Jednostavno je sve provjeriti, navedi jedinice, datume, lokacije.
Zanimljivo je kako svakih par godina se pokrene ova tema sa istim netačnostima, vrijedi zato i ovo ponoviti
Not Dead Yet: The VRS Counteroffensive,
24 September-6 October 1995
Despite the pummeling it was taking all over the country, the VRS still displayed its abilities as a counter-puncher. In western Bosnia in particular, the Serbs made a determined drive to roll back Bosnian Army gains around Bosanski Novi and Kljuc. After the HV's Operation "Una 95" and the ARBiH 5th Corps attacks on Sanski Most had been contained and in some cases pushed back in the fighting of 18-22 September, the VRS moved quickly to strike at the 5th Corps forces moving toward Bosanski Novi and Prijedor-Ljubija. Moving on the night of 23-24 September. Arkan's SDG and the VRS's veteran 65th Protection Regiment, 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade, and the 43rd Motorized Brigade struck hard against 5th Corps's OG "North." General Mladic personally supervised the operation. In six days of fighting, the OG's four brigades were driven back as much as 15 kilometers in some places. Then, with Bosanska Krupa and Otoka in sight, the VRS had to abruptly halt its attack as ARBiH gains around Mrkonjic Grad forced the VRS to shift reserves to this important sector.
Beginning about 20 September, the 5th Corps's OG "South" had undertaken its drive on Mrkonjic Grad. With the 17th Krajina on the left and 501st Mountain on the right, ARBiH troops pushed back parts of the demoralized 17th Kljuc Brigade, together with scattered parts of other formations. In over a week of advances, the two ARBiH brigades pushed forward some 17 kilometers, coming within 3 kilometers of Mrkonjic Grad and reaching the edge of the Manjaca Mountains, which protected Banja Luka from the south. By 1 October, VRS forces around Mrkonjic Grad were in a desperate situation.
Thus it was that the 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade and the SDG had to break off their successful counter-drive toward Bosanska Krupa and rush to newly threatened Banja Luka, coming under the command of Colonel Milenko Lazic's Operational Group 2/30th Division. To conduct the counterattack, two tactical groupings were created around Mrkonjic Grad. On the right, the 2nd Krajina Infantry and 16th Krajina Motorized Brigades were to drive west toward the Sana River northeast of Kljuc; while on the left, the Bosnian Serb Special Police Brigade, reinforced with the SDG (and probably Serbian RDB troops) pushed the 5th Corps away from Mrkonjic Grad. This group would then move on Kljuc itself. At least one armored battalion from the 1st Armored Brigade supported the attack. In addition, the reinforced 5th Kozara and 6th Sanske Infantry Brigades from "Prijedor" Operational Group 10 were to push south from the Sanski Most area toward Kljuc. The VRS hoped to crush OG "South" in the converging jaws. By 3 October, the VRS counterattack began to gain steam, driving back the 17th Krajina and the 501st, which had been reinforced with only one independent battalion. Additional 7th Corps reinforcements were on the way, but they were late in arriving. By 6 October, the VRS had pushed to within 1 kilometer of Kljuc from the east, having advanced some 17 kilometers in three days.
With the town of Kljuc on the verge of capture, the VRS apparently felt able to withdraw the 16th Krajina Brigade to reinforce threatened VRS positions in the Ozren Mountains. Just as the 16th Krajina departed, however, the ARBiH defenses stiffened with the arrival of the new 7th Corps formations. VRS troops—now primarily "Prijedor" OG forces from the 5th and 6th Brigades—continued to press against the 5th/7th Corps line near Krasulje, gaining little ground in heavy fighting through 8-9 October. The tables, however, were about lo turn again. The Croatian Army was preparing to reenter the battle. It was again the Serbs' turn to be surprised.
End Game—The Fall of Sanski Most and Mrkonjic Grad, October 1995
With Kliuc threatened, the Bosnian Army had again requested HV/HVO assistance. Zagreb agreed, since the capture of Mrkonjic Grad and a drive into the Manjaca Mountains—the objective for the HV/HVO operation—would give Zagreb a stranglehold over Banja Luka. With their forces poised to drive on the city, the Croatians would be in a position to ensure that the Serbs (the FRY and Republika Srpska) lived up to the tentative cease-fire agreement or to an eventual peace deal for Bosnia—or, even more important, for eastern Slavonia, the last Serb-controlled part of Croatia. If the Serbs refused to deal, Zagreb would take the city, conquering western Bosnia for itself and leaving Sarajevo with an enlarged Bihac pocket. In either case, Zagreb would further demonstrate and cement its role as the region's power broker.
