salik79 wrote:Lik ne vjeruje nama, koji smo zivi svjedoci, ne vjeruje nasim najvisim vojnim i politickim duznosnicima tog vremena, ne vjeruje bilo kome...Osim Amerima
Pa, ako je tako, evo clanak Mark Dannera (slobodno progooglaj ko je on), iz 1996. :
Hypocrisy in Action: What's the real Iran-Bosnia Scandal
http://www.markdanner.com/articles/print/65
Ja cu samo par citata:
In September of 1991, the United Nations imposed an arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia. The embargo, predictably, favored the Bosnian Serbs, for they had ready access to the arms stockpiles and factories amassed by the Tito regime. President Bush, determined to avoid an election-year involvement in a messy Balkan war, firmly supported the embargo; and in September of 1992, when a plane loaded with Iranian arms landed in Zagreb, his Administration strongly protested.
Within a week, an Iranian cargo plane touched down at the Zagreb airport and began unloading its cargo of arms; a week after that, news of the shipments appeared on the front page of the Washington Post.
In April, 1995, the Post again reported that, with Washington's "tacit acceptance," Iran had continued to deliver "large quantities of arms to Bosnia's Muslim-led government." This non-secret secret policy soon bore fruit. The rearmed Croatians and Bosnians won decisive victories; and the ethnic cleansing and bloodletting of that summer, along with the savagery of the Serb counterattacks, made possible the map, faintly inscribed though it is, that was conceived at Dayton.
From a clutch of congressional committees we will now hear this or that honorable member profess himself, like Captain Renault, "shocked, shocked" to learn that Iranian arms had cleared the way for Dayton.
Speaker Newt Gingrich blames this on "extraordinarily amateurish" policymaking; but the causes lie deeper, both in the sad hypocritical history of the United States in the Bosnian war (the Americans promised help, but only the Iranians delivered) and in the way our national-security apparatus functions -- or, rather, a decade after Iran-Contra -- malfunctions.
Ajde sada da postavimo malo kompletniji taj clanak a ne samo po recenicu kako to ti radis cesto.. da ne kazem da vadis iz konteksta nedao Bog.
Hypocrisy may be the mother's milk of politics, but there are occasions -- the controversy now being manufactured in Congress over "secret" Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia is one -- when the glass runs over. In the coming weeks, citizens will watch as that late-twentieth-century American art form, the full-dress political scandal, enters its decadent phase. Panelled committee rooms, indignant congressmen, stubborn Administration witnesses -- all the familiar trappings will be on display. But the inquisition will plumb only an emptiness: a secret that wasn't a secret, a crime that wasn't a crime. And the real crime, the real secret hypocrisy of our dealings with Bosnia and Iran, will lie in plain sight, unsought and undisturbed.
In September of 1991, the United Nations imposed an arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia. The embargo, predictably, favored the Bosnian Serbs, for they had ready access to the arms stockpiles and factories amassed by the Tito regime. President Bush, determined to avoid an election-year involvement in a messy Balkan war, firmly supported the embargo; and in September of 1992, when a plane loaded with Iranian arms landed in Zagreb, his Administration strongly protested.
That summer and fall, as ghastly images of Muslim prisoners in Serb concentration camps appeared on television, candidate Bill Clinton called for the use of "whatever it takes to stop the slaughter" in Bosnia. But while Clinton, as President, did prove different from his real-politik predecessor in his sympathy for the Bosnians, he shared Bush's unwillingness to take risks.
In the late spring of 1993, Clinton shelved his first Bosnia policy, "lift and strike" -- so called because it envisaged lifting the embargo and initiating American air strikes -- in the face of strong objections from our European allies. Even so, Republicans in Congress argued vehemently, with Senator Bob Dole arguing most vehemently of all, that the embargo should be lifted -- unilaterally, if necessary -- so that the Bosnians could "defend themselves." These critics tended to sidestep the fact that the United States would be obliged to send troops to evacuate European peacekeepers and that, in any case, lifting the embargo, by encouraging an all-out Serb offensive, might lead to the destruction of the Bosnians.
I
n March of 1994, Clinton Administration offcials scored a diplomatic success in the Balkans by fashioning a tenuous "federation" between Bosnian Muslims and Croats. By now, American intervention - so often dangled before the hapless Bosnians - had been effectively ruled out, and only Bosnian and Croat victories over the triumphant Serbs could "even the playing field" and make possible a broader settlement.
And so, during the last days of April, 1994, when the Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman, approached the American Ambassador, Peter Galbraith, and inquired what the Clinton Administration would say to his establishing a full-scale "pipeline" of arms from Iran to Bosnia (a modest stream of weapons was already flowing from Islamic countries, Iran included), Galbraith responded that he had "no instructions." This non-answer answer, we now learn from the Los Angeles Times, in almost the only bit of genuine news in this affair, had been formulated the night before, "at the highest levels" -- that is, with the involvement of President Clinton himself.
Within a week, an Iranian cargo plane touched down at the Zagreb airport and began unloading its cargo of arms; a week after that, news of the shipments appeared on the front page of the Washington Post.
Within months, Congress passed a law forbidding the Administration to enforce the embargo. In April, 1995, the Post again reported that, with Washington's "tacit acceptance," Iran had continued to deliver "large quantities of arms to Bosnia's Muslim-led government." This non-secret secret policy soon bore fruit. The rearmed Croatians and Bosnians won decisive victories; and the ethnic cleansing and bloodletting of that summer, along with the savagery of the Serb counterattacks, made possible the map, faintly inscribed though it is, that was conceived at Dayton. 
