Egipat: Hosniju Mubaraku prijeti smrt vješanjem
20. 04. 2011. • 19:49 A. K.
Svrgnuti egipatski predsjednik Hosni Mubarak saučesnik je u ubistvima antirežimskih demonstranata za vrijeme nemira u toj zemlji, izjavio je član egipatske istražne komisije nakon što je objavljeno njeno izvješće o optužbama na račun članova bivše egipatske vladajuće porodice Mubarak.
Nezavisno o tome je li naredio pucanje na demonstrante ili je šutio i to dozvolio, Mubarak je odgovoran za smrt 846 civila i 26 policajaca koji su ubijeni u revoluciji, naročito zato što se od prvog dana otvorilo vatru na mirne demonstrante - izjavio je sudija Omar Maravan.
Protesti protiv Mubaraka trajali su 18 dana, a završili njegovom ostavkom 11. februara. Komisija je istraživala napade na civile, ali i navodno otvaranje zatvora, puštanje kriminalaca na ulice i namjerno stvaranje haosa i ozračja nesigurnosti u zemlji. Također se ispitivala vladina manipulacija medija, navodi Jutarnji.
Utvrđeno je i da je upotreba sile bila neproporcionalna potrebi te da su i policajci gađali ljude koji su s prozora snimali proteste te se namjerno u demonstrante zabijali vozilima.
Mubarak je optužen i za korupciju, a za isto se optužuju njegove sinove Alaa i Gamala, koji su, kao i otac, zatvoreni. Spomenute članove porodice Mubarak mogla bi zadesiti sudbina iračkog vođe Sadama Huseina, koji je osuđen na smrt vješanjem, tvrde tamošnji mediji.
stigla demokratijaNorisCak wrote:Najmlađi sin libijskog vođe Moamera Gadafija, Saif al Arab Gadafi (29), ubijen je sinoc zajedno sa svoje troje djece .
Inace,svi su bili civili .
Saif je bio student u Njemackoj ,a djeca su bila djeca .
PS.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nt-2xzDM ... r_embedded
..Obama se u medjuvremenu lijepo zabavlja
Milioni i milioni arapskih para, uglavnom saudijskih, preko lobi grupa su završili u džepovima senatora, kongresmena, ovih i onih savjetnika za intervenciju i američku naklonost u Bosni i na Kosovu. Tadašnji američki establišment je dobro naplatio bombardovanje.... U tom kontekstu treba spomenuti i Maleziju.Za ovo drugo dvoje - da, intervenisu uglavnom kad im je u interesu, ali taj interes nije uvijek primarno ekonomski. Sumnjam da su u BiH ili na Kosovu imali ekonomski interes, mislim da je bio u pitanju vise strateski interes suzbijanja Srbije, odnosno posljednjeg bastiona uticaja Rusije u istocnoj Evropi. Dakle, to ne mijenja cinjenicu da su oni nama vojno pomogli 95e. Nisam ih nazvao 'spasiocima' Bosne.
Uostalom, zar se ne mogu interesi velikih poklapati sa interesima onih gdje ovi intervenisu?
NorisCak wrote:Opet ubise Bin Ladena .
Ovaj put ga sahranise u moru (uz islamski obred)
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)Code: Select all
http://www.24sata.info/vijesti/svijet/62728-Turska-Pokusaj-atentata-turskog-premijera-Erdogana-poginuo-policajac.htmlIspravno neosporno,valjda i Ahmadnedzada ceka ista sudbina. A kada su Sadama objesili,sta ono bijase. A-ha americka okupacijaBosnolog wrote:Tako se radi sa zlocinackim diktatorima i ubicama vlastitog naroda,....
Vjesati stoku javno za pouku i poruku drugim diktatorskim zlikovcima i ubicama vlastitog naroda koji je decenijama pljackao,tlacio i ubijao neistomisljenike,....pravda je spora ali dostizna,...
Egipat: Hosniju Mubaraku prijeti smrt vješanjem
20. 04. 2011. • 19:49 A. K.
