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Sanjarko wrote: ↑22/07/2022 23:36 nevidim ja nikako rjesenje ove agresije na Ukrajinu

Ima Bosne_Bice Bosne wrote: ↑23/07/2022 00:47

Sanjarko wrote: ↑22/07/2022 23:36 nevidim ja nikako rjesenje ove agresije na Ukrajinu

Izvuci jos malo taj jednokular.

p206 wrote: ↑23/07/2022 00:15

Sanjarko wrote: ↑22/07/2022 23:36 nevidim ja nikako rjesenje ove agresije na Ukrajinu

mislim da će ovo trajati 4 godine
većina ratova (posebno modernih) je trajala 4 godine, to nije slučajno

saimidin wrote: ↑23/07/2022 00:10 Fazon je da li ce se zapad uopste baviti pracenjem svih ovih detalja, tko je kada I kome prodao, I kako je na kraju zavrsilo kod.orka

Sanjarko wrote: ↑22/07/2022 23:36 nevidim ja nikako rjesenje ove agresije na Ukrajinu

Sanjarko wrote: ↑23/07/2022 00:52

Ima Bosne_Bice Bosne wrote: ↑23/07/2022 00:47

Izvuci jos malo taj jednokular.

ti vidis to, a ja djecaka koji kroz to posmatra, nekontam sta je smijesno

japin_mutapi wrote: ↑22/07/2022 23:28 saudijcima je najjeftinija njihova nafta a nikako od rusa ne mogu dobiti jeftinije
uz to kako ce rusi prebaciti tu naftu do saudije
glupost zesca

karirana_dekica wrote: ↑23/07/2022 07:04 Kako me nervira kad novinari željni klikova lupe glupost i privuku publiku.
Saudijci kupuju MAZUT za svoje potrebe, ne kupuju naftu. Njihova sirova nafta je vrhunskog kvaliteta i izvoze je.
Ali ko još čita vijesti kad ima naslov pajel.

drug_profi wrote: ↑23/07/2022 01:19 Neko je pitao koje su jedinice u okruzenju.

Satrap_Darije wrote: ↑23/07/2022 07:37 Oleksander Zinchenko, ukrajinski nogometas sto je plakao pred kamerama zbog rata je iz Ukrajine otisao 2014. zajedno sa roditeljima - U RUSIJU.
Razlog: rat u Donbasu.

drug_profi wrote: ↑22/07/2022 22:42 Koga zanima, a znam da volite i imate svoje zivotinje:

zilog wrote: ↑23/07/2022 02:49

Sanjarko wrote: ↑22/07/2022 23:36 nevidim ja nikako rjesenje ove agresije na Ukrajinu

Kako ne vidis?

1. Rusi sami likvidiraju Putlera i povuku se iz Ukrajine
2. Rusi se povuku iz Ukrajine i likvidiraju Putlera
ima jos 3, 4, 5..., ali su sve to varijacije na 1. i 2.

Problem nije ni u Ukrajincima, ni u zapadu, nego u wanabe Hitleru, koji bi da nas kao uvede u "novi svetski poredak"...

parappa wrote: ↑23/07/2022 07:46

Satrap_Darije wrote: ↑23/07/2022 07:37 Oleksander Zinchenko, ukrajinski nogometas sto je plakao pred kamerama zbog rata je iz Ukrajine otisao 2014. zajedno sa roditeljima - U RUSIJU.
Razlog: rat u Donbasu.

Pobjegli ljudi od rata. Tad Rusija oficijelno nije bila u ratu.
Znaš li koliko je ljudi (većinom Bošnjaka) iz Istočne Bosne '92 izbjeglo u Srbiju i Crnu Goru?

Satrap_Darije wrote: ↑23/07/2022 07:58

parappa wrote: ↑23/07/2022 07:46

Pobjegli ljudi od rata. Tad Rusija oficijelno nije bila u ratu.
Znaš li koliko je ljudi (većinom Bošnjaka) iz Istočne Bosne '92 izbjeglo u Srbiju i Crnu Goru?

