mark II wrote:
Netačno. Oxfordska empirijska posmatranja instikta u kontekstu sveopćeg postojanja ukazuju na to da ljudi instiktivno vjeruju u postojanje uzroka i posljedice, u ovom slučaju Stvoritelja i stvorenoga. Tvoje ne vjerujem u Boga apriori negira sve dokaze koji upućuju na takvo što ili ih relativiziraju, što je i normalno, jer je ateizam tvoja vjera, dokazi te ne zanimaju - kao ni kršćane za koje je Bog bradati djed na oblaku. Sve u prirodi nas upućuje na to da je posljedica neke akcije - sve je reakcija na akciju, i to je empirijski dokazano prirodno stanje stvari - šta je osnovni prauzrok, zapravo kakav je on je nešto što ne znamo, ali ne znači da ne postoji. Ateisti negiraju temeljni uzrok, agnostici ne negiraju prauzrok ali ne ulaze u njegovu kakvoću, jer ga empirijski ne mogu objasniti.
Sljedeće, Tesla je vjerovao u gravitaciju ALI:
Tesla was critical of Einstein's relativity work, calling it:
“ ...[a] magnificent mathematical garb which fascinates, dazzles and makes people blind to the underlying errors. The theory is like a beggar clothed in purple whom ignorant people take for a king ... its exponents are brilliant men but they are metaphysicists rather than scientists ...[76] ”
Tesla also argued:
“ I hold that space cannot be curved, for the simple reason that it can have no properties. It might as well be said that God has properties. He has not, but only attributes and these are of our own making. Of properties we can only speak when dealing with matter filling the space. To say that in the presence of large bodies space becomes curved is equivalent to stating that something can act upon nothing. I, for one, refuse to subscribe to such a view.[77]
Tesla "nije bio loš matematičar", vjerovao je u gravitaciju, no i pored Ajnštajnovih matematičkih vratolomija nije povjerovao u njih, mada se sva moderna fizika temelji na njima. Svi su uzimali Boga u obzir, niko vilenjake. Bog je osnovni uzrok svega, zato ga svi uzimaju u obzir - kroz afirmaciju ili negaciju - vilenjaci sa tim nemaju ništa. Problem je što ateisti prisilno žele svakoga ko vjeruje svrstati u red onih koji vjeruju u dedu na oblaku, kroz poistovjećivanje sa vilenjacima. To jednostavno nije tačno.
Totalno je offtopic - jednostavno moraš se pomiriti sa činjenicom da postoje ljudi koji vjeruju, zapravo instiktivno svi vjeruju kako istraživanja pokazuju, proizvoljno kasnije neki ponukani ljudskim interpretacijama prestaju da vjeruju, vele da su ateisti, a potom vele da ne odbacuju mogućnost... jadda jadda etc etc
Nisam sad nesto s vremenom da rastabirim par tvojih tvrdnji koje smatram prilicno neutemeljenim (poimanje ateizma, dokaza, pogresna poredjenja, itd.) ali evo nadjoh nesto istog da ti kopiram tekst u kojem se obradjuje domen koji tebi sluzi kao toboznji dokaz za postojanje svevisnjeg, sto on,
bas naprotiv 
, naravno nikako nije (sve je do toga na koji ces nacin posloziti puzzle u kompletnu sliku)
:
Is religion natural?
The study of language provides many examples of how the universality of X does not entail that X is innate (see Pinker, 1994, for discussion). All languages have a word that refers to hands, for instance, but this is probably because it is important for people everywhere to talk about hands, not because of a specific innate propensity toward hand-naming. Similarly, beliefs in Gods, the afterlife, and so on may be universal, not because they are innate, but because such beliefs emerge in all societies, perhaps as solutions to some problems that all human groups face. From this perspective, universals of religious belief are cultural inventions, created by adults. A complete developmental account of the growth of religious belief, then, would be one of cultural learning.
There is a growing body of work, however, that suggests that this is not entirely right. Instead, while culture plainly plays some role, some of the universals of religion are unlearned (see Atran, 2004; Barrett, 2004; Bering, in press; Boyer, 2001; Bloom, 2004, 2005; Evans, 2000, 2001; Guthrie, 1993; Kelemen, 2004; Pinker, 1997). There are two main threads of this argument.
