Ukrajina

[Dangubic]

[yt][/yt]

40ak samo na kijv

Cuj Rusija Hamas na steroidima ? Jel se ovako laje nadajuci se pomoci Izraela ?

Nazvati nekog Hamasom nije nista pozitivno.

[Čitalac]

Henry Kissinger – „patrijarh američke spoljne politike“ – u tekstu za Spectator ponudio je svoje viđenje diplomatske solucije rata u Ukrajini i usprotivio se „uništenju Rusije“. Po Kissingeru, Rusija bi se povukla na pozicije iz februara, zadržala bi Krim, tzv. DNR i LNR i o tome bi se moglo pregovarati nakon uspostavljanja primirja. O ostalim „spornim teritorijama“ građani bi se mogli izjasniti na referendumu pod nadzorom međunarodne zajednice. Ukrajina bi se trajno, na ovaj ili onaj način, vezala za NATO jer je, po Kissingeru, neutralnost sada potpuno besmislena.

Cilj mirovnog procesa bio bi dvojak: potvrditi slobodu Ukrajine i definirati novu međunarodnu strukturu, posebno za srednju i istočnu Europu. Na kraju bi Rusija trebala naći mjesto u takvom poretku.
Poželjni ishod za neke je Rusija koju je rat učinio impotentnom. Ne slažem se. Unatoč svoj svojoj sklonosti nasilju, Rusija je dala odlučujući doprinos globalnoj ravnoteži i ravnoteži snaga tijekom više od pola tisućljeća. Ne treba umanjivati njenu povijesnu ulogu. Vojni neuspjesi Rusije nisu eliminirali njezin globalni nuklearni doseg, što joj je omogućilo da prijeti eskalacijom u Ukrajini. Čak i ako se ta sposobnost smanji, raspad Rusije ili uništavanje njezine sposobnosti za stratešku politiku moglo bi njezin teritorij koji obuhvaća 11 vremenskih zona pretvoriti u sporni vakuum. Njena konkurentska društva mogla bi odlučiti svoje sporove riješiti nasiljem. Druge zemlje bi mogle nastojati proširiti svoje zahtjeve silom. Sve te opasnosti bile bi složene prisutnošću tisuća komada nuklearnog oružja koje Rusiju čini jednom od dvije najveće svjetske nuklearne sile.

U Kremlju su velikom brzinom reagovali na Kissingerov tekst. Peskov kaže da će ga pažljivo analizirati.

"Nesumnjivo, Kisindžerov talenat, iskustvo i stručnost uvijek su traženi, a posebno u ovakvim kriznim situacijama. Sa velikim interesovanjem analiziraćemo njegov tekst", kaže Peskov.

[karanana]

na zalost, koliko god je govno kissinger vec decenijama/stoljecima, ne kraju ce biti nesto ove vrste. nema sanse vojno istjerati rusiju sa krima. cak i ako ukri iznenade i stvarno pritisnu krim, mislim da ce rusi u tom trenutku ako stvarno nemaju izlaz roknuti atomsku. ukrajina mora izvuci sta moze, vratiti se na pozicije 24.2. vratiti onaj jug, mozda se vratiti na azovsko more do mariupola, izgubiti krim mozda i dio donbasa ali uci u nato odmah. neki trejd off ce se na zalost morati uraditi. ne znam, tesko je govoriti o tome, ali de facto ukr vec 8 godina ni nema krim ni donbas. samo da se rusi vrate na 24.2. i nato, mozda bi se mogli prihvatit. a ja bi rusiju izoliro za sva vremena i od plina i od nafte i od prodaje bilo cega njima pa nek crknu i u donbasu i na krimu i u moskvi.

[mishic]

Od Kisindžera nema mutnijeg a ne mudrijeg!

[trambusek88]

https://vm.tiktok.com/ZMFG26Xoc/

[SanskiBiser]

Ukraine War, 16 December 2022
Hello everybody!

Up front, answers to the same or similar question/s received from several readers.


1.) Can Russia launch a new large-scale offensive — on Kyiv, on Kharkiv, on any other place?

On Kyiv? Nope. The VSRF hasn’t got the necessary troops in southern Belarus, and Lukashenko — as keen as he is to please Putin in any possible way — neither has enough troops and firepower, nor the taste for any kind of adventures. At least it is my assessment that, at most, Belarus is going to keep on trying to tie down few brigades of the ZSU by its ‘indirect threats’ and ‘manoeuvring’ along the mutual border. Any deployments of the necessary troop contingents (40,000+) would be promptly detected by Western intelligence and reported correspondingly.

