Ukraine War, 16 November 2022: General Update
Didn’t manage to finish and post the ‘Part 3’ of my review of the air war in Ukraine before being underway to Great Britain for a week. Plenty of things have happened during the last seven-eight days, though: therefore, I’ll first try to catch with latest developments and then get back to the air war.
This is going to be a ‘salty’ review: with other words, one full of sarcasm, and there are always lots of people who do not like that. Disclaimer: you’re reading this entirely at your own risk and I am not going to accept liability for any damage caused by logic or reason.
KHERSON
I’ll start with the topic ‘Kherson’ because, up front,
I’ve got some great news!
Thanks to Putin, since around 7–8 November, we have a clear definition of ‘forever’….at least when it comes to Russia under Putin.
In Russia under Putin, forever = 42 days.
That’s, approximately, how long it took between Putin declaring Kherson a part of the Russian Federation, forever, and then Putin ordering a withdrawal of the Russian troops from the western bank of the Dnipro River, and thus from Kherson. Forever. …not the ‘Putin’s forever’…. I hope…
Now, sure, hairsplitters are going to correct me and say something like, but hey, it was Shoygu, i.e. the Keystone Cops in Moscow, or what most of you know as ‘Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation’ — who ordered that withdrawal, back on…. was it 7 or 8 November?
….ho-hum….
this is a serious question for anybody (still) thinking that way: after eight months of Putin doing everything in his powers to, systematically, destroy the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (VSRF) — foremost through deploying them in contravention to the doctrine along which these are organised, equipped, and trained, and in violation of almost every Russian ‘rule of warfare’ — preached like dogmas to every single cadet of any kind of a Russian military educational facility there is — you still want to explain me that it’s anybody else but Putin who has the final say in this regards?
….
that it’s anybody else but Putin to blame….?
If so, I would have two Ferraris to sell. Sure, at the first look, they might look like just one, 25+ years old Vespa Sfera 50, but hey: they’re two, and red, and the price is the life-time-opportunity. Here’s evidence, so you can believe me:
If you see just one Ferrari on this photo, I think you should consult your doc. But, whoever sees just one Vespa Sfera 50…. sigh… nobody can help you. All those seeing the ‘truth’ — i.e. two Ferraris — you’re most welcome!
‘T WAS A CONSPIRACY, STUPID…
But, I’m digressing….
Already since around 9–10 November, all the possible conspiracy theoreticians are busy finding about 1,482,089 reasons for Putin’s decision. Anything is good but the simple fact that the VSRF run away because it couldn’t keep even its 20,000–30,000 troops there supplied (‘or so’, assessments about their strength varry), not to talk about doing the same with a city and oblast with a population of around 500,000 (+/- who knows how many: nobody can say….)…and that in winter.
Because the VSRF couldn’t hold Kherson any longer and even Putin was forced to understand and accept this reality. It couldn’t, because it couldn’t keep them supplied with necessary ammo, food and reinforcements; and it couldn’t keep them supplied because it could not bring the required minimum of 300–400 truck-load of ammunition and supplies over the Dnipro every single day.
….and,
you know, that’s so hard to understand, because conspiracy theories are easier to understand — than simple matters of fact about warfare, like propaganda, logistics…or that awful thing called ‘logic’…
Nah. Instead, it was a ‘negotiated withdrawal’. ‘FSB and CIA agreement’. ‘USA approved it’…
Erm….if nothing else, ask yourself: since when does Putin need ‘CIA agreement’ for anything he does? If so, how comes Trump was at odds with the CIA during his term…?
STRATEGIC
….
which is bringing me to the klix question: from what is known, the Keystone Cops in Moscow demanded a permission to withdraw from Kherson over a month ago (if not earlier). Why did Putin refuse to grand permission ‘back then’, but now changed his opinion?
From geo-strategic point of view, it was obvious that Kherson was taken with help of treachery and at the time Putin expected to secure entire Ukraine — or at least large parts of it — in a matter of ‘few days’. Indeed, at the time his Dirlewangers were expected to reach Odesa, and then establish a ‘corridor’ all the way to the self-declared ‘Transnistria’ in Moldavia, too. It was obvious that Kherson was then held because it was of use for Putin — as a propaganda tool for his TV-appreances in Russia, perhaps as a bargain for possible negotiations, too. However, that was months ago. Once Ukrainians checked that advance at Voznesensk, back in early March, the option of that ‘drive on Odesa’ was out of the window. At least since the VSRF failed to expand its control to all of Kherson Oblast, and then began constructing fortifications around it, last summer, not to talk about vicious Ukrainian effort to interdict the Russian logistics, Kherson became a liability.
