Ukrajina

[Gandalf]

[emirolini]

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Ja bih obratio paznju na ovaj trougao, stranica od 30ak kilometara.



Cini mi se da je Polohy kljuc za jug. A ovladavanje citavim trouglom bi dalo razne mogucnosti, pa i novu turu “gesture of goodwill” i to puno vecih razmjera nego sto je to bilo sa Khersonom.

Mapa malo vece teritorije za orjentaciju:


Google maps ne daje bas dobar pregled jer sve izgleda monotono, ali na topografskoj karti se bolje vidi. (right click / open image in new tab)


1. Najvise podrucje u citavom regionu
2. Raskrsnica pruga koje dolaze sa svih strana i to
a) Donetsk - Donbas sa istoka (sto ukljucuje i Mariupol na jugu)
b) Berdyansk na jugu
c) Krim - Melitopol na zapadu
d) Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro i sva ostala slobodna teritorija na sjeveru
3. Nema nekih specijalnih vodotokova da prave problem
4. Relativno dobra putna povezanost - centralna linija Polohy - Andriivka - Berdyansk
5. Ne bas tako utvrdjeno kao sto je slucaj sa osom Tokmak - Melitopol - a koji bi itekako bili ugrozeni (i ne samo oni) ovladavanjem ovog podrucja.

6. ...
7. Profit

Da sam kakav djeneral (srecom po potencijalne potcinjene, nisam) i da se moram fokusirati na jug, svoje glavne adute bih stavio na ovladavanje doticnim a Tokmacenje ostavio cisto kao vezivno tkivo operacije. Rasipanje resursa na moguce stvari oko Khersona bih zanemario jer zasto ih prosipati kad ce se taj zapad morati sam povuci cim mu se suze mogucnosti komunikacije prema istoku. Ali bih na sve moguce nacine nastojao uvjeriti protivnika da zelim nesto uraditi i na zapadu

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Svaka cast i hvala na izdvojenom vremenu za ovo

[Gandalf]

[trambusek88]

Četnička posla

[emirolini]

Svaki put kada izgube na vojnom polju izive se nad civilima. Bas ko cetnici.

[sumirprimus]

Tanko osim aetiljerije

[zigzag]

Nije ih lako stići kad bježe.

[SanskiBiser]

Kenneth Gregg jutros:

Jutarnje ažuriranje od 13. lipnja 2023. s prilično dobrim vijestima.

Službeno koristimo 1/3 naših snaga u ovoj fazi ofenzive. Turisti pak imaju 90% svojih resursa u Ukrajini koncentriranih u regiji Zaporizhzhia. Nakon što su nase jedinice od zadnjeg ažuriranja proširile zauzeto zemljište u Novodarivki i Makarivki, turističke jedinice u Rivnopilu sada su u velikom riziku da budu opkoljene. Postoji samo jedan izlaz iz ovog područja i on je u skladu s trenutnom crtom fronte. Jedinice u Rivnopilu trenutno imaju vrlo malo mogućnosti za održavanje.

Je li to sve plan Glavnog stožera od početka? Mnogo toga upravo sada počinje imati smisla. Sada imamo priliku bez teških bitaka ponovno zauzeti 60 km2. Kada se to dogodi, izravnali smo crtu bojišnice u tom području i pregazili i crtu kontakta i prvu liniju obrane.

Također vidimo da su turisti počeli voditi ljude s druge i treće linije obrane da pokušaju začepiti otvore. To pak znači da im posljednje dvije linije obrane slabe.

Trend koji vidim je da se turisti polako ali sigurno počinju navlačiti i da imaju prevelike gubitke u obrani.

U Bakhmutu, naši dečki nastavljaju s preuzimanjem kanala na nekoliko mjesta čije je objavljivanje snimaka napadačkih jedinica dopušteno. Ovdje također vodimo rat i čini se da su zadovoljni ishodom, živi su.

Tijekom noći turisti su poslali 2 vala projektila i bespilotnih letjelica, posebno prema Kryvyi Rih. Očito se shvatilo da se obara sve što se šalje prema Kijevu. Nažalost, i rakete i bespilotne letjelice su se ovdje probijale kroz protuzračnu obranu i nanijele veliku štetu civilnim ciljevima.


SLAVA UKRAJINI

[Crvene_brigade]

Heroji oslobađaju svoju zemlju

[madner]

Ma manje, mozda i 10%

Ne vidim nikakav veliki plan u ovoj ofanzivi. Prodor je trebao biti zapadnije, gdje su Leopardi nastradali. To bi otvorilo put za Tokmak.

Ovaj sporedni pravac je sporedni jer ne vodi nigdje. Zato je i prva linija 10 km juznije.

[F&N]

Ma slabo ovo

[splinter]

Može li se ovaj Tokmak jednostavno zaobići ili staviti u poluokruženje?

[Crvene_brigade]

Heroji oslobađaju svoju zemlju

[sumirprimus]

Može li se ovaj Tokmak jednostavno zaobići ili staviti u poluokruženje?

tokmak ili okolinu tokmaka moraju uzeti ili doveti pod vatrenu kontrolu, i onda ide nizbrdo za ruje. sat otkucava da se povuku do krima i mariupola.