On Kharkiv? Similar to above, which means: nope. It hasn’t got the necessary troops along that section of the border. Actually, the VSRF troops there are busy constructing a massive defense line along the border.

Anywhere else in Ukraine? Possible, but unlikely.



A large-scale offensive is requiring several elements to become possible. One needs not only troops, ammo, and supplies, but equipment too. Right now, Putin has only troops — and then poorly-trained troops. Sure, many of these are mobilised veterans of the VSRF, but at least as many are aged, in poor shape, out of training. Of course, the VSRF is trying to improve the training of its ‘mobiks’, and those in the process of reaching the battlefield now have got a least 3–4 weeks of exercises. However, having troops is not enough. A big offensive would require ammo, supplies, and heavy equipment — and all of that on, or immediately behind the frontline.

The VSRF is meanwhile back to having about 300,000–310,000 troops deployed in Ukraine, of which about 150,000 are involved in combat operations: as we’ve seen in the past, this is about the maximum its logistics can support. Actually, the logistics of the VSRF collapsed already two times as soon as the number grew to more than 150,000 troops deployed in combat operations (see withdrawals from Kyiv and Chernihiv in the first case, and then the loss of eastern Kharkiv and Kherson, in the second).

No matter what is the terrain (and the terrain is always dictating the warfare), a matter of fact is that foot soldiers cannot advance as fast as motorized- or mechanized troops. The VSRF has lost too many of its best tanks, too many of its best infantry fighting vehicles, and too much of its best artillery to remain capable of organising and effectively running a massive mechanised operation. It failed to suppress Ukrainian air defences; lost too many combat aircraft, helicopters and too many of its airborne troops and special forces to run any kind of large-scale airborne assaults; nowadays, it’s constantly suffering heavy losses in skilled personnel and stocks of supplies due to continuous Ukrainian HIMARS-strikes on command- and logistic facilities, too. As result, the VSRF has lost the capability to ‘line-up’, say, 200 artillery pieces and then oversaturate Ukrainian positions with similar volumes of artillery fire like it used to do in the Izyum-, Popasna-, Severodonetsk- and few other areas at earlier times.

Without this capability, the VSRF cannot ‘breach’ the frontline: it cannot destroy enough fortified Ukrainian positions within any short periods of time, so to enable its infantry — or vehicles — to advance. If it cannot destroy Ukrainian positions, the result is always the same: Ukrainians remain capable of shooting back, and then the Russian infantry is suffering stupendous casualties (such the last few weeks in the Bakhmut area).

In such cases, the klix ‘critical’ factors — from the Ukrainian point of view — is to keep ZSU troops in resupplied with ammo, and replacement barrels for their machine guns.

All the VSRF is presently able of doing is what it is already doing in the Bakhmut area, and, to a lesser degree, in the Avdiivka area: rolling infantry attacks, wave-after-wave, going on for hours, sometimes for days, supported by mediocre artillery and plentiful, but ineffective air strikes.

Problem: such offensive operations are extremely slow — at least in comparison to mechanised operations. They are ‘slow’ because humans can’t run as fast as an armoured fighting vehicle can move. Even less so can aged mobiks in poor physical condition run as far and at any comparable speeds — and that while carrying their combat gear, plus weapons and ammo — as vehicles can move. In turn, this is offering Ukrainians plenty of times to react: even if taken by surprise, they can bring in reinforcements and resupply ammo, and bring their own artillery to bear. In the last few weeks in the Bakhmut area, Russian infantry assaults were so slow in development, that Ukrainians were even able to run air strikes by their Su-25s on them.


The only thing where the ZSU can mess up is by launching entirely pointless counterattacks — and thus expose its own troops and equipment to Russian defensive fire, like this has happened several times the last few weeks, first in the Pisky area, then in the Bakhmut area. Here, one must hope that the dismissal of few of super-patriotic commanders that had ‘more guts than brains’, is going to prevent similar tragedies like when half a specific special forces battalion was squandered to, arguably, destroy most of a Russian infantry brigade… (nope: I’m not going to go into any additional details in this regards).


Finally, yes, no doubt: the VSRF might still have around 9,000 tanks, and a similar number of infantry fighting vehicles, and at least as much artillery left in its reserve, as stressed by the Chief of the Estonian Military Intel, two days ago (and then hyper-ventilated by the Western media). It’s certainly going to do its utmost to return as many of these into operational condition as possible. However, there is no indication for any kind of major reform, re-structuring and upgrades in the way the VSRF is equipped, trained and fighting. Nothing of the kind the Soviet Army did in 1941–1942, for example: the System Putin is preventing any kind of major improvement, while no amounts of gung-ho-daydreaming can overpower modern firepower.

