@JMGuti
Ja sam stavio "Prevedem" pod navodnike nisam mislio doslovno prevedem a ono sto sam ti napisao je na osnovu malo vise informacija nego sto si ti procitao u tim clancima....Govor zapovjednika 93 je "publicity stunt" koji se ne razlikuje sustinski od poruke Zelenskog "saljite jos, saljite vise.." A ono sto on stvarno misli ce objaviti u nekoj svojoj knjizi koju ce napisati ako i kad prezivi rat... za strane novinare se ima spremna "posebna" prica...
Zato sam odlucio da te malo prozovem radi reakcije da elaboriras ovako kako jesi sta su ti izvori na osnovu kojih pravis zakljucke. I to je tvoj izbor nemam nista protiv i ja citam NYT i redovno pregledam sta ima novo ali i oni imaju ozbiljne istrazivacke clanke koji se dugo pripremaju i ove lakse reporterske sa ratista. Ali, ako bi se samo na njih oslanjao,na te clanke, procjene i zakljuci su pod rizikom da budu pausalni...
Na logistiku 93 se oslanjanju sve manje jedinice u Bahmutu koje su u njihovoj blizini dejstava, npr dobrovoljacke Seih Mensur ili Sloboda Rusije, manje specijalne postrojbe - problem je sto zavisno od nivoa dejstava logistika kasni i ovako je otezana dostava u grad jos kad logistika operativnog sektora ne dostavlja dovoljno onda je to problem. A tu pricu od manjku municije i "Send MOARRR" to je ukrajinska mantra i moraju tako...u praksi hronicno nedostaje i veoma brzo se trosi minobacacka municija svih kalibara, granate 30-40 mm, RPG municija, teska artijerlija veceg kalibra ima dovoljno municije i ta artiljerija je kroz mart i danas odrzala Bahmut. Municije 12.7 i za pjesadijsko naoruzanje ima dovoljno ali se desava da vojnici ostanu bez municije brzo dok su na polozaju a dostava tj. popuna sa novom kasni i to kosta ljude glave u takvim situacijama a desavalo se u Bahmutu pocesto pogotovo u aprilu zbog dinamike borbenih dejstava...
polovinom marta objavljeno a pocetkom marta je Korshak boravio na ratistu oko Bahmuta pa samo segmenti koji su bitni za ovu pricu.
Also, for the record, if sometimes my answers seem vague, it’s intentional, I’m concealing information (usually something I saw) that might be tactically useful to the Russians. I’m doing that first because I personally think the Russians are the bad guys in this war, and second, because I (like all reporters that go to the front) signed a contract with the Defense Ministry promising not to divulge military information of a tactical nature.
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As to high Russian casualties, everyone said they are advancing and keep getting hit with artillery and direct fire. A couple of soldiers told me they had seen Russian soldiers advance past Russians who had been hit without stopping to give first aid.
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A couple told me the Russian regulars were more competent than the Wagner guys, but, they said that as long as there is enough artillery and mortar ammo it wouldn’t matter who’s attacking.
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In general, the plan seems to be to try and catch the infiltrators with drones and then hit them with mortars or artillery, and if that doesn’t work then the UAF infantry defends its holes until the Russians get too close. So the Russian tactic “works”, but in the sense that Russian gains literally can be from fighting position to fighting position — at times a matter of dozen meters or so. The attacks are not constant and according to the soldiers I talked to most of the time they just fail, everyone is killed or run off. One officer pointed out that the Russian army is advancing in Bakhmut about 1/10th of a kilometer a week, probably.
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q:
Hi Stefan, has there been any response to your (and Tom Cooper’s) writings regarding shortages of ammo, bobwar, etc? Is this having an impact? I’ve been reading Ukraine was warned about the high ammo usage by some western countries — but that seems a bit unfair in the sense that it’s not like *not* shooting the russian invaders is a realistic option. So is anyone listening to this particular issue?
