ultima_palabra wrote:Na aprilac se može gledati sa dvije strane... onaj prijedlog koji je bio na stolu nije bio dobar, ali imali smo garancije od Amerikanaca da će biti i druga faza ustavnih promjena... da li bi je bilo nikad nećemo saznati.
Druga stvar, i ako je trebalo odbiti aprilac trebalo je to uraditi kroz proces pregovora, postaviti uslove za redukciju entitetskog glasanja pa vidjeti hoće li RS-ovci prihvatiti - znači prebaciti lopticu na njihovu stranu i nabiti im epitet kočničara, kao što sad SDP radi u procesu formiranja vlasti. Nikako onako kaubojski kao Hare, nakon čega nas je Amerika pustila niz vodu nekoliko godina
Što se tiče Haretovih ekonomskih uspjeha
Ovako je tih dana izvjestavala americka ambasada:
SUMMARY: Constitutional reform measures agreed on March 18 by Bosnia and Herzegovina's political party leaders are now under consideration by relevant committees in the BiH Parliament. Driven by Bosnia's electoral calendar, amendments must be approved by the end of April in order for the changes to the national government to be in place by the October 2006 general elections. With 15 crucial days to go before Parliament acts, our count indicates that we have not -- yet -- nailed down all the votes we need. Some parliamentarians continue to argue that the changes do not go far enough; they reject the existing package in favor of a non-existant but theoretically more sweeping package to be negotiated in the future. As intensive Embassy lobbying (bolstered by the international community) moves forward, we are emphasizing a united message: these changes are an important first step, essential for BiH's Euro-Atlantic integration, and the best which can be agreed by all parties
now. For the first time, Bosnians are changing their Dayton-era constitution themselves. As the parliamentary
vote nears, we will need a strong public message from Washington to bolster our public diplomacy outreach. This
cable is the first in a series of updates on constitutional reform legislation. END SUMMARY.
After reaching political agreement March 18 on a package of
measures to strengethn Bosnia and Herzegovina's
national government, political leaders approved draft
amendments and legislation for parliamentary approval and
sent it forward on March 25. The measures provide for a
single President with limited competencies and two Vice
Presidents. The Council of Ministers becomes the key
institution of executive authority, and the Prime Minister
receives enhanced powers. In Bosnia's bicameral parliament,
the House of Representatives will double in size, and the
upper house -- the House of Peoples -- will find its role
limited to consideration of issues touching on the vital
national interest of Bosnia's three peoples.
Although the small multi-ethnic
government coalition partner "Party for BiH" (SBiH)
participated in the negotiation process, it withdrew and is
now formally opposed thanks to the Presidential ambitions of
its once and future leader, Haris Silajdzic. Also opposed:
the small Bosnian Serb Radical party and a couple of small
parties without parliamentary representation. They are
joined, critically, by several members of the Bosnian Croat
HDZ who -- having been ousted from their party positions by
HDZ leader Covic -- are opposed to anything Covic has
negotiated.
In the 42-seat House of Representatives, 28 votes
are needed to ensure passage. We estimate we have 23 solid
votes now. Our strategy is to focus on several potentially
persuadable representatives to get the five votes needed.
This includes key SBiH parliamentarians who are clearly
uncomfortable with Silajdzic's self-interested rejectionism.
The Ambassador met on April 6 with SBiH's Beriz Belkic;
Belkic, deeply uncomfortable with SBiH's stance (having
participated in negotiations through January), admitted that
it was difficult to explain. Belkic told the Ambassador that
SBiH planned to offer an amendment to the legislation which
would eliminate qualified majority voting in the House of
Representatives (QMV, also known as the "entity vote").
Unless QMV was eliminated, SBiH would vote against the
package (rather than abstaining). However, Belkic added that
he was still open for discussion.
¶8. (C) The Ambassador pressed Belkic to reconsider. Surely
Belkic realized, from his participation in the negotiations,
that the Bosnian Serbs could not agree to end QMV now?
Belkic admitted he did. Ambassador pointed out that Belkic
and SBiH had a clear choice to make: support constitutional
reform now, or be responsible for putting the brakes on
Bosnia's Euro-Atlantic integration. With his reputation for
responsible government, Belkic should not align himself with
those who wanted the first Bosnian-negotiated constitutional
reform to fail.
¶9. (C) SBiH's proposed amendment would put the Bosniaks and
Croats in a bind. President Tihic told the Ambassador on
April 4 that his party, SDA, could not be put in the position
of voting to maintain the practice. In the meeting of party
leaders with the Ambassador on April 5, Tihic proposed that
-- if the amendment was tabled by SBiH -- the Bosnian Serb
parties allow SDA, HDZ and the largely Bosniak SDP to side
with SBiH. The Bosnian Serbs could then veto the provision
in the full House. While the Bosnian Serbs rolled their eyes
(realizing that they would once again be portrayed negatively
in the press), SDP leader Lagumdzija argued persuasively that
all the party leaders must stand, together, against amendment
and for the compromises they had negotiated together. The
Ambassador will reinforce this point with Tihic in the coming
days.
Our outreach to the Bosnian Serb community has, of
necessity, been more low-key. Constitutional reform is not
viewed as positive by most Bosnian Serbs. They are ready to
accept the political leaders' agreement on this set of
reforms precisely because it focuses on national
institutions. Our challenge will be to get support for the
next -- post-election -- phase of the constitutional reform
process. That is the phase which, by examining
"sub-national" government structures, will most threaten
entity (read: Republika Srbska) prerogatives.
Amerikanci su ocito imali plan za postepeno uredjenje drzave i dramaticno smanjenje ovlasti entiteta u korist drzave
Nazalost, uletio je ego-manijak Haris i sve razvalio.
Hvala jos jednom Harise, kao da ti Daytonska sramota nije bila dovoljna, nego si morao i ovo razvaliti.