[pici]

Jos se nije doslo do odredjenog mjesta, gdje bi Ukri pokrenuli jaci prodor. Jos uvjek su ovo manji udari do nivoa bataljona. Kad krenu brigade, onda moze se govoriti o jacim napadma i udarima. Takticka ofanzivna djelovanja na vise pravaca, sve je ovo ocekivano. Iznenadni udar mora biti na mjestu gdje su rusi najtanji i najmanje ocekuju. Svaka odbrana ima svoju slabost kao i napad. Dzabe utvrdjenja ako ih brane demoralisane trupe i lose obuceni vojnici i napad je isto tako. Znaci najbolje ukrajinske trupe ce probiti gdje su rasporedjeni ovi nasilu mobiksi i imaju manje eltitnih jedinica za krpljenje.
Razvlacenje fronte ce pokazati rupu u ruskoj odbrani.

PVO, PVO, PVO, mora jos PVO-a kod Ukra. Nebo nije cisto.

[sumirprimus]

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Finally within over the last day it appears that the Russians attempted a counterattack against the central advance of this axis but were rather unceremoniously repelled by Ukrainian forces suffering losses in the process.

zanimljiv tred...usput opisuje koje su sve jedinice ukljucene na kom pravcu.

[zigzag]

Jos se nije doslo do odredjenog mjesta, gdje bi Ukri pokrenuli jaci prodor. Jos uvjek su ovo manji udari do nivoa bataljona. Kad krenu brigade, onda moze se govoriti o jacim napadma i udarima. Takticka ofanzivna djelovanja na vise pravaca, sve je ovo ocekivano. Iznenadni udar mora biti na mjestu gdje su rusi najtanji i najmanje ocekuju. Svaka odbrana ima svoju slabost kao i napad. Dzabe utvrdjenja ako ih brane demoralisane trupe i lose obuceni vojnici i napad je isto tako. Znaci najbolje ukrajinske trupe ce probiti gdje su rasporedjeni ovi nasilu mobiksi i imaju manje eltitnih jedinica za krpljenje.
Razvlacenje fronte ce pokazati rupu u ruskoj odbrani.

PVO, PVO, PVO, mora jos PVO-a kod Ukra. Nebo nije cisto.

Dugo toplo ljeto....

Sad je na ovim rusima što su privremeno u Ukrajini da nikako ne spavaju naredna tri četiri mjeseca.

[sumirprimus]

kazu putin je juce opet smijenio gerasimova, dakle ide novi kolovodja za ostatak ofanzive.
ne svidja mu se nacin na koji je zavrsila zimsko proljetna ork ofanziva.
zanilmjiva analiza gerasimova, i 4 kljucne tacke po kojim je zakazao.

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2/ Having culminated in their 2023 offensive, the Russians must now (largely) turn to the strategic defensive to defend against the Ukrainian campaign just commenced. What are the next moves for the overall Russian commander, General Valery Gerasimov?
3/ In an article published in May 2023, I characterised Gerasimov as a four-time loser. This is important context in considering his response to the developing Ukrainian 2023 offensive. A brief exploration of his recent failures are as follows.

Why this Russian general may be Ukraine's greatest asset
In authoritarian regimes, competent soldiers are less important than loyal ones. And, as Russia's General Valery Gerasimov may find out in the future, they also make excellent scapegoats for tyrants w…
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-05-09/ ... /102315862
4/ Failure one was the original plan for the invasion of Ukraine. As the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Gerasimov and Russian Defence Minister Shoigu would have played a key role in the planning and approval of this plan.
5/ Gerasimov’s second failure was the chaotic first few weeks of the Russian mobilisation after it was announced by President Putin in September 2022. Gerasimov should have anticipated such a move once it was clear the war was not going well; that is his job afterall.
6/ Failure three for Gerasimov was the decade of transformation overseen by he and Shoigu. As the Ukraine ‘special military operation’ has shown, the reforms have not built the type of modern, well-led military organisation essential to success in modern war.

7/ To round out his questionable record, General Gerasimov assumed command of the Russian forces in Ukraine in January, and with little delay launched a wide-scale offensive. The Russian military in Ukraine experienced very limited success with these ground offensives.
8/ As @KofmanMichael & @ralee write: "Gerasimov launched an ill-conceived & ill-timed offensive...The Russian military, still recovering, was in no position to conduct offensive operations given its deficits in force quality, equipment, and ammunition."

Beyond Ukraine’s Offensive
The West needs to prepare the country’s military for a long war.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/ ... -offensive
9/ By April, despite small gains around #Bakhmut, the Russian 2023 offensives had largely culminated. According to US intelligence sources, the Russians have lost over 100,000 soldiers since December 2022, including 20,000 killed.