As result, what Putin and Surovikin are sending to the frontlines nowadays are older types of weapons systems, all of lesser combat effectiveness, and they’re going to be operated by troops with poorer training and thus lesser combat effectiveness (the only exception from this rule is the deployment of Borshchevik systems, designed to track down Starlink terminals, where it remains unclear how many of these are available at all). Unless there is some sort of fundamental change in the way characters like Putin and Surovikin think — and I know no indication for this, right now — this is unlikely to change any time soon (say: 3–6 months).

That said: mind that this is likely to remain that way only if the West continues supporting Ukraine as (relatively) ‘intensively’ as it is doing the last 4–5 months. Should the amount of that support — especially: the amount of ammunition — decrease, Ukraine is going to be in deep trouble.



2.) Importance and impacts of the Lancet-3 LPGM (also Lancet-3M)?

Over the last two months, the Russians began deploying a slowly increasing number of their Lancet-3M LPGMs against the ZSU. As far as is known, by now these have hit about a dozen of Ukrainian tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles each, about 20 artillery pieces and up to six mobile SAM-systems (plus few Russian vehicles…).

Generally, the effectiveness of such weapons systems is heavily dependent on good reconnaissance — and nice weather: they have a very short endurance and depend on what the operator can see through the narrow field of view of their cameras for precise targeting. If one knows where to search for a possible target: fine. They’re effective. But, if not, they’re ineffective.

I’ve stated this already several times: with the VSRF losing the mass of its reconnaissance UAVs, and then with the onset of the bad-weather-season, its reconnaissance capabilities have greatly diminished, and thus since mid-November the Keystone Cops in Moscow are not releasing as many of Lancet-taken videos as at earlier times. This is indicating that the number of their deployments has significantly decreased. We have to expect this to change as the weather improves, in spring 2023.

BTW, from studying few videos clear enough to show, I’m not convinced every of Lancet-hits shown by the Russians really means some piece of equipment was even seriously damaged. Thus, it is possible that the klix effectiveness of Lancelets is lower than assumed just on basis of counting how many hits were scored in released videos. However, one should keep in mind that nobody — no Ukraine, no Russia, no US Army, none of armed forces of NATO (nope, Israel neither) — has any effective means of countering the deployment of such a weapons system in big numbers. Thus, should the Russians find a way to manufacture them in some serious numbers, they’re going to become extremely unpleasant in 2023.



AIR/MISSILE WARFARE

After smashing the HQ of the 58th CAA, two days ago, yesterday, the ZSU run additional M142 HIMARS-strikes on Russian command posts and logistic hubs in Tokmak, Polohy, and Berdyansk, and then hit a hotel in Zhelezniy Port, in the southern Kherson region, reportedly used by the FSB, plus ‘something’ (ammo depot?) in Kadievka, in the Luhansk area.

Today, the VKS and the Russian Navy released 72 cruise missiles, plus 27 S-300 SAMs fired in ballistic mode at Ukraine. Tu-95s were releasing from over Saratov and the Caspian Sea, Tu-22M-3s have released several Kh-22s over the Sea of Azov, Su-34s were releasing Kh-31P, Kh-35, and Kh-59 PGMs. One of Kh-101s malfunctioned and crashed inside Russia, near Volgograd.

Primary targets were power facilities in the east and south of the country: the Zaporizhzhya area alone was attacked by 15 missiles, another half a dozen were recorded in Dnipro, and several in Vinnitsya. Ukraine quickly claimed ’80–90%’ as shot down, but from what is known by now, Kremenchuk, Kirovgrad, Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Poltava, and Kherson completely lost power (including the local sections of the railway system), Dnipro lost its underground, while emergency black-outs were imposed in Kyiv, Odessa, Zaporizhzya, and Zhytomyr. Ukroenergo dclared the state of emergency, reporting hits on 9 facilities, that over 50% of the power grid was knocked out, and in a massive reduction of production by nuclear facilities.

Sadly, this was predictable — as was the fact that now the Ukrainian power grid has received debilitating damage, and is going to take yet longer to repair — and is going to have all the imaginable negative consequences listed in my last report, and that sooner, rather than later.