I saw no barbed wire to speak of, but of course I wasn’t on forward fighting positions. I can say without a doubt that where I was Ukrainian fire outweighed Russian fire (outgoing vs. Incoming) by ten to one, and no I am not exaggerating. So it seems possible someone figured out that a shell/mortar round famine in the UAF around Bakhmut needed to be eliminated. I can’t speak for all times in all places, but when I was there, my observation, the Ukrainians were clearly dominating the indirect fire fight.Not just mortars either, big stuff as well.
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On casualties, no idea of the specific ratios, but the soldiers and officers I talked to pretty much without exception told me the Russians were dying in large numbers and that the UAF units were taking casualties but no one was going to quit fighting. Remember, this is soldiers talking to a foreign journalist.[/b]
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How much of the reported Wagner casualties are the untrained prisoners vs. the well regarded Wagner troops?! Would be very sad if Ukraine is losing experienced troops and not degrading the experienced Wagner troops in greater numbers.
Ukraine is without question losing experienced troops. I get the impression, not from this field trip but from watching/communicating with a couple of the more standout units, that the old rule that once a unit is combat experienced it suffers fewer casualties over time, definitely is true in the UAF. I have seen reports claiming 10–20 percent of Wagner is competent soldiers, but I have no way of knowing if that is true.
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Q: To what degree is the information you’re able to share either redacted or influenced by opsec?
A: Great question, the answer is to some degree. The more the answer might give a Russian military planner information he might reasonably not have from other sources, the more I’m redacting myself. As noted above if you’re still curious in a month remind me, this kind of information definitely has an expiration date.
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Morale is overall good, I would say. As I gather, for most holding out is a given, the thing is, for a few who happen to be in the not-so-many holes or buildings the Russians have picked for the days attacks, you may run out of ammo, get Russian infantry inside your position, find out company or battalion can’t give you fire support like you need it, or die. But most of the guys in a given day just hold their positions, or do their specialty job whatever it is. Morale goes up when people hear Ukrainian guns outshooting the Russian ones.
Pretty much whenever possible both sides use indirect fire. Firefights (I am told) are rare, short-range firefights of anything longer than a second or two are extraordinary. Weapons heavier that mortars absolutely are being used, I confirm howitzers firing both ways where I was.
My view is the Russians will have a whole lot of very bloody fighting ahead of them before they even manage to threaten Bakhmut’s communications seriously, and if the weight of artillery I heard and observed over the weekend was any indicator of the general situation, the Ukrainians have artillery dominance around Bakhmut. Given sufficient shells and mortar rounds, there will be no danger, is how I see it.
Q: I have always felt the key to winning this war is artillery. Russias army is basically an army of artillery and without that its nothing. Lately we have suddenly seen an uptick in Ukrainian artillery kills, which I think can be significant. Is this because Russia has pushed its artillery forward to make it more effective ( and more vulnerable) or has some dynamic changed that allows Ukraine to make significant counter battery strikes ?
A: I think two things have happened. First, somehow, the Russians are in a shell shortage and the Ukrainians have if not unlimited ammo then enough to go out and try and kill things on a regular basis. This plus Ukrainian drone advantage — the Russians admit this openly, they complain about it — means that the Ukrainian artillery over time has probably had more ability to hit priority targets the drones find, which without question include Russian artillery. I saw UAF artillery which by type and location almost certainly was doing counter-battery work. Whether or not the trend is significant, don’t know, but I do know when I was in the area the Ukrainian bangs seriously outnumbered the Russian bangs.
Ovo je od covjeka koji se javno zalio kao i Tom Cooper da dobija svojim kanalima informacije iz Bahmuta da manjka municije u Bahmutu narocito tokom druge polovine februara, i da je narocito kriticno bilo sa nedostatkom minobacacke municije i 30-40 mm granatama. A to dvoje je kriticno bilo za zaustavljanje napada Wagner jedinica dok ne bi pocela djelovati po njima artiljerija 155 mm, 122 mm...
6 aprila sam napisao na temi na osnovu onoga sto sam citao i od Cooper i Korshaka i od Gregga jer ljudi koji su cesto reporteri/novinari ili analiticari postave pitanja nakon posta na FB pa im oni odgovore detaljnije nego u postu. Bitno da naglasim da su i Cooper i Korshak javljali da manjka svega u Bahmutu tokom februara ali ne i od marta. Kupera koristi i Tabak iz Hrvatske i povremeno se javi u komentarima...
