Odlicna analiza:
Serbia and consolidation of the Kosovo state
Author: Helsinki Committee to Defend Human Rights in Serbia
Uploaded: Wednesday, 24 March, 2010
Careful analysis of Belgrade's contradictory Kosova policy, torn between its formal claim that it is part of Serbia, its underlying aim to annex the north, and its desire to continue on the road to eventual EU integration
Following its proclamation of independence, Kosovo entered the phase of consolidation of its statehood, which Serbia is trying to prevent in all possible ways. This is why Belgrade has been using its diplomatic energy primarily on lobbying against further international recognition of Kosovo. The decision to seek the opinion of the International Court of Justice in The Hague on the legality of Kosovo’s decision on independence is an integral part of this effort.
Belgrade’s main aim, however, is to reopen negotiations with Prishtina in order to pose the question of Kosovo’s partition, which would result in its northern part joining Serbia. This is why speculation about a Greater Albania are increasingly being voiced in the Serbian media, which quote a Gallup poll according to which the majority - 70 percent - of Albanians believe that Kosovo and Albania should unite, while some 47.3 per cent of those polled in Kosovo and 39.5 of those polled in Albania believe that this will happen in the near future. The historian Cedomir Antic argues that it is perfectly logical for the Albanians to pursue this aim. (1). The endorsement by Belgrade of Greater Albanian aspirations essentially allows the Serbian side to make similar claims: for partition of Kosovo, and for the eventual incorporation of the Bosnian entity of Republika Srpska.
This is an old strategic aim, present for over a decade. After 1999 it became focussed on preventing the integration of northern Kosovo. This is evident from numerous works of the so-called Serbian national strategists. Dobrica Cosic thus admits that Kosovo is ‘lost’, but he insists that the Serbian parliament ‘is losing without protest an ethnic territory of at least 46 kilometres of Serbia’s interior along the Ibar, with the southern mineral-rich part of the largest Serbian mountain of Kopaonik’. As he argues, while the Albanians are annexing Serb ethnic territory in places along the old Serbian-Turkish border, as it was until the 1878 Congress of Berlin, ‘the Serbians stay silent and dream of a Europe without borders’. (2)
A recent article by Svetozar Stojanovic, a key national strategist, is indicative in this regard. He confirms the aim of dividing Kosovo, and insists that ‘continuing to unite the Serb-majority part of Kosovo with the Serbian state remains, all things considered, our most important task’. Stojanovic stresses, however, that this does not imply that ‘we should stop insisting on the fact that the whole of Kosovo belongs to Serbia, and on the need to establish security for our population living in enclaves surrounded by Albanians, on the search for our missing compatriots, on the return of the internally displaced population and the refugees, on the preservation of our churches, monasteries and cultural monuments, or on the return of - or at least compensation for - usurped property’. According to Stojanovic, this should be called a policy of sharing control over Kosovo, rather than its territorial partition. It would make sense, he says, to think eventually about an amendment to the Serbian constitution, whereby the mainly Serb part of Kosovo would be directly joined to Serbia, while the rest would continue to be treated as ‘essentially autonomous’. (3)
Belgrade’s attempt to convince the West that Serbian nationalists are using the question of Kosovo to threaten the government has proved successful. As a result, Serbia has not been asked to recognise Kosovo, and many other inconsistencies on its part have been disregarded. Up to now the international community, and in particular the USA and the EU, have essentially tolerated Serbia’s foreign policy, in the belief that the international activity of the Serbian foreign minister, Vuk Jeremic, in regard to Kosovo protects the Serbian president, Boris Tadic, from nationalist attacks. It is largely for this reason that the Serbian initiative in the UN to seek the opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of Kosovo’s independence was swallowed, on the assumption that this removes the Kosovo issue from the political agenda. (4)
But there are growing warnings concerning Vuk Jeremic’s arrogant behaviour. The latest came from the EU parliament’s reporter on Serbia, Jelko Kacin, who criticised Jeremic because of his statement that ‘the ball is now in the European court’ when it comes to European integration, and informed him that ‘we are dealing not with a football game but with Serbia’s future’. And he added: ‘It is not the EU that is joining Serbia, but Serbia that is joining the EU. As long as the minister thinks that his job is that of a football commentator, he will not be acting as a foreign minister who can bring Serbia closer to the EU.’(5)
Jeremic was criticised even more strongly for withdrawing the Serbian ambassador from Podgorica following Montenegro’s recognition of Kosovo, as well as for his intemperate reaction to the visit made by Croatian president Stjepan Mesic to Prishtina on 8 January 2010.