Ultimately, me thinks, the old KGB-ist in him was still hoping for ‘our man in the USA’ — i.e. what the KGB knew as ‘our asset’ already while saving billions in savings of the Soviet Communist Party by transferring these to Western bank accounts, back in the 1990s — which is certain Donald J Trump, failing to realise his ‘Red Wave’ idea during the mid-term elections in the USA.
Of course, there is no firm evidence for this being the reason why Putin eventually gave up. Hand on heart: it’s unlikely there is ever going to be any. However, when reading such lecture like Putin’s People: how the KGB took back Russia, and then took on the West — and then considering how soon after Trump’s failure Putin brought his decision to withdraw, this is making a lots of sense.
(….just like he didn’t invade Ukraine on 20 February 2022, as originally planned, but four days later — and that because Beijing told him to hold back until the end of the Olympic Games there….)
PURSUIT
As next, the VSRF withdrew from Kherson in, relatively, ‘good order’. Notably, and because Putin publicly declared that Kherson is ‘Russia, forever’ - while leaving, the Russians destroyed whatever was still intact of the infrastructure: water supply, power supply, Antonovsky Road Bridge, you name it… while, where ‘good order’ means that the Russians left behind ‘only’ about 10–15% of their troops, and, relatively, little heavy equipment. With other words: the withdrawal was an organised operation, run — under the given circumstances — in good order.
I do not have any precise figures, yet — primarily because the Ukrainian Armed Forces (ZSU) are still busy clearing up the entire mess, and because that’s likely to take at least a month longer (should there be any doubts: clearing heavy equipment left behind by the VSRF in eastern Kharkiv went on well into October, while clearing all the Russian mines there…. that’s going to take years) — but, there’s no doubt that the mass of VSRF, VDV, and Separatist troops that used to be in Kherson came away.
Logical conclusion: they’re going to be available to fight somewhere else — starting with the eastern bank of the Dnipro.
….but no: the dust caused by their withdrawal didn’t even settle when — back on 12–13 November — first rumours appeared about Ukrainians crossing the Dnipro River in multiple places.
This was promptly declared for ‘unsubstantiated rumour’; indeed, for ‘impossible’. After all, we all ‘know’, 1000% sure, that the Russians were constructing three linese of defence along the eastern bank of the Dnipro, since months already. Therefore, it’s ‘impossible’ that ZSU run an amphibious assault on the Kinburn Peninsula and, apparently, secured all of it up to ‘somewhere between Heroiske and Rybalche (BTW, western half of Kinburn is in the Mykolaiv Oblast, eastern in Kherson). Foremost, it’s impossible that, as of 13 November, Ukrainians have crossed the Dnipro in the Nova Kakhovka area, and liberated Oleshky, about 20km further south-east.
‘No way’…
In reality: it’s more than ‘perfectly possible’. Actually, it’s ‘perfectly logical’.
Something like ‘Rule №1’ whenever in warfare for the case that the enemy is withdrawing is to keep that enemy on withdrawal. I.e. to rush own troops forward, into a ‘pursuit’, and force the enemy to withdraw yet further.
In eastern Kharkiv, we’ve seen what happens when ZSU ‘run out of steam’ in such a situation: the VSRF bought the time to bring in reinforcements and establish a new frontline. Sure, this might not last long, but it’s there, and it’s going to take time — and cost valuable life — to breach and collapse it again. Thus, it’s a better idea to send the ZSU units into a pursuit of withdrawing Russians, yes, ‘over the Dnipro and further east’.
Is that ‘risky’? Yesno. It is not when one considers that ZSU is not running this kind of advanes without first running good reconnaissance; without having a good clue about ‘positions’, ‘condition’, ‘capabilities and intentions’ of the Russians. It’s even less so when one considers the proximity of this part of Ukraine to the Black Sea, and thus a host of NATO-operated reconnaissance assets.
With other words: the GenStab-U and the South OK know what are they doing and why are they rushing their units into advance over the Dnipro.
…..and, be sure: no sane Russian military officer — not even a lieutenant fresh out of a military academy — would ever let Ukrainians establish a bridgehead on the eastern side of the Dnipro, if only having the means to prevent that.
Only Putin would — because he both can’t care less and is a ‘statesman’ who can’t care less about reality: a populist, maintaining himself in power with help of corruption, propaganda and conspiracy theories.