Bakhmut, vec mjesec dana Ukrajinci imaju potpunu premoc u artiljeriji u Bakhmutu i pokrivaju citavo ratiste bez problema, nema nedostatka municije vise ni za pjesadiju ni za artiljeriju. Rusi nemaju na tom ratistu vise artiljeriju kao tokom borbi oko SD, uspjeli su samo kod Avdivke da imaju jaca i koncentrisanija dejstva artiljerije zato su u Bakhmutu gubici Wagnera strasni. Poboljsanjem vremenskih uslova ostaje da se vidi da li ce Orlani i novi dronovi koje Rusi sve vise koriste zadnjih par sedmica omoguciti jaca i preciznija dejstva ruske artiljerije, veliki problem ostaje od dolaska HIMARsa logistika za Ruse i da li i koliko sigurno mogu raditi dostavu municije svojim artiljercima tamo gdje to mogu izvesti tamo mogu i koncentrisati vatru i napraviti nesto. Novije na temi treba podsjecati da ruska logistika ovisi o zeljeznici. Ova premoc u artiljeriji koju su Ukrajinci ostvarili u Bakhmutu je moguce imala uticaj na usporeno povlacenje iz grada, koje je vrlo ozbiljno planirano mjesecima i sad se polako sprovodi u djelo. Povlacenje je ocekivano jos prije vise od mjesec dana ali o tacnim razlozima zasto se od toga odustalo po prvobitnom planu i zasto se ovako sporo izvodi znace se tek za pola godine i vise. Sve sto se prica/pise su samo spekulacije pojedinaca...
I ovo sve gore sto ja napisah na osnovu tih izvora kompajlirano se i ostvarilo cak je Cooper isao sa objavama 5-6 dana ranije i prije sa informacijama tokom aprila nego british intelligence update...i sve se potvrdilo kao tacno...i upotreba TOS i dolazak divizije VDV i to da ce se Ukrajinci povlaciti da ih ima znatno manje od Rusa u gradu i da je to dio taktike, cak se covjek bio uspanicio na FB da postoji rizik da Rusi pregaze i opkole Ukrajince u gradu u tom momentu toliko je veci omjer snaga bio u korist Rusa..
Sto se tice gubitaka, bio je komentar Korshaka, da je puno lakse ranjenih vojnika i kontuziranih vojnika, koji svi moraju proci medicinsku obradu i kontrolu i da se desavalo da se kompletna rotacija koja je frisko stigla morala povuci i mienjati vec nakon 48 sati jer prakticno niko nije bio bez laksih rana ili neke vrste kontuzije to se desavalo tamo gdje su najzece borbe bile i tu su se na kraju ljudi rotirali svaka 3 dana a kroz April rotacije su bile svakih 3-5 dana za sve jedinice u Bahmutu. Imas jucerasnji upis Coopera gdje objasnjava sta Ukrajinci rade po tom pitanju u Bahmutu.
Sto se tice Korshaka:
Stefan Korshak
Stefan Korshak, a Kyiv Post staff writer from 1997-2000, is a veteran foreign correspondent with more than 25-years experience in the former Soviet Union. His war zone experience includes Chechnya, South Ossetia/Georgia and Afghanistan. He also has performed journalist work in the conflict zones Transnistria, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh; and filed reports from remote locations like the Caucasus Mountains, the Carpathian Mountains and the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone. He is a professional writer, photographer/editor and video producer. Korshak served in the U.S. Army from 1985-1989. He holds degrees from George Washington University and Yale University, and he has performed course work at Middlebury University and Leningrad State University.
Ovdje su ti njegovi clanci koje je za Kyiv Post pisao, a objavljuje na mediumu sedmicne izvjestaje ili svakih par dana ako nesto bitno i zanimljivo se desi..https://archive.kyivpost.com/author/stefan-korshak
debil se otkrio prosle godine kad je stavio sliku salate koju se ima samo uzeti u konzum i mercator prodavnicama u Sarajevu 