1.Common-sense dualism
It is not controversial that young children naturally make sense of physical entities in different terms than psychological entities: naïve physics is different from naïve psychology. The claim explored here is considerably stronger. It is the idea that we think of bodies and souls as distinct; we implicitly endorse a strong substance dualism of the sort defended by philosophers like Plato and Descartes. Under one variant of this account, our dualism is a natural by-product of the fact that we have two distinct cognitive systems, one for dealing with material objects, the other for social entities. These systems have incommensurable outputs. Hence dualism emerges as an evolutionary accident (Bloom, 2004).
Dualism has interesting consequences. If bodies and souls are thought to be separate, you can have one without the other. Most things, such as chairs, cups, and trees, are thought of as bodies without souls, not possessing goals, beliefs, will, or consciousness. More significant for religion, dualism makes it possible to imagine souls without bodies. Christianity, Islam and Judaism, for instance, involve a God who created the universe, performs miracles, and listens to prayers. He is omnipotent and omniscient, possessing infinite kindness, justice, and mercy. But he does not, in any literal sense, have a body.
Our dualism also opens the possibility that people can survive the death of their bodies. Religions provide different accounts as to the fate of the soul: It might ascend to heaven, descend to hell, go off into some sort of parallel world, or occupy some other body, human or animal. Indeed, a belief that the world teems with ancestor spirits, the souls of people who have been liberated from their bodies through death, is common cross-culturally (Boyer, 2001).
Dualism comes naturally to children. When asked, in implicit and explicit ways, preschool children will say that they believe the brain is only responsible for some aspects of mental life, typically those involving deliberative mental work, such as solving math problems. But the brain is not essential for activities such as pretending to be a kangaroo, loving one’s brother, or brushing your teeth (e.g. Gottfried, Gelman & Schultz, 1999; Johnson, 1990; Lillard, 1996). This is done by people, not their brains.
The most dramatic demonstration of childhood dualism concerns the development of afterlife beliefs. Bering and Bjorklund (2004) told children of different ages stories about a mouse that died, and asked about the persistence of certain properties. When asked about biological properties of the mouse, the children appreciated the effects of death, including that the brain no longer worked. But when asked about the psychological properties, most of the children said that these would continue – the dead mouse can have thoughts, and hold desires. The body was gone, but the soul survives. And children believe this more than adults do, suggesting that while we have to learn the specific sort of afterlife that people in our culture believe in (heaven, reincarnation, spirit world, and so on), the notion that consciousness is separable from the body is not learned at all; it comes for free.
One of the first things an undergraduate learns in an introduction to psychology class is that substance dualism is mistaken. It is assumed by virtually all scientists that mental life is the product of physical brains (though there is little consensus as to how this all works). Here, as in other domains, common-sense religious beliefs clash with science.
2. Over-attribution of agency and design
We have what Boyer (2001) has called a ‘hypertrophy of social cognition’: a willingness to attribute psychological states, including agency and design, even when it is inappropriate to do so.
The classic demonstration here is that of Heider and Simmel (1944), who made a simple movie in which geometrical figures – circles, squares, triangles – moved in certain systematic ways, designed, based on the psychologists’ intuitions, to tell a tale. When shown this movie, people instinctively describe the figures as if they were specific people (bullies, victims, heroes) who have goals and desires, and they repeat back pretty much the same story that the psychologists had intended to tell. Further research finds that you do not even need bounded figures – you can get much the same effect with moving dots, as well as in movies where the ‘characters’ are not single objects at all, but moving groups, such as swarms of klix squares (Bloom & Veres, 1999).
The anthropologist Stewart Guthrie (1993) was the first modern scholar to notice the importance of this tendency as an explanation for religious thought. In his book, Faces in the Clouds, Guthrie presents anecdotes and experiments showing that people attribute human characteristics to a striking range of real-world entities; his list includes: airplanes, automobiles, bags, bells, bicycles, boats, bottles, buildings, cities, clouds, clothing, earthquakes, fire, fog, food, garbage, hats, hurricanes, insects, locks, leaves, the moon, mountains, paper, pens, plants, pottery, rain, the sun, rivers, rocks, sirens, swords, tools, toys, trains, trees, volcanoes, water, and wind. We are hypersensitive to signs of human agency, so much so that we see intention where all that really exists is artifice or accident. As Guthrie puts it: ‘The clothes have no emperor’. This capacity to attribute agency based on minimal cues is not a late-emerging developing accomplishment. One can get the same sorts of intentional attributions even in babies (e.g. Csibra, Bíró, Koós & Gergely, 2003; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000).