On je iz zapadne Ukrajine.

Satrap_Darije wrote: ↑23/07/2022 07:58

parappa wrote: ↑23/07/2022 07:46

Pobjegli ljudi od rata. Tad Rusija oficijelno nije bila u ratu.
Znaš li koliko je ljudi (većinom Bošnjaka) iz Istočne Bosne '92 izbjeglo u Srbiju i Crnu Goru?

On je iz zapadne Ukrajine.

Jon Parshall

Ukraine Update: I've wanted to write about the artillery war for a while, but I'm basically amalgamating two recent posts by Jack W Greene and Tom Cooper here. TL;DR: it's a truism that weapons and tactics don't win wars; strategy does. But having some kickass HIMARS systems sure doesn't hurt.


Let's start with the obvious: Russian logistics suck. Russian logistics have *always* sucked. When given a choice between flashy paper strength and sexy weapons technology vs. the humdrum business of figuring out how to move boxes and bullets from depot to battlefield, the Russians have *always* preferred the former.

Obviously, that's true of many other armies as well. But if you're honestly going to put yourself out there as a real heavyweight military, you need to demonstrate some basic competency in the art of supply. The Russians have never really managed better than a passing grade on this topic in any of their modern wars. And in *this* war, at least to this point, Russian logistical weaknesses have been glaringly obvious (see Exhibit A: "Umpty-Mile Long Armored Column Stalled North Of Kiev")

There have been a lot of comparisons between NATO logistics and the Russians being bandied about recently, but they bear repeating here. Logistics are a *cult* in NATO, particularly for the Americans. This goes back all the way to WWII. I once made a count of the number of pages in the U.S. Army's official histories that were devoted to logistical topics: *seven* volumes comprising 5,500 pages. That's crazy. Nobody does logistics like we do--which makes sense because America's modern wars have always been fought across freakin' huge oceans.


With the NATO countries, military logistics are based on palletized loads in industry-standard shipping containers optimized for multi-modal transport. Roll off a ship or a plane, then right onto a train, then off the train again on the other end, onto a truck, out to the field, etc. You do it that way, because stuff is easier to load and move, easier to track via inventory systems, easier and faster to unpack, and easier to disperse and hide.

In the Russian army, by contrast, the standard method of moving things around is to put wooden boxes of stuff on trains, ship it to a rail-head, then offload it by hand, a box at a time, onto trucks, drive them to a dump that's not too far from the rail head, and then unload them. When you move them from the dump to the guns, you do the same thing, in reverse, and again largely by hand. There's a lot more manual labor involved. And lo and behold, when you have a lot of manual laborers in the system who may not be all that skilled at what they do, or motivated, or concerned about dispersal, or camouflage, or proper stowage, or munitions safety, well, accidents tend to happen under even the best of circumstances... which a war isn't.


The Ukrainians, being nobody's fools, have correctly determined that a Russian artillery piece without shells is just a useless piece of metal. And whereas knocking out enemy artillery systems, especially of the self-propelled variety, is rather difficult because of their ability to move around, ammunition depots are delightfully large, stationary, and prone to going 'boom' if you so much as scratch them.

The thing that makes HIMARS so lethal is 1) its ability to "shoot and scoot" (and thus stay out of trouble), 2) its comparatively long range (84km), and 3) its absurd accuracy, via satellite-guided munitions.

The Ukrainians are moving their handful of launchers around constantly, then zipping into range, firing a salvo of missiles at the target, and then scooting right back out of Russian artillery range again. Reload, rinse, and repeat. And obviously, their reloads are following them around in similarly mobile trucks, being held close but not too close, etc. Are the Ukrainians perhaps also benefiting from precise, near real-time targeting data being fed to them from satellite and intel platforms owned by a nearby friendly alliance bloc whose name starts with an 'N'? I don't know what you're talking about.