BATTLE OF DONBASS

Generally, the weather is slightly above freezing: colder temps are expected for the next week, only. With that, we’re back to ‘mud’… seas of mud, to be more precise…and to Russian human wave assaults in the Bakhmut area: alone reading reports about these is turning my stomach upside down (not to talk about watching videos of the ‘aftermath’)….but, well…. here you are…

Kupyansk-Svatove… back and forth fighting around Novoselivske and Stelmakhivka was reported by both sides, the last two days. Apparently, ‘nothing special’ (except for those directly involved, of course): Russian attacks on Hryanykivka (Dvorichna area) and Stelmakhivka have been repulsed. That said, the ZSU seems to have captured a few pieces of Russian heavy equipment, including a T-90M and one MSTA-S in this area.

Kremina….although the 144th Motor Rifle continued attempting to lessen Ukrainian pressure through attacks north and south of the town, Brigadier General Gromov (Main Operational Directorate, GenStab-U) claimed an advance of the ZSU to ‘1,5km from Dibrovna.

That said, most intensive fighting was reported from the Bilohorivka area, on the Siversky Donets, where since three days the Russians are trying to break through in direction of Siversk — with the obvious aim of lessening Ukrainian pressure upon Kremina from the south.

Bakhmut… On 13 December, Wagner, reinforced by the 31st Brigade VSRF, launched a massive attack into the eastern outskirts of the town and over the next two days claimed to have entered the eastern outskirts, even secured many of buildings in the Fedor Maksimenko and Pervomaysky Streets. Together with rotation of several ZSU units (see earlier reports), this prompted many into the conclusion ‘Ukraine is short of losing Bakhmut’. This attack was eventually checked by the 71st Jäger and Georgians, which — with help of few precise artillery barrages — then regained all the terrain lost up to about a dozen of homes on the western side of the Fedora Maksymenka Street (here the results of the fight involving Georgians). RUMINT has it the 31st was rendered ‘non-combat-effective’ in this showdown, and withdrawn from the battlefield.

Simultaneously with above-mentioned assault, the Wagner attacked positions of the 53rd Mech in Opytne — with similar results. Actually, Ukrainians deployed there report an ‘artillery deficit’ on the Russian side.


All of this leaves me without the option but to observe that I’m enjoying, ever more so often, all the stories still ‘stressing’ how the ZSU is ‘losing 500 killed in action’ in Bakhmut — ‘every single day’ — and how ‘desperate’ should Zelensky be about the situation here. They’re funny because the local sources cannot confirm anything of that kind: ‘few dozens of wounded in action’, yes, and at most. But 500 killed every single day? Sorry, that cannot even be described as ‘science fiction’.

Why? Foremost because the VSRF nowadays — and this is including the Wagner — simply lacks the artillery it used to have the last summer. It lacks the necessary ammo: it cannot saturate such targets like specific sectors of the frontline with barrages of 20,000+ shells a day any more. What is left of its artillery is lacking precision, too: the VSRF lacks UAVs that can operate in current weather, and thus the precision of its artillery barrages is poorer — while its artillery is meanwhile suffering, heavily, to the Ukrainian counter-battery operations. Finally, thanks to improved training and equipment, but also the degeneration of the Russian military capabilities, Ukrainian CASEVAC and MEDEVAC are functioning far better than just a few months ago.

A good indication for anybody claiming something else is actually telling fairy tales are stories about ‘local hospitals being overfilled with bodies and wounded’. In reality, any seriously wounded ZSU troops are evacuated out of Bakhmut: there are several teams doing that. Sure, their job is not easy, it is dangerous and trying, and takes longer than everybody involved would like, but there are no bigger issues with such operations.

Bottom line: once again, nope, there is no Ukrainian withdrawal from Bakhmut — and this is extremely unlikely to change. Not only because the ZSU has enough well-supplied and well-trained troops there, but alone because the logic dictates that it’s better to keep on defending well-protected positions, than to withdraw from them and then have to re-take them, later on.

Perhaps more concerning is the fact that the Russians do seem to have crossed the channel west of Kurdyumivka and, by the time they were finally stopped, almost reached Bila Hora and Dyliivka. This was actually a massacre, no military operation, with the Russians throwing several waves of infantry into the Ukrainian fire, until one of waves ‘in the rear’ managed to dig out enough trenches to survive and hold out. However, it is increasing the pressure upon ZSU units deployed there.

Toretsk….haven’t found any news about possible additional Russian attacks on Druzhba and Pivnichne.