Serbia’s attempt to arbitrate in all relations in the region has not been welcomed by the international community, which views such behaviour as not constructive and a waste of time for all countries in the region, beginning with Serbia in particular. But what the Serbian nationalists are after is indeed to slow down Serbia’s progress towards the EU, and Vuk Jeremic’s conduct is illustrative of their position.
Belgrade’s rejection of the ‘Strategy for integration of northern Kosovo’ received an ‘answer’ from the Albanians of southern Serbia. The president of the Kosovo assembly, Jakup Krasniqi, stated that Serbs of northern Kosovo wishing to secede should bear in mind that the Albanians of Preševo and Bujanovac are ready to join Kosovo. Krasniqi believes that any exchange of territory ‘should be done by agreement and cooperatively, involving not just the local Serbs but also the politicians in Belgrade’. (6) This statement indicates that Belgrade, which keeps a close watch on southern Serbia, will be confronted with new pressures over a territory which it has always viewed as being of strategic importance. Milorad Ekmecic, the historian and ideologue of the Bosnian war, insists that the state that holds the Preševo valley controls Macedonia: i.e. that it is hegemonic in the Balkans.
Northern Kosovo and the parallel institutions
Following the proclamation of independence, the parallel institutions and Kosovo’s division pose the main challenge to consolidation of the Kosovo state. The parallel institutions gained in strength during the 2004-8 period, when Vojislav Koštunica was Serbian prime minister. Serbia at that time was spending a great deal of money on Kosovo, without proper public control: up to this year the Kosovo budget was treated as a top state secret, and this led to widespread corruption. The money set aside for Kosovo was not spent as earmarked. (7) In 2010 the Serbian government decided further to reduce the Kosovo budget (around 40 million euros for the year), which suggests that Serbia is unable fully to finance its Kosovo policy, i.e., pay for the parallel institutions and the people implementing the policy of division.
The parallel institutions remained in place after the proclamation of Kosovo’s independence in February 2008. In addition to northern Mitrovica, which has always been the strategic point of division of Kosovo, Serbia has invested considerable sums also in enclaves south of the river Ibar, especially in the municipality of Štrpce, i.e., the ski centre Brezovica. But the focus has remained on northern Mitrovica, which has enjoyed the status of a no-man’s land for the past ten years, because those living there obey neither Serbian nor Kosovar laws. The absence of any border control between northern Mitrovica and Serbia, as well as its dysfunctional judiciary and police, have turned northern Kosovo into a main centre of corruption and organised crime in the Balkans.
The pro-European government and the Kosovo question
The pro-European Serbian government installed in May 2008 visibly changed Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo. Although Kosovo remains a theme of special interest for Serbia in foreign policy, the fact is that Serbia took a number of strategic and technical steps in relation to Kosovo. To begin with, it defined a kind of exit strategy by taking the dispute over its status to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Also, Boris Tadic and the Serbian government signed in 2009 a key document on cooperation between the Serbian ministry of the interior and EULEX. By signing this agreement, it recognised de facto the (international) border with Kosovo, given that the document established police and customs control.
Serbia’s demand for EU candidate status creates a new context, in that when it officially becomes a candidate, one may expect additional steps on Serbia’s part towards accepting reality. The implementation of the accord with EULEX changes essentially the relationship of forces on the ground, because it forces Serbia to make concessions anticipated by the agreement.
The problem of the parallel structures remains. It started be resolved practically, however, of its own accord after the local Kosovo elections held on 15 November 2009, everywhere except in northern Mitrovica. Despite major obstruction the Serb community did vote in respectable numbers, which additionally brought into question the already dysfunctional parallel institutions. Thus, for example, after ten years of parallel government in the municipality of Štrpce, a new leadership took over without major incidents. The new local government was formed by the Independent Liberal Party and Hashim Thaçi’s Democratic Party of Kosovo. Branislav Nikolic was elected president, in a municipality where Serbs form seventy per cent of the population. Only a day earlier the Serbian government minister for Kosovo, Goran Bogdanovic, was deported from Kosovo for disregarding proper procedure and for political activity.
Belgrade’s reaction to Serb participation in the local elections was exceptionally mild. Apart from statements made by several opposition leaders, the ruling parties said practically nothing about the new administration in the municipality of Štrpce, that used to be treated as exceptionally important because of its economic potential. The Serbian prime minister responded to the deportation of Serbia’s Kosovo minister by recalling a few ambassadors for consultation and issuing formal protests.