Svrgnuti egipatski predsjednik Hosni Mubarak saučesnik je u ubistvima antirežimskih demonstranata za vrijeme nemira u toj zemlji, izjavio je član egipatske istražne komisije nakon što je objavljeno njeno izvješće o optužbama na račun članova bivše egipatske vladajuće porodice Mubarak.
Nezavisno o tome je li naredio pucanje na demonstrante ili je šutio i to dozvolio, Mubarak je odgovoran za smrt 846 civila i 26 policajaca koji su ubijeni u revoluciji, naročito zato što se od prvog dana otvorilo vatru na mirne demonstrante - izjavio je sudija Omar Maravan.
Protesti protiv Mubaraka trajali su 18 dana, a završili njegovom ostavkom 11. februara. Komisija je istraživala napade na civile, ali i navodno otvaranje zatvora, puštanje kriminalaca na ulice i namjerno stvaranje haosa i ozračja nesigurnosti u zemlji. Također se ispitivala vladina manipulacija medija, navodi Jutarnji.
Utvrđeno je i da je upotreba sile bila neproporcionalna potrebi te da su i policajci gađali ljude koji su s prozora snimali proteste te se namjerno u demonstrante zabijali vozilima.
Mubarak je optužen i za korupciju, a za isto se optužuju njegove sinove Alaa i Gamala, koji su, kao i otac, zatvoreni. Spomenute članove porodice Mubarak mogla bi zadesiti sudbina iračkog vođe Sadama Huseina, koji je osuđen na smrt vješanjem, tvrde tamošnji mediji.
Ko zeli procitati cijeli tekst, i jos mnogo njih, dovoljno je samo registrovati se, dzabalama.Understanding the Revolutions of 2011
Weakness and Resilience in Middle Eastern Autocracies
By Jack A. Goldstone
May/June 2011
The wave of revolutions sweeping the Middle East bears a striking resemblance to previous political earthquakes. As in Europe in 1848, rising food prices and high unemployment have fueled popular protests from Morocco to Oman. As in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989, frustration with closed, corrupt, and unresponsive political systems has led to defections among elites and the fall of once powerful regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and perhaps Libya. Yet 1848 and 1989 are not the right analogies for this past winter's events. The revolutions of 1848 sought to overturn traditional monarchies, and those in 1989 were aimed at toppling communist governments. The revolutions of 2011 are fighting something quite different: "sultanistic" dictatorships. Although such regimes often appear unshakable, they are actually highly vulnerable, because the very strategies they use to stay in power make them brittle, not resilient. It is no coincidence that although popular protests have shaken much of the Middle East, the only revolutions to succeed so far -- those in Tunisia and Egypt -- have been against modern sultans.(...)
(...)Yet there is another kind of dictatorship that often proves much more vulnerable, rarely retaining power for more than a generation: the sultanistic regime. Such governments arise when a national leader expands his personal power at the expense of formal institutions. Sultanistic dictators appeal to no ideology and have no purpose other than maintaining their personal authority. They may preserve some of the formal aspects of democracy -- elections, political parties, a national assembly, or a constitution -- but they rule above them by installing compliant supporters in key positions and sometimes by declaring states of emergency, which they justify by appealing to fears of external (or internal) enemies.
Behind the scenes, such dictators generally amass great wealth, which they use to buy the loyalty of supporters and punish opponents. Because they need resources to fuel their patronage machine, they typically promote economic development, through industrialization, commodity exports, and education. They also seek relationships with foreign countries, promising stability in exchange for aid and investment. However wealth comes into the country, most of it is funneled to the sultan and his cronies.
The new sultans control their countries' military elites by keeping them divided. Typically, the security forces are separated into several commands (army, air force, police, intelligence) -- each of which reports directly to the leader. The leader monopolizes contact between the commands, between the military and civilians, and with foreign governments, a practice that makes sultans essential for both coordinating the security forces and channeling foreign aid and investment. To reinforce fears that foreign aid and political coordination would disappear in their absence, sultans typically avoid appointing possible successors.