Avdiivka….on 14 December, the VSRF launched a new attack on Vodyane — apparently with the aim of reaching Sieverne and Tonenke, few kilometres further north, and thus driving in the back of the ZSU garrison of Avdiivka. This assault was cut to pieces, regardless of Russian claims to have ‘liberated the main part’ of Vodyane. Actually, Ukrainians reported that the enemy was stopped well outside the village. East of there, and in the aftermath of that Ukrainian counterattack that drove all the way into south-western Pisky, the Russians are back to trying to reach the southern side of Pervomaiske: i.e. approximately where they used to be about two months ago.

Finally, yesterday, Pushilin proudly announced the ‘liberation’ of ‘80% of Marinka’. Ironically, the Keystone Cops only claimed to have reached the road to Krasnohorivka, thus ‘cutting off the supply line to the settlement’. I’ve got no idea what military genius thinks he can ‘cut off the supply line to the settlement’ connected by three roads, through (even if) cutting off just one road, but this must be another of Russian miracles in violation of basic laws of mathematics and physics. Certainly enough, Pushilin and the Keystone Cops might want to better coordinate their statements in the future, otherwise one can’t but conclude that this was another of their failed attacks.

[sumirprimus]

@SanskiBiser brat se potrudio i red je ispostovat i procitat

[geralt]

mislim da ovo nije switchblade, nego haubička granata sa proximity upaljačem..

Može bit', preširoko je ovo za Switchblade 300 kad bolje pogledam

Usput, ne kontam zašto ih slabo koriste?

Najvise zbog malenog dometa, moze letjeti samo 15 minuta. Teoretski moze preci do 10 km u jednom pravcu, ali to je ako znas tacno gdje je meta i posaljes ga u pravoj liniji prema njoj, a i to je premalo za vrijednije mete kao sto je artiljerijska posada. Vozilima slabo sta moze, tako da ostaje jos opcija terorisanja pjesadije u rovu, a mobiksi nisu meta vrijedna da se potrosi dron na njih.

Jednostavno oruzje koje ne odgovara ovom ratu. Zamisljeno da ganja talibane koji su pobjegli iza brda, a ne za pretezno artiljerijski rat dvije mehanizovane vojske. Switchblade 600 i Phoenix Ghost jos nisu isporuceni, pretpostavljam jer ih modifikuju.

[SanskiBiser]

@SanskiBiser brat se potrudio i red je ispostovat i procitat

10ak minuta sjeckam, markiram, slike ubacujem

[sumirprimus]

Lajkuj da procita obavezno

[sumirprimus]

@SanskiBiser brat se potrudio i red je ispostovat i procitat

10ak minuta sjeckam, markiram, slike ubacujem

Znam na kracim postovima koliko uzima vremena i emergije, svska cast zato

[geralt]

The only thing where the ZSU can mess up is by launching entirely pointless counterattacks — and thus expose its own troops and equipment to Russian defensive fire, like this has happened several times the last few weeks, first in the Pisky area, then in the Bakhmut area. Here, one must hope that the dismissal of few of super-patriotic commanders that had ‘more guts than brains’, is going to prevent similar tragedies like when half a specific special forces battalion was squandered to, arguably, destroy most of a Russian infantry brigade… (nope: I’m not going to go into any additional details in this regards).

Interesantno, steta sto nema vise detalja o ovome. Posebno kontranapad prema Piskiju je bio tako besmislen da je dosta ljudi koji prate rat bilo ubijedjeno da su ga Rusi izmislili dok nisu izasli video dokazi.

[karanana]

nesto slicno kao kontranapad koji se desio u sjeverodonjecku ljetos kad je u jednom trenutku i vraceno pola grada ali su onda kasnije zavaljeni. nesto slicno se i kod nas desavalo.

kad je u pitanju ta kontra prema piskiju, da li je prvomajske vraceno? jer ako se sjecam nakon piskija rusi su nastavili i uzeli prvomajske prije par mjeseci i onda je bilo nekih kontri.

[sumirprimus]

Bitno je da ruje ne mogu meda.
I da je laz o hiljadama stranaca u zsu jer gruzici su s najvecom zrtvama dosad 36.

[karanana]

ne znam koje su procjene stranaca u zsu. neko odokatvino bi rekao da je to mozda max velicina jedne brigade ali naravno razdvojeno u internacionalnu legiju, gruzijsku legiju, domicilne brigade....mozda 2-3 milje max. ja mislim da je na pocetku bila navala kreno i kurta i murta, ko spanski gradjanski rat. selfiji, objave....roknuse dva kinzara ili iskandera na smjestaje u lavovu i ti avanturisti koji su bili vecina tih dolazaka shmugnuse. vjerovatno je i ostalo ono sto valja i sto je korisno.