The strategy for integration of northern Kosovo
The international community has made a plan for the integration of the north into Kosovo’s state institutions. The document entitled ‘Strategy for northern Kosovo’ says, among other things, that decentralisation, i.e., the formation of a separate municipality called Northen Mitrovica, is a key part of Prishtina’s effort to assume administration over the north. The authors’ idea is to demonstrate to the Serbs in this part of Kosovo that they gain from decentralisation: i.e., that they should concentrate on ‘practical gains’ from decentralisation, in order to overcome the greatest problem - ‘realisation that the establishment of the new municipality of Northern Mitrovica means also acceptance of Kosovo’s independence’. The text also states that Prishtina should ‘strongly back cooperative Serbs’ and provide the means for strengthening ‘moderate political factors in northern Kosovo’.
According to the Prishtina government’s plan, the Northern Mitrovica municipality should start to operate after the municipal elections scheduled for May 2010.
The document proposes immediate preparations for constitution of this assembly, with the International Civilian Office (ICO) appointing a transitional team and opening an office in the hamlet of Bošnjacka Mahala inhabited by both Serbs and Albanians. A Kosovo government Communities Office would also be opened there, which would stimulate a gradual extension of the power of these bodies.
The Strategy envisages also a strong presence of the Kosovo police in the north, the establishment of courts, and assumption of full control over the two customs points on the border with Serbia. According to the authors, after a successful formation of the municipality of Northern Mitrovica and its integration into the Kosovo administration, a similar mechanism could be used to bring in also three other Serb-majority municipalities in the north: Zvecan, Leposavic and Zubin Potok.
The documents finds official Belgrade, ‘which supports the parallel institutions and puts pressure on the Kosovo Serbs not to participate in the Kosovo system’ the greatest obstacle to the realisation of this strategy. The authors add that the economic crisis in Serbia presents a good opportunity for implementation of the integration plan, given that the Serbian government has reduced the budget for financing the Kosovo Serbs. They argue also that the parallel Serb institutions which do not recognise the government in Prishtina should be marginalised, and that the UNMIK office should be closed down in favour of a greater role for EU engagement through EULEX. The document says additionally that EULEX should open an office in the north, and recruit a large number of translators, drivers and other personnel from among Kosovo Serbs, as a way of improving dialogue with the Serb community.
Belgrade’s response to the Strategy
The fact that the Strategy met with totally negative reactions in Belgrade suggests a determination to annex northern Kosovo to Serbia. A state secretary in the ministry for Kosovo, Oliver Ivanovic, said that ‘the international community should bear in mind that Mitrovica is not the same thing as Gracanica and Štrpce’. (8). The minister for Kosovo, Goran Bogdanovic, said that the projected strategy for integration of the Serb community is unacceptable to that community, and leads to destabilisation of the north. (9)
The statement made by the Serbian minister of defence, Dragan Šutanovac, is also indicative: ‘Any strategy that does not include the cooperation of the non-Albanian population, and that imposes by force a solution for those municipalities in which Serbs form a majority, is unacceptable.’ The minister stressed, however, that ‘the situation is being carefully monitored, as are other events in the north’; he believed that the only way to solve the problem was by diplomatic means. (10) Šutanovac’s statement shows that Belgrade is nevertheless taking a cautious stand, and that its cooperation can be expected also in regard to northern Kosovo.
A gathering of Kosovo Serbs was held on 4 February 1010 in the presence of the Serbian Orthodox Church, at which a plan drafted by Peter Feith and Hashim Thaçi on the integration of northern Kosovo was categorically rejected. Expectations were voiced that Belgrade will defend Serb national interests in Kosovo, and will strengthen the parallel institutions so that they are able better to resist the international community’s plans. (11) The Serbian assembly was asked to pass a resolution that Kosovo remains within Serbia. The vice-president of the assembly of the Kosovo communities, Marko Jakšic, stressed that ‘there is no independent Kosovo without help from Belgrade’, while Bishop Artemije criticised the Serbian government for ‘dividing the Kosovo Serbs’. The rally was joined also by representatives of the conservative bloc, made up of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), the Progressive Party (NS) and the Serb Radical Party (SRS), represented respectively by Miloš Aligrudic, Velimir Ilic and Dragan Todorovic, which is using the ‘Strategy on integration’ to criticise the government and win public support for early elections.