To keep the masses depoliticized and unorganized, sultans control elections and political parties and pay their populations off with subsidies for key goods, such as electricity, gasoline, and foodstuffs. When combined with surveillance, media control, and intimidation, these efforts generally ensure that citizens stay disconnected and passive.
By following this pattern, politically adept sultans around the world have managed to accumulate vast wealth and high concentrations of power. Among the most famous in recent history were Mexico's Porfirio Díaz, Iran's Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Nicaragua's Somoza dynasty, Haiti's Duvalier dynasty, the Philippines' Ferdinand Marcos, and Indonesia's Suharto.
But as those sultans all learned, and as the new generation of sultans in the Middle East -- including Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Omar al-Bashir in Sudan, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya, and Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen -- has discovered, power that is too concentrated can be difficult to hold on to.
PAPER TIGERS
For all their attempts to prop themselves up, sultanistic dictatorships have inherent vulnerabilities that only increase over time. Sultans must strike a careful balance between self-enrichment and rewarding the elite: if the ruler rewards himself and neglects the elite, a key incentive for the elite to support the regime is removed. But as sultans come to feel more entrenched and indispensable, their corruption frequently becomes more brazen and concentrated among a small inner circle. As the sultan monopolizes foreign aid and investment or gets too close to unpopular foreign governments, he may alienate elite and popular groups even further.
Meanwhile, as the economy grows and education expands under a sultanistic dictator, the number of people with higher aspirations and a keener sensitivity to the intrusions of police surveillance and abuse increases. And if the entire population grows rapidly while the lion's share of economic gains is hoarded by the elite, inequality and unemployment surge as well. As the costs of subsidies and other programs the regime uses to appease citizens rise, keeping the masses depoliticized places even more stress on the regime. If protests start, sultans may offer reforms or expand patronage benefits -- as Marcos did in the Philippines in 1984 to head off escalating public anger. Yet as Marcos learned in 1986, these sops are generally ineffective once people have begun to clamor for ending the sultan's rule.
The weaknesses of sultanistic regimes are magnified as the leader ages and the question of succession becomes more acute. Sultanistic rulers have sometimes been able to hand over leadership to younger family members. This is only possible when the government has been operating effectively and has maintained elite support (as in Syria in 2000, when President Hafez al-Assad handed power to his son Bashar) or if another country backs the regime (as in Iran in 1941, when Western governments promoted the succession from Reza Shah to his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi). If the regime's corruption has already alienated the country's elites, they may turn on it and try to block a dynastic succession, seeking to regain control of the state (which is what happened in Indonesia in the late 1990s, when the Asian financial crisis dealt a blow to Suharto's patronage machine).(...)
http://www.foreignaffairs.com
Professor Goldstone is a consultant to the U.S. State Department, Intelligence Agencies, and the U.S. Agency for International Development
Ma ja, znam, znam..., zabij munosara wrote:Professor Goldstone is a consultant to the U.S. State Department, Intelligence Agencies, and the U.S. Agency for International Development
-----------------------------NIN wrote:Ma ja, znam, znam..., zabij munosara wrote:Professor Goldstone is a consultant to the U.S. State Department, Intelligence Agencies, and the U.S. Agency for International Development
nije ti to zanimljivo nikome jarane..koga briga za tamo neku afganistansku bijedu..a koji su uz to i muslimani..osim toga anglocionisti samo šire demokraciju...mir-vama wrote:Snage pod američkim zapovjedništvom nastavljaju ubijati civile u Afganistan
/Presstv- pozivajući se na svjedoke, javlja da su snage pod američkim zapovjedništvom u Afganistanu u provinciji Kenar, na istoku te zemlje, ubile 4 žene.
U maju mjesecu ove godine snage pod američkim zapovjedništvom su u provinciji Kenar ubile 9 djece starosne dobi od 7 do 9 godina.
U akcijama inostranih snaga u Afganistanu, od američke okupacije 2001. godine, do sada je ubijeno na hiljade civila.