The new HV/HVO operation, 'Juzni Potez* (Southern Move), was scheduled to begin on 8 October. General Gotovina, using HVO Brigadier Zeljko Glasnovic's OG "East," again led the HV/HVO assault. The main shock forces came from the redoubtable 4th and 7th Guards Brigades and the 1st HGZ. The three HVO Guards brigades and other independent battalions and companies were in the second echelon, giving Gotovina 11,000 to 12,000 troops. During the first phase of the operation, the HV Guards formations were to seize Mrkonjic Grad itself, together with the adjoining Podrasnica Valley and the road junction of Cadjavica—an advance of about 12 kilometers. During the second phase, the HVO Guards formations would take over the advance, seizing the southern edge of the Manjaca Mountains and the important Bocae hydroelectric plant—the last major source of electricity for Banja Luka and Serb-held western Bosnia. The whole operation was scheduled to take four days.
VRS Colonel Milenko Lazic's Operational Group-2/30th Division had consolidated its defenses around Mrkonjic Grad after Operation "Maestral" in September. The town was now defended by three brigades—the 7th Motorized, 3rd Serbian, and 11th Mrkonjic Light Infantry Brigades. The VRS force probably numbered about 5,500 troops. These formations had covered the rear of the VRS units undertaking the Kljuc counterattack, watching the HV/HVO.
The HV/HVO assault began on 8 October, with a diversionary attack by the HV 126th Home Defense Regiment and 1st HVO Guards Brigade against the VRS 11th Mrkonjic Brigade, some 15 to 20 kilometers west of Mrkonjic Grad. Gotovina hoped to mislead the VRS as to the direction and timing of the main attack. This came the next day, although the start was delayed for two hours by thick fog. A strong artillery-rocket bombardment was followed by Mi-24 helicopter gunship strikes on VRS positions. Despite this display of preparatory and supporting firepower, the opening HV/HVOattack encountered strong opposition. General Gotovina states that,
. . . the enemy offered strong resistance in all directions, through a well-organized and fortified defense, but also with strong, synchronized artillery fire.
The 1st HGZ, 4th Guards, and 7th Guards Brigades weathered the onslaught to punch their way into the VRS defenses, although the 7th Guards in particular had difficulties against its VRS namesake, the 7th Motorized Brigade, southeast of Mrkonjic Grad. By the end of 9 October, the HV had moved forward about 5 kilometers, partially enveloping the town and giving the defenders no respite.
The next day, VRS defenses began to disintegrate under the professional pounding of the HV/HVO. Mrkonjic Grad fell after the 4th Guards Brigade apparently broke through the 3rd Serbian Brigade's defenses southwest of town. This outflanked the 7th Motorized Brigade's staunch defenders, and the VRS troops had to pull out. The 1st HGZ and 4th Guards occupied Podrasnica and Cadjavica as they moved on Manjaca. On the right, the 7th Guards and the newly inserted 2nd HVO Guards Brigade advanced toward Bocac.
On 11 October, the HV units wore withdrawn and the two rernaiiung HVO Guards Brigades moved forward |n their place, Although VRS artillery fire roked the attackers, Ihe withdrawing VRS infantry and armor formations were disorganized, and the HVO troops were able reaeh their operation stop line along the southern edge of Manjaca—only 25 kilometers from Banja Luka
Meanwhile, General Dudakovic had been planning a counterstrike of his own against troops of the VRS "Prijedor" Operational Group 10, which were still attempting to push South toward Kijuc. The addition of some 10,000 troops from the 7th Corps and other ARBiH commands greatly strengthened his ability to renew the drive on Sanski Most while still vigorously "defending KJjuc. With the arrival of these formations, Dudakovic regrouped his brigades, shifting OG "Center"—now reinforced with the ARBiH Guards Brigade and the 501st Brigade—to the left, while filling OG "South" with five 7th Corps brigades.
On 9 October, Dudakovic attacked with OGs "Center" and "South.The most important assault came in the middle under OG "Center," where the 502nd and 510th Brigades faced their old nemeses from the Grabez plateau—the 15th Bihac and 17th Kljuc Brigades. Again these VRS formations disintegrated under the 5th Corps blow, exposing the VRS formations on their flanks. Colonel Zeljaja's troops had to fall back or face encirclement. The next day, 10 October, elements of the 43rd Motorized Brigade and the 11th Dubica Brigade tried and failed to halt the 5lh Corps at the outskirts of Sanski Most, and the Bosnians seized the town. Despite the national ceasefire agreement scheduled to go into effect on the morning of 12 October, it looked as if Dudakovic had the VRS on the run, and so he continued the offensive. OG "Center" suddenly took a sharp check, however, when the undaunted 43rd Motorized Brigade rallied northeast of Sanski Most. Now the battles seesawed for most of a week, both sides continuing to jockey for position around Sanski Most without either being able to force significant changes in the frontline. The fighting faded to a fruitless finish on 20 October.
Iz knjige "Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995", Vol. I, CIA, Washington 2002