Growing preparations for integrating the Serbs by the Kosovo government and the ICO
The International Management Group for Kosovo, made up of those countries that have recognised Kosovo, support the plan for integration of the north as proposed by the International Civilian Office. At its meeting in Vienna on 8 February 2010, the Group invited all sides, including Serbia, to play a ‘constructive role in this important process, in order to secure better living standards in northern Kosovo’. The meeting in Vienna also concluded that ‘significant progress’ has been made in implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, and that Kosovo’s territorial integrity is ‘genuinely tied to regional stability’. (12)
But Serbian officials have rejected this plan, which they describe as a threat to regional stability. The Serbian deputy prime minister, Božidar Ðelic, has said that Serbia does not recognise the International Management Group, which is illegal and its conclusions worthless. (13) Speaking of the Vienna meeting, Oliver Ivanovic has said that Peter Feith is ‘cooking’ the data, trying to appear more successful than he really is. He insists that UNMIK will not leave Kosovo by a unilateral decision of individuals or a group of countries, and that Resolution 1244 remains in force. ‘Such a decision cannot be passed in the UN Security Council, and I think that Peter Feith should think about his next job.’
Speaking of the Strategy, Dušan Janjic of the Forum for Inter-ethnic Relations said that Feith was a lobbyist fighting to strengthen Prishtina’s presence across Kosovo, and that his Strategy was part of these efforts. Belgrade should not bother with Feith, as they used to do with James Lyon (of the International Crisis Group), because this only raises his rating, but should instead open negotiations with Brussels about Kosovo. Serbia should ensure that the EU, not Feith, should deal with Kosovo, in order to prevent implementation of his threat that Serbia’s entry into the EU will be made conditional upon recognition of Kosovo. (15) Janjic stressed that Feith is more dangerous in Brussels than in Kosovo. ‘He says what the majority in the EU thinks, which is that Belgrade’s policy is in crisis. This enables Brussels to demand, given that its own policy towards Kosovo is also in crisis, that Belgrade should choose between the EU and Kosovo. It is to be expected that several states will be found which will make recognition of Kosovo a condition of Serbia’s entry into the EU. Belgrade should respond to this with a counter-thesis: "We will join the EU, of course, but on the Cyprus model"; it is this that Serbian foreign minister Vuk Jeremic is trying to achieve in my view’, says Janjic. (16)
Peter Feith has already nominated fourteen members of a preparatory committee for northern Mitrovica who will prepare the resources, the means and the administrative structure for the running of the new municipality of Northern Mitrovica. The EU special representative has announced also the establishment of a TV channel that will broadcast in minority languages, as well as a separate Serb channel. Article 3 of Annex 2 of the Ahtisaari Plan relating to minority rights states that: ‘Kosovo will undertake all measures needed to secure an international frequency plan that would provide the Kosovo Serbs with access to a licenced and independent TV channel in the Serb language throughout Kosovo’.
The Kosovo security forces (FSK) are meant to take over responsibility for the protection of religious and cultural sites. Since the arrival of NATO in 1999, all the more important monuments of Serb culture have been under KFOR control. The Orthodox monasteries, churches, monuments and other cultural and historical sites will now come under FSK’s protection. Quoting NATO sources, the Prishtina Albanian-language daily Koha Ditore writes that the monument on Gazimestan will be among the first to do so. The Kosovo Serbs argue, however, that it is too early for the Serbian monasteries to be placed under FSK protection, and that security conditions are not the same everywhere, because some monasteries, such as Gracanica, are surrounded by their own congregations, i.e. Serbs.
The Kosovo government has set aside 2.1 million euros for a number of capital projects in the municipalities of Štrpce and Gracanica. The needs of displaced Serbs are increasingly being met, such as for example organising collective visits to Orthodox cemeteries, which some have not visited for ten years. The organised return home of Serbs is also proceeding without problems. Thus, for example, 17 Serb returnee families were given keys to new apartments in Laplje Selo. Apart from displaced people returning from Serbia, the project allocated also apartments to 36 Serb families living up to now as displaced people in places inside Kosovo. According to UNHCR data, some 20,000 refugees and displaced people have returned thus far.
International actors and consolidation of the Kosovo state
In its strategy towards Kosovo, Serbia has relied largely on Russian support, especially after it had transferred the Kosovo question to the UN. But Russian support clearly has another dimension which Serbia chooses to disregard. This is the fact that Russia is itself trying to find a modus vivendi with the US and the EU, and its support in relation to Kosovo could easily disappear. Circumstances have changed, and so has the nature of Russian support. Thus the permanent Russian representative at NATO, Dimitry Rogozin, said that Serbia would have to give up Kosovo, if it persisted in its intention to join NATO, for then Russia would have to re-examine its attitude to Kosovo - the Russians cannot be greater Serbs then the Serbs themselves, he said.
