zadnji dio vezan za ova jogre tred
gdje su problemi za ukre
12/17 Some units are not allowed to determine armament for themselves based on their needs. Their resources are limited based on regulations, papers, and bureaucracy rather than tactical needs. It doesn’t work from the bottom to the top – mostly from the top to the bottom.
13/17 Insufficient freedom to select defensive positions. Positions are selected by officers in a remote command center, rather than by units on the ground. Officers might avoid challenging ridiculous orders from the CC, fearing repercussions, resulting in a lack of initiative.
14/17 Some senior officers remotely micromanage and intervene in the processes on a platoon, company, and battalion level, often worsening the situation significantly.
15/17 Immobile units limited in weapons, tied to specific positions, deprived of maneuver, and having little leeway in actions are much easier targets for wagnerite cannon-fodder assaults, which are designed to fight against such soviet-styled defenses.
16/17 In the areas where these mistakes were avoided, units performed greatly. While the Ukrainian army improved a lot, it's not always possible to turn a colonel or a general with 30 years of soviet-style experience into a NATO-like commander by performing a 3-month course.
17/17 As Bakhmut experience shows, the system needs to be less top-to-bottom but bottom-to-top. The initiative should be encouraged. Centralized, soviet-style management should be replaced with a NATO-style leadership. To win, we need to be flexible, and adapt soon as possible
• • •
i gdje izbjegnu ove zamke dobro i stoje. da li rade na ovim problemima rade. ne ide sve i odjednom.