[Čitalac]

Odmetnuti pripadnik Wagnera Andrej Medvedev koji je zatražio zaštitu od samog Putina, tvrdi da je upoznat sa deset slučajeva likvidacija onih koji odbiju da se bore i najavljuje da će u slučaju da mu se nešto dogodi biti objavljen video zapis egzekucija iz Alčevska. Po Medvedevu, pripadnici Wagnera su prevareni jer uopšte ne primaju dogovorene zarade, a ni porodice poginulih ne bivaju isplaćene.

The identity of Medvedev was confirmed to The Insider by the head of Gulagu.net Vladimir Osechkin. Earlier, Gulagu.net published Medvedev's appeal to the country's leadership and personally to Vladimir Putin with a request to save his life in the event of his capture by mercenaries from the Wagner PMC. Now Medvedev is on the run, he told The Insider that mercenaries of the PMC Wagner are pursuing him. He claims that he has a video of the execution of mercenaries in Alchevsk (Luhansk region) and if something happens to him, this video will be published. In this video, Medvedev said, two prisoners were executed for refusing to fight.
He claims that Wagner's recruited mercenaries do not receive money, and their relatives do not receive the promised payments for the dead: "We have half of the fighters who were evacuated, they were officially presented as missing. Why is this being done? In order not to pay for the insured event for death, because no insurance agency will ever cover such a number of losses, no insurance agency will take on such a thing. "

https://theins.ru/news/257925

[Hame_]

Ja budala braćo moja

[Hame_]

[saimidin]

PUIs - Putler Usefull Idiots

https://www.index.hr/mobile/vijesti/cla ... 21615.aspx

[Hame_]

Zašto? To je sistem potpuno posvećen odbrani. Jedini razlog da se tako reaguje je zato što uklanja poslednju prijetnju iz Rusije protiv ukrajinskih civila daleko od linije fronta.

[sumirprimus]

ne znam koje su procjene stranaca u zsu. neko odokatvino bi rekao da je to mozda max velicina jedne brigade ali naravno razdvojeno u internacionalnu legiju, gruzijsku legiju, domicilne brigade....mozda 2-3 milje max. ja mislim da je na pocetku bila navala kreno i kurta i murta, ko spanski gradjanski rat. selfiji, objave....roknuse dva kinzara ili iskandera na smjestaje u lavovu i ti avanturisti koji su bili vecina tih dolazaka shmugnuse. vjerovatno je i ostalo ono sto valja i sto je korisno.

Pa par ceta/bataljona max. Vodece dvije su upravo gruzijska i internacionalna. Zajedni nemaaju ni 1000 ljudi .
Interesantna je posatak da gruzini sa 3 miliona stanovnika zasad trpe najvece zrtve medju strancima. Toliko o prici o hiljadama poljaka i amerikanaca sto su rusi pokusavali proturit.

A ovo mislis care da bi kod nas bilo drukcije da pocne rokamje, , ovi najglasnije patriote bi prve smugnule.. ok ok ne bi oni nema sanse.teoretske

[Hame_]

[sumirprimus]

Ne znam dal sam postavljo klip vise ne znam sta gledam a sta postsvljam vrijeme je za pauzu
Uglacnom klip srpskih dobrovoljaca u satoru. Jedinica par njih izaslo i pred kameru.
Ostali "na rucku" valja se i kuci vratit.

[Hame_]

Sve više snimaka. Izgleda da su "opravili" PzH2000

[saimidin]

Ove cuperove analize su dobre, ali moramo se sjetiti da je putler lud, jer vec je jednom poslao orke da zauzmu cijelu UA u roku od tri mjeseca max, i evo vidimo kako im odlicno ide

Jebe se njima za to koliko stvarno treba orka I gvozdjurije, on ce poslati koliko misle, pa kasnije dodavati mesa I zeljeza, nece da fali

Nemaju kome odgovarati, jer imaju kontrolu nad orcima kroz ispiranje mozga tv+web, a jedina prednost toga je da mogu proglasiti pobjedu, cak I da budu potpuno istrjerani iz UA

Kako znamo da ce se ukrajinci zestoko boriti, jedina nepoznata od koje zavisi rezultat je kolicina I vremenski rokovi dostave mts za UA od nato+ koalicije (uz par nato- slucajeva)