The Russian ambassador himself said: ‘Not all NATO members have recognised Kosovo’s independence. As we know, they are Spain, Greece, Romania and Slovakia. But according to international law and the NATO statute, this situation remains an obstacle to Serbia’s entry into the Alliance. Since most NATO countries will not change their position, this means that the Alliance can accommodate Serbia among its members only in its new borders - without Kosovo.’ He stressed that Belgrade would be forced formally to recognise Prishtina, which would lead Madrid and Moscow to change their position. (17)
Most analysts see this threat as blackmail. But it might also be an exit strategy for Russia from a situation that causes it problems in its relations with the EU and NATO. In addition, the forthcoming visit to Kosovo by US secretary of state Hilary Clinton suggests that the US is intensifying the policy of consolidation of the Kosovo state, and that it will not view gladly Belgrade’s forays into northern Kosovo. The fact that representatives of the Kosovo Serbs were invited to a White House prayer breakfast shows that US policy in the western Balkans is being implemented with great care.
In conclusion
The EU’s approach to implementing a strategy for consolidation of Kosovo statehood has produced results up to now, and Serbia’s entry into Euro-Atlantic integrations will undoubtedly be made conditional upon its acceptance of reality in Kosovo.
Serbian recognition of Kosovo is not on the agenda right now, but cooperation with Kosovo via inter-regional cooperation is gradually being forced on Serbia as a condition. The acquisition of candidate status will require Serbia to show greater flexibility in regard to Kosovo in practice, through support for the functioning of Kosovo’s institutions.
The attitude of the international community towards President Tadic and the governing coalition can be summed up as follows: ‘It is necessary to create a dynamic that would lead to a face-saving solution for Serbia, but which would also lead to the reduction and ultimate abandonment of its support for the parallel institutions as Serbia comes closer to the EU.’ (18)
The international community has intensified its efforts to stabilize and consolidate the Kosovo state, and this poses a challenge for the current Serbian government. The government should not let pass this opportunity to behave in a more constructive manner, because the time for blackmail and manipulation by Serbia is fast running out.
Endnotes
:
1.
http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Tema-Dana/3...ovo-paravan-za pljacku-države.
2. Introduction: ‘Možemo više nego možemo’, Pecat, 5.2.2010.
3. Svetozar Stojanovic, ‘Suvremeni svet - Velike sile i velikomali srpski narod’,
www.nspm.rs 24.1.2010.
4. Waz.euobserver.com.
5.
http://www.serbijanet.rs/vesti/vesti...a-jeremica-hml.
6.
www.B92.net, 10.2.2010.
7. For decades Kosovo has been the state’s excuse for robbing all Serbian citizens. Fictional projects and non-existent investment have been one form of stealing from the treasury. The best example of this is the alleged dredging of the bed of the river Gracanka. This project has cost the treasury 11.7 million dinars, yet no one knows who pocketed the money. Someone skilfully used the Kosovo government’s project to clean up the Gracanka, copied it, added the name of the project and the word ‘salvage’, and submitted it to the Serbian government. In 2007 the latter approved the project, and the money was paid and divided. This stolen money was then used by individuals to buy apartments and other real estate in Serbia, finance party activities, etc. The head of the so-called Kosovo District, Goran Arsic, says that 63.7 million dinars were allocated for the improvement of a road five kilometres long between Laplje Selo and Gracanica, although this same road had been rebuilt several times before. In Kosovo Polje municipality, 12.5 million dinars were allocated for a sewage system in the village of Kuzmin, though only a few hundred metres of road remained to be done. Over 12 million dinars were allocated for improving two kilometres of the village of Batuse’s sewage system (the price per metre over the most difficult ground is at most 30 euros).
http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Tema-Dana/3...van-za-pljacku drzave.
8.
www.b92.net.
9. http://www.e-novine,com/region/regio...ija-sever.html.
10.
www.blic.rs
11.
www.e-novine.com
12.
www.b92.net, 8.2.2010.
13. Ibid.
14. Politika, 9.2.2010.
15. Press, 26.1.2010.
16. Danas, 3.2.2010.
17. Blic, 4.2.2010.
18.
http://www.rtv.rs/sr lat/politika/sever-kosova:-obustaviti-podrsku-sacuvati-obraz 170079.html.
http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2698
