled the attainment of that goal under the then international circumstances. For fifteen years now, Serbia has been doing all in its power to prevent constitution of a functional Bosnian state - and has been successful. This is why the thesis that Bosnia cannot sustain within its present borders is being kept alive.

Fully aware of that, key international factors agreed on the necessity for revision of the Dayton Constitution to strengthen cohesion of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In order to question the sustainability of the Bosnian state, Republika Srpska and its leader, Milorad Dodik, have been skillfully hampering all efforts and initiatives in that direction. Milorad Dodik is the one who takes all the actions that incite tensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina (threats with a referendum on independence, denial of Sarajevo as a capital of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, mock defense of the Dayton Accords, etc.).

The Premier of Republika Srpska has extended his initiativeness to Kosovo as well. Not long ago, he appealed to Serbs and Albanians to make "a historical agreement" that would put an end to their territorial disputes. "Partition of Kosovo is the only sustainable solution that could be acceptable to both Serbs and Albanians," he said (Danas, March 15, 2010). Albanians can hardly govern North Kosovo, he argues and suggests, "North Kosovo should be offered in return for a lasting peace and border demarcation with Serbia." Serbia, too, he adds, "must not allow to be blocked for yet another 50 years for the sake of Kosovo." (Ibid.).

In the case of Kosovo the implications of the "territories for peace" plan are far-reaching, as they presuppose recomposition of other borders in the Balkans. Serb nationalists would gladly see Albania as a partner in initiating another round of border corrections. Formerly, Belgrade was counting on Tirana and taking its pulse about partition of Kosovo. But that much hoped for partnership has never come true.

Dodik used Kosovo to make another offer for Bosnia. He came public with the option of "peaceful separation." Should other parties and international actors insist on the amendment of the Dayton Accords and Constitution, "all other possibilities would be open and legitimate," he argues. In the event of a debate on rearrangement of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he says, "a peaceful separation becomes a valid option because Republika Srpska also has the right to decide on the status" (Kurir, March 27, 2010).

Torment of Belgrade

Constantly supervised and pressurized by the international community Belgrade must be constructive vis-à-vis Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, for the time being it restraints from reacting at Dodik's statements. In addition, the government is faced with really serious economic problems mirrored in the sudden resignation of the Central Bank governor Jelasic, frictions at the economic forum at Mt. Kopaonik and the spiraling downward living standards. Serbia's official policy for Bosnia-Herzegovina is formulated by the stand about "supporting any solution the three constitutive peoples agree on." However, "Dodik's options" are in play in the conservative bloc, formal and informal. The recent "scholarly" meeting (Belgrade, late March) marking the 15th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Accords (convened eight months before the proper date) called for "restoration of Dayton's original principles." Participants in the meeting were the well-known promoters of the
Serb national program - from Dobrica Cosic, Svetozar Stojanovic and Ljiljana Smajlovic to Djordje Vukadinovic, Slobodan Antonic and the others.

The meeting's keynote speaker, Milorad Dodik, put across a clear message saying, "The Dayton Agreement is a document for Bosnia-Herzegovina's political history and political future…Should a debate on a new constitution and rearrangement of Bosnia-Herzegovina take place, the only viable concept would be, in my view, a peaceful separation and peaceful coexistence of two entities" (Danas, March 27-28, 2010).

The international community needs to strengthen its role in the Balkans so as to truly contribute to the region's stability. In this sense, the year 2009 marked a breakthrough in the entire region, including Serbia. But Belgrade's aspirations enliven whenever the international community pays less attention to its doings.

Regional reconciliation excludes any country's leadership in the Balkans. Serbia's leadership - Belgrade is always claiming - is just another form for its regional aspirations.

Economic difficulties impose a new economic policy. However, so far nothing indicates that the Serbian government or any other political actors are ready for such a change. The situation, therefore, might get even worse. Under such circumstances, Serbia may easily shift its focus on neighbors and radicalize relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

For all those reasons, Bosnia-Herzegovina's and Montenegro's membership of NATO needs to be speeded up. Membership of NATO puts an end to border issues. Economic policies adjusted to local capacities, notably in agriculture, would invigorate the region.

odlican clanak

Ipak da bude svima prihvatljiv koji ne znaju engleski:

http://www.helsinki.org.rs/serbian/doc/HB-Br62.pdf