The short-term effects, at least, have been impressive. As the graphic Tom Cooper posted a few days ago shows, from July 9 to the 13th, the volume of Russian artillery fell dramatically across the whole front. For thus it is written in the Holy Logistical Bible: "No shells; no 'boom-boom.'" Amen.

Is this "Transformational(tm)." It depends on what you mean. The Russians will certainly adapt (@madner ). They can react in several fashions: 1) by moving their ammo depots further back, 2) dedicating more point-defense SAM systems capable of shooting down HIMARS missiles to guarding their ammo dumps (although their track record has been spotty in this regard), or 3) deliberately co-locating ammo dumps with, say, Ukrainian POWs, or civilian detainee camps or, hell, why not nursery schools (all of which would be a violation of international law, but like Putin gives a rat's patootie about that, right?) But all of those reactions come with a cost, obviously. Options #1 and #2 are the most likely to be implemented, but as I mentioned in another post (and the Economist article reiterates) for every kilometer you move that dump backwards, you're adding two kilometers round trip to your limited truck fleet. Anything that forces the Russians into an even more unfavorable logistical posture can't help but be a good thing long-term for Ukraine.


Bottom line, though, HIMARS is a sniping weapon, strictly for use against high-value targets. It's not the sort of thing that the Ukrainians will use to try and prepare a battlefield for a tactical advance--they don't have enough of them, and the ammo's too expensive.

So, support of Ukrainian ground ops is going to have to continue to be the province of more "meat and potato" options like the M777 and other NATO-standard arty systems that we are slowly transitioning the UKR army over to. That process is ongoing. In fact, honestly, it still has a long way to go, so we haven't started to see the newer arty systems make a difference on the battlefield... at least not yet.

I will, however, make this prediction: IF the Ukrainians can transform the overall artillery balance in this war, to the point where they are capable of putting down the same levels of sustained fire on *Russian* targets that we've seen the Russians utilizing against the Ukrainians, I believe Russian units, and particularly their DPR / LPR lackeys, will break and run.

Their morale isn't nearly as good. Many of them are older, poorly-trained conscripts. A lot of them don't know why they're there. And the DPR/LPR formations in particular have really been chewed up. I think they'll fold up if you punch them hard enough. We haven't reached that point yet, obviously. But I think if that *does* start to happen, we may begin to see some real movement restored to the battlefield.

I also think that if the US ends up providing the 300km range ATACMs munitions for UKRs HIMARS systems, all hell is going to break loose in places like Sevastopol. That could have really unpredictable consequences. But I think that the U.S. having slowly ratcheted up what we're willing to send to Ukraine, it is not unlikely that we will eventually send these munitions to Ukraine as well.

Bottom line: we're still in the middle of a slow-motion, grinding, attritional struggle. Things still suck for Ukraine in the Donbas. But you'll note that the pace of the war has continued to congeal (which is one of the reasons why I've been posting less on the war, and so have others). I think the Russians are plum tuckered out. I'm interested to see what the Fall is going to bring.

Finally, as always, Perun has a great video on the artillery war as well--it's worth checking out.

EME91 wrote: ↑23/07/2022 08:23 Zinchenko je stari banderista. Pustite ovog djikana nek lupeta. Pozivao na sprijecavanje RATA u Ukrajini vise puta.

parappa wrote: ↑23/07/2022 07:46

Satrap_Darije wrote: ↑23/07/2022 07:37 Oleksander Zinchenko, ukrajinski nogometas sto je plakao pred kamerama zbog rata je iz Ukrajine otisao 2014. zajedno sa roditeljima - U RUSIJU.
Razlog: rat u Donbasu.

Pobjegli ljudi od rata. Tad Rusija oficijelno nije bila u ratu.
Znaš li koliko je ljudi (većinom Bošnjaka) iz Istočne Bosne '92 izbjeglo u Srbiju i Crnu Goru?