Ukraine war: More than 20,000 Russian troops killed since December, US says
Another 80,000 Russian soldiers have been wounded in fighting since December, the White House estimates.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65451487
10/ Before considering Gerasimov’s options, what are some of the constraints he now has to work with?
11/ First, the ineffective offensives launched by Gerasimov this year will constrain, but not entirely inhibit, Gerasimov’s ability to effectively respond to Ukrainian attacks in the south and the east.
12/ And while the Russians have constructed a huge number of obstacles in depth across their front line (see a good, updated map of these obstacles by Brady Africk here), Gerasimov still has a massive amount of occupied territory to defend.
Image
13/ 2nd, Gerasimov has several subordinate commanders that he needs to collaborate with and coordinate to build a cohesive overall defensive strategy. And then there are the Private Military Companies, including Wagner…
Image
14/ 3rd, Gerasimov will be keeping an eye on force levels. His 2023 offensives have drained his force of the reinforcements it received after the 2022 partial mobilisation. He is sure to be thinking about another round of mobilisations to top up his force.

The Russian Military’s People Problem
It’s hard for Moscow to win while mistreating its soldiers.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles ... le-problem
15/ 4th, his operational logistics framework will be essential to supporting the Russian defensive plan. #Gerasimov will need to focus on an integrated air and ground defence of his logistics.
16/ Finally, #Gerasimov remains the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces & First Deputy Minister of Defence. As such, he also needs to keep an eye on the defence of Russia’s borders, particularly given the recent Belgorod incursions and drone strikes in Moscow.
17/ What are Gerasimov’s options now that the Ukrainian 2023 offensive has commenced?
18/ Option 1: Hang Tough. Gerasimov’s first option is to hang tough for the time being and watch how the Ukrainian offensive develops. We are only in the early days of the Ukrainian 2023 campaign, and the vast majority of its offensive combat power has yet to be committed.
19/ His preferred option is probably to retain all Ukrainian territory he currently occupies, absorb the Ukrainian offensives, hopefully demonstrate minimal Ukrainian success while preparing for Russian offensive operations later this year.
20/ Option 2: Hang Tough (plus). Gerasimov’s next option is a variation on Option 1, but with limited offensive jabs at Ukrainian weak spots if they open up. The Russians have not shown a flair for making major gains with their offensive operations this year.

21/ Option 3: Reorient the Defence. Perhaps the most politically difficult – but militarily effective – would be a reorientation of the Russian defence around Crimea and the Donbas.
22/ This may be a useful fallback position if things go badly for the Russians in the coming months but is unlikely to be favourably considered as an option in the current environment.
23/ In the short term, Gerasimov is unlikely to make significant changes to his plan for the defence of Ukrainian territory his forces occupy. It is simply too early for him to make major adjustments. Therefore, in the short term, Gerasimov is most likely to ‘hang tough’. End.

[agent_zero]

...

[agent_zero]

Sunckretio je jedan od važnijih komandanata fašističko-agresorskih snaga...

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Grotta je pećina na talijanskom

[sumirprimus]

Any Russian BM-21 Grad MLRS can fire off mines, creating an anti-tank minefield from 8km to 30km ahead. Been that way since Soviet days.

[agent_zero]

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Ja stvarno sve vise sumnjam u autenticnost ovog snimka. Meni ovo izgleda sve vise bas staged.
I savrsena pozicija kamere, bauljanje (glumatanje) ovih sto bjeze, onaj prvi desno pade ko u filmovima...
Ne znam, nisam uvjeren ni 50%.

Kako vi ostali?

Mozda je plasirano od samih rusa da se obeshrabri povlacenje.
Mozda i od ukrajinaca da se ohrabri predaja.

Meni ovo izgleda kao loša režija i gluma.

[agent_zero]

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Ovi su postali jebeniji od izvornog Azova.
Ili imaju samo dobar PR.
Ali svejedno, nece dobro proci niko ko im je na putu.

Azov i 72.ga OMB, najjače brigade.

[statixx]

Izgleda da je Cooper ipak imao dobar info, ovi iz Rivnopila su se povukli, ali su uskocile nove jedinice i pokusale izvesti kontranapad sa zapada na ova izgubljena naselja. Wargonzo jutros pise da Ukrajinci dovlace pojacanja kod Levadne i Novodarivke i krecu na Pryutne.

[Chmoljo]

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Ja stvarno sve vise sumnjam u autenticnost ovog snimka. Meni ovo izgleda sve vise bas staged.
I savrsena pozicija kamere, bauljanje (glumatanje) ovih sto bjeze, onaj prvi desno pade ko u filmovima...
Ne znam, nisam uvjeren ni 50%.

Kako vi ostali?

Mozda je plasirano od samih rusa da se obeshrabri povlacenje.
Mozda i od ukrajinaca da se ohrabri predaja.

Meni ovo izgleda kao loša režija i gluma.

ne izgleda kao da je pucano u sve njih, nego samo u onog najbližeg ovoj trojici. vidi se trenutak kada puca i ovaj pada. ostali su popadali i krenuli puzati u suprotnom smjeru.

meni njihove kretnje ne odaju da je staged, što ne znači da nije. kamera ih je mogla pratiti kako bježe pa naletiti na ovo.