We have a similar bias to attribute an agent when we see nonrandom structure. This is the impetus for the
argument for design – the intuition that the design that is apparent in the natural and biological world is evidence for a designer. In one recent poll in the United States (July 2005), 42% of the respondents said that they believed that humans and other animals existed in their present form since the beginning of time, and most of the rest said that evolution occurred, but was guided by God. Even among the minority of those who claim to endorse Darwinian evolution, many distort it in one way or another, often seeing it as a mysterious internal force driving species towards perfection. Natural selection is like quantum physics, then; we might intellectually grasp it, with considerable effort, but it will never feel right to us. When we see complex structure, we see it as the product of beliefs and goals and desires. We chew over the natural word with our social mode of understanding, and it is difficult to make sense of it in any other way. Our gut feeling that design requires a designer is no secret, and is understandably exploited by those who argue against natural selection, such as Michael Behe (2005), who, in a recent New York Times Op Ed piece, wrote, ‘The strong appearance of design allows a disarmingly simple argument: if it looks, walks and quacks like a duck, then, absent compelling evidence to the contrary, we have warrant to conclude it’s a duck.’
One of the most interesting discoveries in the developmental psychology of religion is that this bias toward creationism appears to be cognitively natural. Four year- olds insist that everything has a purpose, including things like lions (‘to go in the zoo’) and clouds (‘for raining’). When asked to explain why a bunch of rocks are pointy, adults prefer a physical explanation, while children choose functional answers, such as ‘so that animals could scratch on them when they get itchy’. Based on such findings, Kelemen has proposed that children are prone to ‘promiscuous teleology’ – they tend, more so than adults, to see the world in terms of design and purpose (see Kelemen, 2004, for review). Other research finds that when children are directly asked about the origin of animals and people, they tend to prefer explanations that involve an intentional creator, even if the adults who raised them do not. (Evans, 2000, 2001).
Paul Bloom, Religion is natural, p. 149., 150.
Prijevod boldiranog:
Jedno od najzanimljivijih otkrica iz polja razvojne psihologije koja se, izmedju ostalog, bave istrazivanjima na polju religioznosti jeste da je ovaj otklon prema kreacionizmu* kod ljudi ustvari prirodno urodjen, tacnije, kognitivno determiniran. Cetrverogodisnjaci obicno ustrajavaju u ideji da sve ima svoju svrhu, kao recimo lavovi (‘da bi bili u zooloskim vrtovima’) ili oblaci (‘da bi stvarali kisu’). Kada se odrasloj osobi postavi zadatak da objasni zasto je, recimo, oblik stijene uglavnom ostrih ivica odgovor je vecinom okarakteriziran racionalnim (fizikalnim) objasnjenjem dok, s druge strane, djeca izabiru funkcionalne odgovore na ovo pitanje kao, recimo, “da bi se zivotinje mogle pocesati od stijenu”. Na osnovu ovih istrazivanja Kalemen ukazuje na fenomen da su djeca sklona takozvanoj ‘promiskuitetnoj teleologiji’ – nastoje, monogo cesce no odrasli, da vide svijet u smislu dizajna i svrsishodnosti. I druga istrazivanja na ovom polju jasno pokazuju da djeca, konkretno upitana o porijeklu zivotinja i ljudi, jasno preferiraju objasnjenja koja ukljucuju kreatora, pa cak i ona djeca ciji roditelji nisu skloni ovoj vrsti tumacenja.
*Pogledati pod Kauzalitet.
Dakle, rijec je o urodjenom
DUALIZMU a ne religioznosti. Ona je samo posljedica ovog prvog!
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@Abacija, evo ga!
Ja malo znam o ovim detaljima i zbog toga sam anketu postavio po common-sense principu pretpostavljajuci da nece biti problema u vezi pojmova ateist i vjernik. Sad uvidjam da se anketa mogla postaviti na vise nacina.